ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC; 


TOGETHER  WITH  AN 


INTRODUCTORY  VIEW 


OF 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  GENERAL, 


PKELIMIMY  VIEW  OF  THE  REASON. 


BY 

HENRY  P.  TAPPAN. 


NEW  YORK: 
D.     APPLE  TON     AND     COMPANY, 


346  &  343  BROADWAY. 
M.DCCC.LVI. 


,* 


ENTERED,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1855,  by 
D.  APPLETON  &  COMPANY, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern 
District  of  New  York. 


PREFACE. 


THE  work  here  undertaken  differs  somewhat  in  its 
scope  and  design  from  systems  of  Logic  which  have 
hitherto  been  given  to  the  world.  The  Aristotelian 
Logic  is  simply  the  method  of  deduction ;  and,  as 
such,  it  is  complete.  Subsequent  works,  in  so  far 
as  they  have  been  strictly  logical,  have  closely 
copied  the  great  master,  and  have  confined  them 
selves  to  an  exhibition  of  the  deductive  principles 
and  processes.  Now,  the  deductive  method  com 
prehends  merely  the  laws  which  govern  inferences 
or  conclusions  from  premises  previously  established. 
These  premises  may,  in  their  turn,  be  inferences 
from  other  premises,  and  so  on,  to  a  certain  extent ; 
and  just  so  far  this  method  is  all  sufficient.  But  it 
is  evident  that  the  evolution  of  premises  and  con 
clusions,  and  conclusions  and  premises,  must  have  a 
limit.  There  must  be  premises  which  are  not  con 
clusions  from  other  premises,  but  which  arise  in 
some  other  way.  Now,  a  complete  and  adequate 


PREFACE. 


Logic  ought  to  exhibit  this  other  way  likewise :  it 
ought  to  inform  us  how  the  most  original  premises 
arise,  and  upon  what  basis  they  rest. 

Other  methods,  indeed,  have  been  abroad  in  the 
world,  but  without  being  systematically  propounded 
as  parts  of  Logic.  Thus,  the  Platonic  philosophy 
really  contains  a  Logical  development  of  the  most 
original  forms  of  human  thought,  springing  out  of 
the  intuitive  faculty.  And  the  Novum  Organum 
of  Bacon  contains  a  logical  exposition  of  the  method 
of  establishing  first  principles  through  the  observa 
tion  of  phenomena. 

Both  Plato  and  Bacon  have  had  many  able  dis 
ciples  and  expounders ;  and  both  are  daily  coming 
out  into  a  broader  and  clearer  light,  not  as  oppo 
nents,  but — to  adopt  the  thought  of  Coleridge — as 
the  opposite  poles  of  one  great  and  harmonious 
system. 

The  present  attempt,  therefore,  is  to  make  out 
the  system  of  Logic  under  its  several  departments ; 
and  to  present  it  not  merely  as  a  method  of  obtain 
ing  inferences  from  truths,  but  also  as  a  method  of 
establishing  those  first  truths  and  general  principles 
which  must  precede  all  deduction. 

With  all  humility,  I  acknowledge  my  indebted 
ness  to  the  great  thinkers  who  have  preceded  me. 
I  have  of  course  read  as  well  as  thought ;  and  my 
thinking  and  reading  are  naturally  blended  together. 
With  this  acknowledgment,  may  I  be  permitted  to 
go  on  with  my  work,  without  stopping  to  note  nar- 


PREFACE.  5 

rowly  in  my  own  mind,  or  to  remark  to  my  reader, 
when  I  am  drawing  from  original,  and  when  from 
other  sources  ?  I  ought,  perhaps,  in  justice  to  my 
self,  to  remark,  that  the  entire  plan  of  this  work 
was  struck  out  several  years  since,  and  different 
portions  of  it  written  before  Professor  Whewell's 
and  Mr.  Mills'  elaborate  and  suggestive  works  had 
fallen  under  my  eye. 

That  Logic  really  embraces  all  the  parts  which 
I  have  assigned  to  it,  I  think  will  fully  appear  in 
the  sequel.  It  is  that  branch  of  philosophy  which 
expounds  the  laws  of  the  Reason  as  the  faculty  of 
truth  and  reality. 

The  view  which  I  have  taken  of  Logic,  will  jus 
tify  the  prolegomena.  I  give  the  Introduction  to 
Philosophy  in  General,  in  order  to  point  out  the 
relative  position  and  importance  of  Logic  in  a  philo 
sophical  system.  And  I  give  the  Preliminary  View 
of  the  Eeason,  because,  since  this  is  the  faculty 
which  reasons,  or  logitizes,  I  deemed  that  such  a 
view,  if  given  both  clearly  and  briefly,  would  be 
satisfactory  in  this  place. 


CONTENTS. 


PART  I. 

INTRODUCTORY  VIEW  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  GENERAL. 

PAGE 

SECTION  I. — Definition  of  Philosophy 15 

II. — Distinction   between    the    Phenomenal   and   the    Metaphe- 

nomenal 23 

III. — Of  the  Reality  of  the  Metaphenomenal 27 

IV. — The  Objective  and  the  Subjective 32 

V. — Reason  and  Sense 39 

VI. — Sensualism  and  Transcendentalism 42 

VII. — Ideas  and  Laws 50 

VIII. — Primary  and  Secondary  Phenomena 58 

IX. — Antecedence  in  Time  and  in  Necessary  Existence 60 

X. — Ideas  the  last  Authority  of  all  Judgments  or  Knowledges. ...  64 

XL — Divisions  of  Philosophy 

I.  Metaphysics 70 

Comprehending 

Psychology 71 

Dynamics 73 

Anthropology 74 

Ontology 75 

II.  Nomology;  comprehending 

The  Morale 80 

Esthetics ib. 

Somatology 82 

Logic 83 


8  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

SECT.  XII. — Of  the  Relations  between  Philosophy  and  the  Sciences  and 

Arts 86 

Geometry -  89 

Sciences  of  Discrete  Quantity 91 

Natural  Science 92 

Conditional  and  Unconditional  Science 95 

Art 99 

XIII. — Reason,  the  Organ  of  Philosophy 103 

XTV. — Criteria  of  a  True  Philosophy 108 


PAKT  II. 

PRELIMINARY  VIEW    OF    THE    REASON. 

SECTION  I. — General  Introductory  Considerations  respecting  the  Reason...  128 

II. — Outline  of  the  Ideas  and  Functions  of  the  Reason 129 

III. — Explication  of  Ideas 138 

IV. — Explication  of  the  Functions  of  the  Reason 143 

V, — Does  Logic  comprehend  all  the  Functions  of  the  Reason?....  144 


PART  III. 

LOGIC       PROPER. 

BOOK  I. 
PRIMORDIAL,  LOGIC. 

SECTION  I. — General  Laws  of  the  Evolution  of  Ideas , 148 

II.  Metaphysical  Ideas ;  comprehending 

I.  Subject  and  Objective  Exteriority., ,  155 

II.  Time  and  Space 156 

IE.  The  Infinite  and  the  Finite 159 

IV.  Quantity $, 

V.  Quality , 165 

VI.  Relation 167 

VII.  Modality 172 

in. — Nomological  Ideas;  comprehending 

I.  Law ,.  177 


CONTENTS. 


II.  Matter  and  Spirit 178 

III.  Perfection ib. 

IV.  Right  and  Wrong 180 

V.  Freedom  and  Responsibility 182 

VI.  Personal  Identity 183 

VII.  Immortality 184 

VIII.  The  Beautiful,  comprehending 

Symmetry ' 187 

Grace 188 

Regularity,  Uniformity,  Variety ib. 

Determinate  Form 189 

The  Sublime 190 

Melody 191 

Harmony ft. 

IX.  The  Useful 196 

X.  Centralization  and  Diffusion 198 

XL  Affinity  and  Repulsion 199 

XII.  Life ft. 

XIII.  Polarity 200 

XIV.  Instinct ." 201 

XV.  Regularity,   Uniformity,    Variety,    Symmetry,    and 

Determinate  Form 202 

XVI.  Identity,  Difference,  Resemblance 203 

XVII.  Design,  Final  Cause,  Means  and  End 205 

XVIIL  Truth 207 

XIX.  The  Philosophical  Idea 209 

XX.  Intuition 210 

XXI.  Involution  and  Evolution 211 

XXII.  Analysis  and  Synthesis 213 

IV. — Primary  Sensuous  Cognitions,  or  Cognitions  of  the  Exterior 

Consciousness 219 

V. — Primary  Subjective  Cognitions,  or  Cognitions  of  the  Interior 

Consciousness .„, 222 

VI.— Axioms 224 

Metaphysical  Axioms ....  226 

Nomological  Axioms 228 

VII. — Of  the  Characteristics  of  Axioms  in  general 235 

VIII. — General  Relations  of  Axioms , 240 

IX.— Definitions...,  ..  243 


10  CONTENTS. 


BOOK  II. 

INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

PAGE 

SECTION  I. — Introduction 249 

II. — Causes  and  Laws 252 

III. — The  Human  Reason,  as  related  to  the  Objective  World 259 

IV.— General  View  of  Classification 262 

V. — Principles  determining  the  Induction  of  Phenomena  in  Clas 
sification  265 

VI. — Distinction  between  a  General  Fact  and  an  Absolute   and 

Fixed  Law 276 

VII.— The  Logic  of  General  Facts 283 

Principles  of  Elimination : 

I.    General  Difference  with  Uniform  Agreement  in  One 

Point 288 

II.    General  Agreement  with  Uniform  Difference  in  One 

Point 289 

III.  Elimination  by  Corresponding  Quantities  and  Inten 

sities 291 

IV.  Elimination  of  the  Terms  of  a  Sequence,  in  order  to 

determine  which  is  the  Antecedent  and  which  the 

Consequent 294 

VIII. — Inductive  Logic  of  Universal  and  Necessary  Laws 303 

IX. — The  Logic  of  Art 315 

BOOK  III. 

DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

SECTION  I. — Introduction 318 

II. — Analysis  of  Propositions 320 

III. — Of  Propositions,  as  opposed  to  each  other 325 

IV. — Of  the  Conversion  of  Propositions 328 

V. — Propositions  constructed  into  Syllogisms 332 

VI. — Of  Moods  and  Figures 347 

VII. — Of  the  Reduction  of  Syllogisms 351 

VEIL — Of  Modal,  Hypothetical,  and  Disjunctive  Propositions 354 

IX. — Hypothetical  Reasoning 357 

X. — Of  the  Dilemma 362 

XL— Of  the  Sorites 365 

XII. — Application  of  the  Deductive  Formula 368 


CONTENTS.  11 

PAGB 

SEC.  XIII.— Of  Fallacies. 

Fallacies  of  Deduction 377 

Comprehending 

I.  Fallacies  in  the  Formula 378 

n.  Fallacies  in  the  Matter 380 

1.  Ambiguous  Middle ib. 

2.  Fallacies  relating  to  the   Connection  between  the 

Matter  of  the  Premises  and  that  of  the  Conclusion.  383 
Fallacies  of  Induction ;  comprehending 

I.  Fallacies  of  Observation 393 

II.  Fallacies  in  Determining  General  Facts 396 

III.  Fallacies  hi  Inducting  Laws 398 

Fallacies  in  respect  to  Intuition 399 

BOOK  IV. 

DOCTBINE   OF   EVIDENCE. 

SECTION  I. — Nature  of  Proof. 403 

II.— The  different  kinds  of  d  priori  and  a  posteriori  Proof. 408 

III. — Of  the  Nature  of  the  Relation  between  Antecedents  and  Con 
sequents 413 

IV.— Of  Degrees  of  Evidence 416 

V. — Of  Testimony 430 

VI. — Circumstantial  Evidence 436 

VII. — Argument  from  Progressive  Approach 443 

VIII.— Proving  by  Example 446 

IX. — Reasoning  from  Experience 451 

X. — Reasoning  from  Resemblance  and  Analogy 454 

XL — Demonstrative  Proof. 462 

XII.— Calculation  of  Probabilities  and  Chances....  ..  463 


PART    I. 

INTRODUCTORY  VIEW  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
IN  GENERAL. 


PART   I. 

INTRODUCTORY  VIEW  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  GENERAL. 


SECTION  I. 
DEFINITION   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

THE  term  PHILOSOPHY  in  common  usage  has  obtained  an 
indefinite  and  often  an  improper  application.  When  em 
ployed  alone,  and  without  relation  to  any  specific  subject, 
it  is  generally  supposed  to  refer  to  natural  science  :  and 
thus  a  Treatise,  or  Essay,  or  Lecture,  on  Philosophy,  would 
be  expected  to  embrace  something  relating  to  Mechanics, 
Astronomy,  Chemistry,  Electricity,  or  Magnetism. 

Some  undoubtedly  would  go  beyond  this  ;  and  regard 
the  term  in  its  higher  applications,  as  expressing  something 
in  relation  to  the  doctrines  of  the  intellectual  and  moral 
powers  :  or  they  would  simply  identify  it  with  Metaphysics, 
a  term  no  less  vague  and  obscure  to  common  apprehension. 

It  is  to  be  expected  that  the  affirmation  will  at  first 
appear  to  many  paradoxical,  that  Mechanics,  Astronomy, 
Chemistry,  &c.,  are  not  branches  of  Philosophy :  but  in  the 
end  it  will  appear  perfectly  just.  Philosophy  indeed  holds 
a  close  and  most  important  relation  to  these  sciences  :  they 
are  grand  results  of  philosophy  ;  but  they  are  not  philoso 
phy  itself.  And  even  Metaphysics,  general  and  compre- 


16  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

hensive  as  it  is,  does  not  comprehend  all  philosophy — it 
only  forms  one  of  its  important  divisions. 

In  defining  philosophy,  we  may  go  on  to  say,  that  it  is 
the  Scientia  Scientiarum — "  the  Science  of  Sciences  ;  as 
its  object  is  to  explain  the  principles  and  causes  of  all  things 
existing ;  and  to  supply  the  defects  of  inferior  sciences, 
which  do  not  demonstrate,  or  sufficiently  explain  their 
principles/'  *  Or  we  may  call  it  the  "  Science  of  the  Uni 
versal  and  the  Absolute."  But  this  is  not  enough.  It 
would  be  like  defining  Astronomy  as  the  "  Science  of  the 
Heavens."  A  definition  may  be  just,  and  yet  by  reason 
of  its  dry,  general,  technical,  and  elaborate  form  of  expres 
sion,  may  fall  short  of  the  true  end  of  all  definition,  viz., 
to  lead  the  intelligence  to  a  clearer  insight  and  a  more  per 
fect  comprehension. 

PHILOSOPHY  is  a  word  formed  from  the  Greek  $t\oao- 
<pia.  It  primarily  expresses  a  mental  affection — a  love  of 
knowledge  or  of  wisdom. 

It  cannot  be  questioned  that  such  an  affection  is  in 
herent  in  the  human  mind.  It  appears  in  feeble  infancy- 
it  stimulates  the  activities  of  the  busy  prattling  child — it 
forms  the  wakeful  earnestness  and  joy  of  youth — it  stirs 
nobly  in  manhood — it  decays  not  with  the  decay  of  age. 
It  is  a  moving  spirit  even  in  savage  life,  and  shows  man, 
when  lowest,  as  still  above  the  brute.  This  impulse  TO 
KNOW,  this  restless  CURIOSITY,  is  connected  with  the  whole 
development  of  humanity  in  Science,  Arts,  Government, 
and  Religion.  Co-existent  with  this  love  of  knowledge  is 
the  love  of  external  action.  Hence,  the  development  of 
humanity  appears  not  only  in  the  cultivation  of  the  intel 
ligence  and  the  consequent  unfolding  of  the  sciences  ;  but 
also  in  the  construction  of  implements  and  machinery,  and 

*  Ed.  Ency. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  17 

in  the  changes  and  improvements  wrought  upon  the  face 
of  Nature.  The  eager  love  of  knowledge,  and  the  no  less 
eager  love  of  action — the  impulse  TO  KNOW,  and  the  im 
pulse  TO  DO — these  are  elements  spontaneously  at  work  in 
human  nature,  and  may  be  appropriately  termed  philo 
sophical  elements. 

Let  us  conceive  of  that  period  when  the  Heavens  and 
the  Earth  were  finished,  and  man  was  created  and  placed 
in  the  Earth  its  inhabitant  and  lord.  Then  he  had  the 
same  faculties  which  he  now  possesses  ;  and  the  Earth  was 
under  the  government  of  the  same  physical  laws  which 
govern  it  now  ;  but  his  faculties  were  undeveloped,  and 
science  and  art  had  not  yet  appeared  ;  and  the  Earth, 
whatever  modifications  it  might  be  capable  of,  stood  as  it 
came  from  the  hand  of  the  Creator,  in  uncultivated  beauty. 
But  man,  as  he  walks  abroad  upon  the  Earth,  with  all  the 
endowments  of  intelligence  and  feeling,  observes  the  Hea 
vens  and  the  Earth,  exercises  thought,  generalises,  and 
forms  conclusions.  What  is  working  within  him,  im 
presses  its  form  upon  all  outward  things  : — the  forest  is 
levelled,  and  cultivated  fields  appear ;  the  mountain  and 
the  valley  feel  the  touch  of  his  hand,  and  put  on  new  ap 
pearances  ;  he  opens  a  way  across  rivers,  and  covers  the 
ocean  with  fleets  ;  where  rivers  are  wanting,  he  creates 
them  ;  he  digs  into  the  crust  of  the  Earth,  and  brings  up 
minerals  and  appropriates  them  ;  he  calls  into  being  a 
thousand  useful  arts  ;  he  scatters  over  the  face  of  the 
Earth  convenient  habitations,  and  crowds  them  together 
into  cities.  But  not  only  does  he  change  the  face  of  the 
Earth,  and  put  to  his  uses  its  various  materials — he  also 
establishes  government,  administers  law,  and  awards  jus 
tice  :  he  speaks  eloquence  into  being  ;  poetry  born  in  his 
heart,  is  expressed  in  flowing  numbers  ;  he  perfects  sound  O/ 


18  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 

into  music  ;  he  takes  the  chisel,  and  from  the  marble 
quarry  spring  up  forms  whose  beauty  is  divine  ;  and  ma 
jestic  temples,  which  seem  born  with  them  as  their  fit 
habitation  ;  he  takes  the  pencil,  and  dipping  it  in  the 
colors  of  heaven,  imitates  every  form  of  life,  and  advances 
beyond  Nature  herself :  he  affirms,  reasons,  and  believes  ; 
draws  out  pure  abstractions  from  his  thought ;  advances 
into  Nature,  and  searches  out  laws  for  her  phenomena  ; 
and  thus  builds  up  systems  of  science  :  he  invents  a  method 
of  analysis,  and,  in  the  laboratory,  compels  Nature  to  re 
veal  her  more  secret  processes  ;  and,  not  content  with  this 
world,  the  light  of  heaven,  which  has  lighted  him  to  his 
labors  here,  he  seizes  upon  as  his  minister,  and  makes  it 
reveal  to  him  the  worlds  from  whence  it  has  travelled. 
Still  more — from  these  finite  forms,  he  ascends  up  to  the 
INFINITE  ;  he  is  a  worshipper  of  GOD,  and  an  expectant 
of  immortality. 

"  Imagine  a  being  who  had  been  present  at  the  earliest 
days  of  the  universe,  and  of  human  life  ;  who  had  seen  the 
external  surface  of  the  Earth,  as  it  came  forth  from  the 
hands  of  Nature,  and  looked  upon  all  the  beauty  of  those 
ancient  times ;  who  had  seen  the  beautiful  forms  which 
Nature  presented,  and  heard  the  melodious  sounds  which 
she  then  uttered ;  in  a  word,  a  being  who  had  been  a  spec 
tator  of  the  first  exhibition  of  the  primitive  world,  and 
who  should  return  at  the  present  day  amidst  the  prodigies 
of  our  industry,  our  institutions,  and  our  arts ;  would  it 
not  seem  to  him  in  his  astonishment  as  if  he  no  longer 
recognized  the  ancient  dwelling-place  of  man  ;  as  if  beings 
v  of  a  superior  order  had  transferred  their  abode  to  the 
Earth  and  had  metamorphosed  it  ?  "  *  Or  contemplate  an 

*   Introduction  Generale  a  1'Histoire  de  la  Philosophic,  par  M.  Cousin. 
Lee.  I. — Linberg's  Translation. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN    GENERAL.  19 

epitome  of  the  whole  mighty  development  of  mind  in  a 
single  individual,  appearing  first  on  the  shore  of  this  world 
a  feeble  infant,  and  in  less  than  a  century  assuming  the 
character  of  a  Newton,  a  Leibnitz,  a  Milton :  and  as  an 
illustration  of  the  changes  made  in  the  condition  of  the 
world  by  human  invention  and  skill,  take  the  history  of 
Mechanics,  of  the  Needle  and  the  Telescope. 

In  contemplating  these  developments  and  changes, 
what  enquiry  springs  up,  yea,  irresistibly  springs  up,  in 
the  mind  ?  Do  we  not  ask,  how  all  this  came  to  pass,  and 
why  the  developments  and  changes  came  up  under  these 
particular  forms  ?  Do  we  not  ask,  why  did  man  change 
the  face  of  the  Earth  ?  Why  did  he  create  government  ? 
Why  did  he  give  birth  to  science  and  art  ?  Where  and 
how  did  the  development  of  his  mind  begin ;  and  how  did 
it  proceed?  What  are  the  laws  of  his  thought,  the 
ground  of  his  knowledges  and  beliefs,  the  forms  of  his  rea 
sonings,  and  the  methods  of  his  investigations?  What 
are  the  laws  of  his  emotions  and  passions  ?  What  are  the 
capacity  and  force,  and  what  the  laws  of  his  will  ? 

Enquiries  like  these  evince  the  workings  of  the  philo 
sophic  spirit ;  they  are  found  under  some  form,  in  some 
degree,  in  every  human  mind.  Few,  indeed,  take  in  that 
whole  field  of  enquiry,  which  embraces  the  complete  de 
velopment  of  humanity  ; .  but  whether  in  the  child,  or  in 
the  adult,  in  the  savage,  or  in  cultivated  man,  you  perceive 
questionings  after  the  origin  and  reason  of  things — after 
efficient  and  final  causes — an  earnest  prying  of  the  mind 
into  something  beyond  mere  visible  and  tangible  forms, 
you  there  perceive  the  workings  of  the  philosophic  impulse 
— the  $tXocro<£/a.  This  is  the  DAWN  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  The 
impulse  TO  KNOW  and  TO  DO,  the  elements  of  philosophy 
spontaneously  at  work  in  the  mind,  lead  forth  the  develop- 


20  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

ments  and  changes  above  mentioned.  The  enquiry  after 
the  causes  and  reasons  of  these  developments  and  changes, 
after  they  have  in  any  degree  taken  place,  is  the  higher 
form  of  the  <&i\ocro(t)ia,  and  leads  forth  the  mind  to  the 
construction  of  philosophy  as  a  system.  Under  the  first 
form,  the  mind  appears  intent  upon  its  objects,  thinking, 
feeling,  doing,  and  making  its  inherent  energies  to  appear 
in  external  effects.  Under  the  second  form,  it  turns  back 
upon  itself, — that  is,  makes  itself  its  own  object  by  an  act 
of  reflection,  and  finds  out  its  own  reach  and  limits,  its 
own  aims  and  laws. 

$i\oaro(f)la,  from  expressing  the  impulse  TO  KNOW  and 
the  consequent  causal  activity  of  man,  and  from  express 
ing,  after  the  development  of  humanity  has  taken  place, 
the  impulse  to  seek  after  the  laws  and  principles  which 
have  governed  this  development,  comes  to  express  these 
laws  and  principles  themselves.  These  laws  and  princi 
ples,  like  the  simple  desire  of  knowledge,  act  spontaneously 
in  the  development  of  humanity.  They  are  in  the  highest 
sense  philosophical  elements  of  our  being,  inseparable  from 
it,  and  energizing  as  a  plastic  power  within,  and  as  such 
distinguishable  from  philosophy  as  an  expressed  system 
without,  laid  down  in  books,  or  in  the  lectures  of  the 
schools.  The  first,  of  course,  gives  birth  to  the  second,  as 
thought  gives  birth  to  language. 

In  that  early  period  of  humanity  to  which  we  have  ad 
verted,  it  could  not  exist  as  a  developed  system  :  it  was 
then  in  man  as  a  light  and  a  power,  under  which  he  thought 
and  acted,  but  upon  which  he  did  not  reflect :  Thus  the 
idea  of  the  useful,  led  him  to  change  the  face  of  nature 
and  to  originate  the  ordinary  arts  :  The  idea  of  justice, 
led  him  to  constitute  government  and  law  :  The  idea  of 
the  beautiful,  led  him  to  the  creations  of  painting,  sculp- 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  21 

ture,  music,  and  poetry  :  The  inherent  laws  of  Jus  intelli 
gence,  guided  him  in  his  reasonings  ;  he  believed,  because 
he  could  not  disbelieve,  and  faith  appeared  in  him  like  a 
sublime  and  divine  instinct :  When  he  looked  out  upon 
the  phenomena  of  the  world,  he  assigned  them  causes, 
because  he  could  not  think  of  them  without  this  relation  : 
And  from  finite  being,  his  mind  necessarily  rose  up  to  the 
conception  of  the  Infinite  Being — he  became  a  worshipper 
under  the  energy  of  a  spontaneous  and  irresistible  idea. 

At  length  reflection  began — when  it  began  we  know 
not,  but  its  beginning  was  the  birth  of  philosophy  as  a 
system  developed  and  recognized.  By  the  act  of  reflection, 
or  self-consciousness,  the  mind  turns  back  upon  itself,  and 
makes  itself  the  object  of  its  own  contemplations.  All  the 
phenomena  of  the  mind,  are  presented  in  the  field  of  its 
consciousness  ; — the  sensations  which  are  caused  by  the 
external  world — the  affirmations  of  the  reason — the  voli 
tions — must  all  alike  appear  there,  in  order  to  be  known. 
There  is  an  ordinary  consciousness  which  belongs  neces 
sarily  to  every  man  ;  but  reflection  is  a  special  and  volun 
tary  consciousness,  and  thence  called  a  philosophic  con 
sciousness,  which  appears  only  when  the  mind  becomes  the 
object  of  its  own  observation  by  an  act  of  self-determina 
tion. 

Now  in  the  exercise  of  this  philosophic  consciousness, 
the  mind  questions  itself  respecting  the  grounds  of  its 
knowledge  and  its  faith — respecting  the  forms  of  its  think 
ing,  and  the  modes  of  its  investigation — respecting  the 
grounds  of  its  decisions  in  arts,  morals,  government,  and 
religion :  it  makes  those  very  enquiries  which  we  recog 
nize  in  ourselves,  when,  reviewing  the  progressive  develop 
ment  of  humanity,  we  are  struck  with  wonder  and  admira 
tion  at  what  man  has  accomplished,  and  at  what  man  has 


22  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

himself  become.     The  results  of  these  enquiries  form  sys 
tematic  philosophy. 


Let  us  sum  up  here  the  preceding  observations,  so  as 
to  present  a  succinct  definition. 

1.  Philosophy,  from  $1X00-0$  la,  expresses  the  inherent 
desire  of  knowledge  in  the  human  mind  ;  and  as  closely 
connected  with  this,  the  desire  of  action.     Under  the  im 
pulse  of  these  desires  man  begins  to  acquire  knowledge  ; 
and  to  exert  his  causality  in  appropriating  the  materials 
supplied  him  from  the  earth — in  working  in  various  arts, 
and  in  modifying  the  face  of  nature. 

2.  After  a  time  he  begins  to  reflect  upon  the  develop 
ment  of  his  mind,  the  facts  he  has  observed,   and  the 
works  of  his  own  power  and  skill :  and  now  the  <£A.oo-o<£/a, 
or  love  of  knowing,  takes  a  new  direction,  and  impels  him 
to  search  out  the  causes,  laws,  and  forms  of  the  various  de 
velopment  of  his  own  being. 

3.  These  causes,  laws  and  forms  really  existed  subjec 
tively,  inseparable  from  himself,  before  he  began  to  make 
them  the  object  of  his  thought  and  curious  inquiry  :  and 
they,  as  the  first  principles  of  his  being,  and  as  governing 
its  manifestations,  are  the  substantial  elements  of  philo 
sophy, 

4.  These  first  principles  of  his  being  are  known  through 
reflection,  or  self-consciousness  ;  and  when  stated  methodi 
cally,  under  proper  divisions,  and  with  clear  definitions 
and  expositions,  form  Didactic  Philosophy. 

The  term  ^iXoa-o^ia,  which  at  first  expressed  only  the 
desire  of  knowledge,  or  love  of  truth  spontaneously  work 
ing  in  the  human  mind,  is  thus  employed  to  express  all  the 
grand  results  of  this  high  and  glorious  impulse. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  23 


SECTION  II. 

DISTINCTION    BETWEEN    THE    PHENOMENAL    AND    THE 
METAPHENOMENAL. 

CONSCIOUSNESS  is  the  common  field  of  all  our  mental 
activity.  All  our  sensations,  our  perceptions,  thinking, 
and  reasoning,  our  imaginations  and  fancies,  our  emotions, 
passions,  determinations,  and  volitions,  alike  appear,  and 
are  recognized  here.  These  affections  of  our  being  are  not 
the  movements  of  an  insensate  mechanism  :  we  know  them 
in  their  going  on,  and  we  know  ourselves  as  the  SUBJECTS 
of  them. 

Now  there  is  an  important  distinction  to  be  drawn  here. 
The  distinction  between  the  immediate  objects  of  conscious 
ness,  and  those  objects  which,  although  known,  or  at  least 
supposed  to  be  known,  yet  lie  without  the  sphere  of  con 
sciousness.  The  immediate  objects  of  our  consciousness 
are  phenomena ,  and  these  only  are  phenomena  ;  while  those 
objects  which,  by  supposition,  lie  beyond  immediate  con 
sciousness,  are  metaphenomenal. 

What  are  the  immediate  objects  of  consciousness,  or  of 
what  are  we  immediately  conscious  ?  This  is  the  first 
enquiry. 

Let  us  begin  with  our  sensations.  The  sensations  are 
affections  of  our  inner  being,  and  unquestionably  are  the 
immediate  objects  of  consciousness.  But  there  are  many 
perceptions  and  judgments  which  come  up  to  view  in  con 
nection  with  the  sensations,  which,  together  with  their 


24  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

objects,  are  entirely  distinct  from  the  sensations.  The 
bare  sensations  are  those  of  color,  of  sound,  of  fragrance, 
of  taste,  of  touch,  of  heat  and  cold,  of  titillation,  and  of 
pain  and  pleasure.  In  these  are  contained  what  are  com 
monly  called  the  secondary  qualities  of  matter :  but  this 
designation  cannot  be  made  from  the  bare  sensations. 
We  have  in  the  sensations  mere  internal  experiences,  or 
movements  of  our  own  inner  being.  We  are  not  conscious 
of  matter,  distance,  space,  substance,  or  cause  ; — we  are 
conscious  of  sensations  only.  We  may  be  conscious  of  the 
action  of  other  faculties  of  our  being,  affirming  or  perceiv 
ing  the  existence  of  body,  distance,  space,  substance,  and 
cause  ;  but  the  bare  sensations  are  no  such  affirmation,  or 
perception.  I  think  it  must  be  plain  to  every  mind  that 
will  reflect  a  little,  that  if  we  had  only  the  sensations 
above  mentioned,  we  should  have  no  knowledge  of  an  ex 
ternal  world  whatever. 

The  same  conclusion  must  be  drawn  with  respect  to 
the  primary  qualities  of  matter.  These  are  extension  and 
resistance.  But  resistance  to  immediate  consciousness  is 
only  an  internal  experience,  and  extension  only  a  repetition 
of  this  experience.  There  is  nothing  in  this  experience  to 
give  us  a  knowledge  of  any  thing  external :  time,  space, 
substance,  and  cause,  are  not  contained  in  a  mere  inward 
experience,  a  mere  modification  of  our  own  being.  In  the 
primary  qualities,  therefore,  we  have  no  immediate  con 
sciousness  of  an  external  world.  It  thus  appears,  in  gen 
eral,  that  we  have  an  immediate  consciousness  only  of  cer 
tain  affections  or  modifications  of  our  own  being.  What 
immediately  appears  to  us,  what  we  immediately  know, 
are  these  affections.  These  are  truly  the  phenomenal.  If 
there  be  an  external  world, — if  there  be  substance,  space, 
time,  and  cause, — they  are  not  phenomenal,  or  immediately 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  25 

recognized  in  the  consciousness,  nor  do  they  come  directly 
from  the  sensations. 

Let  us  suppose,  then,  that  we  have  faculties  by  which 
we  can  know  an  external  world,  and  by  which  we  can 
know  substance,  time,  space,  body,  and  cause,  either 
through  the  sensations,  or  independently  of  them  ;  then, 
with  respect  to  these  faculties,  the  enquiry  arises  also,  what 
are  the  immediate  objects  of  consciousness  ? 

The  faculties  themselves  are  not  the  immediate  objects  ; 
nor  are  the  objects  perceived,  and  the  truths  affirmed,  the 
immediate  objects  :  simply  the  acts  of  these  faculties  are 
the  immediate  objects  of  consciousness.  Thus  in  perceiv 
ing  any  external  object,  as  a  house  or  a  tree,  I  am  not  im 
mediately  conscious  of  the  house  or  the  tree,  but  of  sensa 
tions  of  color,  and  of  the  act  of  perceiving.  The  external 
object  does  not  come  into  my  consciousness,  but  only  the 
sensations  and  perceptions,  and  these  are  simply  movements 
of  my  own  being.  Indeed,  my  own  being,  as  a  substance 
endowed  with  faculties  of  feeling,  knowing  and  willing,  is 
not  immediately  presented  to  my  consciousness  :  I  am  con 
scious  only  of  certain  phenomena,  and  of  acts  of  judgment 
connecting  the  phenomena  with  external  objects  and  inter 
nal  faculties. 

In  processes  of  deep  thinking  and  reasoning,  the  same 
holds  true.  In  studying  out  some  mathematical  theorem, 
for  example,  the  "recondite  mathematical  relations, — the 
necessary  and  absolute  truths  are  not  immediate  objects  of 
consciousness  ; — but  the  acts  of  attention,  the  acts  of 
thinking  and  reasoning — the  modifications  of  my  own  be 
ing  in  order  to  know  and  comprehend,  and  in  knowing  and 
comprehending.  The  mathematical  relations,  the  necessary 
and  absolute  truths,  do  not  come  into  consciousness  as 
phenomena, — the  acts  and  modifications  of  my  own  being 

2 


26  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

are  the  phenomena,  while  the  relations  and  truths  are 
metaphenomenal. 

Again,  God  is  invisible  :  He  is  neither  as  a  substance 
addressed  to  the  senses,  nor  is  he  manifested  to  the  con 
sciousness  as  a  modification  of  our  interior  being  ;  but  still, 
if  known  at  all,  he  must  be  known  by  these  modifications  : 
He  is  not  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  but  known 
through  them. 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  broad  and  clear  distinction  be 
tween  the  phenomenal  and  the  metaphenomenal.  Sensa 
tions,  emotions  and  passions,  acts  of  perceiving,  judging, 
reasoning  and  imagining,  acts  of  choice  and  volition — 
these,  as  the  immediate  objects  of  consciousness,  are  phe 
nomenal  ;  but  the  causes  of  sensation,  emotion,  and  pas 
sion,  the  objects  and  truths  perceived,  affirmed,  or  deduced, 
the  objects  of  the  imagination,  of  choice  and  volition — 
these,  not  being  the  immediate  objects  of  consciousness, 
are  metaphenomenal. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  27 


SECTION  III. 

OF  THE  REALITY  OF  THE  METAPHENOMENAL. 

THE  reality  of  the  phenomenal  is  not  questioned.  That  I 
have  certain  sensations,  perceptions,  emotions,  passions, 
and  volitions,  this  is  immediate  knowledge  and  conscious 
ness  :  but  whether  the  objects  of  these  acts  and  experiences 
of  my  being  have  a  real,  positive,  and  independent  exist 
ence,  this  may  be  and  has  been  questioned,  and  even  de 
nied  :  The  reality  of  the  metaphenomenal  has  been  ques 
tioned  and  denied. 

It  will  be  readily  granted  by  all,  that  by  the  imagina 
tion  we  can  create  objects  which  are  unreal ;  and  that  in 
our  actual  perceptions  we  are  often  mistaken,  and  seem  to 
perceive  what  we  afterwards  discover  to  have  no  reality,  or 
to  be  a  very  different  object  from  what  we  thought  it  to  be. 
But,  beyond  all  this,  it  has  been  contended  that  there  is  no 
objective  reality  whatever  ; — that  the  tree  and  the  house 
which  I  now  see,  and  which  everybody  sees,  has  no  exist 
ence  out  of,  and  independently  of,  the  perception  of  which 
I  and  everybody  are  immediately  conscious  ;  and  the  same 
of  all  objects,  whether  external  things,  or  internal  truths. 

It  is  undeniable  that  men  generally  believe  in  the  re 
ality  of  the  metaphenomenal ;  nay,  that  only  a  few  specu 
lative  philosophers,  have  ever  denied  it. 

Now,  the  aim  of  philosophy  is  to  explain  the  actual 
development  of  our  being,  of  all  that  man  has  thought 


28  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

and  done.  Hence  even  the  errors  of  man  must  be  ex 
plained.  If,  therefore,  men  have  erred  in  their  belief  in 
the  reality  of  the  metaphenomenal,  it  must  be  shown  both 
that  it  cannot  exist,  and  how  men  have  come  to  entertain 
this  universal  but  erroneous  belief. 

Those  who  believe  in  the  reality  of  the  metaphenomenal 
are  indeed  required,  as  philosophers,  to  show,  how  it  is  le 
gitimately  attained  :  but,  on  the  other  hand,  those  who 
deny  this  reality,  in  opposition  to  a  common  sentiment, 
are  justly  required  to  explain  this  common  sentiment. 

The  denial  of  the  metaphenomenal  had  its  origin  in  a 
mode  of  explaining  the  attainment  of  it.  Its  reality  was 
at  first  assumed  as  unquestionable  ;  but  the  explanation 
given,  finally  developed  the  denial  as  a  legitimate  conse 
quence. 

The  cardinal  principle  of  this  mode,  was  the  assump 
tion  that  the  mind  could  perceive  only  by  coming  in  contact 
with  the  object  of  perception,  in  accordance  with  a  sup 
posed  axiom,  nihil  agit,  nisi  cum,  et  ubi  est,  nothing  can  act 
except  when  and  where  it  is.  This  principle  was  suggested 
by  an  apparent  law  in  physics,  viz. :  that  one  body  can  act 
upon  another  only  by  actual  contact.  The  truth  of  this 
law  is  now  disputed,  and  even  the  impossibility  of  an  actual 
contact  between  the  particles  of  bodies  firmly  believed. 
But  if  the  law  were  unquestionable  in  respect  to  physics, 
on  what  legitimate  grounds  can  it  be  taken  as  a  law  of 
equal  appropriateness  and  validity  in  explaining  the  per 
ceptions  of  the  mind  ?  That  the  mind  can  perceive  only 
by  coming  in  contact  with  the  objects  of  perception,  must 
be  a  mere  assumption.  Besides,  by  the  physical  analogy, 
the  mind  perceiving  as  well  as  the  object  perceived  must 
be  material. 

Having  assumed  the  law,  however,  the  great  aim  now 


PHILOSOPHY   IN    GENERAL.  29 

naturally  became  to  explain  how  the  contact  between 
mind  and  its  objects  takes  place. 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  plain  that  mind  and  the  ex 
ternal  material  objects  do  not  immediately  come  in  contact. 
The  mind  perceives,  therefore,  not  the  material  objects 
themselves,  but  certain  representations  of  these  objects, 
which  were  variously  called  species,  forms,  images,  and 
ideas.  But  what  are  these  representative  forms  ?  Various 
were  the  explications.  The  old  Aristotelians  held  that 
they  are  made  up  of  fine  material  particles  which  enter 
the  different  organs  of  sense,  and  form  themselves  into  the 
required  image  in  the  brain,  and  that  there  the  mind 
comes  in  contact  with  them. 

After  the  age  of  Des  Cartes,  this  theory  was  abandoned  ; 
and  the  image  or  idea  was  spoken  of  as  an  impression 
made  upon  the  brain  like  that  made  upon  wax  by  a  seal. 
Here  no  material  particles  were  received  into  the  brain 
through  the  organs  of  sense  ;  but,  impressions  being  made 
upon  the  organs  from  without,  images  were  'shaped  upon 
the  brain  corresponding  to  the  external  objects. 

It  is  evident  that  the  representative  image  once  ad 
mitted,  must  become  a  fruitful  subject  of  speculation. 
These  speculations,  however,  all  tended  to  one  result — a 
result  proclaimed  in  part  by  Berkley,  and  fully  by  Hume 
— namely,  that  above  mentioned,  the  denial  of  the  meta- 
phenomenal. 

If  we  know  only  the  representative  images  affirmed  to 
be  in  the  mind,  then  we  can  have  no  legitimate  knowledge 
of  any  thing  out  of  the  mind  ;  for,  as  in  all  our  attempts 
to  approach  exteriority,  we  are  met  merely  by  these  images, 
they  are  all  that  we  can  possibly  attain  to.  Hence, 
Berkley,  on  this  principle,  cannot  be  confuted,  when  he 
affirms,  "  The  existence  of  a  body  out  of  a  mind  perceiv- 


30  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

ing  it,  is  not  only  impossible,  and  a  contradiction  in  terms, 
but,  were  it  possible,  and  even  real,  it  were  impossible  that 
the  mind  should  ever  know  it." — Hume  is  equally  consist 
ent  in  his  sweeping  affirmation  :  "  Now,  since  nothing  is 
ever  present  to  the  mind  but  perceptions,  and  since  all 
ideas  are  derived  from  something  antecedently  present  to 
the  mind,  it  follows  that  'tis  impossible  for  us  so  much  as 
to  conceive  or  form  an  idea  of  any  thing  specifically  differ 
ent  from  ideas  and  impressions.  Let  us  fix  our  attention 
out  of  ourselves  as  much  as  possible  ;  let  us  chase  our 
imaginations  to  the  heavens,  or  to  the  utmost  limits  of  the 
universe  ;  we  never  really  advance  a  step  beyond  ourselves, 
nor  can  we  conceive  any  kind  of  existence  but  those  per 
ceptions  which  have  appeared  in  that  narrow  compass. 
This  is  the  universe  of  the  imagination  ;  nor  have  we  any 
idea  but  what  is  there  produced." 

The  denial  of  the  metaphenomenal  appeared  under  two 
forms  : — First,  that  of  Idealism.  Here  the  facts  of  imme 
diate  consciousness  were  taken  as  the  only  universe,  "  the 
universe  of  the  imagination."  Secondly,  that  of  Material 
ism.  Here  the  representative  images  were  merely  con 
sidered  as  arising  from  material  objects,  and  impinging 
upon  material  organs,  and  thence  affecting  the  brain,  or 
sensorium.  What  now  is  the  soul  which  receives  the  next 
impression  but  a  finer  form  of  matter,  and  what  are  its 
sensations  and  ideas  but  a  movement  of  the  internal  or 
ganism  ? 

There  is  a  class  of  philosophers,  and  Reid  may  be  placed 
at  their  head,  who  endeavor  to  dissipate  the  dogmas  of 
both  Idealism  and  Materialism  by  the  stern  voice  of  Com 
mon  Sense.  Every  man  believes  in  the  metaphenomenal — 
in  objective  reality  and  truth ;  therefore,  it  exists  for  every 
man.  Here  common  sense  pauses  :  but  the  philosophical 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  31 

impulse  still  urges  to  the  enquiry,  Is  there  not  reality  in 
opposition  to  Idealism  and  Materialism  ?  Is  there  not  re 
ality  independently  of  a  mere  subjective  persuasion  ?  The 
first  are  forms  of  a  philosophy  which,  on  its  received  prin 
ciples,  demonstrates  conclusions  in  opposition  to  general 
belief.  And  is  the  general  belief  incapable  of  explaining 
itself  by  demonstrating  the  reality  of  its  objects  ?  Must  it 
merely  doggedly  affirm  itself  in  opposition  to  the  philoso 
phical  diagrams  paraded  before  it  ?  And  shall  the  united 
efforts  of  the  human  mind  end  in  the  birth  of  two  great 
parties,  both  occupying  absurd  positions — the  one  affirm 
ing,  "  I  prove,  although  I  do  not  believe  ; "  and  the  other, 
"  I  believe,  although  I  cannot  prove  ?  "  May  we  not  prove 
and  believe,  and  believe  and  prove  ? 

It  is  now  evident,  I  think,  that  the  cardinal  aim  of 
philosophy  must  be  to  reach  the  metaphenomenal.  If  the 
existence  of  the  metaphenomenal  can  be  demonstrated, 
then  the  facts  of  consciousness,  the  phenomenal,  are  ac 
counted  for.  • 


32  INTRODUCTORY  VIEW  OF 


SECTION  IV. 

THE  OBJECTIVE  AND  THE  SUBJECTIVE. 

IN  determining  the  actual  development  of  our  being,  in 
its  various  relations,  we  find  ourselves  at  once  introduced 
to  two  forms  of  being  :  the  SUBJECTIVE,  and  the  OBJEC 
TIVE.  The  subjective,  under  its  simplest  and  most  unique 
form,  is  myself ;  and  the  objective,  under  its  most  general 
form,  comprehends  whatever  is  not  expressed  in  the  term 
me,  or  myself.  Again,  the  simple  subjective,  myself,  be 
comes  objective,  when,  in  an  act  of  self-consciousness,  I 
make  it  the  object  of  my  thought.  And  again,  the  objec- 
thse  general,  or  whatever  is  not  myself,  must  be  subdivided 
into  the  purely  objective  and  the  subjective  general.  The 
purely  objective  is  that  which  is  not  only  not  myself,  but 
totally  unlike  myself — different  in  kind — having  no  proper 
ties  in  common.  The  subjective  general  is  that  which, 
embracing  myself,  is  like  myself — the  same  in  kind — having 
properties  in  common  :  a  distinction  of  personalities,  of 
laws,  causalities,  and  sympathies — but  yet  agreeing  in  be 
ing  connected  with  personalities,  in  implying  the  presence 
of  mind,  and  in  being  capable  of  being  referred  in  kind  to 
the  finite  and  the  infinite  mind. 

I  will  explain  :  I  have  developed  to  my  own  conscious 
ness  a  thinking  principle,  a  will  or  free  causality,  and  va 
rious  emotions  and  passions  ;  and  these,  either  as  consti 
tuting  or  as  being  inseparable  from  my  own  personality, 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  33 

constitute  the  simple  subjective.  Now,  I  conceive  of  other 
personalities  like  my  own,  each  being  to  itself  the  simple 
subjective  ;— and  of  these  distinct  personalities  I  conceive 
of  one  as  the  Eternal  and  the  Infinite,  while  all  the  others 
are  finite  of  various  degrees. 

Now,  all  these  personalities  come  under  the  denomina 
tion  of  the  subjective  general.  They  are  all  of  one  kind, 
and  each  one  is  capable,  by  an  act  of  self-consciousness,  of 
making  itself  the  simple  subjective,  and  of  considering  all 
else  in  relation  to  itself  as  objective  ;  and  capable  of  even  ; 
making  itself  an  object  to  itself. 

Besides  these  distinct  personalities,  which  are  directly 
like  myself,  and  palpably  of  the  same  kind,  there  are  other 
forms  of  the  subjective,  which,  however,  are  ultimately  re-  v 
solvable  into  the  former.  The  vegetable  and  animal  life 
—the  forces  and  laws  of  the  material  creation,  chemical 
affinities — the  informing  power  of  animal  and  vegetable 
physiology,  that  power  by  which  every  animal  and  every 
plant  is  produced  invariably  after  its  own  kind,  from  the 
vitalized  seed  ; — these  forces,  laws,  affinities,  and  informing 
powers — these  busy  workers  and  co-workers — these  wise 
and  exact  regulators  of  the  whole  natural  world — what  are/'1 
they  ?  There  is  design  and  causality  here  which  cannot 
be  conceived  of  without  mind  :  Whether  the  mind  be  in 
the  material  masses,  formative  and  governing  by  direct  in 
fluence  and  immediate  presence  ;  or  whether  it  have  invisi 
ble,  unconscious,  and  incomprehensible  agents,  makes  not ; 
mind  is  here  as  the  seat  of  power,  and  the  fountain  of  law. 
If  all  that  is  personal  belong  to  the  subjective  general, 
then  also  must  these  laws  and  forces  belong  to  the  subjec 
tive  general  likewise  ;  for,  although  they  do  not  directly 
appear  as  personalities,  because  giving  us  no  manifesta-  / 
tion  of  self-conscious  determination,  still  they  cannot 


34  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

but  be  involved  in  some  way  in  such  personalities,  since 
their  explication  and  conception  is  impossible  in  any  other 
way. 

But  what  is  then  the  pure  objective,  or  that  which  can 
in  n6  sense  be  subjective  ?  Whatever  is  directly  known  by 
the  senses,  or  by  the  muscular  organism,  is  purely  objective. 
I  see  and  smell  a  flower — that  is,  I  have  certain  sensa 
tions,  which  arise  from  the  correlation  between  my  senses 
and  a  certain  substance  lying  in  space  and  exterior  to 
myself.  Now,  I  say  not  that  I  could  form  the  judgment 
here  expressed,  without  subjective  principles  ;  but  the  ex 
terior  substance  which  I  name  a  flower  in  expressing  this 
judgment,  I  conceive  of  not  as  life,  but  as  a  product  of 
life,  and  upheld  by  life  ;  not  as  a  formative  power,  a 
forma  formans,  but  as  a  substance  informed,  a  forma 
formata.  Again,  a  ball  is  tossed  towards  me,  and  I  catch 
it  in  my  hands.  In  doing  this,  I  have  the  sensation  of 
hardness,  or,  in  other  words,  I  experience  a  muscular  re 
sistance.  Now,  here  again,  I  do  not  say  that  I  could 
have  formed  this  judgment  without  subjective  principles  ; 
but  the  ball,  or  body,  I  conceive  of  not  as  itself  a  resisting 
cause,  or  as  a  gravitating  power,  but  as  that  in  which  such 
a  cause  and  power  are  habitant ;  and  while  cause  and 
power  belong  to  the  subjective,  I  cannot  but  assign  the 
gross  material  phenomena  to  the  purely  objective.  They 
are  not  me,  nor  like  me  :  they  are  not  life,  or  formative 
power  :  they  are  not  a  force  or  a  law.  "  In  the  material 
sense  of  the  word  Nature,  we  mean  by  it  the  sum  total  of 
all  things,  as  far  as  they  are  objects  of  our  senses,  and  con 
sequently  of  possible  experience — the  aggregate  of  phe- 
/  nomena."  *  All  that  is  exterior  to  me,  and  phenomenal 

*  Coleridge. 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  35 

to  the  outer  senses,  and  which  does  not  account  for  and 
explain  itself — as,  for  example,  effects  require  causes  to 
explain  them, — is  purely  objective. 

But  not  only  are  all  material  phenomena  purely  objec 
tive  ;  all  phenomena  of  consciousness  which  are  known 
merely  as  acts  or  movements  of  the  thinking,  willing,  and 
sensitive  faculties — that  is,  all  which  comes  into  the  con 
sciousness  through  the  outer  senses,  and  thence  called  sen 
sations  ;  and  all  which  is  presented  in  the  activities  of  the 
internal  faculties,  the  perceptions,  reasonings  and  imagina 
tions,  the  acts  of  memory  •  and  fancy,  and  the  volitions, 
emotions,  and  passions,  are  objective  likewise. 

The  distinction  between  the  subjective  general,  there-  y 
fore,  and  the  pure  objective,  is  co-extensive  with  the  meta- 
phenomenal  and  the  phenomenal. — But  in  this  point  of 
view,  it  is  a  distinction  in  the  kind  or  nature  of  the  par 
ticulars  compared.      The  metaphenomenal  is  subjective, 
because  it  is  that  upon  which  the  development  of  our  being 
ultimately  rests  :   the  phenomenal  is  objective,  because  it 
is  that  in  which  the  development  of  our  being  appears  ac-  /v 
tually  taking  place. 

The  development  of  the  Intelligence  must  ultimately 
rest  upon  ideas,  principles,  or  first  truths.  In  the  process 
of  this  development,  appear  its  perceptions,  reasonings, 
imaginations,  and  so  on. 

The  development  of  the  Will  must  ultimately  rest 
upon  the  laws  of  the  Reason.  In  the  process  of  this  de 
velopment  appear  choices  and  volitions. 

The  development  of  the  Sensitivity  must  ultimately 
rest  upon  the  laws  of  the  Eeason,  likewise.  In  the  pro 
cess  of  this  development  appear  the  various  sensations, 
emotions,  and  passions.  When  the  subjective  is  fully 
attained, — that  is,  when  all  principles  are  known,  all  laws 


36  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 

obeyed,  all  fitting  sensations,  emotions,  and  passions 
brought  out  and  regulated  by  reason,  then  the  develop 
ment  of  our  being  is  complete.  While  this  development 
is  going  on,  the  phenomenal,  or  the  purely  objective,  is 
thrown  out. 

But,  although  the  phenomenal  is  always  and  only 
objective,  we  have  seen  that  the  subjective  can  also  be 
come  objective  ;  but  this  last  distinction  does  not,  like  the 
former,  arise  from  a  difference  in  kind,  but  merely  from  a 
change  of  position  or  relation.  Every  intelligent  personal 
subject  can  make  all  else  objective  to  itself — nay,  can  make 
itself  objective  to  itself,  by  an  act  of  reflection. 

To  sum  up  the  preceding  distinctions,  we  have  all  pos 
sible  forms  of  being  embraced  under  the  subjective  and 
the  objective,  as  follows  : 

1.  The  subjective  simple,  or  myself  ; 

2.  The  subjective  simple,  taken  as  objective  to  my 
self; 

3.  The  objective  general,  or  whatever  is  not  myself; 

4.  The  objective  general,  divided  into  the  subjective 
general   and   the   pure   objective  ; — the   first   comprising 
whatever  is  metaphenomenal — the  second  whatever  is  phe 
nomenal. 

The  distinctions  made  and  explained  above,  give  us 
the  leading  philosophical  conception,  and  enable  us  clearly 
and  succinctly  to  state  the  leading  problems.  The  lead 
ing  philosophical  conception  is  that  of  explaining  the 
development  of  my  being.  Now  this  development  pre 
sents  me, 

First,  the  phenomenal,  or  what  appears  to  my  imme 
diate  consciousness.  This  consciousness  I  can  divide  into 
the  exterior,  or  that  which  contains  mere  sensations  ;  and 
the  interior,  or  that  which  contains  the  movements  of  my 


PHILOSOPHY    IN   GENERAL.  37 

own  faculties.  Now,  all  these  phenomena,  whether  of  the 
exterior  or  interior  consciousness,  constitute  the  pure  06- 
jective^  because  they  lie  before  the  reflective  power. 

Secondly,  I  have  the  metaphenomenal,  or  that  which 
lies  beyond  the  phenomena  :  and  this  admits  likewise  of  a 
twofold  division.  The  metaphenomenal  in  the  world 
without,  which  is  to  account  for  the  sensations  ;  and  the 
metaphenomenal  within,  which  is  to  account  for  the  acts 
which  take  place  upon  the  sensations.  Now,  the  meta 
phenomenal  without  and  within,  constitutes  the  subjective  f 
general,  because  it  lies  under  and  sustains  the  phenomenal 
as  the  ground  of  its  possibility. 

Hence  we  announce  a  main  problem  in  philosophy, 
namely  :  To  determine  the  validity  and  the  forms  of  the 
subjective,  and  to  show  its  relations  to  the  objective. 

Again,  in  the  development  of  my  being,  the  earliest 
conviction  at  which  I  arrive  is  the  Ego  sum,  I  AM.  Now, 
starting  with  this  conviction,  I  find  that  all  which  I  know, 
I  know  not  only  in  the  field  of  my  consciousness,  but  also 
in  the  determination  and  activity  of  my  personal! ty.  I  find 
thus,  that  I  am  a  simple,  unique  subject,  lying  in  some 
sort  under  all  being  whatever,  determining  the  mode  and 
extent  of  its  cognizance,  and  even  its  reality. 

Hence  we  announce  another  problem  in  philosophy,  no 
less  important  than  the  preceding,  namely  :  To  determine 
objective  reality  ;  or  the  reality  of  the  objective  general, — 
of  that  which  is  not  myself. 

The  first  problem  is  disputed  by  the  sensualists,  or 
those  who  derive  the  materials  of  all  cognition  from  expe 
rience.  The  second  is  disputed  by  the  idealists,  or  those 
who,  like  Berkley  and  Hume,  deny  the  possibility  of  know 
ing  an  external  world. 

*  Ob  and  jaceo.  t  Sub  and  jaceo. 


38  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

Once  more  :  The  subjective  simple  which  attempts  to 
reach  the  objective  general,  attempts  also  to  reach  itself. 
This  it  can  do  only  by  making  itself  an  object  to  itself. 
Hence  arises  a  new  and  unique  form  of  knowledge  through 
the  power  of  reflection  or  self-consciousness  ;  and  thus  we 
have  the  problem :  To  determine  the  faculties  and  laws  of 
the  simple  subjective. 

These  three  problems  cover  the  whole  field  of  Philoso 
phy,  as  will  be  apparent  when  we  come  to  consider  its 
cardinal  divisions. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN    GENERAL.  39 


SECTION  Y. 

REASON     AND     SENSE. 

IN  the  present  developed  state  of  my  faculties,  I  know  my 
self  as  Body  and  Spirit.  Spirit  is  the  subjectivity  within, 
which  thinks,  feels,  and  wills.  The  body,  the  material  ta 
bernacle  of  the  spirit,  is  a  part  of  the  great  system  of  ex 
ternal  nature  :  it  is  the  same,  mechanically  and  chemi 
cally  ;  and  it  lives  and  decays  like  all  other  living  things- 
What  is  its  relation  to  the  spirit  ?  It  is  the  curious  and 
wonderful  mediator  between  matter  and  spirit.  Through 
the  nerves,  distributed  into  five  external  senses,  and 
through  the  muscular  organism  sometimes  called  the 
"sixth  sense"  and  the  sense  of  resistance,  nature  reaches 
the  spirit.  What  is  the  product  of  this  union  ?  Sensa 
tions,  and  nothing  more.  No  thought,  no  knowledge— 
simply  an  experience  of  sound,  color,  sapidness,  fragrance, 
touch,  and  resistance.  But  the  cognitive  faculty  within 
is  not  unfurnished.  It  is  prepared  to  know  the  world, 
from  whence  the  sensations  arise  ;  and  it  is  prepared  to 
know  itself.  Sensation  conditionates  the  reason  in  two 
ways  : — 

First — In  sensation,  in  common  with  all  the  subjective 
faculties,  it  wakes  to  self-conscious  activity.  It  here  be 
gins  to  live  its  knowing  and  thoughtful  life. 

Secondly — Sensation  furnishes  materials  of  cognition  ; 


40  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 

or  signs  which  the  reason  appropriates  readily  and  fa 
miliarly,  in  reading  the  external  world. 

The  lower  faculty,  as  it  were,  sings  a  joyful  matin  song 
under  the  window  of  the  reason  ;  then  this  glorious  power 
awakes,  and  looking  out,  recognizes  the  reality,  beauty,  and 
laws  of  God's  works,  and  the  Great  Maker  himself ;  and 
then,  turning  back  upon  itself,  sees  there  the  image  of  the 
Divine  wisdom  and  love.  In  knowing  the  world,  the  mind 
is  developed,  and  all  its  faculties  brought  into  exercise  ; 
and  as  consciousness  necessarily  accompanies  every  internal 
movement,  the  mind  is  likewise  revealed  to  itself. 

The  first  knowledge  of  both  spirit  and  nature  is  spon 
taneous.-  Afterwards,  comes  the  period  for  philosophical 
reflection  upon  the  one,  and  philosophical  observation 
upon  the  other ;  and  then,  psychology  and  natural  science 
are  born. 

As  our  faculties  become  unfolded  in  their  relations 
with  nature,  important  changes  take  place.  The  sensa 
tions  and  muscular  resistance,  which  originally  could  di 
rectly  of  themselves  give  us  no  knowledge,  are  now 
transformed  into  apt  and  familiar  signs  of  all  external 
bodies,  forms  and  qualities.  The  different  shades  of  light 
and  color,  now  associated  with  bodies,  forms  and  qualities, 
readily  represent  them,  and  we  seem  to  know  every  thing 
by  the  eye.  It  is  now  almost  an  universal  sense.  So  also 
the  different  sounds  received  by  the  ear,  enable  us  to  dis 
tinguish  persons,  things,  places,  and  distances.  The  same 
principle  applies  to  all  the  senses.  The  reason  has  appro 
priated  them  all,  and  made  them  such  quick  and  familiar 
servitors  of  knowledge,  that  we  now  seem  to  have  an  im 
mediate  perception  of  the  outer  world.  On  the  other 
hand,  Keason,  having  from  the  first  activity  of  the  sense 
which  opened  the  play  of  the  mental  powers,  entered  upon 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  41 

its  career  and  unfolded  itself  to  itself,  is  now  no  longer  de 
pendent  upon  sensuous  experience  as  occasions  of  intellec 
tion.  It  can  now  retire  within  itself,  and  think  with  closed 
senses.  Memory  and  Imagination  now  wait  upon  it,  to 
supply  it  with  facts  and  images  ;  and  within  its  own 
depths  it  has  opened  fountains  of  pure,  absolute,  and  neces 
sary  truth. 

As  the  body  is  thus  the  mediator  through  which  the 
outer  world  reaches  the  spirit,  so  also  it  is  the  mediator 
and  instrumentality  through  which  the  spirit  reaches  the 
external  world,  and  impresses  itself  upon  it.  One  set  of 
nerves  obey  nature,  and  give  sensations  to  the  spirit. 
Another  set  of  nerves  obey  the  spirit,  and  move  the  mus 
cular  organism.  The  tongue  and  the  hand  are  the  two 
great  instruments  by  which  the  mind  does  its  work  with 
out.  The  arts  of  industry  and  beauty — all  the  changes — 
all  the  improvements  which  the  spirit  hath  made  in  the 
great  field  of  nature,  it  hath  made  by  the  tongue  and  the 
hand. 

What,  then,  is  humanity,  but  spirit  conditionated  on 
the  one  hand  in  its  incipient  activity,  and  in  its  knowledge 
of  an  external  world,  by  sensuous  impressions  ?  And  con 
ditionated  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  exertion  of  its  causality 
and  plastic  power,  by  an  apt  material  instrumentality  ? 


42  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 


SECTION  VI. 

SENSUALISM    AND    TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

WE  now  arrive  at  the  point  of  departure  of  two  great  sys 
tems  of  philosophy.  Taken  under  their  modern  develop 
ments,  Locke  may  be  said  to  represent  the  one,  and  Kant 
the  other. 

Sensualism,  concentrating  its  thought  in  the  sensuous 
conditions  of  knowledge,  loses  sight  of  the  truth  that  they 
are  merely  conditions  ;  and  goes  on  to  expound  them  as 
the  primary  and  radical  elements  of  knowledge  itself. 
Hence  the  utmost  development  of  the  human  intelligence 
presents  us  only  the  combination  and  expansion  of  these 
elements.  The  reason  is  absolutely  incapable  of  arriving 
at  any  truth  whose  generating  or  constitutive  elements 
have  not  first  entered  the  senses.  The  senses  thus  be- 
j  come  the  sources  and  measure  of  all  knowledge. 

Transcendentalism  begins  with  sensation  no  less  than 
sensualism.  Kant  opens  his  great  work  with  the  affirma 
tion,  "  That  all  our  knowledge  begins  with  experience, 
does  not  admit  of  a  doubt."  But  then  transcendentalism 
does  not  make  the  sensations,  the  radical,  generating  and 
constitutive  elements  of  knowledge  ;  but  conditions,  under 
which  the  cognitive  faculty  begins  to  act,  and  suggestions, 
upon  which,  by  its  own  force,  and  according  to  its  own 
2  ideas  and  laws,  it  forms  cognitions. 

The  views  which  the  two  systems  entertain  respecting 


PHILOSOPHY   IN    GENEKAL.  43 

the  primordial  state  of  the  mind,  differ  widely.  Locke  re 
presents  the  state  of  mind  before  sensation  takes  place  by 
a  sheet  of  white  paper,  and  Hobbes  by  a  slate,  in  which 
there  is  no  idea  or  element  of  knowledge,  but  merely  a 
susceptibility  of  being  written  upon.  To  this  view  all  the 
adherents  of  this  system  conform. 

Transcendentalism  represents  the  mind  as  having  the 
possibility,  the  scope,  the  law  and  the  form  of  all  know 
ledge  within  itself.  Whatever  the  mind  be,  whatever  its 
faculty  of  knowing,  and  with  whatever  elements  it  be 
primordially  furnished,  it  is  easily  conceivable  that  in  the 
act  of  knowing  it  brings  this  faculty  and  these  elements  to 
bear.  Now,  in  order  to  determine  the  reach  of  the  cog 
nitive  faculty,  and  whether  the  mind  really  have  primordial 
elements  of  knowledge,  we  need  only  examine  our  actual 
knowledges.  The  sensations  can  easily  be  analyzed  :  and 
if  they  be  the  primary  elements  of  knowledge,  they  will 
appear  every  where  in  the  composition  and  deduction  of 
thought  :  for  every  mere  composition  must  preserve  the 
original  elements,  and  can  show  nothing  absolutely  new  ; 
and  every  deduction  must  keep  within  the  measure  and 
kind  of  the  starting  points. 

But  if  in  our  actual  knowledges,  there  be  found  ele 
ments  which,  so  far  from  belonging  to  the  sense,  appear 
in  their  nature  and  characteristics  to  transcend  the  utmost 
capacity  of  the  sense,  then  these  elements  unquestionably 
lay  claim  to  a  higher  origin.  And  if  these  elements,  when 
disintegrated  from  our  complex  knowledges  and  held  up 
before  the  reason,  are  readily  recognized  and  reaffirmed  by 
this  faculty  as  necessary,  universal  and  absolute,  then  may 
they  legitimately  be  claimed  as  the  product  of  this  faculty 
alone. 

Now  the  sensations  are  those  of  the  eye,  consisting  of 


44  INTKODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

light  and  color ;  of  the  ear,  consisting  of  the  various 
sounds  ;  of  smelling  and  tasting,  consisting  of  odor  and 
sapidness  in  their  endless  varieties  ;  of  touch,  consisting 
of  simple  and  uniform  impressions  upon  the  nerves  wher 
ever  they  are  distributed  ;  of  muscular  resistance,  consist 
ing  of  hardness  and  softness,  smoothness  and  roughness  ; 
and,  in  the  last  place,  the  sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain, 
and  of  titillation. 

But  our  actual  knowledges  bring  to  view  substance, 
cause,  time,  space,  truth,  justice,  and  many  other  ideas  of 
similar  characteristics — ideas  which  no  analysis  of  the  mere 
sensations  can  ever  unfold.  And  while  these  ideas  can  be 
brought  under  the  observation  of  the  senses,  even  now  that 
they  are  known,  no  more  than  they  could  at  the  first  be 
evolved  out  of  them,  to  the  reason  itself  they  are  intui 
tively  true,  universal,  and  necessary. 

When  we  speak,  therefore,  of  transcendental  truth  in 
the  just  philosophical  sense,  we  speak  of  nothing  doubtful, 
but  of  that  which  both  in  itself  is  most  certainly  known, 
and  in  its  relations  makes  all  other  knowledge  possible. 

The  application  of  the  term  transcendental  is  con 
venient  and  appropriate,  because  it  is  descriptive.  It 
tells  the  simple  fact,  that  the  human  mind,  while  it  is 
susceptible  of  impressions  from  without  by  means  of  the 
organs  of  sense — impressions  which  conditionate  its  first 
development,  and  afford  materials  for  an  important  de 
partment  of  its  knowledge, —  nevertheless  contains  within 
itself  those  elements  of  truth,  those  forms  of  knowledge, 
those  first  principles  of  all  thought  and  reasoning,  which 
transcend  the  reach  of  the  senses.  The  lower  faculty  is 
connected  with  that  corporeal  organism,  through  which 
spirit  communes  with  nature.  It  occupies  the  sphere  ap 
propriated  to  it,  and  does  its  work  well.  The  higher 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  45 

faculty  of  the  pure  Eeason  has  its  sphere  also  ;  and  is  just 
as  capable  in  its  sphere  of  announcing  primordial  truths, 
the  forms  of  perception,  and  the  laws  of  reasoning,  as  the 
sense  in  its  sphere  is  of  giving  forth  sensations. 

From  this  it  is  evident  that  the  metaphenomenal  and 
subjective  identify  themselves  with  the  transcendental. 

Locke  is  a  great  and  venerable  name  ;  and  no  one  may 
speak  lightly  of  him.  But  an  excessive  veneration  has  led 
some  who  disclaim  sensualism,  to  claim  for  his  doctrines 
certain  saving  clauses  in  those  passages  where  he  speaks 
of  Keflection  as  one  of  the  sources  of  ideas. 

There  is  no  school  of  philosophy  that  might  not  be  am 
bitious  of  retaining,  as  an  authority,  such  a  man  as  Locke  ; 
and  one  cannot  well  conceive  how  any  thing  less  than  a 
supreme  and  honest  love  of  truth  could  influence  any  one 
to  dispense  with  his  authority. 

For  my  part,  I  can  say  from  my  heart  that  I  admire 
and  love  Locke.  His  clear  and  penetrating  intellect,  his 
good  sense  and  manly  candour  ;  his  strong  English  heart, 
his  pure  English  style  ;  and  his  decided  moral  and  religious 
principles,  always  quietly  about  him  like  the  coat  he  wears, 
like  the  air  he  breathes,  like  the  familiar  tones  of  his  com 
mon  discourse,  and  the  prevailing  expression  of  his  honest 
face, — altogether  I  admire  and  love  him.  And  notwith 
standing  the  errors  of  his  system,  I  shall  continue  to  read 
and  admire  and  love  him. 

Locke  refers  all  our  knowledge  to  two  sources,  Sensa 
tion  and  Keflection.  The  latter,  as  he  defines  it,*  is  un 
doubtedly  the  interior  consciousness, — it  embraces  the 
operations  of  the  mental  faculties  :  and  the  former  is 
equivalent  to  the  exterior  consciousness.  All  that  appears 

*  Book  II.,  ch.  1,  §  4. 


46  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

to  us,  therefore,  appears  in  the  consciousness  ;  and  all 
which  there  appears,  consists  of  the  simple  sensations,  and 
the  operations  of  the  mind,  and  whatever  is  revealed  in  or 
by  the  operations  of  the  mind.  Now  so  far  the  Transcen- 
dentalist  will  go  with  Locke  ;  so  far  there  is  no  difference 
whatever.  But  when  we  come  to  consider  the  mental 
operations  themselves,  we  find  the  great  point  of  departure 
of  the  two  systems.  According  to  Locke,  the  mental  facul 
ties,  when  they  go  into  action,  not  only  begin  conditionally 
and  in  point  of  time  with  sensation,  but  they  also  derive 
all  the  materials  and  elements  upon  which  their  activity 
is  expended,  from  sensation,  and  the  conscious  experiences 
of  the  mental  activity  itself.  The  sensations,  together 
with  the  acts  of  "  perception,  thinking,  doubting,  believ 
ing,  reasoning,  knowing,  willing,  and  all  the  different  act 
ings  of  our  own  minds/'  are  the  first  radical  elements  from 
which  all  possible  knowledges  are  formed. 

Now,  the  introduction  here  of  the  ideas  of  reflection  or 
the  interior  consciousness,  by  no  means  changes  the  charac 
ter  of  the  system  ;  for  these,  no  less  than  the  sensations, 
are  merely  phenomenal.  The  operations  of  the  mind,  as 
well  as  the  sensations,  are  conditions  of  knowing  the  tran 
scendental  truths.  Thus  the  succession  of  thought,  as  well 
as  the  succession  of  sensations,  is  a  condition  of  knowing 
time.  Indeed,  the  most  important  truths  are  revealed 
upon  condition  of  the  experiences  of  the  interior  conscious 
ness.  But  recollect  that  the  contents  of  sensation  and  re 
flection,  while  to  the  transcendentalist  they  are  mere  con 
ditions  of  conceiving  time,  space,  substance,  power,  and  so 
on ;  to  Locke  and  his  school  they  are  the  simple  ideas  or 
elements  out  of  which  these,  and  all  the  most  abstruse 
truths  are  compounded,  or  drawn.* 

*  Book  II.,  ch.  12,  §  1  and  §  8. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  47 

The  transcendentalist  can  say  that  sensation  and  re 
flection,  or  the  exterior  and  interior  consciousness,  are  the 
only  sources  of  our  knowledge  ;  understanding  by  this  that 
all  that  we  know  we  know  either  upon  the  experience  of 
sensations,  or  in  the  acts  of  knowing,  of  which  we  are  con 
scious  ;  but  this  is  a  very  different  thing  from  making  the 
sensations  and  the  acts  of  knowing  the  materials  or  ele 
ments  out  of  which  all  that  we  know  is  compounded.  I 
have  already  distinguished  between  the  mere  act  of  know 
ing  and  that  which  is  known,  calling  the  first  the  phenom 
enal,  and  the  second  the  metaphenomenal ;  and  just  as 
broadly  as  that  distinction  are  the  two  systems  to  be  dis 
tinguished.  Sensualism  merges  every  thing  into  the  phe 
nomenal  :  Transcendentalism  transcends  or  passes  beyond 
the  phenomenal,  and  reaches  the  universal  and  necessary 
truth,  the  substantial  and  real  being  ; — that  which  is  the 
rational  ground  of  all  phenomena,  without  which  they 
could  have  had  no  existence,  and  without  which,  now  that 
they  exist,  they  cannot  be  explained  and  accounted  for. 

Men  generally,  and  even  most  philosophers,  in  daily 
thought  and  occupation,  are  more  with  the  phenomenal 
than  the  metaphenomenal,  and  thus  from  the  familiarity 
of  use,  the  phenomenal  comes  to  be  regarded  as  more  un 
questionable  and  certain  than  truths  of  pure  reason.  I 
think,  however,  that  a  little  quiet  thinking  must  dissipate 
this  illusion  from  every  mind.  How  do  we  reach  the  phe 
nomenal,  that  is,  our  sensations  and  the  operations  of  our 
mental  faculties  ?  Is  it  not  simply  by  a  form  of  knowing, 
— namely,  consciousness?  Now,  if  there  be  a  form  of 
knowing  adapted  to  the  metaphenomenal,  why  do  we  not 
know  this  as  well  as  the  phenomenal  ?  But  there  is  such 
a  form  of  knowing,  namely,  Intuition,  or  the  direct  per 
ception  and  insight  of  Keason  ;  and  we  are  conscious  of 


48  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

the  exercise  of  the  function  implied  in  this  form — we  are 
conscious  of  knowing  by  intuition.  Is  not  the  act  of  in 
tuition,  of  which  we  are  conscious,  as  valid  as  the  sensa 
tion  of  which  we  are  conscious  ?  Nay,  more,  is  not  the 
truth,  which  we  are  conscious  of  knowing  in  the  exercise 
of  the  intuitive  function,  as  valid  as  the  conscious  act  by 
which  it  is  known?  To  immediate  consciousness,  as  a 
form  of  knowing,  we  refer  sensation  and  the  operations  of 
the  mental  faculties.  To  the  intuition  of  reason,  as 
another  form  of  knowing,  we  refer  the  transcendental 
truths.  This  is  the  whole  account  of  the  matter.  The 
sensualistic  school  will  insist  upon  it  that  the  objects  of 
immediate  consciousness  alone  are  the  elements  of  know 
ledge — while  the  transcendental  school  affirm  that  the 
fundamental  elements  are  found  beyond  immediate  con 
sciousness. 

But  the  principles  on  which  transcendental  truths  are 
denied,  involve  the  denial  of  all  objective  reality  whatever, 
beyond  immediate  consciousness.  It  is  not  merely  the 
ideas  of  pure  reason,  which  lie  beyond  immediate  con 
sciousness  ;  all  the  pure  mathematics  transcend  it  like 
wise.  Nay,  the  entire  outer  world  transcends  it ;  for  all 
must  allow,  that  not  the  received  objects  of  the  external 
world  are  immediate  objects  of  consciousness,  but  only 
the  sensations  supposed  to  arise  from  these  objects.  In 
deed,  in  this  very  way  were  Berkley  and  Hume  led  to 
deny  all  objective  reality,  out  of  consciousness.  It  is 
plain  that  they  deduced  their  doctrines  legitimately  from 
the  system  of  Locke. 

I  conclude  here  by  remarking,  that  the  denial  of  the 
metaphenomenal  as  that  which  transcends  immediate 
consciousness  must  involve  the  destruction  of  all  philosophy. 
If  we  are  shut  up  to  mere  phenomena,  we  can  account  for 


PHILOSOPHY   IN    GENERAL.  49 

nothing.  We  have  only  to  observe,  classify,  and  name ; 
to  mark  a  ceaseless  involution  and  evolution,  where  nothing 
absolutely  begins,  and  nothing  can  be  truly  finished. 
Thus  the  whole  field  of  human  thought  becomes  a  pan 
orama  of  shadows. 


50  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 


SECTION  VII. 

IDEAS     AND     LAWS. 

THE  word  "idea,"  according  to  the  usage  of  Locke,  ex 
presses  whatever  we  are  immediately  conscious  of.  The 
word  "idea,"  according  to  the  usage  of  Plato,  expresses 
what  we  cannot  be  immediately  conscious  of.  In  the 
usage  of  Plato,  however,  "idea"  does  not  express  any 
thing  transcendental  of  consciousness  in  the  external 
world,  but  only  the  metaphenomenal,  lying  in  the  mind 
itself.  And  here  we  see  at  once  the  fallacy  of  all  that 
Locke  has  said  respecting  innate  ideas.  Taking  the  word 
in  his  usage,  that  ideas  cannot  be  innate,  is  a  truism ;  for 
nothing  is  more  evident,  than  that  mere  sensations  and 
acts  of  the  mind,  that  is,  mere  phenomena,  cannot  be 
innate — they  exist  only  as  they  appear  in  the  conscious 
ness.  His  reasoning,  therefore,  does  not  reach  the  point 
in  debate.  On  the  other  hand,  "ideas,"  in  the  Platonic 
usage,  cannot  but  be  innate,  since  the  word  expresses 
those  primordial  laws  of  knowing,  thinking  and  reasoning, 
and  those  necessary  and  absolute  elementary  truths  which 
are  inseparable  from  the  mind  itself. 

In  order  to  form  a  clear  conception  of  ideas  in  the 
Platonic,  or  transcendental  sense,  let  us  recui  to  the  dis 
tinction  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective.  The  sub 
jective  simple,  or  mind,  is  directly  opposed  to  all  supposed 
forms  of  being,  lying  out  of  mind,  and  comprised  in  the 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  51 

phenomena  of  sensation,  and  whatever  in  the  exterior 
world  is  connected  with  their  production.  It  is  the  op 
position  of  the  spiritual  subjective,  myself,  and  the  un- 
spiritual  objective,  exterior  to  myself.  Now,  the  true 
Platonist  or  transcendentalist  views  every  thing  existing 
beside  mind,  as  made  by  mind,  after  the  laws  of  mind, 
and  primarily  for  mind. 

It  is  a  kindly  doctrine,  and  to  be  heartily  received, 
that  one  design  of  the  great  Creator,  in  forming  the 
countless  tribes  of  animals,  was  to  multiply  the  forms  of 
enjoyment.  Every  sensitive  creature  hath  its  sphere  of 
life,  its  bountiful  provisions,  and  its  term  of  happiness. 
But  irrational  creatures  comprehend  neither  the  world  in 
which  they  subsist,  nor  the  curious  workmanship  of  their 
own  organism.  The  world,  in  its  wise  designs,  its  exact 
order,  and  its  beautiful  forms,  is  not  made  for  them.  It 
is  made  for  them  only  in  respect  to  the  gratification  of 
their  mere  animal  wants.  But  under  all  these  higher 
points  of  view,  it  is  obviously  made  for  rational  beings. 
Our  physical  constitution,  indeed,  finds  its  fitting  pro 
visions  and  accommodations  in  the  world ;  but  we  are  not 
confined  to  these.  To  us,  the  world  is  a  vast  and  sublime 
exhibition  of  design,  skill,  causative  and  regulative  force, 
harmonious  relations,  and  beautiful  forms. 

We  can  conceive  of  a  period  when  there  was  as  yet 
no  creation,  and  the  Creator  dwelt  alone  in  the  immensity 
of  his  being.  Now  we  cannot  but  believe  there  was 
arrayed  before  his  mind,  every  possible  form  of  being, 
every  possible  constitution  of  a  universe,  every  possible 
variety  of  life  ;  and  there,  also,  lay  the  map  of  the  worlds 
which  were  ordained  actually  to  be.  In  his  mind  was  all 
the  science  and  art,  according  to  which,  the  Universe  was 
to  be  bodied  forth :  and  there,  too,  was  that  creative 


52  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

energy,  which  had  but  to  exert  itself,  and  Creation  would 
stand  forth  in  all  its  glory  and  magnificence.  Now  the 
preconceived  laws,  forms  and  relations  of  the  universe,  as 
they  lay  in  the  Divine  mind,  are  a  part  of  the  Divine 
ideas.  Viewed  in  relation  to  the  Eternal  Keason,  as  giving 
the  original  thought  and  law,  they  are  ideas  simply. 
Viewed  in  relation  to  the  Divine  imagination,  as  giving 
forth  definite  forms  and  relations,  they  become  ideals, 
models,  or  archetypes.  Divine  ideas,  as  the  originating 
thoughts  and  archetypes  of  worlds,  cannot  be  exhausted 
in  the  actual  creation,  for  God  is  infinite.  Again,  there 
must  be  in  the  Divine  mind  thoughts  and  conceptions 
which  do  not  take  their  embodiment  in  material  forms. 
Such  are  those  which  relate  to  pure  science  and  moral  gov 
ernment.  Whatever  thus  lies  in  the  Divine  mind,  consti 
tutes  the  Divine  ideas. 

Suppose  the  infinite  mind  to  constitute  another  mind 
like  itself.  This  mind,  of  course,  must  be  finite  ;  but 
inasmuch  as  it  is  mind,  it  must  have  the  same  ideas,  accord 
ing  to  its  measure,  which  are  found  in  the  Divine  original. 
These  ideas,  perhaps,  could  not  be  given  in  a  fully 
developed  state,  that  is,  drawn  out  into  all  their  conse 
quences  and  applications,  for  this  would  appear  to  border 
upon  the  infinite ;  but  given  in  their  elementary  state,  to 
be  unfolded  by  the  active  and  free  thought  of  the  being 
thus  gloriously  constituted.  Such  a  being  may  be  con 
ceived  of,  as  existing  without  a  body  and  organs  of  sense 
— a  pure  spirit ;  and  although  thus  without  sensation,  and 
supposed  even  to  have  no  knowledge  of  a  real  world,  in 
its  pure  thoughts  and  imaginations  it  might  have,  not  only 
mental  activity,  but  emotions  of  beauty  and  grandeur  ex- 
quisitely  delightful.  For  such  emotions  even  now  are 
awakened  in  our  minds,  without  calling  in  the  aid  of  im- 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENEEAL.  53 

mediate  sensation,  when  in  dreams,  and  esthetical  efforts 
of  the  imagination,  we  are  entertained  with  forms  of  great 
ness  and  beauty  beyond  the  power  of  mere  sense  to  reveal.  y 
But  now,  suppose  this  being  to  be  introduced  to  the  actual 
creation,- — would  not  the  possibility  of  its  knowing  and 
comprehending  it,  arise  from  the  correspondence  between 
the  outward  reality  and  the  ideas  within  ?  Would  it  not 
understand  the  real  world,  just  so  far  as  it  had  the  pre 
conceived  law  and  archetype  within?  At  least,  to  a  being 
destitute  of  sensation,  no  other  possible  way  could  exist. 
Let  us,  then,  make  another  supposition,  namely : — That 
a  being  be  constituted  like  the  Divine  mind  ;  but  instead 
of  existing  as  a  pure  spirit,  that  it  be  connected  with  a 
material  body,  with  organs  of  sense — this  body  itself 
forming  a  part  of  the  system  of  things  without  ;  and 
that  its  relations  to  this  body  are  such  that  it  cannot 
become  conscious  of  existence,  nor  begin  the  play  of  its 
powers  until  sensations  are  produced  within,  by  corporeal  , 
impressions  without.  Shall  the  law  of  perception  and  the 
forms  of  knowledge  now  be  changed,  because  sensuous 
conditions  are  demanded  for  their  development  ?  It  is 
impossible  and  inconceivable.  The  originating  power  and 
law  of  thought  must  still  remain  in  the  spirit,  to  which 
they  of  necessity  belong.  This  last  new  form  of  being,  is 
new  only  in  respect  to  the  conditions  of  its  beginning  to 
act,  and  the  mode  and  conditions  of  its  communication 
with  the  external  world ;  while  the  possibility,  and  the 
determinate  form  of  its  knowing,  still  lie  in  its  inherent 
spiritual  faculties,  and  its  necessary  and  constitutive  ideas.  ** 
The  universe  represents  the  Divine  thought ;  and  now  it 
cannot  but  represent  the  thought  given  likewise  to  this 
highly  endowed  creature,  whom  we  recognize  as  man  him 
self.  .. 


54  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

When  man,  therefore,  was  placed  upon  the  smiling 
outspread  earth,  and  beneath  the  bright  starry  heavens, 
be  did  not  find  himself  a  stranger  and  out  of  place.  His 
mind  and  heart  responded  to  the  works  of  his  Creator. 
His  spirit  drank  in  the  living  beauty  of  all  things,  because 
he  was  formed  to  know  the  beautiful.  He  saw  the  wise 
design  of  Creation,  because  he  himself  was  endowed  with 
a  designing  mind.  He  searched  and  found  out  the  order 
of  the  heavens  and  the  earth,  and  the  great  and  all-regu 
lating  laws,  because  the  principles  of  science,  the  founda 
tions  of  law,  were  laid  in  bis  own  intelligence.  We  have 
a  striking  illustration  of  this  mutual  adaptation  and  har 
mony  in  the  science  of  mathematics.  This  science  is 
drawn  directly  from  the  reason  of  man,  By  this  science 
he  is  enabled  to  measure  the  planets.  The  Great  and 
Divine  Mathematician  made  the  universe  according  to 
these  lofty  and  exact  principles.  He  then  gave  his  crea» 
ture  the  capacity  to  construct  this  pure  and  unerring 
science  ;  and  thus  man  has  a  ladder  by  which  he  can 
mount  from  earth  to  heaven. 

If  ideas  of  the  reason  are  embodied  in  the  external 
world,  determining  its  forms,  relations,  and  movements, 
what  do  they  become  when  thus  embodied  ?  The  answer 
is  given  in  one  word— LAWS.  Force  or  power  Jias  its  origin 
in  the  Divine  causality ;  but  that  which  appropriates, 
Compounds,  directs,  and  governs  force3  is  Law,  answering 
to  the  Divine  idea.  All  ideas  do  not  become  laws,  regu^ 
lating  Force  in  the  exterior  sphere  of  their  manifestations, 
Some  ideas  give  the  law  to  perception,  and  determine  our 
knowledges ; — others  give  the  law  to  the  fine  arts,  and 
determine  the  forms  of  the  beautiful ;  others,  again,  givq 
the  law  to  the  free  casuality  or  the  responsible  will,  and 
determine  moral  rectitude.  But  these  all  go  out  intq 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  55 

some  form  of  law.  Law  and  idea  are  thus  the  same. 
Viewed  in  respect  to  the  reason,  originating,  conceiving, 
and  projecting,  we  speak  of  the  idea :  viewed  in  respect 
to  the  sphere  of  determinate  movement  and  action,  we 
speak  of  the  law. 

Now,  if  the  object  of  science  he  to  ascertain  the  laws 
of  the  universe,  we  see  how  it  depends  upon,  and  must 
grow  out  of,  philosophy. 

There  is  a  period  in  the  development  of  mind  in  rela 
tion  to  external  nature,  when  observation  and  thought  first 
awake.  It  is  a  period  of  spontaneous  communication 
between  the  soul  and  nature,  springing  up  from  the  rela 
tion  between  the  ideas  within  and  their  embodiment  with 
out.  A  voice  from  without  calls  to  the  soul  within,  and 
the  soul  joyfully  answers  back.  In  the  very  impressions 
made  upon  the  sensitivity  by  nature,  the  occasion  appears 
when  the  ideas  are  required,  in  order  to  know  and  compre 
hend.  The  reason  is  noticing  carefully,  and  struggling  to 
comprehend :  in  the  very  effort  of  earnest  thought  it  per 
ceives  ideas,  vaguely,  perhaps,  at  first,  and  immediately 
carries  them  out  to  nature  as  a  tentative  law.  The  first 
efforts  to  assign  laws  to  nature,  and  to  expound  her  great 
system,  may  be  crude  and  imperfect,  wild  and  imaginative, 
because  observation  is  limited,  and  reason  only  partially 
developed ;  but  the  process  is  the  same  in  kind,  at  the 
dawn  of  science,  and  at  its  glorious  noontide.  It  is  the 
union  of  ideas  and  observation,  This  first  period  may  be 
called  the  TIME  OF  AWAKENING. 

The  second  period  is  the  TIME  OF  PROPHECY.  The 
mind  now  realizes  in  clear  and  decided  reflection,  what  it 
wants.  It  proceeds,  therefore,  to  make  out  the  system  of 
nature  by  mapping  out  the  related  bodies,  their  forms, 
magnitudes,  and  relations,  and  assigning  them  forces  and 


56  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

laws.  In  this  work  the  mind  is  prone  to  become  intoxi 
cated  by  its  first  glimpses  of  the  grand  mechanism  of  the 
world,  and  to  imagine  that  the  great  discovery  is  com 
pleted  :  here,  then,  it  pauses,  and  gives  itself  up  to  dog 
matizing.  In  reality  it  has  only  arrived  at  a  theory,  or  a 
tentative  system  of  nature :  it  has  made  prophecies  more 
or  less  clear,  but  nothing  yet  is  established. 

The  third  period  is  THE  TIME  OF  ELABORATE  OBSER 
VATION,  EXPERIMENT,  AND  CALCULATION.  Dissatisfied 
with  preceding  results,  and  yet  taking  advantage  of  them, 
the  mind  now  sets  itself  at  work  afresh.  It  endeavors  to 
think  more  profoundly,  to  reason  more  logically,  and  thus 
to  escape  from  empty  conjectures  and  fallacies.  Now  it 
aims  to  observe  more  extensively  and  accurately,  at  the 
same  time  reducing  its  observations  to  an  exact  and  con 
venient  classification  :  and  not  content  with  the  facts  of 
nature  as  they  present  themselves  of  their  own  accord,  by 
ingeniously  contrived  experiments  it  forces  out  new  and 
more  curious  facts  from  the  hitherto  silent  and  veiled 
bosom  of  nature.  Now,  too,  it  diligently  cultivates  pure 
science,  that  it  may  construct  formulae  for  the  solution  of 
the  problems  which  come  thronging  in. 

The  fourth  period  is  the  TIME  OF  DETERMINATE  SCI 
ENCE.  Now  imaginary  conceptions,  and  the  ideas  of 
merely  possible  systems,  are  set  aside,  and  the  true  idea 
finds  its  corresponding  law. 

Thales  belongs  to  the  first  period  ;  Pythagoras  and 
Ptolemy  to  the  second  ;  Copernicus,  Kepler,  and  Tycho 
Brahe  to  the  third  ;  Newton  and  La  Place  to  the  fourth. 

In  the  amazing  advance  which  has  been  made  in  de 
terminate  science,  and  in  perfecting  methods  of  investiga 
tion,  the  four  periods  in  respect  to  any  new  subject  may  be 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  5*7 

said  to  be  passed  through  in  one  generation  and  in  the  life 
time  of  one  philosopher. 

Natural  science  will  then  only  be  completed  when  all 
the  phenomena  of  nature  shall  be  reduced  under  a  univer 
sal  causality,  and  assigned  to  fitting  laws  known  in  their 
conformity  to  ideas.  Then  the  ideas  and  the  laws  will,  as 
it  were,  stand  face  to  face,  and  the  phenomena  be  the  in 
telligible  words  which  pass  between  them. 

The  Mathematical,  Moral,  and  -ZEsthetical  Sciences  are 
formed  in  the  same  way.  The  ideas  of  the  reason  project 
the  forms  and  relations,  and  give  the  laws.  The  perfec 
tion  of  these  sciences  lies  in  their  conformity  to  the  abso 
lute  ideas. 


3* 


58  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 


SECTION  VIII. 

PRIMARY    AND    SECONDARY    PHENOMENA. 

WE  shall  begin  with  the  exterior  consciousness.  The  pri 
mary  phenomena  are  the  simple  sensations.  These  are  in 
themselves  incapable  of  projecting  themselves  beyond  the 
sphere  of  consciousness.  But  when  the  ideas  are  added  to 
them,  moulding  and  appropriating  them  by  the  laws  of 
perception,  then  they  become  merged  into  positive  judg 
ments  respecting  bodies,  in  space  with  forms,  qualities, 
distances,  magnitudes,  and  movements.  The  sensations 
now  habitually  are  not  thought  of  as  simple  affections  of 
the  sensitivity  ;  but  whenever  they  arise,  the  mind  is  busy 
in  noticing  the  goings  on  of  the  world  in  space.  Hence, 
when  we  speak  of  phenomena  in  this  developed  state  of 
perception,  we  mean  not  the  mere  sensations,  but  the  ac 
tual  appearances  and  changes  of  bodies,  of  which  the  sen 
sations  have  now  become  such  apt  and  familiar  signs  that 
we  lose  sight  of  their  original  simplicity  and  bareness. 
Just  as  in  language,  when  we  hear  the  familiar  and  appro 
priate  sounds,  or  see  the  familiar  symbols,  we  seem  at 
once  to  be  present  to  the  world  of  thought  and  imagination. 

Now  the  phenomena  transferred  from  the  sensitivity, 
and  characterized  and  classified  as  the  phenomena  of  an 
outward  world,  constitute  the  secondary  phenomena  of  the 
exterior  consciousness. 

A  similar  transformation  takes  place  in  the  interior 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  59 

consciousness.  Here  the  primary  phenomena  are  simple 
acts,  or  movements.  But  the  ideas  here  also  add  them 
selves  to  the  phenomena,  and  we  come  to  know  a  subject 
—a  personality,  endowed  with  power,  intelligence  and 
freedom.  The  mere  phenomena  could  not  carry  them 
selves  back  into  spiritual  reality,  but  of  themselves  would 
remain  a  bare  flow  of  appearances  through  the  field  of  the 
consciousness,  without  telling  the  fountain  from  whence 
they  came,  or  whither  they  were  tending.  But  in  the  very 
giving  forth  of  the  phenomena  in  the  consciousness,  the 
ideas  make  their  appearance  under  the  form  of  an  intuitive 
perception  and  affirmation  ;  and  then  the  mind  knows  it 
self  as  spirit  endowed  with  reason,  power  and  freedom, 
and  perceives  design  and  law  in  every  movement.  Thence 
forward  there  are  no  more  bare  phenomena  ;  but  it  is  the 
reason,  knowing,  designing,  and  commanding ;  the  will 
exerting  causality  ;  the  sensitivity  alive  with  emotion  and 
passion  ;  the  glorious  mind  exerting  itself  in  its  proper 
sphere.  The  acts  and  affections  of  definite  powers  are  the 
secondary  phenomena  of  the  interior  consciousness. 

The  above  distinction  is  an  important  one  ;  for  men 
generally  think  of  phenomena  under  their  secondary  form 
in  the  developed  state  of  the  mind  :  many,  therefore, 
might  fall  into  some  confusion  when  the  phenomenal  is 
represented  as  lying  wholly  in  the  field  of  consciousness, 
under  its  primary  presentation. 


60  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 


SECTION  IX 

ANTECEDENCE  IN  TIME,  AND  IN  NECESSARY  EXISTENCE. 

THIS  is  what  Cousin  styles  Chronological,  and  Logical 
Antecedence. 

The  first  is  the  antecedence  of  the  primary  phenomena  ; 
the  second,  the  antecedence  of  ideas. 

To  a  mind  not  placed  under  sensuous  conditions,  the 
phenomena  of  the  interior  consciousness  would  alone  claim 
antecedence  in  time.  To  man,  who  is  mind  under  these 
conditions,  the  phenomena  of  the  exterior,  as  well  as  of  the 
interior  consciousness,  claim  this  antecedence.  Did  the 
phenomena  alone  exist,  no  question  respecting  necessary 
existence  could  arise  ;  but  in  the  actual  manifestation  of 
ideas  within  the  sphere  of  thought,  this  question  cannot  be 
avoided. 

The  distinction  here  held  up  to  view  is  very  important, 
and  really  not  difficult  to  comprehend.  In  the  actual  de 
velopment  of  our  being,  the  primary  phenomena  obviously 
must  first  appear  in  the  order  of  time ;  for  sensation  is  the 
first  awakening  of  conscious  existence,  phenomena  are  the 
immediate  objects  of  consciousness,  and  consciousness  is 
the  first  form  of  knowledge.  The  knowledges  to  which  we 
attain  through  the  consciousness  of  phenomena,  are  pre 
sented  under  the  form  of  judgments  or  affirmations  made 
by  the  Keason.  But  these  judgments,  as  acts  of  the  Kea- 
son,  are  phenomena  of  the  interior  consciousness  ;  as  phe- 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  61 

nomena  they  must  rest  upon  something  antecedent ;  but 
this  something  antecedent  is  not  sensation,  for  sensation 
stands  only  in  the  relation  of  a  condition,  and  does  not 
contain  the  elements  of  the  judgments.  Upon  analysis, 
these  elements  are  found  to  be  ideas.  Ideas,  then,  must 
have  the  antecedence  of  necessary  existence.  Mere  sensa 
tion,  in  a  particular  form  of  being,  may  exist  without  in 
volving  antecedent  ideas  in  the  sphere  of  that  being  ;  but 
judgments  or  knowledges  formed  upon  the  basis  of  ideas, 
necessarily  involve  their  prior  existence  ;  and  as  ideas 
can  be  traced  to  nothing  higher,  their  antecedence  must  be 
that  of  necessary  existence. 

Sensations  demand  a  previous  necessary  existence,  only 
as  all  phenomena  demand  antecedent  causality.  But  the 
phenomena  of  the  interior  consciousness,  in  addition  to 
this,  demand  a  constructive  reason. 

Sensations  are  known  before  cause  is  known  ;  and  yet 
as  without  an  antecedent  cause  they  could  not  have  ex 
isted,  so  neither  could  they  have  been  known  under  the 
causal  relation,  without  the  antecedent  idea  of  cause. 
Affirmations  of  the  reason  appear,  before  the  reason  and  its 
ideas  come  into  the  field  of  reflection  ;  and  yet,  had  not 
these  had  a  necessary  prior  existence,  the  affirmations 
would  not  have  been  possible. 

Experience  is  the  conditionating  starting  point  in  the 
order  of  time.  Ideas  are  the  determining  starting  point  in 
the  order  of  rational  judgments. 

Experience  marks  the  time  when  the  knowledges  begin. 
Ideas  alone  make  the  knowledges  possible.  Experience  is 
the  dial-hand  which  tells  the  hour  of  the  mind's  morning 
when  it  awakes  to  thought.  Ideas  necessitate  the  move 
ment  of  the  dial-hand  itself. 

Again  :   As  the  sensuous  experiences  of  the  exterior 


62  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

consciousness  conditionate  the  reason  in  the  order  of  time 
in  the  development  of  those  ideas  by  which  it  knows  the 
external  world  ;  and  as  the  experiences  of  the  interior 
consciousness  conditionate  it  in  the  order  of  time  in  the 
development  of  those  ideas  by  which  it  knows  the  intel 
lectual  world  :  while,  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  order  of 
necessary  prior  existence,  ideas  determine  all  the  know 
ledges  arrived  at  :  so,  likewise,  the  particular  judgments 
formed  respecting  objects  in  either  world,  conditionate  the 
universal  truths  in  the  order  of  time  ;  while  these  truths, 
in  the  order  of  necessary  prior  existence,  determine  the 
particular  judgments.  For  example :  in  the  external 
world  the  particular  judgment  that  a  given  body  is  in 
space,  precedes  in  time  the  universal  judgment  that  every 
body  must  be  in  space  ;  while  the  universal  judgment 
comprehended  in  the  ideas  of  space  and  substance,  must 
have  had  a  prior  necessary  existence  in  order  to  make  the 
other  possible.  And  in  the  interior  and  intellectual  sphere, 
although  the  affirmation  that  all  phenomena  must  be  as 
signed  to  causality,  would  not  have  been  formed  until  a 
particular  instance  of  causality  had  appeared  ;  still,  in  the 
order  of  necessary  prior  existence,  the  universal  truth  must 
have  been  embraced  in  the  inherent  idea  of  causality,  or 
the  particular  judgment  assigning  a  particular  phenomenon 
to  an  appropriate  cause,  would  have  been  impossible,  as 
having  no  basis  on  which  to  make  its  appearance. 

To  sum  up  the  whole  in  brief :  In  the  development  of 
our  being,  the  phenomenal  as  to  time  precedes  the  meta- 
phenomenal ;  in  necessary  existence,  the  latter  precedes 
the  former.  The  phenomenal  is  first  known,  but  it  could 
not  be  known  at  all  in  its  actual  state,  unless  the  meta- 
phenomenal  had  had  a  prior  existence  :  and  as  the  univer 
sal  belongs  only  to  the  metaphenomenal,  the  universal  and 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  63 

particular  come  into  the  same  conditionating  relations. 
The  particular  is  first  known,  and  yet  it  could  not  be 
known  at  all  unless  there  had  been  a  necessary  prior  exist 
ence  of  the  universal.  The  phenomenal,  are  first  appear 
ances  in  time  :  the  metaphenomenal,  cause  them  by  a 
necessary  spontaneous  power.  The  metaphenomenal  ex 
isted  out  of  the  relation  of  time,  and  independently  of  it ; 
when  the  phenomena  were  given  in  this  relation,  then  the 
condition  was  supplied,  under  which,  the  metaphenomenal 
could  be  apprehended  by  an  act  of  knowing  standing  in 
this  relation  also. 


64  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 


SECTION  X. 

IDEAS  THE  LAST  AUTHORITY  OF  ALL  JUDGMENTS  OR 
KNOWLEDGES. 

A  JUDGMENT  or  knowledge  is  an  affirmation  of  the  reason. 
When  expressed  in  language,  it  becomes  a  proposition ; 
because,  it  then  passes  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  individual 
consciousness,  and  is  propounded  to  general  thought. 

Every  proposition  consists  of  a  subject  and  predicate. 
The  subject  is  that  of  which  the  affirmation  is  made.  The 
predicate  is  that  which  is  affirmed  of  the  subject.  T^e 
affirmation  is  either  positive  or  negative  ;  that  is,  an  affirma 
tion  of  agreement  or  disagreement. 

Fixing  the  mind  upon  the  question  of  agreement  or 
disagreement,  it  is  evident  that  there  are  only  two  ways  in 
which  it  can  be  determined, — namely,  by  deduction  or  by 
intuition.  If  by  deduction,  then  the  subject  and  predicate 
are  compared  by  means  of  a  third  or  middle  term,  with 
which  they  both  agree  ;  or  with  which  one  disagrees,  and 
the  other  agrees.  This  forms  the  syllogism,  which  will  be 
analysed  hereafter.  But  a  question  arises,  respecting  the 
agreement  of  the  two  terms  with  the  third,  respectively  :— 
Is  this  known  by  deduction  or  by  intuition  ?  If  by  deduc 
tion,  then  we  have  had  a  previous  comparison  subsidiary 
to  the  one  in  hand.  But,  again,  how  was  the  agreement 
seen  in  this  previous  comparison, — by  deduction,  or  by  in 
tuition  ?  If  by  deduction,  then  there  must  have  been  a 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  65 

comparison  still  more  remote.  Thus,  A  agrees  with  B, 
because  they  respectively  agree  with  C.  But  A  agrees 
with  C,  because  A  and  C  respectively  agree  with  X.  And 
B  agrees  with  C,  because  they  respectively  agree  with  Y. 
Again,  B  agrees  with  Y,  because  they  respectively  agree 
with  Z  ;  and  so  on. 

It  is  manifest  that  this  series  of  retrogressive  deductions 
cannot  be  continued  ad  infinitum.  We  must  at  last  ar 
rive  at  a  point  where  the  agreement  is  seen,  without  a 
middle  term,  by  direct  insight  or  intuition.  We  thus 
arrive  at  what  is  generally  called  a  FIRST  TRUTH,— a  truth 
which  neither  admits  of  nor  requires  a  demonstration. 
Such  are  the  axioms  of  geometry.  Here,  then,  is  a  rest 
ing-place  of  thought — here  is  an  absolute  authority.  The 
axiom  is  authoritative,  because  it  is  drawn  out  of  the  pure 
reason,  and  permeated  with  its  ideas.  For,  plainly,  the 
axiom  could  not  be  formed,  if  the  reason  were  not  furnished 
with  the  ideas  of  relation,  eqality,  and  identity.  The  rea 
son,  out  of  its  own  thought,  and  by  its  own  authority, 
forms  the  axiom.  A  succession  of  comparisons  thus  con 
ducts  us  upward  to  the  idea  as  the  last  authority, 

Let  us  next  view  the  subject  and  predicate  separately. 
The  subject  can  be  thought  of  without  the  predicate ;  and 
the  predicate  without  the  subject ; — -each  being  a  distinct 
cognition.  Now  the  question  may  be  started,  How  do  we 
come  by  each  distinct  cognition  introduced  into  the  com 
parison  ?  And  here  it  may  appear  upon  analysis,  that 
each  is  the  result  of  a  previous  comparison ;  and  still  fur 
ther,  the  terms  which  enter  into  this  previous  comparison, 
may  themselves  be  drawn  from  a  comparison  lying  still 
farther  back.  But,  as  in  the  former  case,  the  series  of 
comparisons  must  at  length  come  to  an  end,  and  we  must 
arrive  at  cognitions  which  are  obtained  without  a.  compari- 


66 


INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 


son  of  foregoing  cognitions.  Take,  for  example,  the  propo 
sition,  Every  body  is  in  space,  We  have  here  the  cogni 
tion  of  body,  and  that  of  space  :  Now,  if  it  were  granted 
that  body  is  derived  from  a  preceding  comparison,  it  is 
plainly  impossible  that  space  could  be  thus  derived.  In 
space,  then,  we  have  a  simple  original  cognition.  The 
same  must  appear  in  tracing  back  every  cognition.  These 
first  elements  of  thought,  whatever  they  be,  must  be  the 
foundations  of  all  the  subsequent  cognitions.  If,  according 
to  Locke,  these  first  elements  were  merely  the  phenomena 
which  form  the  immediate  objects  of  consciousness,  they 
undoubtedly  would  be  the  foundations  of  all  the  subsequent 
knowledges,  as  he  has  represented  them. 

According  to  the  transcendental  system,  however,  the 
original  elements  are  ideas  or  simple  intuitions  of  the  pure 
reason,  given  upon  sensuous  conditions,  but  not  formed  out 
of  them,  The  truth  of  the  latter  system  appears  upon 
the  last  analysis  of  our  knowledges,  since  this  analysis 
does  not  give  us  bare  phenomena  of  the  interior  and  exte 
rior  consciousness,  but  ideas,  as  the  constitutive  elements, 

We  may  next  view  the  subject  and  the  predicate  in 
their  particular  relation  to  each  other.  Here  propositions 
take  a  two-fold  designation.  They  are  either  Analytical 
or  Synthetical. 

First,  the  Analytical,*  Here  the  subject  contains  the 
predicate  ;  and,  in  the  form  of  the  proposition,  the  predi 
cate  is  wound  out  of  it,  Nothing  more  is  really  said  in 
the  predicate  than  what  is  implied  in  the  enunciation  of 
the  subject  j  but  for  the  purpose  of  definition  or  explana^. 
tion,  that  which  is  implied  in  the  subject,  is  stated  fully 
arid  clearly.  For  example  :  when  we  say,  Body  is  ex* 
(f 

*  AvaAtw,  to  unwind  or  unravel. 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  6*7 

tended,  the  predicate  extended  affirms  nothing  more  than 
what  is  implied  in  Body,  for  body  is  inconceivable  without 
extension.  The  immediate  basis  of  every  analytical  propo 
sition  must,  therefore,  be  the  cognition  expression  in  the 
subject.  Then  the  question  comes  up  next,  What  is  the 
basis  of  the  cognition  itself  ?  And  here,  as  before,  we  are 
carried  back  to  some  original  element  lying  in  the  reason, 
or  in  the  sense,  or  in  both.  But  as  the  sense  cannot  sup 
ply  the  constitutive  elements  of  the  cognition,  but  only  its 
condition,  we  are  inevitably  led  to  assign  the  idea  of  reason 
as  the  last  authority  and  basis  of  all  propositions  of  this 
class, 

Secondly,  the  Synthetical. $  Here  the  subject  does  not 
contain  the  predicate,  but  the  latter  contains  a  distinct 
cognition,  which  is  added  to  the  former  for  the  enlargement 
of  the  thought.  For  example  :  when  we  say,  every  body 
gravitates,  or  has  iveight,  the  predicate  is  not  contained 
or  necessarily  implied  in  the  subject,  for  body,  as  a  resist 
ing  and  extended  substance,  is  a  possible  cognition  before 
the  knowledge  of  gravity  is  attained  ;  and  this  gravity  is 
a  new  cognition,  attained  and  joined  to  the  former,  in 
some  other  way.  ]N"ow,  there  are  but  two  ways  by  which 
the  new  cognition  can  be  attained,  viz.  :  by  observation, 
or  by  intuition.  Hence  arises  the  distinction  of  synthetical 
propositions  into  a  posteriori  and  a  priori. 

That  every  body  gravitates  is  a  synthetical  proposition 
ct  posteriori,  because  we  gain  the  cognition  contained  in 
the  predicate  by  observation,  or  sensuous  experience  pro-* 
jected  into  the  outer  world,  arid  revealing  the  secondary 
phenomena.  But  even  this  predicate  does  not  find  its  uk 
timate  authority  in  the  observation  itself,  since  the  obser^ 

^  2,vvTi6r]fj.ij  to  put  together. 


68  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

vation  could  not  have  been  moulded  without  the  d  priori 
cognitions  of  space,  cause,  and  substance.  The  a  posteriori 
only  gives  us  the  sensuous  fact  which  appears  first  in  a 
succession  in  the  relation  of  time ;  while  the  cl  priori  gives 
us  the  constitutive  idea. 

Synthetical  propositions  a  priori  are  those  whose  pre 
dicates  are  attained  by  direct  intuitions,  and  without  the 
intervention  of  any  sensuous  experience.  For  example  : 
Every  phenomenon  must  have  a  cause.  Here,  not  only  is 
the  predicate  not  unwound  from  the  subject,  but  no  obser 
vation  of  phenomena  in  any  succession  whatever  can  afford 
any  suggestion  or  type  of  it.  The  phenomena  reveal  only 
phenomena  to  observation  :  but  these  being  given,  the 
reason  supervenes  and  reveals  the  idea  of  cause  by  its  own 
insight  and  authority.  Hume,  indeed,  very  consistently 
affirms  that  there  is  no  cause  demanded  or  really  existent, 
because  he  admits  no  elements  of  thought  beyond  the  phe 
nomena  themselves.  But  unless  we  adopt  this  bare  state 
ment — for  philosophy  it  cannot  be  called — we  must  make 
the  synthesis  of  cause  in  the  above  axiom,  by  intuition  of 
reason  alone — that  is,  either  the  predicate  is  nothing,  and 
the  proposition  absurd,  or  the  basis  is  an  d  priori  principle. 

It  appears,  then,  from  the  preceding  analysis  of  propo 
sitions,  that  whether  we  consider  them  in  the  comparison 
of  the  subject  and  predicate,  of  which  they  are  composed, 
or  in  the  deduction  of  the  terms  taken  separately,  or  in 
the  particular  and  interdependent  relations  of  the  two 
terms,  we  are  inevitably  in  the  last  result  led  to  the  ideas 
of  the  reason  as  the  last  authority  on  which  they  rest, 
But  inasmuch  as  every  form  of  knowledge  and  belief,  when 
expressed  in  language,  takes  the  ibrm  of  a  proposition,  it 
must  follow  that  the  ultimate  basis  of  all  knowledge  and 
belief  must  be  the  ideas  of  the  reason, 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  69 

In  making  our  last  appeal  to  Beason,  we  are  not  want 
ing  in  reverence  to  the  Great  God  our  Maker.  On  the 
contrary,  we  are  bowing  before  him  with  the  profoundest 
homage  :  for  the  ideas  revealed  in  our  reason,  are  there 
implanted  by  Him — are  his  own  voice  within  us.  And 
when  by  holy  prophets  he  sends  us  a  special  revelation  be 
yond  and  above  that  which  is  given  naturally  in  the  con 
stitution  of  our  reason,  we  receive  it,  both  because  it 
claims  to  come  from  the  Infinite  Keason  by  attending 
signs  and  wonders  addressed  to  the  sense,  and  because  it 
contains  everywhere,  in  its  great  truths,  provisions  and  du 
ties,  the  resplendent  marks  by  which  we  cannot  but  recog 
nize  its  source.  It  is  as  if,  seeing  with  a  clear  vision  the 
whole  pathway  up  to  the  vestibule  of  Heaven,  when  the 
gate  of  Heaven  itself  is  opened  upon  us  we  know  that  we 
are  witnessing  no  illusion,  for  although  new  visions  burst 
upon  us,  we  feel  assured  they  are  those  to  which  such  a 
pathway  must  lead  us. 


70  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 


SECTION  XI. 

DIVISIONS   OF    PHILOSOPHY. 

THE  pure  objective  depends  upon  the  subjective — the  phe 
nomenal  upon  the  metaphenomenal.  Hence  the  latter,  as 
sustaining  and  accounting  for  the  former,  becomes  the  ma 
terial  of  philosophy. 

Now,  in  the  most  general  conceptions  which  we  form 
of  the  subjective  and  metaphenomenal,  we  have, 

First :  SUBSTANCE,  endowed  with  faculties  or  functions, 
and  causes  or  forces. 

Secondly  :  LAWS,  or  that  which  determines  and  regu 
lates  the  manifestations  and  movements  of  the  first. 

Philosophy  in  relation  to  the  first,  in  accordance  with 
old  usage,  we  shall  call  METAPHYSICS.* 

The  second, — if  we  may  venture  to  frame  a  term — we 
shall  call  NoMOLOGY.f 

I.— METAPHYSICS. 

Metaphysics  treats  of  that  which,  as  actually  existent 
and  productive  or  creative,  lies  beyond  the  physical,  or  the 
merely  phenomenal.  I  think,  feel,  and  will :  What  is 
that  which  thinks,  feels,  and  wills  ?  What  is  that  which 

*  Merer  &V<TIKT],  i.  e.,  beyond  the  physical. 

*  NO/J.OS  Ao'/oy,  i.  e.,  the  doctrine  of  law. 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  71 

lies  beyond  the  mere  phenomena  of  the  thoughts,  feelings, 
and  volitions  ?  Again  :  through  my  senses,  and  my  mus 
cular  organism,  I  attain  to  an  exterior  world,  whose  forms 
I  call  material.  What  lies  under  or  beyond  these  primary 
and  secondary  qualities,  and  these  various  forces  ?  What 
accounts  for  these  changes — these  perpetual  modifications? 
In  the  development  of  my  being,  I  am  presented  with  the 
physical  or  phenomenal  ;  and  the  enquiry  is,  What  is  the 
metaphysical  or  the  metaphenomenal,  which  is  to  account 
for  my  development  in  this  direction  ? 

The  answer  to  these  enquiries  is  given  by  PSYCHOLOGY, 
DYNAMICS,  ANTHROPOLOGY,  and  ONTOLOGY.  These  may 
be  considered  as  the  divisions  of  metaphysics,  and  subdi 
visions  of  philosophy. 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

Psychology  *  is  that  part  of  metaphysics  which  accounts 
for  all  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
modifications  or  manifestations  of  the  subjective  simple. 

In  Psychology,  we  have  the  whole  being  of  man  given 
in  its  inherent  powers  and  faculties,  and  in  its  relations  to 
Grod  and  the  world.  In  Psychology,  we  effect  the  analysis 
of  the  reason,  and  arrive  at  its  eternal  and  absolute  ideas. 
In  Psychology,  therefore,  we  find  the  basis  of  Logic,  Es 
thetics,  Morals,  Politics,  and  Eeligion,  and  of  Science 
generally.  That  the  above  is  strictly  true,  any  one  may 
realise  to  himself  by  reflecting  upon  the  operations  of  his 
mind,  when  endeavoring  to  attain  to  any  knowledge  what 
ever,  or  when  endeavoring  to  execute  any  thing,  or  when 
disciplining  himself  to  any  state  or  condition  of  the  pas-  ' 

hoy os,  the  doctrine  of  the  soul. 


72  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

sions.  All  his  thinking,  purposing,  and  willing,  and  all 
his  discipline  of  the  passions,  lie  within  his  consciousness, 
and  are  inseparable  from  himself.  Whatever  he  may  at 
tain  to  as  really  exterior  to  himself,  becomes  his,  only  by 
some  modification  of  himself  in  relation  to  it. 

What  is  the  psychological  method  1  It  is  to  examine 
the  facts  of  consciousness,  and  by  these  to  arrive  at  the 
faculties  and  compass  of  our  being.  It  is  by  facts  of  con 
sciousness  that  we  arrive  at  every  thing  ;  and  yet  there 
can  be  no  facts  of  consciousness  without  bringing  to  view 
the  simple  subjective.  My  aim  may  be  to  arrive  at  some 
thing  belonging  to  the  subjective  general,  or  at  something 
belonging  to  the  purely  objective,  but  still,  I,  the  simple 
subjective,  am  there  permeating  the  whole — I  am  there 
thinking,  imagining,  remembering,  comparing,  general 
izing,  reasoning,  determining,  exerting  causality,  or  put 
ting  forth  emotions  and  desires  :  and  whatever  else  I  may 
arrive  at,  I  do  not  arrive  at  it  without  a  further  develop 
ment  of  my  own  faculties,  without  knowing  something 
more  about  myself.  Indeed,  I  do  not  only  in  this  way 
perpetually  see  myself,  however  I  may  be  engaged,  but 
my  own  faculties  assume  to  me  the  importance  of  measur 
ing  to  me  the  universe  :  I  can  know  only  upon  condition 
that  I  have  the  faculty  of  knowledge  ;  and  however 
abundant  may  be  the  objects  of  knowledge,  the  number 
and  perfection  of  the  cognitions  must  depend  upon  the 
capacity  and  vigor  of  the  cognitive  faculty. 

But  although  Psychology,  as  embracing  the  science  of 
our  mental  constitution  and  its  faculties,  embraces  in  some 
sort  all  science,  since  whatever  is  known,  is  known  by  these 
faculties,  and  since  in  every  act  of  knowing,  feeling,  or 
doing,  these  faculties  are  brought  to  light, — still  it  is 
clearly  distinguishable,  as  a  particular  branch  of  Philoso- 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  73 

phy.  It  is  strictly  the  doctrine  of  the  mind  as  a  distinct 
entity — the  doctrine  of  the  simple  subjective  : — in  fine,  it 
is  self-knowledge. 

When  through  the  phenomena  of  the  mind  we  have 
arrived  at  a  knowledge  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  to 
gether  with  their  characteristics,  their  distinction,  their 
relations,  and  their  unity,  we  have  arrived  at  Psychology. 

DYNAMICS. 

Dynamic  %  Philosophy  treats  of  the  life  and  working 
powers  of  nature.  On  every  side  we  see  the  forms  of  a 
universal  life— in  the  myriads  of  the  animal  and  the  vege 
table  tribes.  Everywhere,  also,  powers  and  energies  are  at 
work,  in  large  masses  and  in  small,  as  presented  in  the 
vast  forms  of  astronomy,  in  the  winds  and  tides,  in  mag 
netism  and  electricity  ;  and  in  the  minute  forms  of  chemi 
cal  affinities.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  reflect  upon  the 
productive  life  of  nature,  and  the  forces  at  work  in  nature, 
without  enquiring  after  their  origin,  their  dependency, 
their  centre,  In  this  enquiry  the  mind  is  irresistibly  led 
upward  to  the  infinite  and  absolute  life,  and  the  infinite 
and  absolute  power.  Dynamic  philosophy  ends  its  enquiry 
in  God,  who  filleth  all  in  all. 

We  have  before  us  the  distinction  between  the  pheno- 
ynenal  or  purely  objective,  and  the  metapjienomenal  or  sub 
jective.  We  have  also  the  subjective  as  embracing  the 
energies  of  thought,  will,  and  feeling,  as  found  in  myself, 
and  in  other  beings  like  myself,  both  of  the  finite  and  in 
finite  degree  ; — and  the  energies,  life,  and  forces  at  work 
in  material  masses,  those  masses  which  are  extraneous  to 

energy  or  force. 


74  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

me,  and  known  to  me  by  their  correlations  with  the  sensi 
tivity  as  given  through  the  five  senses,  and  by  muscular 
resistance. 

Now  it  is  plain  from  this,  that  Dynamics  expresses  in 
relation  to  this  life  and  energy  working  in  extraneous  ma 
terial  masses,  what  psychology  expresses  in  relation  to  the 
faculties  working  within  the  substance  of  the  mind.  As 
suming  here  the  distinction  between  material  and  imma 
terial  substance,  we  may  say  of  Psychology  that  it  treats 
of  the  faculties  or  powers  which  produce  or  develope  the 
phenomena  given  in  connexion  with  immaterial  substance  ; 
and  of  Dynamics,  that  it  treats  of  the  faculties  or  powers 
which  produce  or  develope  the  phenomena  given  in  con 
nexion  with  material  substance.  In  both  we  begin  with 
the  phenomenal,  and  arrive  at  the  subjective  as  account 
ing  for  the  phenomenal.  We  may  sum  up  the  whole  by 
saying,  that  Psychology  respects  the  subjective  faculties 
of  the  mind  ;  Dynamics  respects  the  subjective  powers  of 
matter. 

ANTHROPOLOGY. 

Anthropology  *  takes  up  man  in  the  union  of  his  spirit 
ual  and  simple  subjective  being,  with  a  physical  and  ani 
mal  life  and  organism. 

View  man  in  his  mere  animal  nature  and  functions, 
and  he  appears  different  from  all  other  animals.  The 
spirit  within,  modifies,  enlarges  and  ennobles  the  animal 
without — he  is  the  most  glorious  and  interesting  of  all 
animals. 

This  animal  nature  is  also  affected  variously  by  the 
external  world  with  which  it  is  linked,  and,  indeed,  of 

t  AvOpujros  and  Aoyos,  the  doctrine  of  humanity, 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  75 

which  it  forms  a  part  :  climate,  natural  scenery,  food,  and 
employment,  all  act  upon  it.  It  is  thus  modified  at  the 
same  time  by  the  spirit  within,  and  by  influences  from 
without. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  animal  thus  closely  commun 
ing  with  spirit,  reacts  upon  the  spiritual  sphere.  The 
most  susceptible  point  of  this  reaction  is  the  sensitivity, 
through  which  the  emotions  and  passions  become  strikingly 
modified.  In  every  theatre,  therefore,  of  human  passion 
— in  social  life,  in  government,  in  war,  in  commerce,  in 
the  arts  of  beauty,  you  may  see  the  influences  of  the  ex 
ternal  nature.  But  inasmuch  as  man  is  a  unity,  this 
modifying  action  cannot  be  exerted  upon  his  sensitivity, 
without  reaching  in  some  form  and  degree  his  entire  being ; 
so  that  his  thinking  and  reasoning,  his  free  activity,  and 
even  his  moral  character,  gain  a  tone  from  the  objects 
which  surround  him,  and  show  the  complexion  of  the  sun 
which  shines,  and  the  atmosphere  which  breathes  upon 
him. 

Anthropology  is  thus  a  union  of  Psychology  and  that 
part  of  Dynamics  which  informs  the  science  of  physiology. 
Indeed,  as  actually  cultivated,  it  is  hardly  a  pure  philoso 
phy,  but  rather  a  mixture  of  philosophy,  physiology  and 
natural  history.  In  its  determining  elements,  however, 
it  is  strictly  philosophical. 

ONTOLOGY. 

After  having  considered  the  life  and  forces  belonging 
to  the  pure  subjectivity  of  being,  as  distinguished  from 
the  phenomenal  or  the  pure  objective, — we  come  next  to 
consider  the  SUBSTANCE  of  being.  The  idea  of  substance, 
like  the  ideas  of  time  and  space,  of  cause,  and  of  right  and 
wrong,  is  intuitively  given  in  the  reason. 


76  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

Upon  the  observation  of  phenomena,  we  not  only  as 
sign  them  causes  and  laivs,  we  also  assign  them  substance. 
Substance  is  therefore  metaphenomenal,  and  belongs  to 
subjectivity  in  general ;  and  hence  the  consideration  of 
substance  forms  a  part  of  philosophical  speculation. 

Metaphysics,  as  relating  to  substance,  is  ONTOLOGY.  * 

To  Ontology  belong  such  questions  as  the  following  : 
— What  is  substance  ?  Is  substance  distinguishable  from 
its  properties  ?  Do  substance  and  properties  necessarily 
imply  each  other  ?  Is  the  relation  between  substance  and 
properties  to  be  distinguished  from  the  relation  between 
cause  and  effect?  What  are  the  distinctions  and  rela 
tions  of  spiritual  and  material  substance?  Is  the  soul 
material?  Is  God  in  his  substance  identified  with  the 
world,  or  is  he  extra-mundane  ?  What  are  the  relations 
between  infinite  and  finite  substance  ?  Is  space  substance 
or  attribute  ?  Is  it  to  be  referred  to  matter  or  spirit,  or 
is  it  independent  of  both  ?  Does  the  omnipresence  of  God 
suppose  his  essence  of  substance  to  be  diffused  through  all 
space  ? 

Questions  of  Ontology  do,  undoubtedly,  exist  in  the 
human  mind  ;  and  because  they  exist,  they  require  an 
answer.  No  question  of  the  mind  is  to  be  arbitrarily  set 
aside.  If  its  aim  be  an  impossibility,  it  must  be  proved 
to  be  so,  but  as  long  as  a  hope  of  its  solution  remains,  it 
must  remain  as  a  question.  Now,  a  great  many  vain  and 
idle  questions  have  come  up  in  Ontology,  but  it  was  phi 
losophy  itself  that  exposed  them,  and  set  them  aside.  On 
the  other  hand,  many  questions  of  the  very  last  impor 
tance  are  presented  here.  Whether  the  soul  be  material 
or  immaterial ;  whether  God  be  identified  with  the  world, 

*  OI/TOS  and  Aoyos,  the  doctrine  of  essential  being. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN    GENERAL.  77 

or  be  extra-mundane,  are  not  trifling  questions,  as  the 
history  of  philosophy  abundantly  shows.  If  Ontology 
could  arrive  at  nothing  positive,  its  negative  decisions 
would  for  ever  give  it  an  important  place  in  philosophy. 


We  have  distinguished  the  subjective  and  the  objec 
tive  ;  the  latter  the  phenomenal,  the  secondary  and  de 
pendent — that  which  consciousness  directly  recognizes,  and 
which  requires  to  be  accounted  for,  by  referring  it  to  some 
thing  antecedent :  The  former,  the  metaphenomenal,  pri 
mary,  independent,  *  not  directly  recognized  by  the  con 
sciousness,  and  which  does  not  in  like  manner  require  to 
be  accounted  for. 

The  subjective  general  is  that  which  accounts  for  the 
pure  objective.  This  is  their  relation.  Thus  the  will  ac 
counts  for  all  choices  and  volitions  ;  and  is  subjective  in 
relation  to  them  taken  as  the  objective.  Thus  the  sensi 
tivity,  in  connexion  with  its  external  correlates,  accounts 
for  all  the  sensations  ;  and  is  subjective  to  them  taken  as 
the  objective.  Thus  the  reason  accounts  for  all  acts  of 
perception,  knowing,  and  reasoning  ;  and  is  subjective  to 
them  taken  as  objective.  Thus  the  extraneous  physical 
powers  account  for  all  the  phenomena  of  matter  ;  and  are 
subjective  to  them  taken  as  the  objective. 

In  considering  the  relation  of  the  subjective  to  the  ob 
jective,  we  say  generally  as  above,  the  former  accounts  for 
the  latter.  But  the  enquiry  may  still  come  up,  How,  or 

*  I  do  not  mean  here  to  exclude  the  fact,  that  both  the  powers  of  our  own 
minds,  and  the  extraneous  physical  powers,  require  and  are  dependent  upon  the 
First  and  the  Infinite  :  I  mean  only  the  inherent  and  constituted  sufficiency  of 
these  in  relation  to  their  proper  phenomena. 


78  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 

under  what  forms,  does  the  former  account  for  the  latter? 
Is  it  sufficient  to  say  it  accounts  for  the  latter  simply  as 
the  subjective?  May  not  the  subjective  itself  be  pre 
sented  under  different  relations  to  the  objective?  Un 
questionably,  there  are  two  different  relations  which  may 
be  named  and  distinguished,  viz.  the  relation  of  SUBSTANCE 
AND  PROPERTIES,  and  the  relation  of  CAUSE  AND  EFFECT. 
The  subjective  may  be  taken  as  either  substance  or  cause ; 
the  objective  may  be  taken  as  either  property  or  effect. 
Cause  is  self-determined,  creative,  and  contingent  activity. 
Substance  is  fixed,  and,  relatively  at  least,  necessary  ex 
istence.  Cause  can  be  thought  of  as  having  potentiality 
to  a  variety  of  effects,  without  being  connected  with  any 
/  particular  effects  as  its  necessary  manifestations.  Sub 
stance  cannot  be  thought  of  without  implying  certain  pro 
perties  as  its  necessary  and  fixed  manifestations.  Effect 
begins  to  be  after  cause  exists.  Property  is  co-existent 
with  substance  from  its  beginning.  Effect  is  related  to 
cause  contingently.  Property  is  related  to  substance 
necessarily. 

Again :  Substance  cannot  be  given  without  involving 
in  some  way  the  idea  of  cause.  If  it  be  finite  substance, 
it  is  caused.  If  it  be  infinite  substance,  causality  is  con 
ceived  of  as  inseparable  from  its  unity.  Universally,  im 
material  substance  or  mind  involves  causality.  Material 
substance,  besides  being  itself  caused,  is  the  vehicle  or 
medium  of  the  manifestations  of  causality,  either  directly 
or  indirectly :  directly,  if  physical  powers  be  taken  as 
proper  causality ;  indirectly,  if  they  be  taken  as  the  pro 
perties  of  substance.  On  the  former  hypothesis,  the 
Divine  causality  absorbs  the  supposed  physical,  and  is  all- 
pervading  and  omnipresent.  On  the  latter  hypothesis, 
the  Divine  causality  is  taken  as  having  produced  a  certain 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  79 

form  of  substance,  that  is,  material,  different  from  the 
Divine  substance,  and  constituted  with  these  physical 
forces,  as  fixed  and  inseparable  properties.  On  the  former 
hypothesis,  matter  is  represented  as  inert  until  permeated 
by  activities  ;  on  the  latter,  it  is  inseparable  from  activities. 
For  example :  on  the  former,  gravity  is  distinct  from  mat 
ter  as  a  cause,  and  interfused  by  special  constitution; 
on  the  latter,  matter  cannot  be  conceived  of  without 
gravity,  nor  gravity  without  matter.  But  not  only  does 
substance  involve  the  idea  of  cause ;  cause  also  involves 
the  idea  of  substance.  Cause  cannot  be  separated  from 
mind,  and  mind  cannot  be  conceived  of  without  substance. 
This  is  true  both  of  Will,  directly  recognized  as  such,  and 
of  physical  powers,  when  taken  as  causes  proper. 

Taking  the  Subjective,  then,  as  divided  into  Cause  and 
Substance  ;  and  the  Objective,  as  divided  into  Effects  and 
Properties,  the  latter  springing  from  the  former,  and  being 
accounted  for  as  existent,  by  being  referred  to  the  former, 
the  enquiry  arises,  How  do  the  latter  spring  from  the 
former,  or  what  regulates  the  action  of  cause,  and  the 
development  of  substance  ? 


II.— NOMOLOGY. 

This  at  once  introduces  us  to  the  Doctrine  of  Law,  or 
NOMOLOGY,  which  is  the  second  grand  division  of  philoso 
phy.  Nomology  treats  of  the  ]aws,  according  to  which 
the  subjective  ought  to  cause  effects  and  develope  proper 
ties.  It  also  explains  the  possible  violations  of  these  laws. 

Nomology  is  divided  into  the  MORALE  ;  ESTHETICS  ; 
SOMATOLOGY  ;  and  LOGIC. 


80  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

THE    MORALE. 

This  comprises  the  laws  which  ought  to  govern  the 
Will — the  laws  of  duty,  the  laws  which  command  what  is 
due — what  ought  to  be  done  in  moral  relations.  If  all 
causality  is  resolvable  into  Will,*  then  the  MORALE  is  re 
lated  to  all  creations,  whether  by  the  infinite  cause,  or  by 
finite  causes. 

The  laws  of  duty,  however,  must  be  distinguished  from 
the  rules  of  art.  The  first  enjoin  upon  us  what  ought  to 
be  done  in  our  moral  relations,  or  in  our  relations  to  mind, 
embracing  what  is  due  to  ourselves,  to  others,  and  to  God. 
The  second,  point  out  how  any  rational,  ingenious,  useful, 
or  esthetical  design  is  to  be  effected. 

ESTHETICS. 

Esthetics  f  may  be  briefly  defined  the  '  Philosophy  of 
the  Beautiful.'  As  the  Morale  relates  to  the  will,  so  this 
relates  to  the  sensitivity.  As  the  Morale  determines  what 
ought  to  be  done  in  the  moral  relations  ;  so  this  determines 
what  ought  to  please,  or  what  is  really  agreeable  to  the 
sensitivity  in  its  unperverted  and  rightly  developed  con 
dition. 

There  is  in  some  sort  an  interchange  between  the 
Morale  and  Esthetics.  Esthetics  lays  down  the  rules  of 
the  fine  arts  to  the  executive  will.  The  Morale  enjoins 
upon  the  sensitivity  the  proper  moral  emotions  and  desires. 

Esthetics  comprises  the  principles  and  laws  of  the 
beautiful,  or  of  the  agreeable,  or  of  taste,  (for  all  this 
variety  of  designation  has  obtained,)  not  only  in  relation 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  p.  294. 

t  At0-07?<m,  perception  or  sensibility. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  81 

to  the  actual,  but  also  in  relation  to  the  possible.  That 
which  may  be  is  known,  and  the  influence  of  its  beauty 
felt,  as  well  as  that  which  is. 

When  man  awakes  to  existence,  his  eye  beholds  the 
beautiful,  the  sublime,  the  graceful,  the  proportionate, 
the  congruous  ;  and  his  ear  perceives  melody  and  harmony, 
with  the  joy,  the  ecstasy  of  one  recognizing  the  thoughts 
of  his  own  spirit,  the  reflected  forms  of  his  own  being. 
The  splendors  of  the  heavens  above  him — the  scenery  of 
the  earth  around  him,  are  not  strange  to  him  ;  he  knows 
them  in  himself,  and  he  knows  himself  in  them.  But  he 
cannot  rest  in  these  delightful  contemplations.  The  foun 
tains  of  his  thought  open  and  enlarge  beyond  the  world 
which  his  senses  have  recognized.  It  would  seem  as  if 
this  world  were  presented  him  to  call  out  the  activities  of 
a  being,  of  which  it  cannot  be  the  measure. 

Hence,  man  creates :  he  creates  in  statuary,  painting, 
music,  architecture,  gardening,  poetry,  and  romance.  He 
does  not  confine  himself  to  imitations — he  creates.  His 
creations  are  not  only  of  that  which  is  possible  in  this 
world,  but  of  that  also  which  it  requires  a  more  perfect 
constitution,  both  physical  and  moral,  to  realize  ;  and  thus 
in  his  thought  he  knows  other  worlds.  Salvator  Eosa  gives 
us  nature  as  she  is,  with  only  finishing  touches  of  the 
ideal;  but  Milton,  in  his  " delicious  Paradise/'  introduces 
us  to  a  creatfon  not  indeed  opposed  to  nature,  but  requir 
ing  nature  under  a  more  genial  clime,  in  more  glorious 
worlds.* 

In  poetry,  and  in  the  fine  arts,  generally,  the  ideal  of 
the  mind  is  indeed  never  perfectly  expressed.  The  poet 
and  the  artist  labor  to  make  visible  the  thought  upon 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  pp.  130  and  131. 


82  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

which  they  dwell  in  rapture  ;  but  they  never  satisfy  their 
own  earnest  aspirations,  —  they  have  a  vision  which  they 
cannot  reveal  to  others  ;  and  they  find  that  the  world,  as 
presented  them,  not  only  is  not  the  measure  of  their  being, 
but  also  that  all  the  efforts  of  art  cannot  make  its  forms 
and  materials  even  truly  representative  of  that  being; 
and  the  perfectly  beautiful  remains  with  them  as  a  pure 
idea,  of  which  they  have  only  been  enabled  to  give  a  dim 
reflection. 

In  Esthetics  the  human  mind  seeks  to  solve  the  mys 
tery  of  the  arts  ;  it  enquires  after  their  origin,  their  laws, 
and  their  method  ;  and  seeks  to  comprehend  their  reach, 
and  the  grounds  of  their  limitations. 

This  is  that  beautiful  philosophy  which  leads  us  far 
back  into  the  spirit  of  man,  there  to  find  the  true  Cas- 
talian  spring,  and  there  to  converse  with  the  "  Sacred 
Nine  "  as  living  and  real  inspirations 

SOMATOLOGY. 

Somatology  *  holds  a  relation  to  Dynamics  similar  to 
that  which  the  Morale,  Esthetics,  and  Logic  hold  to 
Psychology  ;  it  comprises  the  necessary  laws  which  govern 
the  changes  and  motions  of  bodies,  as  the  former  do  the 
necessary  laws  which  govern  the  mental  activities. 

It  is  difficult,  however,  in  its  present  development,  to 
represent  Somatology  as  a  branch  of  pure  philosophy,  and 
to  distinguish  it  clearly  from  the  Science  of  Nature.  In 
the  Morale,  there  are  necessary  and  absolute  laws  of  the 
good  ;  in  Esthetics,  of  the  beautiful  ;  in  Logic,  of  intuition 
and  ratiocination  :  but  can  we  say  with  the  same  positive- 


and  \oyot,  the  doctrine  or  law  of  bodies. 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  83 

ness,  that  there  are  necessary  and  absolute  laws  for  deter 
mining  the  relations  and  changes  of  bodies?  The  appli 
cation  of  the  pure  mathematics  in  solving  the  problems 
which  arise  respecting  bodies  ;  the  limitations  which  are 
fixed  to  the  possible  laws  of  forces  now  existing — for 
example,  the  necessity  that  the  centripetal  force  should 
vary  inversely  as  the  square,  and  not  inversely  as  the  cube 
or  any  higher  power  of  the  distance ;  the  fact  that  great 
minds,  like  Newton's,  preconceived  before  they  calculated 
— indeed,  that  all  minds  must  preconceive  before  they 
calculate  ;  and  the  necessary  conception  that,  amid  indefi 
nite  variety  there  still  must  exist  fixed  laws,  go  to  show 
that  absolute  and  necessary  laws  must  somewhere  exist 
in  respect  to  bodies,  and  that  of  course  Somatology  must 
be  a  possible  and  real  philosophy. 

The  difficulty  in  the  way  of  determining  with  exact 
ness  this  branch  of  philosophy,  arises  from  the  vast  com 
pass  of  nature,  and  the  indefinite  diversity  admissible. 
It  cannot  be  doubted,  however,  that  Somatological  ideas 
in  the  form  of  prophetic  suggestions,  direct  the  investiga 
tions  of  science.  These  ideas  unite  with  phenomena  in 
the  inductive  process  through  which  science  is  determined. 
These  were  the  preconceptions  of  Newton  in  determining 
the  law  of  gravitation ;  and  of  Davy  in  inventing  the 
safety-lamp, 

LOGIC. 

In  the  Greek,  Aoyos  expresses  the  faculty  of  reason 
or  intelligence.  Aoyi&{j,aL  and  2vX\oyi&/j,ai  are  the  verbs 
expressing  the  action  of  this  faculty ;  the  latter  being 
particularly  appropriated  to  express  this  action  in  draw 
ing  conclusions  from  premises,  that  is,  syllogizing  or  pro 
ceeding  according  to  the  law  and  formula  of  the  2v\\oyt,o-- 


84  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 


/io?,  the  Syllogism.  Aoyi/cr)  (re^vrj  or  eTria-rri^,  under 
stood),  expresses  the  science  and  art  of  Reasoning,  or 
Loqic. 

Aoyi/c^,  or  Logic,  has,  indeed,  been  represented  as  a 
mere  art,  or  at  least  limited  to  such  forms  of  representa 
tion  as  to  convey  the  impression  of  a  mere  art.  It  is 
plain,  however,  that  under  its  highest  acceptation,  it  must 
refer  to  philosophical  principles  ;  for  if  in  relation  to  any 
part  of  our  being  we  are  stimulated  by  the  ^LXoao^ia  to 
enquire  after  the  laws  and  the  method  of  its  action  and 
development,  we  are  thus  stimulated  in  relation  to  the 
A,oyo9,  or  reason. 

The  Reason  is  the  faculty  of  knowledge  in  general. 
Logic  expresses  in  relation  to  the  Reason,  what  the  Morale 
expresses  in  relation  to  the  Will,  and  what  Esthetics  ex 
presses  in  relation  to  the  Sensitivity.  Reason  perceives 
and  knows  ;  seeks  and  arrives  at  truth.  But  what  are 
the  laws  which  regulate  its  perceptions  ?  What  are  the 
methods  which  it  pursues  in  seeking  after  truth  ?  What 
are  the  ultimate  grounds  of  its  knowledges  and  beliefs  1 
When  we  have  answered  these  questions,  we  have  Logic 
completed  as  a  branch  of  philosophy. 

Logic  takes  precedence  of  all  the  other  branches  of 
Nomology.  The  others  are  all  dependent  upon  it.  Laws, 
whether  belonging  to  the  morale,  esthetics,  or  somatology, 
are  all  based  upon  ideas  of  the  reason.  But  Logic  deter 
mines  the  legitimate  processes  and  characteristics  of  ideas 
themselves.  Again,  wherever  the  reason  acts,  there  must 
be  laws  to  determine  and  regulate  its  action.  Logic, 
therefore,  is  co-extensive  with  these  laws,  for  the  province 
of  logic  is  the  laws  of  the  reason.  But  as  reason  acts 
wherever  there  is  intellection,  it  acts  in  every  department 
of  philosophy  ;  and  hence  logic  permeates  the  whole. 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  85 

Logic  permeates,  but  does  not  absorb  the  whole. 
Logic  is  present  to  give  laws  to  thought,  investigation, 
and  ratiocination ;  but  these  laws  are  universal  and  irre 
spective  of  the  particular  subjects.  Each  subject,  there 
fore,  still  retains  its  distinctive  position,  characteristics  and 
aims.  Psychology  still  aims  to  determine  the  faculties  of 
the  mind ;  Dynamics,  the  forces  of  nature  ;  Anthropology, 
the  union  of  man  and  nature ;  Ontology,  the  reality  and 
distinctions  of  substance  ;  the  Morale,  the  laws  of  duty ; 
Esthetics,  the  laws  of  the  beautiful ;  Somatology,  the 
laws  of  bodies.  These  do  not  sink  into  Logic;  but  as 
Eeason  is  the  universal  organ  of  philosophical  construction, 
Logic  is  everywhere  present  as  the  light  and  atmosphere 
of  thought. 


86  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 


SECTION  XII. 

OF    THE    RELATIONS    BETWEEN    PHILOSOPHY,    AND    THE 
SCIENCES    AND    ARTS. 

PHILOSOPHY  and  Science  are  often  employed  as  identical 
terms.  Philosophy,  indeed,  is  science  ;  and  science,  if  not 
pure  philosophy,  is  closely  connected  with  it.  The  word 
science  is  strictly  used  in  the  sense  of  systematic  know 
ledge  in  relation  to  a  given  and  defined  subject ;  and  as 
in  every  such  system,  particular  phenomena  are  accounted 
for  and  explained,  the  science  puts  on  very  much  of  the 
air  of  philosophy.  But  what,  then,  marks  the  distinc 
tion  ? 

One  obvious  distinction  is  this,  that  philosophy  is  con 
versant  simply  with  principles  ;  while  in  a  science,  princi 
ples  are  applied  to  a  particular  subject.  In  the  science  of 
nature,  for  example,  the  philosophical  ideas  of  cause  and 
effect,  of  substance  and  properties,  and  general  somatologi- 
cal  laws,  are  applied  to  a  particular  class  of  phenomena. 

The  science  begins  with  the  phenomena,  as  the  condi 
tions  of  its  development :  and  when  the  phenomena  are 
reduced  under  common  causes  and  laws,  then  the  science 
is  determined  and  fixed.  But  philosophy  is  taken,  to  ac 
count  for  the  phenomena  in  the  general.  First  :  by 
affirming  that  there  must  be  causes  and  laws  :  Secondly, 
by  laying  down  in  logic  the  principles  of  induction,  inves- 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  87 

tigation,  and  deduction  :  Thirdly,  by  conceiving  somato- 
logical  causes  and  laws,  and  applying  them  tentatively  to 
the  phenomena. 

The  subjective  and  the  objective  make  up  the  sum  of 
all  knowledge,  actual  or  possible.  Philosophy  finds  its 
elements  in  the  subjective,  so  that  the  determination  of  the 
subjective  is  the  determination  of  philosophy.  Science  is 
conversant  directly  with  the  objective  ;  but  it  proceeds  by 
the  aid  of  the  subjective.  Its  aim  is  to  distinguish  and 
generalize  the  objective  into  particular  spheres,  under  par 
ticular  causes  and  laws. 

We  will  suppose  the  subjective  to  have  been  deter 
mined — we  will  suppose  the  mind  to  know  its  own  facul 
ties,  substance,  and  laws — and  to  know  the  external  world 
in  its  substance,  forces,  and  laws.  In  making  this  suppo 
sition,  we  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  the  subjective  is  thus 
antecedently  and  primarily  completed  before  science  begins. 
On  the  contrary,  the  developments  of  philosophy,  the  con 
structions  of  science,  and  the  inventions  and  workings  of 
art,  all  go  on  together.  But  for  distinctness  of  conception, 
and  in  order  to  show  forth  clearly  the  relations  as  well  as 
the  differences  of  the  two,  we  may  make  this  supposition. 
In  making  this  supposition,  I  bring  myself  into  possession 
of  Psychology,  Dynamics,  Anthropology,  Ontology,  Es 
thetics,  the  Morale,  Somatology,  and  Logic.  I  have 
named  my  reason,  will,  and  affections — I  have  distin 
guished  material  and  immaterial  substance — I  have  con 
ceived  of  the  universal  life  in  nature — of  powers  and  forces 
—and  of  laws  regulating  their  action.  I  have  in  the 
Morale  distinguished  the  just,  the  benevolent,  and  the 
true  ;  in  Esthetics,  I  have  conceived  of  the  absolute  laws 
of  beauty,  proportion,  and  sublimity  ;  in  Somatology,  I 
have  determined  the  necessary  laws  of  bodies  ;  and  in  re- 


88  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

lation  to  the  Season,  I  have  laid  down  the  formulas  of  a 
rigid  logic. 

Now,  what  is  the  passage  from  the  purely  subjective  to 
the  objective  ?  We  shall  endeavor  to  give  the  answer. 

Science  is  divided  into  the  pure,  exact,  universal, 
and  absolute,  and  the  mixed,  contingent,  limited,  and 
variable. 

The  first  embraces  the  pure  mathematics.  The 
mathematical  sciences  are  pure,  because  incapable  of  being 
formed  out  of  sensible  representations.  They  are  exact, 
because  never  falling  short  of,  and  never  transcending  the 
principles  and  axioms  on  which  they  are  based.  They  are 
universal,  because  never  admitting  of  exceptions.  They 
are  absolute,  because  it  is  inconceivable  that,  in  any  rela 
tion,  or  by  any  power,  they  are  capable  of  being  changed. 

Natural  science,  on  the  contrary,  is  mixed,  because, 
although  admitting,  nay,  demanding  the  application  of 
the  principles  of  exact  and  pure  science,  still  it  has  such 
material  properties,  and  properties  so  foreign  to  the  pure 
science,  as  to  prevent  the  strict  application  of  these  prin 
ciples.  Body  is  in  space,  and  assumes  forms  in  its  con 
formations,  and  moves  through  lines  in  performing  its 
revolutions,  which,  in  the  way  of  analogy,  may  be  called 
geometrical ;  and  these  forms  and  lines  may  be  taken  as 
grounds  of  many  important  conclusions  deduced  by  means 
of  geometrical  principles  ;  but  the  mathematical  astrono 
mer  knows  full  well,  and  takes  care  not  to  neglect  the  dif 
ference,  between  the  pure  and  absolute  geometry  of  his 
mind,  and  the  rough  sphericity  of  the  planets,  and  the 
jagged  lines  of  their  orbits.  If  geometry  were  a  philoso 
phy,  then  its  difference  from,  and  its  relations  to,  natural 
science,  would  form  an  intelligible  illustration  of  the  dis 
tinctions  and  relations  of  philosophy  and  science. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN    GENERAL.  89 

GEOMETRY. 

Geometry,  however,  is  a  science,  and  our  first  aim  is  to 
distinguish  it  from  philosophy,  as  well  as  to  show  its  rela 
tions  to  philosophy.  The  philosophy  upon  which  geometry 
is  constructed,  comprises  ontology  and  logic.  But  ontology 
enters  into  it  only  so  far  as  space  is  concerned.  That 
space  is  not  body,  that  it  is  infinite  and  necessary ;  the 
definitions  of  the  point,  of  lines,  surfaces,  and  solids,  all 
belong  to  ontology  in  the  determination  of  their  absolute 
separation  from  substance,  and  their  independent  and  un 
changeable  verity. 

The  point  is  a  conception  of  absolute  and  indivisible 
unity.  But  although  a  unity,  perfect  and  absolute,  it 
cannot  be  called  a  quantity  ;  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  the 
absolute  negation  of  all  quantity  ;  it  is  not  length — it  is 
not  breadth — it  is  not  thickness  ;  but  it  is  where  quantity 
begins.  We  assume  this  point  in  space,  by  our  thought, 
and  then  quantity  is  supposed  to  be  formed  in  one  direc 
tion  ;  and  the  least  departure  from  the  point,  in  one 
direction,  forms  the  line  or  simple  extension.  This  line 
must  of  necessity  be  curved  or  straight.  Then  quantity  is 
supposed  to  be  formed  in  two  directions  ;  and  the  least 
departure  from  the  point  in  two  directions  forms  length 
and  breadth,  or  surface.  Surface,  likewise,  must  of  neces 
sity  be  either  plane  or  curved.  Then,  again,  quantity  is 
supposed  to  be  formed  in  three  directions  ;  and  the  least 
departure  from  the  point,  in  three  directions,  forms  length, 
breadth,  and  thickness,  or  the  solid.  Solid,  again,  must 
of  necessity  be  composed  of  plane  or  curved  surfaces. 
Quantity,  as  thus  conceived  of,  is  exact  quantity,  because 
it  has  absolute  limitations. 

This  conception  of  quantity  is  a  pure  ontological  con- 


90  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 

ception  of  the  reason — not  ontological  positively  as  denn 
ing  a  particular  substance,  but  negatively  as  defining  a 
quantity  absolutely  independent  of  substance. 

Having  the  pure  quantity  thus  given,  we  may  now  be 
gin  to  use  it  for  the  purpose  of  scientific  construction. 
And  now  come  in  the  other  philosophical  elements,  viz.  : 
— those  belonging  to  Logic.  There  are,  1.  The  axioms— 
the  conceptions  of  agreement  and  difference — of  equality 
and  inequality — of  a  whole  and  its  parts — of  measure  and 
proportion.  2.  The  deductive  formula. 

As  far  as  the  conception  of  space,  of  the  point,  of  the 
pure  quantity,  and  of  the  logical  elements  goes,  we  have 
simply  philosophy.  But  when  we  proceed  to  construct 
out  of  this  pure  quantity  a  variety  of  definite  figures,  and 
to  consider  their  particular  relations,  and  to  apply  to  them 
the  logical  axioms  and  formula,  for  the  purpose  of  eliciting 
particular  conclusions  in  the  form  of  regular  propositions 
or  theorems,  we  give  birth  to  determinate  science.  It  is 
true,  indeed,  that  the  conclusions  of  geometry  are  univer 
sal  and  absolute,  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  questioned 
that  geometry  is  a  most  philosophical  science ;  but,  never 
theless,  it  is  justly  considered  a  science,  inasmuch  as  ante 
cedent  principles  are  applied  to  a  particular  material  or 
subject,  which  principles  are  true,  wholly  independently 
of  the  subject  to  which  they  are  applied.  All  the  axioms 
and  the  logical  formula,  are  manifestly  of  this  character  ; 
and  the  conceptions  of  a  point,  and  of  pure  quantity  be 
ginning  there,  although  more  immediately  connected  with 
the  geometrical  constructions,  are,  nevertheless,  indepen 
dent  and  general : — A  point — a  line— a  surface— a  solid, 
may  be  thought  of  independently  of  all  particular  forms, 
relations,  and  propositions. 

While  thus  the  philosophy  and  the  science  are  distinct, 


PHILOSOPHY   IN    GENERAL.  91 

the  relation  between  the  two  is  most  intimate  arid  impor 
tant.  The  philosophy  may  exist  without  the  development 
of  the  science  ;  but  the  science  cannot  be  formed  without 
the  philosophy.  The  philosophy  does  not  require  the 
science,  either  to  account  for  it,  or  to  make  it  more  plain  • 
but  the  science  refers  directly  back  to  the  philosophy  as 
its  only  basis,  and  affording  the  only  means  of  its  expli 
cation. 

SCIENCES    OF    DISCRETE    QUANTITY. 

Arithmetic  and  algebra,  in  like  manner,  have  their 
philosophical  basis.  They  do  not  begin  with  absolute 
unity  in  forming  their  quantities  ;  the  idea  of  unity  as  a 
philosophical  idea,  is  antecedent  to,  and  independent  of, 
these  quantities  ;  but  although  their  unit,  always  assumed 
and  ever  variable,  cannot  represent  the  absolute  and  in 
variable  unit,  still  it  has  its  origin  as  a  conception  of  unity 
in  the  absolute  and  pure  idea.  Here,  also,  we  have  uni 
versal  axioms,  conceptions  of  abstract  quantity,  of  equality, 
difference,  measure  and  proportion,  and  logical  formulae. 
When  we  come  to  apply  these  antecedent  and  independent 
elements  of  thought,  and  primary  conceptions,  to  the  re 
lations  of  a  particular  class  of  quantity — to  discrete  quan 
tity,  for  the  purpose  of  arriving  at  particular  solutions  and 
theorems,  we  construct  a  science  ;  and,  indeed,  we  may 
be  almost  said  to  invent  an  art — an  art  of  representing 
quantities  and  relations,  of  giving  deductions  in  detail,  and 
of  solving  problems. 

Here,  again,  the  distinction  between  the  philosophy 
and  the  science  is  clear,  as  well  as  the  intimate  and  im 
portant  relations  between  the  two.  It  must  be  evident, 
also,  that  the  same  philosophical  ideas  and  principles, 
give  birth  to  distinct  sciences,  as  in  the  case  of  geometry 


92  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW    OF 

and  arithmetic.  The  distinction  of  these  sciences  is 
grounded  upon  the  distinction  of  their  subject  matter. 
The  subject  matter  in  both  is  quantity  ;  but  in  one  it  is 
continued  quantity  ;  and  in  the  other,  discrete  quantity  ; 
or  the  one  is  quantity,  beginning  at  an  absolute  limit,  and 
increasing  itself  by  extension  in  space  ;  the  other  is  quan 
tity  beginning  with  any  assumed  unit,  and  increasing  or 
diminishing  itself  indefinitely,  by  addition  and  division. 
In  the  one,  we  consider  the  relations  of  figures  formed  of 
lines  and  surfaces  ;  in  the  other,  the  relations  of  numbers, 
as  abstract  and  universal  quantities,  capable  of  represent 
ing  any  real  quantities  whatever,  on  condition  that  these 
quantities  be  divisible  into  units.  In  respect  of  both,  we 
have  the  same  general  ideas,  axioms  and  logic. 

NATURAL    SCIENCE. 

I  shall  take  this  as  a  general  designation,  embracing 
Mechanics,  Astronomy,  Magnetism,  Hydrostatics,  Physi 
cal  Dynamics  in  general,  Chemistry,  and  so  on. 

I  do  not  intend  to  convey  the  idea,  that  every  thing 
thus  embraced  under  this  designation,  is  strictly  scien 
tific  ;  there  is  much  that  is  still  theoretic.  I  comprise  them 
all  under  this  designation,  because  they  refer  to  phenomena, 
which  in  their  psychological  relations  are  of  one  kind.  All 
these  phenomena,  are  phenomena  of  sensation,  or  of  mus 
cular  resistance,  which  is  closely  connected  with  sensation. 
The  quantities  of  geometry  and  arithmetic,  and  of  the 
pure  mathematics  generally,  have  an  existence  wholly  in 
dependently  of  the  senses  ;  but  all  the  forms,  movements, 
and  phenomena  generally,  of  natural  science,  are  made 
known  in  the  consciousness  by  the  correlations  of  external 
substance  with  the  senses,  or  by  a  resistance  to  the  mus- 


PHILOSOPHY   IN    GENERAL.  93 

cular  organism.  By  careful  and  repeated  observations, 
that  is,  by  addressing  our  senses  to  their  correlative  ob 
jects  without, — by  investigations  and  experiments, — we 
acquaint  ourselves  with  the  various  sensuous  phenomena, 
and  their  characteristics.  These  phenomena  are  next 
classified  by  resemblances  and  differences,  and  by  common 
relations  ;  and  are  attempted  to  be  explained  by  the  as 
signment  of  causes  and  laws.  In  making  this  assignment 
we  may  at  first  merely  hypothesise  the  causes  and  laws  : 
the  system  built  up  in  this  way  is  merely  a  theory,  and 
not  demonstrated  science.  A  theory  is  taken  up  for  the 
time  being,  with  the  understanding  that  it  is  subject 
either  to  be  confirmed,  or  to  be  wholly  set  aside,  accord 
ingly  as  more  extended  experiments  and  observations  shall 
enable  us  to  decide.  A  science  has  for  its  basis,  not  mere 
hypothetical  causes  and  laws,  but  causes  and  laws  de 
monstrated  and  fixed. 

Now,  in  constructing  a  natural  science,  we  have  re 
course  both  to  philosophy  and  to  pure  science. 

1.  We  have  recourse  to  philosophy.  Ideas  of  time  and 
space  ; — of  substance  and  attributes  ; — of  cause  and  ef 
fect  ; — of  law  ; — of  quantity,  relation,  measure,  and  pro 
portion  ;  ideas  of  distributed  life  and  distributed  causality ; 
of  central,  and  diffusive  movement ;  distinctions  of  the  sub 
jective  and  the  objective,  and  of  personal  and  impersonal 
manifestations  ;  the  conception  of  generic  wholes,  and 
specific  differences  ;  ideas  of  unity,  multiplicity,  and  to 
tality  ;  the  relations  and  distinctions  of  the  finite  and  the 
infinite  ;  a  knowledge  of  logical  formulas  ;  a  knowledge  of 
mind,  as  the  seat  of  all  power,  wisdom,  design,  and  gov 
ernment — all  work  together  in  the  scientific  construction. 
It  is  impossible  to  step  forth  into  this  wide  field  of  natural 
phenomena,  without  having  metaphysical  and  nomologi- 


94  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW    OF 

cal  questions  crowded  into  the  mind  ;  and  every  attempt, 
whether  to  build  up  a  theory  or  a  science,  is  made  upon 
the  basis,  and  in  the  light  of  philosophy.  These  first 
ideas,  principles,  and  distinctions,  are  presumed  by  every 
one  ; — the  mind  elaborates  science  under  their  spontaneous 
influence,  even  where  they  are  not  defined  and  compre 
hended  in  known,  philosophical  systems. 

2.  We  have  recourse  to  pure  science,  or  the  mathema 
tics.  The  mathematics  are  the  science  of  pure  quantity 
—of  simple  extension  from  the  absolute  point  ;  and  of 
abstract  number.  But  physical  bodies  take  upon  them 
selves  forms  analogous  to  geometrical  forms  ;  and  move  in 
lines  analogous  to  geometrical  lines  :  their  distances,  mag 
nitudes,  densities,  temperatures,  attractions,  velocities, 
times,  &c.,  are  capable,  also,  of  being  represented  com 
paratively  by  numbers.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that 
mathematical  principles  may  be  employed  in  the  deter 
mination  of  physical  relations  and  laws.  But  still,  should 
conclusions  drawn  on  mathematical  principles  respecting 
bodies,  assume  the  perfect  geometrical  form  of  bodies,  or 
regard  them  as  pure  and  exact  quantities,  there  would, 
of  necessity,  be  error  in  the  conclusions.  The  mathema 
tics  are  conversant  with  pure  space  and  abstract  number ; 
but  body  has  properties  entirely  foreign  and  peculiar. 
Hence,  in  the  determination  of  physical  science,  there  is 
not  an  absolute,  but  a  conditional  application  of  mathe 
matical  principles.  It  is  thus  that  the  mixed  mathema 
tics  are  produced. 

It  thus  appears,  in  natural  science,  that  the  material 
of  the  construction  is  that  part  of  the  objective,  embracing 
the  sensuous  phenomena  ;  that  the  ultimate  grounds  of 
the  construction  lie  in  pure  subjectivity  or  philosophy ; 
that  the  preparations  for  the  construction  are  experiment, 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  95 

observation,  and  classification  ;  and  that  the  immediate 
organon  of  the  construction  is  the  mathematics.  Deduc 
tive  and  inductive  logic  are,  indeed,  employed  in  the  con 
struction,  but  not  as  an  immediate  organon  ;  they  are  a 
part  of  the  all-penetrating  and  governing  philosophy — the 
deductive  logic  pervading  the  mathematics  throughout, 
and  the  inductive  appearing  in  the  determination  of  every 
general  principle  from  particular  observations. 

Let  us  now  sum  up  the  preceding  observations.  PHI 
LOSOPHY  is  the  knowledge  of  the  subjective,  the  absolute, 
the  primary,  and  the  universal ; — SCIENCE  is  the  know 
ledge  of  the  objective  within  particular  spheres,  under 
philosophical  conceptions,  and  with  laws  determined  in 
relation  to  particular  phenomena.  Philosophy  is  com 
plete  without  phenomena  :  Science  must  be  constructed 
out  of  phenomena.  Philosophy  comprehends  :  Science  is 
comprehended. 

CONDITIONAL    AND    UNCONDITIONAL    SCIENCE. 

Geometry  can  have  no  relation  to  phenomena  of  the 
exterior  consciousness — it  cannot  be  constructed  out  of 
these  phenomena.  But  to  the  phenomena  of  the  interior 
consciousness  it  is  related — it  is  constructed  out  of  these 
phenomena.  We  have  seen  that  after  the  formula  of 
logic,  the  idea  of  space,  and  the  conceptions  of  a  point, 
and  of  quantity,  in  one,  two,  and  three  directions  are 
given,  as  the  necessary  and  the  absolute  ;— the  mind  pro 
ceeds  to  construct  certain  definite  figures  in  space,  and  to 
consider  their  relations  in  the  light  of  the  principles  al 
ready  developed  ;  and  so,  also,  with  respect  to  discrete 
quantities,  it  proceeds  to  the  formation  of  signs  and  sym 
bols  as  representatives  of  these  quantities  and  their  general 


96  INTKODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

relations  ;  and  proposes  to  itself  various  problems  for  so 
lution.  This  particular  and  definite  action  of  the  intelli 
gence  presents  us  the  phenomenal  of  the  interior  con 
sciousness. 

The  principles  and  conceptions  above  referred  to,  are 
independent,  primary,  and  necessary ;  and  the  action  of 
the  intelligence  in  comprehending  them  as  knowledges,  is 
accounted  for  only  in  the  fact  that  they  are  essential  and 
inseparable  elements  of  thought.  The  intelligence  cannot 
think  without  logic  :  it  cannot  form  cognitions  upon  sen 
sation,  without  space — and  the  very  idea  of  space  involves 
the  point  absolute,  and  extension  in  three  directions ; 
number — as  the  one — the  many — the  total— is  no  less  a 
necessary  element.  The  intelligence  within  its  actual  re 
lations  and  conditions  cannot  go  into  action  without  them. 
But  it  is  not  necessary  that  it  should  go  on  to  form  the 
triangle,  the  circle,  the  sphere,  the  polyhedron,  and  pro^ 
blems  in  discrete  quantity  ;  when  it  does  so,  it  presents 
phenomena  to  the  interior  consciousness  which  demand  to 
be  accounted  for  by  something  antecedent  ;  and  when  the 
antecedent  principles  are  appealed  to,  these  phenomena 
become  a  material  out  of  which  exact  and  pure  sciences 
are  constructed. 

Reflection  will  show  the  analogy  between  this  case  and 
that  of  natural  science,  in  its  relation  to  the  exterior  con-* 
sciousness.  Cause  and  effect,  substance  and  attributes, 
space,  law,  designing  and  governing  mind — we  cannot 
suppress  the  ideas  of  these  amid  the  phenomena  of  nature, 
the  intelligence  cannot  form  its  simplest  cognitions  i 
pendently  of  them.  Neither  could  the  objects  of  our 
nitions  be  supposed  to  exist  without  these.  But  these 
primary  ideas  and  principles  can  be  supposed  to  exist 
without  our  particular  cognitions  and  their  objects.  Now, 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  97 

our  cognitions  of  the  external  world,  by  our  sensations, 
are  the  phenomena*  which,  by  philosophical  principles, 
and  the  organon  of  the  mathematics,  we  form  into  natural 
science.  In  the  same  way,  by  philosophical  principles, 
and  by  logic  in  particular,  do  we  form  pure  and  exact 
science  from  our  cognitions  of  these  forms  of  space,  and 
numerical  problems.  The  science  in  both  cases  lies  in 
the  determination  of  particular  laws  governing  particular 
relations. 

In  the  case  of  the  pure  and  exact  science,  the  law  is 
absolute  and  unalterable  :  but  this  arises  from  the  nature 
of  the  object  of  the  cognition  : — forms  in  space,  generated 
from  the  absolute  point,  and  abstract  numbers,  are  ojects 
given  in  the  pure  reason,  and  are,  therefore,  as  absolute 
and  unchangeable  as  the  reason  itself :  but  bodies  in  space 
are  objects  given  in  sensation,  and  because  contingent,  are 
capable  of  indefinite  changes.  While,  however,  the  pre 
sent  constitution  of  bodies  remains,  the  laws  demonstrated 
of  their  particular  relations  must  remain.  In  the  one 
case,  the  law  determined  is  universal  in  the  particular  re 
lations  of  the  quantities,  unconditionally,  because  the  quan 
tities  themselves  are  absolute  :  in  the  other  case,  the  law 
determined,  in  the  particular  relations  of  the  quantities, 
is  universal,  conditionally,  because  the  quantities  them 
selves  are  contingent. 

This,  obviously,  lays  a  ground  for  a  distinction  of  the 
sciences. 


I.— UNCONDITIONAL  AND  ABSOLUTE  SCIENCE. 

This  embraces,  as  we  have  seen,  the  pure  mathe 
matics. 

*  The  secondary  phenomena :  vide  Sec.  VIII. 
5 


98  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

To  this  may  be  added  the  science  of  ethics,  or  the 
determination  of  particular  laws  for  the  particular  rela 
tions  which  moral  and  responsible  beings  stand  in  to  God, 
to  each  other,  and  to  inferior  beings.  As  these  relations 
are  immutable,  so  the  science  formed  by  the  application 
of  general  philosophical  principles  to  the  phenomena 
appearing  in  them,  must  be  immutable  likewise. 

The  science  of  the  civil  law,  or  jurisprudence,  is  also 
to  be  ranked  among  unconditional  sciences,  because,  based 
upon  immutable  moral  relations.  The  distinction  between 
ethics  and  jurisprudence  is  simply  this ;  Ethics  is  the  sci 
ence  of  right  and  wrong,  in  its  application  to  the  relations 
of  moral  beings  universally ;  jurisprudence,  in  its  applica 
tion  to  these  relations  as  they  appear  under  a  particular 
government,  in  a  particular  state.  The  laws  of  ethics 
belong  to  man  as  man ;  the  laws  of  jurisprudence  belong 
to  man  as  the  citizen  of  an  organized  commonwealth.  In 
the  constitution  of  government,  man  cannot  lose  his  in 
herent  nature,  and,  consequently,  cannot  be  lawfully  com 
pelled  to  violate  any  principle  of  necessary  rectitude  ;  but, 
still,  in  the  constitution  of  government,  he,  as  a  moral 
being,  comes  into  peculiar  and  marked  relations.  It  is, 
indeed,  true,  that  in  the  utmost  scope  of  ethics,  juris 
prudence  would  be  comprehended  within  its  definition. 
The  usage  which  has  distinguished  the  two  sciences,  has 
not  separated  or  opposed  the  cardinal  principles. 


II.— CONDITIONAL  SCIENCE. 

This  exists  on  condition  that  the  relations  of  the  phe 
nomena  remain  unchanged.  All  the  natural  or  physical 
sciences  are  of  this  description.  The  great  laws  of  As- 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  GENERAL.  99 

tronomy,  for  example,  accurately  determined  as  they  are, 
and  forming  a  stupendous  and  glorious  body  of  science,  are, 
nevertheless,  science,  only  while  the  constitution  of  the 
universe  remains  as  it  is.  Let  the  relations  of  the  pheno 
mena  be  changed,  and  the  present  science  is  destroyed. 
Now,  it  is  plainly  conceivable  that  changes  might  take 
place,  to  an  indefinite  extent.  We  can  set  no  bounds  to 
Omnipotence  in  modifying  the  forms  of  physical  being 
and  the  constitution  of  planetary  systems.  The  distinc 
tions  of  right  and  wrong,  the  nature  of  truth,  justice,  and 
benevolence,  can  be  changed  no  more  than  God  himself 
can  be  changed ;  but  our  thought  does  not  attach  the 
same  immutabilitv  and  necessity  to  natural  forces  and  laws. 


ART. 

We  have  defined  Philosophy — we  have  defined  Science 
— and  shown  the  relation  of  the  former  to  the  latter  ; 
but  it  remains  to  define  Art,  and  to  show  the  relation 
which  the  first  two  hold  to  it. 

Art,  in  common  usage,  is  confined  to  express  the  exer 
tion  of  human  causality  for  the  modification  of  bodies  ac 
cording  to  principles  and  rules. 

The  most  enlarged  idea  of  art  is  given  in  the  work 
of  creation  itself,  by  the  Almighty  and  Allwise  Creator. 
The  creation  everywhere  exhibits  design,  law,  and  skill. 
We  may,  therefore,  without  any  figure  of  speech,  call  God 
the  first  and  Great  Artist  and  Mechanician.  He  created, 
arranged,  and  finished,  according  to  principles  and  rules 
which  his  own  exhaustless  intelligence  supplied.  The 
variety,  the  number,  the  nice  and  elaborate  perfection,  the 
beauty,  benignity,  and  glory  of  his  works,  exceed  not  only 
our  actual  knowledge,  but  the  utmost  flight  of  our  im- 


100  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

agination.  From  the  glimpses  which  astronomy  furnishes 
of  the  extent  and  the  continual  advance  of  creation,  we 
are  irresistibly  led  to  the  conviction,  that  the  mind  will 
find  new  objects  to  observe  and  admire,  throughout  its 
immortality. 

Human  art  is  comparatively  a  feeble,  yet  a  beautiful 
copy  of  the  Divine.  God  formed  the  substances  together 
with  their  properties,  upon  which  human  skill  is  exercised. 
He  fixed  the  laws  under  which  this  skill  must  accomplish 
its  ends.  We  imitate  the  beauty  of  nature,  or  improve 
upon  it,  only  by  observing  these  properties  and  laws.  If 
we  attempt  to  do  violence  to  them,  we  are  not  long  wait 
ing  for  a  rebuke  of  our  folly,  and  a  demonstration  of  our 
weakness.  But  if  we  fall  in  with  the  suggestions  of  nature, 
and  work  according  to  the  principles  and  rules  on  which 
she  has  been  constituted,  then  the  arts  of  utility  and 
beauty  will  appear,  rich  and  manifold,  and  the  human  will 
become  both  a  co-worker  with  the  Divine,  and  an  instru 
ment  of  completing  its  projections. 

Now,  in  analyzing  human  art,  we  are  led  to  perceive 
its  connexion  with  both  philosophy  and  science. 

1.  With  philosophy.  This  appears  in  the  ideas  under 
which  it  works.  There  is,  in  the  mechanical,  or  useful 
arts,  generally,  the  idea  of  utility  itself — the  idea  of  im 
proving  upon  the  actual  forms  and  arrangements  of  nature, 
and  of  adapting  them  more  perfectly  to  our  wants,  actual 
or  fanciful.  This  idea  is  the  forecasting  thought,  and  the 
propelling  energy  of  the  reason  itself,  and  hence  is  an  ele 
ment  of  pure  philosophy. 

In  the  fine  arts  appear  the  ideas  of  proportion,  grace, 
symmetry,  congruity,  and  harmony — forming  the  complex 
idea  of  beauty.  This  idea  leading  to  all  improvements 
upon  the  beauty  of  the  existing  forms  of  nature,  as  in 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  101 

landscape  gardening,  for  example ;  and  to  the  creation  of 
new  forms  of  beauty,  as  in  statuary,  architecture,  paint 
ing,  music,  and  poetry,  has  its  origin  also  in  the  pure 
reason,  and  is,  therefore,  a  philosophic  element. 

2.  With  science.  Science  being  the  determination  of 
the  laws  governing  the  relations  of  phenomena,  as  they 
spring  forth  in  succession  from  causality,  the  artist,  when 
he  undertakes  a  work,  either  of  imitation  or  creation,  is 
bound,  in  the  use  of  materials,  and  in  the  arrangement 
of  parts,  to  observe  these  laws.  He  not  only  works  under 
the  inspiration  of  pure  ideas,  or,  in  other  words,  the  con 
ception  of  the  ideal,  but  working  in  the  field  of  nature, 
he  works  in  obedience  to  her  material  constitution — her 
fixed  properties  and  laws.  In  architecture,  he  works  under 
ideas  of  proportion,  congruity,  grace,  and  dignity ;  but, 
at  the  same  time,  he  must  regard  the  properties  of  his 
materials,  and  pay  the  utmost  respect  to  mechanical  laws. 
In  musical  composition,  he  is,  indeed,  led  on  by  the  ideas 
of  melody  and  harmony ;  but  in  producing  and  arranging 
the  sounds  which  form  the  material  of  the  art,  he  cannot 
dispense  with  physical  laws.  Similar  illustrations  may  be 
given  in  relation  to  the  other  fine  arts. 

That  the  mechanician,  and  the  inventor  of  arts  of 
utility,  base  their  operations  upon  scientific  laws,  requires 
no  illustrations. 

EULES  OF  ART  are  explicit  specifications,  expressed 
clearly  in  language,  and  by  diagrams,  and  numbers,  with 
respect  to  form,  measure,  proportion,  combination,  and 
adjustment.  They  lay  down  in  simple  terms  how  the 
causality  must  execute  a  given  work.  They  direct  the 
application  of  physical  skill. 

An  individual  may  be  a  crude  philosopher,  and  raw 
and  uninstructed  in  science ;  but  still,  he  may,  by  long 


102  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 

practice,  acquire  the  skill  of  obeying  rules  of  art.  The 
philosophy  and  the  science  implied  in  the  rules,  and  from 
which  the  rules  were  deduced,  he  is  incompetent  to  ex 
plain,  and  does  not  even  comprehend ;  but  skilfully  and 
readily  adjusting  his  physical  instrumentality  under  the 
simple  directions  of  the  rules,  he  rears  the  stately  temple, 
or  fashions  and  arranges  the  curious  machinery  of  the 
watch.  Such  men  are  mere  copyists  or  mechanics. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENEKAL.  103 


SECTION  XIII. 


PHILOSOPHY  is  the  knowledge  of  mind  and  nature  in  their 
faculties,  forces,  substances,  and  laws  ;  and  the  knowledge 
of  truth  conceived  of  as  independent  of  all  being. 

Science  is  the  knowledge  of  phenomena,  as  accounted 
for,  reduced  under,  and  regulated  by,  these  faculties,  forces, 
substances,  and  laws.  Art  is  reproduction,  imitation,  and 
creation,  by  human  causality  and  skill,  under  the  light  and 
authority  of  philosophy  and  science. 

Phenomena,  or  the  purely  objective,  are  the  immediate 
experiences  or  objects  of  consciousness  ;  and  are  either  ex 
periences  of  the  action  of  pure  reason,  and  simple  choice 
and  volition,  or  of  sensations  depending  upon  correlative 
objects  without. 

The  metaphenoinenal,  or  the  subjective  general,  are 
the  realities  of  being  and  truth,  which  do  not  form  the 
immediate  experiences  of  consciousness,  but  are  known 
mediately  through  these  experiences. 

Philosophy  relates  to  our  whole  being :  but  in  con 
structing  philosophy  as  a  system,  our  whole  being  does 
not  form  the  organ  of  this  construction.  Philosophy  is 
not  a  creation  of  the  will :  nor  is  it  an  outflow  of  the 
emotions  and  passions.  There  is  but  one  faculty  which 
can  claim  to  be  the  organ  of  philosophy,  and  that  is  the 
REASON. 


104  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 

The  Keason  is  the  faculty  of  all  perception,  whether 
by  immediate  intuition,  or  by  mediate  representation  or 
deduction ;  whether  of  the  interior  or  the  exterior  con 
sciousness;  whether  of  the  past,  the  present,  or  the  future; 
whether  of  the  actual  or  the  possible,  or  of  the  probable 
or  the  impossible  ;  whether  of  phenomena,  or  of  being  and 
truth ;  whether  of  cause  or  law.  All  perception  and  all 
knowledge  belong  to  this  one  faculty. 

Now  that  the  Keason  should  perceive  the  movements 
or  phenomena  of  the  other  faculties,  and  assign  them  their 
laws  in  the  Esthetics  and  the  Morale;  and  that  it  should 
perceive  all  forms  of  being  and  truth  taken  as  objective  to 
itself,  seems  to  present  no  difficulties.  But  how  does  the 
reason,  while  perceiving  all  else,  perceive  likewise  its  own 
acts  or  phenomena  ;  and  while  giving  out  the  laws  of  the 
other  faculties,  give  out,  likewise,  its  own  laws,  thereby 
constructing  Logic  ? 

The  difficulty  here  presented,  it  will  be  perceived, 
consists  in  the  fact  that  the  reason  must  perceive  its 
own  phenomena,  while,  in  order  to  develope  phenomena 
itself,  it  is  engaged  in  perceiving  something  objective  to 
itself;  it  must  give  out  the  laws  which  regulate  its  own 
movements,  while,  in  order  to  develope  these  laws,  it  is 
engaged  in  determining  laws  for  some  other  faculty,  or  in 
some  similar  exercise  upon  that  which  lies  without  its  own 
immediate  subjectivity.  How  can  I  observe  my  own  per 
ceptions  and  thoughts,  and  the  laws  which  regulate  my 
perception  and  thinking,  when  the  acts  of  perceiving  and 
thinking  imply  that  the  reason  is  intent  upon  objects? 
And  if  the  reason  be  supposed  to  withdraw  itself  from 
objects  for  the  purpose  of  examining  itself,  then,  again, 
how  can  the  reason  examine  itself  without  calling  itself 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  105 

into  action  by  fixing  itself  upon  objects — which  is  a  re 
currence  of  the  same  difficulty? 

The  difficulty  is  to  be  answered  by  simply  appealing  to 
the  fact — the  fact  of  consciousness.  In  the  very  act  of 
thinking  or  perceiving,  and  when  I  am  drawing  conclu 
sions,  or  forming  cognitions,  I  am  conscious  of  these  acts. 
The  reason  has  this  twofold  capacity  of  knowing  phe 
nomena,  and  being,  and  truth,  external  to  its  own  subjec 
tivity  ;  and  of  knowing,  at  the  same  time,  its  own  acts 
and  its  own  subjectivity  in  tkese  acts.  This  is  spontaneous 
and  necessary  self-knowledge. 

The  deduction  of  the  laws  of  its  own  operations,  and 
the  construction  of  logic,  can  be  effected  only  by  reflection 
or  philosophical  consciousness. 

The  reason,  when  it  perceives,  thinks,  or  ratiocinates, 
does  so  under  the  consciousness  of  its  own  acts,  and  under 
convictions  of  the  reality  and  truth  of  its  operations.  Its 
development  begins  and  goes  on  to  an  indefinite  extent 
spontaneously,  before  it  pauses  to  look  back  upon  its 
course,  in  order  to  trace  out  the  laws  of  its  own  movement. 
In  this  way,  not  only  had  cognitions  of  an  outward  world 
been  formed,  and  many  admirable  principles  in  morals, 
law,  and  government,  been  determined,  but  even  geometry 
itself  had  been  carried  to  a  high  degree  of  perfection, 
before  logical  investigation  had  become  ripe.  It  is,  there 
fore,  not  merely  by  attending  to  our  thinking  and  reason 
ing  in  their  going  on,  that  we  arrive  at  the  laws  of  logic. 
In  the  actual  developments  of  the  reason  appearing  in 
works  of  science  and  art,  and  in  all  the  institutions  of 
society,  there  are,  as  it  were,  diagrams  and  charts  which 
the  reason  can  inspect  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  its 
own  laws.  But,  then,  even  in  inspecting  these,  it  renews 
in  the  consciousness  the  original  processes ;  and  does  not 

5* 


106  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW    OF 

really  intermit  the  exercise  of  its  remarkable  function,  of 
knowing  the  laws  of  its  own  movements,  while  these  move 
ments  are  actually  going  on  in  reference  to  that  which  is 
objective  to  itself.  These  diagrams  and  charts  are  of  the 
utmost  importance,  because  they  render  reflection  more 
easy,  by  presenting  the  work  of  investigation  and  deduc 
tion  as  already  completed.  Under  these  circumstances, 
the  renewal  in  the  consciousness  of  the  original  processes 
is  effected  with  no  great  effort,  and  thus  the  reason  is  en 
abled  to  bend  its  strength  to  .acts  of  reflection  and  philo 
sophical  insight.  The  difference  may  easily  be  conceived 
of,  by  supposing  Euclid  to  have  engaged  in  determining 
the  abstract  and  universal  laws  of  deduction  during  his 
first  efforts  at  geometrical  construction ;  or  to  have  com 
pleted  his  geometrical  construction  under  the  spontaneity 
of  the  reason,  and  then  to  have  reflected  upon  the  opera 
tions  of  his  reason  in  this  construction,  for  the  purpose  of 
eliciting  universal  laws  of  deduction. 

Taking  the  reason,  then,  as  the  organ  of  philosophy, 
how  are  we  to  decide  when  we  have  attained  a  genuine 
philosophy  ?  This  question,  undoubtedly,  is  of  the  highest 
importance,  for  a  great  many  spurious  philosophies  have 
appeared.  In  these  prolegomena  to  my  main  purpose,  I 
have  no  opportunity  to  enter  into  minute  elucidations  ;  I 
am  only  indicating  thoughts.  It  would  be  no  ordinary 
undertaking,  by  itself,  to  determine  the  criteria  of  a  true 
philosophy  : — What,  then,  can  be  accomplished  in  a  few 
pages  ! — But  as  an  artist,  where  he  is  not  in  a  condition 
to  give  a  finished  work,  can  still,  by  a  few  lines  and 
touches,  give  an  intelligible  and  striking  outline,  so  at 
least  as  to  attract  contemplation,  to  stir  up  thought,  and 
to  make  the  beholder  desire  a  perfect  picture,  or  rather  to 
go  and  examine  the  original, — be  it  a  quiet  scene  of  hills 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  10*7 

and  plains  and  flowing  rivers,  or  of  wild  rocks  and  woods 
and  cataracts,  or  the  noble  ruins  of  an  old  and  mysterious 
temple ;  so  here,  a  few  hints  and  rough-hewn  thoughts 
thrown  out  may  serve  a  good  end,  by  leading  ingenious 
readers  to  put  forth  their  thoughts  afresh,  and  perhaps  to 
correct  their  past  conclusions. 


108  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW    OF 


SECTION  XIV. 

THE    CRITERIA    OF    A    TRUE    PHILOSOPHY. 

ALL  that  is  secondary  to  philosophy,  and  dependent  upon 
it,  of  course  requires  no  other  ground.  Philosophy  accounts 
for  and  explains  every  thing  beside  itself — it  is  the  final 
authority. 

Hence,  there  is  an  empirical  way  of  testing  a  philoso 
phy.  There  are  a  multitude  of  knowledges  abroad  among 
men,  generally  received  and  believed — nay,  received  and 
believed  so  confidently,  that  he  who  should  question  their 
reality,  would  be  regarded  as  destitute  of  common  sense, 
and  unfit  for  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  society.  A 
philosophy  which  appears  to  uphold  these  favorite  convic 
tions — to  be  the  ultimate  and  unquestionable  ground  of 
them,  is  taken  as  a  well-attested  philosophy. 

Now,  I  would  not  utterly  reject  these  empirical  criteria. 
They  have  their  use,  an  eminently  practical  use,  and  one 
adapted  to  the  people  at  large.  There  are,  for  example, 
certain  convictions  of  a  moral  and  religious  nature,  which 
widely  pervade  the  human  mind,  and  are  the  very  life  of 
the  common  social  system.  Men  are  tenacious  of  these, 
and  that  for  the  best  of  reasons,  viz.,  the  close  connexion 
in  which  they  stand  to  all  that  is  most  dear  and  valuable. 
It  is  just  and  worthy  in  human  nature  to  cling  to  any  phi 
losophy  which  clearly  appears  to  sustain  high  and  invalu 
able  beliefs. 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  109 

But,  while  making  these  admissions,  we  must  still  insist 
upon  other  criteria,  lying  farther  back,  and  which,  indeed, 
are  implied  in  those  which  we  have  above  adverted  to ; 
and  that  for  two  plain  reasons  :  First,  The  empirical  cri 
teria  can  have  no  legitimate  authority  in  themselves.  This 
is  evident,  since  the  secondary  knowledges  are  assumed  to 
establish  that,  without  which  they  could  have  no  reality. 
The  secondary  knowledges  by  hypothesis  require  an  ulti 
mate  basis — they  are  not  self-evident,  they  are  not  neces 
sarily  true  ;  but  their  ultimate  basis  consists  of  philosophical 
principles,  and  the  very  principles  which  they  are  employed 
to  establish.  Now,  we  may  not  prove  an  antecedent  by  a 
consequent,  and  that,  too,  when  it  is  granted  that  this 
consequent  requires  for  its  own  basis  the  very  antecedent 
which  it  is  taken  to  prove. 

And  if  it  be  admitted  that  those  irrepressible  and  firm 
spontaneous  convictions  to  which  we  have  alluded,  are  an 
authority  and  basis  in  themselves,  it  will  be  found  upon  an 
accurate  analysis  that  the  spontaneous  convictions  do  not 
arise  from  the  phenomenal  and  secondary,  but  from  the 
absolute  and  primary,  which  penetrates  and  sustains  the 
phenomenal  and  the  secondary.  For  example  :  One  man 
is  observed  giving  another  man  a  purse  of  money,  and  the 
observer  has  an  irrepressible  and  firm  conviction  that  the 
act  is  right.  By  why  has  he  this  conviction  ?  Because, 
by  supposition,  he  knows  that  it  is  given  in  benevolence, 
or  in  payment  of  a  just  debt.  Now,  the  payment  of  a 
debt  cannot  be  taken  to  prove  the  principle  of  justice,  nor 
the  giving  of  money  to  prove  the  principle  of  benevolence  ; 
but  the  principle  of  justice  commands  the  payment  of  the 
debt,  and  the  principle  of  benevolence,  the  relief  of  the 
needy.  From  observing  the  benign  influences  of  certain 
acts,  I  may  commend  that  philosophy  which  elevates  them 


110  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 

into  immutable  moral  principles  ;  but  then  these  benign 
effects  require  the  existence  of  such  principles  in  order  to 
account  for  their  manifestation.  By  inducting  phenomena 
we  may  arrive  at  a  principle,  but  the  principle  arrived  at 
must  have  had  a  pre-existence  in  order  to  render  the  phe 
nomena  possible.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  philoso 
phy  is  incorporated  with  our  proper  being ;  and  enlightens, 
guides,  and  determines  us  even  when  we  do  not  recognize 
it  by  reflection,  and  are  too  unlearned  to  name  it  as  for 
mally  laid  down  in  systems. 

To  one  untaught  in  systematic  philosophy,  a  very 
natural  prejudice  would  spring  up  in  favour  of  some  phi 
losophy  named  to  him,  if  he  were  informed  that  it  lay  at 
the  bottom  of  his  warmest  and  noblest  feelings  and  beliefs  ; 
but  it  is  perfectly  plain  that  this  philosophy,  if,  in  reality, 
lying  at  the  bottom  of  these  mental  phenomena  of  the  in 
dividual  in  question,  would  really  be  that  which  gave  rise 
to  these  phenomena.  This  individual  may  be  satisfied 
with  it,  from  its  supposed  connexion  with  his  beliefs  and 
sentiments ;  but  it  could  never  be  legitimately  determined 
by  such  criteria.  We  must  determine  independently  of 
the  individual,  whether  his  beliefs  have  a  true  basis  ;  that 
is,  whether  they  are  philosophical  or  unphilosophical : 
hence  the  proper  criteria  must  be  independent  of  the  phe 
nomenal  of  the  individual  mind. 

Secondly,  The  empirical  criteria  cannot  be  legitimate 
in  determining  the  truth  of  a  philosophy,  because,  in  them 
selves  they  do  not,  in  the  first  place,  sufficiently  provide 
against  the  introduction  of  error  ;  and  in  the  second  place, 
it  is  a  matter  of  history  that  errors  have  actually  been  in 
troduced  in  this  way. 

In  the  first  place,  they  do  not  in  themselves  sufficiently 
provide  against  the  introduction  of  error.  Opinions  and 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  Ill 

beliefs  may  be  connected  in  the  human  mind  with  many 
other  particulars  besides  an  innate  philosophy.  They  may 
be  connected  with  prejudices  of  nation,  family,  and  sect ; 
with  pride,  ambition,  favorite  pursuits  and  pleasures.  If 
an  innate  philosophy  always  governed  our  opinions  and 
beliefs,  then  they  would  always  rise  above,  and  be  inde 
pendent  of,  these  other  connexions.  But  so  far  from  this 
being  the  case,  these  other  connexions  do  often  exclusively 
determine  them,  and  in  spite  of  the  innate  philosophy. 
It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  if  actual  opinions  and  beliefs  are 
to  settle  our  philosophy,  it  will  not  only  have  an  ultimate 
basis  beyond  itself,  which  is  absurd  in  the  very  enunciation, 
but  this  ultimate  basis  also,  will  be  just  as  various,  muta 
ble,  conflicting,  and  impure,  as  human  passions  them 
selves.  It  is  impossible,  then,  in  this  way,  to  settle  what 
is  a  true  philosophy. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  it  is  a  matter  of  history,  that 
errors  have  been  introduced  in  this  way.  The  instances 
of  Galileo  and  Abelard,  may  be  taken  as  types  of  a  multi 
tude  that  might  be  sought  out  and  adduced.  Both  were 
severely  persecuted  for  resisting  philosophies  which  had 
their  origin  in  the  prejudices  of  a  learned  unthinkingness  ; 
and  in  the  pride  and  ambition  of  a  corrupt  hierarchy. 
The  current  opinions  demanded  different  philosophies  from 
those  broached  and  expounded  by  these  great  apostles  of 
freedom  of  investigation  and  thought. 

Every  man  holds  certain  opinions  in  common  with  his 
nation,  his  family,  his  political  party,  or  his  religious  sect. 
Are  these  opinions  all  based  upon  sound  philosophy  ?  No 
one  would  contend  for  such  an  absurdity.  These  opinions 
conflict  with  each  other ;  they  cannot,  therefore,  all  be  true. 
But  if  the  mere  strength  of  an  opinion,  and  the  zeal  in  ad 
vancing  it,  are  to  be  taken  as  among  the  sure  criteria  of 


112  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

philosophy,  then  we  shall  establish  a  multitude  of  philoso 
phies  at  war  with  each  other,  and  all  upon  an  equally 
secure  basis.  Philosophy  is  a  word  of  such  awful  and  mo 
mentous  import  and  authority,  that  both  he  who  advocates 
old  opinions,  and  he  who  attempts  to  introduce  new  ones  ; 
both  the  venerator  of  unchanging  institutions,  and  the  re 
former  and  revolutionist ;  both  orthodoxy  and  heresy ; 
both  bigotry  and  liberalism,  will  be  ambitious  of  its  titles, 
and  of  marching  under  its  banners. 

From  this  Babel-like  confusion  of  tongues — from  this 
light  rendered  murky  by  the  dust  and  steam  of  furious 
conflicts,  we  must  retire  to  a  calm  and  elevated  region, 
where  quiet  thought  has  its  home  ;  and  where  the  "  light" 
is  "  dry"  and  pure.* 

In  introducing  the  criteria  of  a  true  philosophy,  I  will 
name  one  thing — not,  perhaps,  really  ranking  among  the 
criteria  strictly  defined,  but  yet,  the  invariable  attendant 
of  such  a  philosophy  : — It  is  the  quality  which  character 
izes  the  spirit  of  the  philosophy.  Philosophy  is  truth, 
nothing  but  truth,  and  truth  immutable,  arrayed  in  the 
glory  and  majesty  of  her  own  eternity.  Now,  that  phi 
losophy,  which  has  developed  itself  in  a  mind  which  loves, 
fears,  and  adores  truth,  with  a  filial  spirit ;  which  takes 
up  its  cross  and  follows  truth  with  an  entire  devotion ; 
which  counts  all  things  else,  whether  they  be  the  preju 
dices  of  family,  sect,  or  nation — or  old  titles  of  honor  won 
in  the  service  of  powerful  and  honored  creeds  and  dogmas 
of  the  church  or  of  the  schools, — but  loss,  for  the  excel 
lency  of  the  knowledge  of  truth — counting  truth  all  gain, 
and  confiding  in  her  with  heartiness,  fearing  no  evils — 
willing  to  endure  all  trials,  and  joyfully  and  certainly  ex- 

*  "  Lumen  siccum." — Bacon. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  113 

pecting  a  satisfactory  and  peaceful  end, — that  philosophy 
recommends  itself  at  once  to  respectful  and  earnest  atten 
tion,  and  gives  promises  which  cannot  well  deceive  us.  For 
as  God  hath  made  the  mind  for  the  apprehension  of  truth, 
and  hath  set  forth  before  it  a  world  of  glorious  truths  for 
it  to  apprehend,  so  we  cannot  but  hope,  nay,  feel  a  strong 
confidence,  that  an  ingenuous  spirit,  looking  out  after  the 
marks  of  truth,  humbly,  purely,  and  freely,  as  the  eye, 
tired  of  the  darkness,  looks  out  for  the  morning  light,  will, 
according  to  the  harmonious  constitution  given  it,  find  her 
resplendent  presence,  and  be  accepted  as  her  oracle,  to 
make  known  her  laws. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark,  also,  that  a  preparation  of 
mind  is  necessary,  as  well  for  the  study  of  philosophical 
principles  announced,  as  for  undertaking  an  announcement 
of  them.  A  genuine  philosophical  spirit  is  the  pre-requi- 
site  of  good  learners,  as  well  as  of  good  teachers.  The 
want  of  this,  indeed,  has  been  the  great  obstacle  to  the 
inculcation  of  truth  in  all  ages  of  the  world. 

There  always  have  been  men  of  ingenuous  and  honest 
minds,  and  designed  by  Heaven  to  be  the  lights  of  their 
age,  whose  teachings,  if  the  multitude  had  listened  to, 
there  would  have  been  a  wide  diffusion  of  wholesome  know 
ledge  and  pure  morality.  Thus  would  the  philosophy  and 
ethics  of  Socrates,  as  an  example  among  the  heathen,  and 
the  sublime  revelations  of  prophets  and  apostles  among 
the  chosen  people,  have  revolutionized  society,  by  destroying 
old,  stagnant  errors,  and  bringing  in  rational  and  heavenly 
truths.  But  it  hath  ever  been  the  folly  of  men,  that  al 
though  having  eyes  to  see,  and  ears  to  hear,  and  under 
standings  to  perceive,  they  have  chosen  old  traditions,  and 
familiar  errors,  before  new  instructions,  simply  because 
these  instructions  demand  at  the  first  an  honest  confession 


114  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 

of  ignorance,  or  impose  new  labors,  or  are  opposed  to 
dearly  cherished  prejudices  and  passions.  Bacon,  in  his 
great  work,  has  exposed  these  enemies  of  new  investiga 
tions,  and  revolutionizing  truths,  where  they  He  in  the 
human  heart.  The  "Idols  of  the  Tribe,"  or  those  preju 
dices  which  belong  to  infirm  human  nature  generally  ;  the 
"  Idols  of  the  Den,"  or  individual  prejudices — the  idiosyn- 
cracies  of  the  man  ;  the  "  Idols  of  the  Market-place,"  or 
the  prejudices  connected  with  set  forms  of  speech  in  the 
announcement  of  opinions  and  dogmas — where  venerable 
phrases  are  mistaken  for  grave  truths  ;  the  "  Idols  of  the 
Theatre,"  or  prejudices  connected  with  wild  and  startling, 
but  idle  theories.  When  these  "Idols"  are  worshipped 
by  the  philosopher,  he  can  make  no  new  discoveries,  unless 
by  accident,  and  then  he  will  be  prone  to  distort  them. 
When  they  prevail  among  the  people, — that  is,  the  read 
ing  people,  those  who  are  seeking  for  information  in  differ 
ent  ways,  and  with  different  degrees  of  interest, — solid 
and  rational  truths  can  gain  friends  but  slowly,  and  are 
liable  to  be  silenced  by  the  authority  of  public  opinion,  the 
rebukes  of  the  church,  or  even  by  the  force  of  civil  law. 

It  holds  true  in  philosophy,  as  well  as  in  religion,  that 
the  sower  may  go  forth  to  sow,  and  sow  none  but  good 
seed,  and  yet  if  the  hearers  be  impracticable,  the  labor 
will  be  in  vain,  and  the  precious  seed  will  be  lost  ;  and  it 
is  only  in  the  good  and  honest  heart  that  truth  finds  a 
proper  soil,  in  whose  rich  depth  she  sends  forth  her  roots, 
and  springs  up  an  immortal  fruit. 

In  proceeding  to  the  direct  enquiries  respecting  the 
criteria  of  a  true  philosophy,  we  cannot  well  avoid  adopt 
ing  as  a  leading  thought,  the  subject  of  the  preceding  sec 
tion,  "  Reason  the  Organ  of  Philosophy."  If  reason  con 
struct  philosophy,  she  must  be  immediately  conversant 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  115 

with  these  criteria  ;  and  as  she  is  the  faculty  of  all  know 
ledges,  she  must  be  the  last  authority  in  determining  them. 

But  where  shall  these  criteria  be  sought  for?  We 
have  shown  that  they  cannot  be  empirical.  Experience 
may  be  the  condition  of  their  development — may  suggest 
them  ;  but  they,  in  themselves,  must  be  subjective.  Phi 
losophy  is  subjective  and  metaphenomenal.  The  criteria 
of  a  true  philosophy  must  be  subjective  and  metapheno 
menal  likewise.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  the  criteria  must 
be  sought  for  in  the  pure  Keason  itself. 

I  will  begin  with  Logic  as  an  illustration.  Logic  gives 
the  laws  of  all  ratiocination.  But  how  do  I  know  when  I 
have,  in  this  respect,  attained  a  true  philosophy  ?  I  do 
not  go  to  the  common,  concrete  reasonings  of  men  on  vari 
ous  subjects.  They  may  confidently  believe  their  current 
conclusions — they  may  deem  them  of  the  utmost  impor 
tance  :  but  the  aim  of  Logic  being  to  test  the  legitimacy 
of  these  conclusions,  it  cannot  go  to  them  as  criteria. 
What,  then,  is  my  only  remaining  resource  ?  Why,  to  go 
to  the  Keason  itself,  and  ask  it  whether  these  principles 
can  be  otherwise  than  true — whether  their  falsity  is  con 
ceivable,  or  possible  ?  The  Reason  gives  the  answer,  from 
its  perfect  insight  or  intuition  ;  and  beyond  this,  there 
can  be  no  appeal.  Is  there  any  other  way  of  determining 
the  truth  of  the  "  dictum  de  omni  et  nullo  ?"  Whatever 
be  the  philosophical  conception — whether  substance,  cause, 
proportion,  harmony,  space,  or  time  ; — whatever  be  the 
philosophical  law — whether  of  Esthetics  or  the  Morale,  or 
belonging  to  Logic, — its  reality  and  truth  can  evidently 
be  settled  only  by  an  appeal  to  the  Reason.  What  the 
Reason  intuitively  perceives,  and  undoubtingly  affirms, 
must  be  reality  and  truth.  The  only  legitimate  way  of 
arriving  at  philosophy,  is  to  question  the  Reason  :  and  so, 


116  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW   OF 

likewise.,  the  only  true  method  of  testing  any  system 
claiming  to  be  philosophy,  is  to  bring  it  in  its  parts,  its 
relations,  and  in  its  constituted  wholeness,  under  the  re 
view  of  the  Keason,  as  the  faculty  of  intuition — of  original 
insight. 

I  may  remark  here,  that  we  are  claiming  in  the  deter 
mination  of  philosophy,  no  more  than  what  the  mathema 
tician  claims  in  the  determination  of  his  science.  How 
shall  we  test  the  definitions  and  axioms  of  Geometry — ex 
cept  by  a  direct  appeal  to  the  intuition  of  Keason  ?  Nay, 
in  every  step  of  the  long  chains  of  reasoning  drawn  out 
from  these  definitions. and  axioms,  the  exact  relations  and 
dependencies  defy  the  possibility  of  error,  by  submitting 
themselves  to  the  intuition  of  Keason. 

There  is  such  a  thing,  then,  as  appealing  directly  to 
Keason,  and  receiving  a  reply  of  more  authority  than  the 
hearing  of  our  ears,  or  the  seeing  of  our  eyes  ;  since  what 
is  generally  received  as  the  most  exact  and  unquestionable 
of  all  the  sciences,  continually  holds  it  up  to  our  view. 
If  it  belong  to  the  mathematics,  much  more  must  it  be 
long  to  philosophy,  which  furnishes  the  ultimate  grounds 
even  of  this  science. 

Philosophy,  when  taken  up  according  to  a  true  method, 
becomes  rigid,  exact,  authoritative.  It  is  only  when  wan 
dering  from  this  method,  that  vague  and  mutable  theories 
and  fancies,  which  belong  neither  to  heaven  nor  earth,  but 
which  seem  grotesquely  to  partake  of  both,  become  phi 
losophies,  falsely  so  called.  Indeed,  so  rife  has  this  tribe 
of  vain  and  fanciful  theorists  ever  been,  that  we  might  ad 
duce  in  illustration  of  the  emptiness  which  may  belong  to 
a  current  opinion,  the  very  general  opinion,  that  philoso 
phy  is  but  an  ever-changing  mysticism,  which  every  new 
adept  may  mould  to  his  peculiar  fancies. 


PHILOSOPHY   IN   GENERAL.  117 

There  have  been  two  classes  of  men,  called  philosophers, 
in  all  ages.  The  one,  very  numerous,  and  composed  of 
these  vain  theorists.  The  other,  generally  embracing  the 
few,  and  plainly  distinguishable  from  the  former,  first,  by 
elevating  philosophy  from  a  mere  deduction  from  experi 
ence,  or  a  mere  expedient  created  to  answer  an  end,  to 
the  dignity  and  permanency  of  a  system  formed  out  of  the 
primary  and  intuitive  perceptions  of  pure  Eeason  ;  and, 
secondly,  by  the  identity  of  the  system  itself,  exhibiting 
clearly  that  the  same  conception  of  philosophy,  and  the 
same  method,  was  transmitted  from  age  to  age,  if  not  in 
books,  yet  in  the  elemental  working  of  the  human  mind 
itself;  and  showing  the  true  philosopher  to  be  a  most 
natural  and  genuine,  although  a  rare  manifestation  of  hu 
manity. 

The  criteria  are  all  embraced  in  the  fact  of  the  Kea- 
son's  authoritative  affirmation.  They  are  capable,  how 
ever,  of  receiving  a  specific  enunciation. 

I.  A  philosophical  truth,  in  its  very  nature,  is  incapa 
ble  of  being  defined  and  demonstrated  by  any  thing  going 
before.     The  aim  of  philosophy  is,  as  the  ultimate  ground 
of  knowledge,  to  define,  demonstrate,  and  account  for  that 
which  in  its  nature  is  incapable  of  standing  alone,  and  re 
quires  something  antecedent  to  define,  demonstrate,  and 
account  for  it.     There  must  be  such 'primary  truths,  for 
if  there  were  not,  there  would  be  an  infinite  retrogressus 
of  thought  in  the  labor  of  defining  and  proving  ;  there 
would  be  no  ultimate  ground  for  the  repose  of  enquiry. 

II.  A  philosophical  truth  must  be  perfectly  clear,  and 
attended  with  no  doubtfulness.     It  is  incapable  of  being 
defined  and  demonstrated,  both  because  it  is  primitive, 
and  because  there  really  is  nothing  clearer  than  itself  by 
which  to  define  and  demonstrate  it.     For  example,  the 


118  INTRODUCTORY   VIEW   OF 

idea  of  space  is  incapable  of  being  defined  and  bemon- 
strated,  not  only  because  there  is  nothing  before  it,  which 
comprehends  it,  and  therefore  adequate  to  defining  it,  but 
also  because  it  is  in  itself  eminently  clear  and  certain. 
That  space  exists,  I  affirm  with  the  utmost  confidence. 
If  I  attempt  to  represent  space  by  body,  or  to  attain  to  its 
utmost  stretch  by  the  multiplication  or  enlargement  of 
bodies,  my  mind  soon  becomes  confused  ;  but  this  confu 
sion  arises,  not  from  any  obscurity  inherent  in  the  idea  of 
space,  but  from  the  absurd  attempt  to  represent  that  un 
der  the  phenomena  of  the  senses,  which  is  not  attained  by 
sensation,  and  is  indeed  antecedent  to,  and  independent 
of,  all  phenomena. 

III.  A  philosophical  truth  is  a  pure  intuition  of  the 
Keason.  It  must  be  seen  without  doubtfulness — it  must 
be  affirmed  with  a  posit iveness  which  admits  of  no 
rational  questioning  in  the  mind  in  which  it  developes 
itself.  But  these  characteristics  belong  only  to  intuitive 
truth. 

#  IV.  Philosophical  truths  being  in  a  high  and  peculiar 
sense,  elements  of  thought,  cannot  remain  unproductive 
where  thought  is  going  on.  Hence,  a  philosophical  truth 
must  make  its  appearance  somewhere  in  the  development 
of  humanity.  If  we  seek  for  it,  we  shall  find  it.  This 
cannot  well  be  confounded  with  the  empirical  criteria, 
against  which  objections  have  already  been  urged.  These 
criteria  suppose  us  to  begin  with  phenomena  as  the  basis 
of  the  philosophical  construction.  Here,  on  the  contrary, 
we  begin  with  the  truth  as  an  affirmation  of  the  Keason, 
and  seek  for  its  manifestations.  This  criterion  is  es 
pecially  useful  to  those  who  seize  a  truth  because  it  fills 
the  mind  with  a  sort  of  inexpressible  delight,  and  kindles 

•'     it  into  a  lofty  enthusiasm,  without  calmly  bringing  it  un- 


PHILOSOPHY    IN    GENERAL.  119 

der  the  eye  of  the  Keason.  It  will  serve  to  dissipate  this 
enthusiasm  and  delight,  and  to  bring  about  a  sober-mind 
edness,  to  call  upon  such,  to  search  for  the  manifestations 
of  the  supposed  truth  in  the  actual  phenomena  of  con 
sciousness. 

V.  Philosophy  cannot  legitimately  present  itself  under 
the  form  of  isolated  truths.     Keason  is  one  ;  and  hence  it 
developes  its  truths  woven  into  a  system,  and  constituting 
UNITY.     That  construction,  therefore,  cannot  be  received 
as  legitimate,  which  does  not  exhibit  the  most  perfect 
agreement  with  itself.     It  will  be  faulty  if  its  parts  ap 
pear  confused,  so  that  there  is  manifest  difficulty  in  de 
termining  whether  any  system  is  aimed  to  be  constituted ; 
or  if  the  parts  being  clearly  brought  out  and  arranged, 
they  fail  to  work  together,  and  are  incoherent. 

VI.  Philosophy  accounts  for  all  phenomena  ;  it  ac 
counts  even  for  error.     Not  that  the  error  is  the  birth  of 
the  Keason,  for  this  is  manifestly  absurd  ;  but  that,  Phi 
losophy   is   adequate    to   giving   an   explanation   of  the 
grounds,  the  possibilities,  the  causes,  and  the  modes  of 
error.     A  true  philosophy,  therefore,  as  a  system,  will  ac 
count  for  the  universe  as  a  system.     Of  course,  the  rea 
son  alone  can  judge  whether  the  one  accounts  for  the 
other.     We  are  thus  brought  back  to  its  simple  authority. 

The  criteria  above  given  must  speak  for  themselves. 
I  believe  a  careful  reflection  will  lead  to  their  approval  in 
the  mind  of  every  genuine  and  candid  philosopher.  If  all 
who  have  engaged  in  the  work  of  philosophical  construc 
tion,  had  governed  themselves  by  these  criteria,  there 
would  have  been  little  difference  among  them  ;  and  the 
world,  long  ere  this,  would  have  witnessed  philosophy 
taking  her  stand  as  the  Scientia  Scientiarum,  and  pos 
sessing  at  least  all  the  clearness  and  exactness  which  are 


120  INTRODUCTORY    VIEW,    ETC. 

claimed  by  many  sciences  dependent  upon  her.  But  when 
men  are  determined  to  preserve  their  "Idols"  at  all 
events  ;  they  are  prepared  either  to  discard  philosophy 
altogether,  or  to  make  her  the  mere  tire-woman  of  their 
prejudices  and  accidental  and  floating  opinions.  A  theory 
in  physics,  a  dogma  in  speculation,  a  creed  in  religion,  a 
name  or  a  degree  in  a  mutable  world,  are  permitted  to 
give  the  leading  thought ;  and  hence  they  seek  not  for 
philosophy  herself,  but  only  to  philosophise  ingeniously 
and  speciously,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  forms  of  truth  while 
they  preserve  the  body  of  error.  They  are  willing  to  im 
pose  upon  themselves, — why,  then,  should  they  scruple  to 
impose  upon  others  ? 


PART  II. 
PKELIMINABY  VIEW  OF  THE  SEASON. 


PART    II. 

PRELIMINARY  VIEW  OF  THE  REASON. 


SECTION  I. 

GENERAL    INTRODUCTORY    CONSIDERATIONS    RESPECTING 
THE    REASON. 

THE  Keason  can  be  comprehended  only  by  a  being  en 
dowed  with  reason.  That  which  knows  all  things  else, 
must  know  itself  likewise.  The  very  idea  of  objective 
knowledge  implies  self-knowledge. 

The  faculty  of  knowledge  can  be  known  only  through 
acts  of  knowing  in  the  consciousness.  What  are  these 
acts?  The  answer  is  easy,  for  there  is  nothing  more  fa 
miliar  to  consciousness.  You  know  this  book,  this  chair, 
this  table ;  you  know  this  mathematical  demonstration ; 
you  know  this  law  of  nature — the  gravitation  of  bodies ; 
you  knoiv  this  rule  of  morals — love  thy  neighbor  as  thy 
self;  you  know  what  happened  yesterday — that  the  sun 
rose  and  set ;  you  know  what  will  happen  to-morrow — 
that  the  sun  will  rise  and  set ;  you  know  the  ideal 
beauty  of  a  statue  or  a  landscape ;  you  know  axioms, 
first  principles,  and  generalizations  ;  you  know  space  and 
eternity.  If  you  ask,  What  is  it  to  know  ?  I  reply,  Look 


124  PKELIMINABY   VIEW   OF 

within  yourself — you  read  there  directly  what  it  is.  What 
other  answer  can  you  desire — what  other  answer  can  you 
obtain  1 

If  you  ask,  What  is  the  Keason  ?  I  reply,  it  is  that 
which  knows — the  knoiuing  substance,  if  you  please  ;  or, 
it  is  yourself,  as  far  as  you  are  a  knowing  being.  In  all 
this,  it  is  evident  that  we  do  not  advance  beyond  the  fact 
of  knowing,  and  the  conception  of  the  faculty  of  know 
ledge  in  general. 

But  what,  then,  is  the  aim  of  psychological  investiga 
tions  with  respect  to  the  Keason  ?  Does  not  the  whole 
enquiry  end  in  the  simplicity  and  obviousness  of  the  fact 
of  knowing? 

It  is,  indeed,  true,  that  whenever,  and  in  whatever 
relations,  the  Reason  is  exercised,  there  is  a  perpetual  re 
currence  of  this  fact :  a  perception  is  a  knowledge ;  an 
axiom  is  a  knowledge  ;  a  demonstration  is  a  series  of 
knowledges ;  and  all  the  relations  of  the  parts  in  the 
making  up  of  the  whole  ratiocination,  are  knowledges. 
But  there  must  arise,  upon  the  general  fact  of  knowing, 
many  enquiries  respecting  the  various  forms,  the  condi 
tions,  the  limits,  the  relations,  the  characteristics,  and  the 
certainty  of  knowledge ;  the  knowledge  of  the  actual,  as 
distinguished  from  the  knowledge  of  the  possible ;  the 
relative  determination  of  knowledge  by  the  inherent 
powers  and  forms  of  the  reason,  and  by  the  objects  of 
knowledge  themselves ;  knowledge,  primitive  and  intui 
tive,  and  knowledge  secondary  and  deductive.  All  these 
and  the  like  enquiries  must  be  related  to  the  psychology 
of  the  Reason. 

The  Reason  may  be  regarded  in  certain  points  of  view, 
as  the  cardinal  faculty  of  the  mind.  It  is  by  knowledge 
and  in  knowledge  that  we  live  and  move  and  have  our 


THE    REASON.  125 

being.  That  I  am — that  there  is  any  being  whatever — 
and  all  the  interests,  relations,  aims,  and  laws  of  being, 
can  be  possible  determinations,  only  on  the  supposition 
that  this  faculty  exists. 

Hence  men  generally  are  prone,  in  representing  mind, 
to  speak  of  it  simply  as  an  intelligence.  Let  Keason  be 
supposed  to  be  extinct,  and  all  other  faculties  are  virtually 
extinct  likewise.  Emotions  and  passions  are  dependent 
upon  perceptions  for  their  existence.  The  Will,  although 
a  cause,  and  self-determined,  could  not  go  into  action 
without  objects  and  aims  of  action.*  But  the  Keason, 
on  the  contrary,  can  be  supposed  to  exist  without  emotions, 
passions,  and  volitions.  Intelligence,  like  a  pure  "dry 
light,"  is  conceivable  without  consequential  emotions  and 
volitions  ;  but  emotions  and  volitions,  without  intelligence, 
are  inconceivable. 

The  Keason,  in  its  full  development,  presents  us 
various  forms  or  offices,  which  by  some  philosophers  are 
represented  as  distinct  mental  faculties.  Consciousness, 
sensation,  perception,  judgment,  abstraction,  conception, 
attention,  imagination,  fancy,  and  memory,  have  all  been 
analysed  as  distinct  faculties.  In  the  actual  constitution 
of  the  mind,  some  of  these  faculties,  so  called,  show 
largely,  when  analysed,  the  action  of  the  Will.  This  is 
true  particularly  of  attention,  abstraction,  and  fancy. 
But  as  far  as  they  express  intelligence,  I  take  them  to  be 
all  comprehended  in  the  Reason.  These  are  not  properly 
intellectual  faculties ;  but  the  intellectual  faculty,  under 
its  different  modes,  and  in  its  different  relations.  This  I 
shall  presently  exhibit.  In  the  outset,  let  us  accustom 
ourselves  to  look  upon  the  Keason  as  one.  It  indeed 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  p.  138, 


PRELIMINAKY    VIEW    OF 

exercises  various  offices ;  it  perceives,  it  judges,  it  draws 
conclusions,  it  imagines,  fancies,  and  remembers ;  but  it 
is  still  the  same  faculty — it  is,  in  all  these,  the  one  and 
indivisible  Eeason. 

The  Eeason,  as  the  faculty  of  knowledge,  must  have  a 
peculiar  constitution — it  must  be  constituted  for  its  office 
— it  must  be  constituted  to  know.  But  it  cannot  know, 
unlees  there  are  objects  of  knowledge — unless  there  is 
something  to  be  known :  and  that  which  is  to  be  known, 
must  likewise  have  its  peculiar  constitution  and  properties. 
Now,  if,  on  the  one  hand,  the  Eeason  does  not  make  its 
objects  in  the  very  act  of  knowing  them ;  so  likewise,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  objects  do  not  make  the  Eeason  in 
the  very  act  of  being  known.  The  Eeason  and  its  objects 
may  exist  in  relation  to  each  other,  but  they  exist  also 
independently  of  each  other.  I  speak  now  of  finite 
Eeason. 

In  the  Divine  and  Infinite  Eeason,  all  possible  forms 
of  being  and  truth  must  have  pre-existed  in  conception 
or  idea,  before  any  actual  development  or  creation  appeared 
in  time  or  space  : — And  whatever  actual  existence  or  de 
velopment  there  ever  has  been,  must  be  consequential  to 
the  forecast,  as  well  as  to  the  causality,  of  the  Divine 
mind.  But  in  the  constituted  and  finite  Eeason,  there  is 
no  dependence  of  its  objects  for  their  existence,  upon  itself. 
Every  form  of  truth,  every  form  of  being  beside  myself, 
would  have  a  perfect  existence,  although  I  did  not  exist. 
And  so,  also,  although  there  were  no  objects  for  my  reason, 
still,  as  a  real  intelligence,  it  would  have  its  fixed  and 
perfect  constitution.  Its  development  would,  indeed,  be 
impossible,  but  it  would  nevertheless  be  there,  ready  to 
be  developed  whenever  the  required  conditions  should  be 
supplied.  This  may  be  illustrated  by  the  analogy  of  a 


THE   KEASON.  127 

grain  of  wheat,  or  the  seed  of  any  plant.  Let  it  be  laid 
up  in  a  granary,  and  there  can  be  no  germination ;  but 
let  it  have  soil,  light,  heat,  and  moisture,  and  there  springs 
up  "first  the  blade,  and  then  the  full  ear."  But  the  seed 
had  its  own  life  and  peculiar  forms  before  it  was  introduced 
into  the  circumstances  and  conditions  of  germination. 
The  soil,  heat,  light,  and  moisture  communicated  no  life, 
or  distinctive  forms: — the  seed,  if  wheat,  was  perfect 
wheat  in  and  of  itself;  if  some  other  seed,  it  was  of  its 
kind,  perfect  in  and  of  itself.  The  soil,  light,  heat,  and 
moisture,  only  supplied  the  circumstances  and  conditions 
of  its  germination,  growth,  and  fruit-bearing.  So  the 
Keason ;  it  is  perfect  in  and  of  itself — it  has  its  own  life, 
energy,  and  distinctive  forms  inherent,  inseparable,  and 
independently  of  all  exterior  circumstances  and  conditions. 
The  presentation  of  objects  through  sensation,  is  like  soil 
to  the  seed ;  books,  conversation,  examples,  the  regular 
discipline  of  schools,  are  like  light,  heat,  and  moisture : 
these  are  requisite  to  its  germination,  growth,  develop 
ment,  perfection,  and  fruit-bearing;  but  all  that  comes 
forth  of  it,  comes  forth  of  its  own  forms,  capacities,  and 
richness,  as  the  Keason. 

Now,  it  is  very  interesting  and  instructive  to  think  of 
the  principle  of  life  and  the  distinctive  forms  of  seeds ; 
and  by  the  aid  of  the  microscope  to  look  within  its  store 
house  of  wonders — its  preparations  for  endless  propaga 
tion  and  increase  !  Surely,  he  who  thus  thinks  and 
examines,  knows  more  of  nature,  attains  to  more  truth, 
than  he  who  merely  plants  and  eats,  without  seeking  any 
thing  further. 

But  of  how  much  higher  moment,  to  comprehend,  if 
possible,  the  forms  of  our  own  intelligence  ! 

Is  it  possible  to  attain  to  this — can  I  know  the  inherent 


128  PRELIMINARY   VIEW   OF 

forms — the  fixed  and  independent  constitution  of  the 
Keason?  Can  I  find  out  with  what  preparations — with 
what  pre-constituted  and  adapted  capacities,  the  mind 
begins  to  know? 

The  earliest  development  of  Reason  must  be  sponta 
neous,  like  the  germination  of  a  seed  sown  in  the  soil. 
There  can  be  no  self-direction  and  forecast  before  know 
ledge  begins.  But  after  Keason  has  gone  out  to  an  indefi 
nite  extent  among  its  objects,  after  it  has  germinated, 
sprung  up,  and  increased  toward  perfection,  unlike  the 
plant,  it  has  the  power  of  reflection,  or  of  looking  back 
upon  the  process  of  its  development,  and  of  separating — 
at  least  so  far  as  to  establish  enquiries — between  its  in 
herent  and  pre-constituted  forms  and  capacities,  and  the 
circumstances  under  which  they  make  their  appearance. 
It  has  the  power  of  doing  in  relation  to  itself,  what  it  does 
in  relation  to  the  plant.  Nay,  may  not  its  self-knowledge 
be  presumed  to  be  more  perfect,  since  it  knows  the  plant 
by  observation,  while  it  knows  itself  in  the  interior  and 
most  intimate  consciousness  ? 

The  inherent  and  original  forms  and  functions  of  the 
Keason,  can  indeed  be  known  only  on  condition  of  ex 
perience  ;  but  when  known,  they  are  seen  to  have  an  d 
priori  existence.  They  are  not  known  d  priori,  under 
standing  by  this  that  they  are  known  independent  of  ex 
perience  ; — they  are  known  through  experience,  but  as  in 
their  nature  prior  to  it,  or  the  experience  would  not  itself 
have  been  possible. 


THE   REASON.  129 


SECTION  II. 

OUTLINE  OF  THE  IDEAS  AND  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  REASON. 

THE  pre-constituted  forms  or  elements  under  which  the 
Eeason  forms  cognitions,  and  assigns  laws,  are  called 
Ideas. 

The  capacities  of  the  Eeason  to  know  in  different 
modes  and  relations,  we  shall  call  its  Functions. 

Ideas  and  Functions  make  up  the  constitution  of  the 
Eeason. 

IDEAS. 

The  ideas  may  be  classified  in  two  ways- 
First  :  We  may  classify  them  as  Ideas  which  deter 
mine  our  cognitions,  and  Ideas  which  determine  our  ac 
tivity.  Under  the  first  head  would  be  comprised  the 
Ideas  of  time  and  space,  the  finite  and  infinite,  of  cause 
and  substance,  of  quantity  and  quality,  necessity  and  con- 
tingence,  and  the  categories  of  purely  cognitive  ideas  in 
general. 

Under  the  second  head  would  be  comprised — 
The  Idea  of  Utility, — that  which  gives  birth  to  human 
industry  and  all  its  achievements. 

The  Idea  of  Eight  and  Wrong, — that  which  gives 
birth  to  Ethics,  Law,  and  Eeligion. 

The  Idea  of  Beauty, — that  which  gives  birth  to  the 
Fine  Arts. 

6* 


130 


PRELIMINARY    VIEW    OF 


The  Philosophical  Idea, — that  which  leads  man  to  at 
tempt  the  explanation  of  his  own  development. 

This  classification,  however,  does  not  preserve  its  par 
ticulars  entirely  distinct,  for  the  last  class  determine  cog 
nitions  as  well  as  activities. 

We  may  therefore  adopt  a  second  method  of  classifica 
tion  according  to  the  philosophical  divisions  given  in  Part 
I.,  Sec,  XL  We  shall  then  have, 

I.  METAPHYSICAL  IDEAS.     II.  NOMOLOGICAL  IDEAS. 

The  first  determine  our  conceptions  in  Psychology, 
Dynamics,  Anthropology,  and  Ontology.  The  second  de 
termine  laws  in  the  Morale,  Esthetics,  Somatology,  and 
Logic. 

In  this  classification  we  accept  all  Ideas  as  cognitive 
in  their  character  ;  while  the  last  division  embraces  those 
only  which  have  the  additional  remarkable  characteristic 
of  becoming  laws  in  the  world  of  objective  reality.  * 

FUNCTIONS. 

I.  INTUITION,  or  the  function  of  primary  and  immedi 
ate  knowledge.     Ideas,  Axioms,  and  First  Truths  in  gen 
eral,  are  the  objects  of  this  function. 

II.  SENSUOUS  PERCEPTION,  or  the  function  of  forming 
cognitions  upon  sensations  or  the  phenomena  of  the  ex 
terior  consciousness. 

III.  ABSTRACTION  AND  GENERALIZATION.      It  is  by 
this  function  that  the  Keason,  taking  up  the  secondary 
phenomena,  first  views  particular  qualities  separately,  and 
then  makes  them  the  basis  of  extensive  classifications. 
The  quality  is  abstracted,  and  then  generalized  as  a  com- 

*  Vide  Part  I.,  Sec.  VII. 


THE    REASON.  131 

mon  sign  ;  and  its  name  becomes  the  name  of  the  class. 
Thus  are  formed  genera  and  species.  To  this  function  we 
are  indebted  for  a  clear  and  distinct  knowledge  of  things, 
and  the  formation  of  a  ready  and  convenient  language. 

IV.  JUDGMENT,  or  the  function  of  perceiving  the  agree 
ment  or  disagreement  between  two  cognitions,  united  as 
the  subject  and  predicate  of  a  proposition. 

V.  INVENTION,  or  the  function  of  finding  out  and  ap 
plying  principles  and  rules  for  the  demonstration  of  theo 
rems,  the  solution  of  problems,  and  the  construction  of 
machines  ;  and  of  making  experiments  for  the  determina 
tion  of  Science.      The  imagination  acts  conjointly  with 
this,  by  calling  up  in  the  mind  the  images  of  diagrams, 
and  of  models  or  archetypes  of  the  outward  construction. 

VI.  MEDIATE  PERCEPTION,  or  the  function  of  inferring 
or  deducing  conclusions  through  a  mediate  cognition,  as 
formally  exhibited  in  the  syllogism. 

VII.  INDUCTION,  or  the  function  of  examining  and 
arranging  the  secondary  phenomena,  so  as  to  determine 
their  causes  and  laws,  and  thus  to  construct  scientific 
systems. 

VIIL  MEMORY,  or  the  perpetuity  of  knowledge.  The 
Reason  which  knows,  retains  its  knowledges.  A  faculty 
of  knowledge  without  this  power  would  scarcely  deserve 
the  name. 

Perhaps  memory  is  too  identical  with  the  simplest  no 
tion  we  can  form  of  Reason,  to  be  called  a  function  ;  it  is 
rather  an  inseparable  characteristic. 

RECOLLECTION  is  more  properly  a  function.  The  act 
of  recollection  is  based  upon  memory.  Its  aim  is  to  bring 
a  permanent  knowledge  within  the  field  of  consciousness. 
The  energy  of  the  will  in  directing  and  holding  the  atten 
tion,  is  involved  in  this  act. 


132  PRELIMINARY    VIEW    OF 

Whatever  we  learn,  we  learn  in  certain  relations,  com 
monly  termed  association  of  ideas.  Hence,  when  our  past 
perceptions  re-appear,  they  appear  in  their  original  rela 
tions,  or  in  relations  nearly  akin  to  them.  Eecollection 
implies  a  dim  foreshadowing  of  the  knowledge  to  be  re 
called  in  some  of  these  relations  ;  upon  this  foreshadow 
ing,  the  cognitive  faculty  is  steadily  fixed,  until  the  whole 
comes  forth  in  distinct  form  and  fullness. 

ATTENTION,  which  some  have  set  down  as  an  intellec 
tual  faculty,  is  really  the  energy  of  the  Will  exerted  over 
the  Reason  in  its  several  functions. 

IX.  IMAGINATION.  Under  its  first  and  simplest  pre 
sentation,  this  is  the  function  of  knowing  objects  which 
have  form,  or  sensible  qualities  generally,  when  the  actual 
sensations  no  longer  exist.  Thus  in  every  act  of  memory, 
and  in  every  conception  of  the  distant,  where  the  objects 
were  originally  known  through  the  senses,  the  imagination 
revives  the  forms  and  sensible  qualities. 

Again,  the  Imagination  appears  as  a  mediatory  func 
tion  between  the  world  of  Ideas,  and  the  world  of  the 
Senses.  The  Imagination  forms  upon  the  Ideas,  Ideals  or 
Archetypes,  according  to  which  the  outward  constructions 
are  fashioned  and  related.  Even  in  respect  to  the  Divine 
Mind,  we  cannot  but  conceive  of  this  function  as  forecast 
ing  and  foreseeing  the  Universe  before  the  creative  act 
took  place.  The  finite  artist  and  mechanician — man,  pro 
duces  his  works  in  the  same  way. 

This  appears  in  the  Fine  Arts,  where  the  ideal  con 
ceptions  of  beauty  and  grandeur  constitute  the  models  or 
archetypes  of  the  forms  which  spring  up  under  the  chisel, 
and  upon  the  canvass,  or  which  speak  in  poetry.  This  ap 
pears  in  the  inventions  of  the  useful  arts,  and  in  scientific 
discovery ;  for  unquestionably,  the  imagination  forms 


THE    REASON.  133 

archetypes  of  mechanical  construction  and  scientific  sys 
tems.  The  Idea  is  not  always  strictly  followed,  and  hence 
the  Imagination  degenerates  into  a  fickle  and  wayward 
Fancy.  But,  nevertheless,  where  the  Idea  does  become 
productive  of  scientific  and  mechanical  results,  this  func 
tion  must  be  employed. 

Nor  is  the  imagination  excluded  from  the  sphere  of 
moral  conceptions.  Whenever  man  in  his  various  relations 
and  duties  becomes  the  subject  of  thought,  not  only  is  the 
Idea  of  right  and  wrong  the  determining  power  of  thought ; 
but  the  ideals  of  character,  also,  under  the  different  varie 
ties  of  moral  greatness  and  beauty,  present  themselves  in 
the  imagination  as  standards  with  which  to  compare  the 
actual,  or  archetypes  to  direct  the  creations  of  genius. 

The  highest  form  of  the  imagination  is  the  creative. 
Here  the  pure  Idea  generates  an  Ideal,  which,  surpassing 
the  beauty  of  any  natural  form,  inspires  the  artist  to  at 
tempt  a  work  of  corresponding  perfection.  Whatever  is 
created,  is  created  according  to  the  Idea.  The  Imagina 
tion  is  the  creative  function  of  the  same  faculty — the  Kea- 
son, — which  gives  forth  the  Idea. 

The  Imagination  is  thus  the  representative,  the  media 
tory,  and  the  creative  function. 

'Let  none  be  startled  or  offended,  when  it  is  said,  that 
man  produces  more  beautiful  proportions  and  forms  than 
nature.  Nature  and  man  are  both  servants  of  the  Infinite 
Mind  of  Beauty  and  Wisdom.  The  first  works  according 
to  fixed  and  necessary  laws,  without  choice  or  conscious 
ness  ;  the  second  works  according  to  the  same  laws,  but 
with  choice  and  consciousness  :  the  one  shadows  forth  the 
Divine  attributes  as  the  effect  related  to  the  cause  ;  the 
other  is  the  very  image  of  the  Divine.  Why  should  not 
God,  therefore,  empower  the  thoughtful  hand  of  man  to 


134  PRELIMINARY    VIEW   OF 

bring  to  light  certain  forms  of  beauty,  which  he  has  not 
committed  to  the  insensate  mechanism  of  nature  ?  Has 
not  the  Idea  of  the  Useful  stimulated  industry  to  make 
nature  more  commodious  and  bountiful  ?  And  why  may 
not  the  Idea  of  the  Beautiful  inspire  Art  to  make  nature 
more  beautiful  ? 

"  God  has  not  limited  man's  knowledge  to  that  which 
is  ;  but  has  enabled  him  to  perceive  that  which  may  be  ; 
and  when  he  proceeds  to  modify  God's  work,  he  is  not  a 
trespasser  and  a  violator,  but  a  more  noble  instrumental 
power,  by  which  God  gives  his  creation  a  higher  finish  and 
a  more  perfect  use."  * 

FANCY  is  arbitrary  imagination,  or  imagination  not 
governed  by  the  pure  Ideas  of  truth  and  beauty.  It  pre 
sents  us,  therefore,  not  Ideals,  but  humorous  and  gro 
tesque  images,  created  by  intentional  violations  of  esthetical 
laws,  and  incongruous  and  disproportioned  combinations. 
Beauty  and  truth  have  defined  and  perfect  archetypes, 
and  therefore  in  given  kinds,  a  limited  variety  ;  but  fan 
ciful  creations  can  have  no  assignable  limit,  inasmuch 
as  their  very  being  consists  in  sporting  with  all  law  and 
rule,  f 

X.  CONSCIOUSNESS,  is  that  function  of  the  Keason  by 
which  it  immediately  knows  phenomena.  J 

Consciousness  has  an  exterior  and  an  interior  direction. 
In  the  former  direction,  it  knows  the  phenomena  of  sensa 
tion  ;  in  the  latter,  the  phenomena  of  the  mental  activi 
ties  beyond  sensation.  In  the  exterior  and  interior  con 
sciousness,  we  have  all  phenomena  whatever,  for  we  have 
comprehended  here  all  the  possible  activities  of  our  being. 

If  we  enquire,  Whence  do  the  phenomena  of  conscious- 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  p.  130. 
f  Ibid,  pp.  133,  134.  |  Vide  Part  I.,  Sec.  II. 


THE    REASON.  135 

ness  arise  ?  the  only  rational  answer  that  can  be  obtained 
is,  that  they  arise  conjointly  from  the  simple  subjective, 
and  the  objective  general, — that  is,  when  these  form  a 
unition  in  knowing,  feeling,  and  willing.  There  can  be  no 
act  of  knowing, — that  is,  no  phenomenon  of  knowing,  un 
less  there  be  both  a  faculty  of  knowledge,  and  an  object  to 
be  known,  either  in  the  world  of  pure  Eeason  or  of  the 
Sense, — at  least,  an  object  which  shall  be  the  foundation 
of  the  cognitions  of  the  knowing  faculty :  even  dreams, 
and  the  wildest  imaginings,  have  some  relation  to  objective 
reality.  There  can  be  no  sensations,  unless  there  be  both 
a  sensitive  faculty  and  real  correlative  objects  ;  and  the 
same  with  respect  to  emotions  and  passions.  There  can 
be  no  volitions  unless  there  be  both  a  will  or  cause,  and 
objects  and  ends  of  causation.* 

From  this  unition  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective — 
unition,  but  not  contact — the  phenomenal  appears,  and  is 
immediately  known  by  the  Keason  in  its  function  of  con 
sciousness  ;  and  then  follow  all  the  other  functions  in  their 
due  place  and  order. 

SELF-KNOWLEDGE,  the  affirmation  Ego  sum,  I  AM,  in 
antithesis  to  the  objective  general — the  not  myself — is 
often  represented  as  a  form  of  consciousness,  and  thence 
called  self -consciousness.  This,  perhaps,  is  more  justly 
comprehended  in  the  intuitive  function,  since  the  self  is 
not  phenomenal,  and  therefore  cannot  be  immediately  re 
cognized  by  consciousness.  It  is  true,  however,  that  the 
antithetical  affirmation  stated  above,  is  the  most  primitive 
of  all  affirmations  : — in  the  very  unition  of  the  simple 
subjective  with  the  objective,  by  which  a  first  phenomenon 
is  given,  the  Reason  knows  the  two  terms,  and  makes  the 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  p.  138. 


136  PRELIMINARY    VIEW   OF 

affirmation  ;  and  with  the  consciousness  of  all  subsequent 
phenomena,  the  affirmation  is  continually  renewed.  There 
is,  therefore,  a  valid  ground  for  representing  self-knowledge 
as  a  form  of  consciousness  j  and  if  properly  explained  and 
distinguished,  the  representation  is  striking,  inasmuch  as 
it  expresses  the  intimate  union  of  mind  with  itself  when  it 
awakes  to  the  knowledge  of  its  own  being.* 

EEFLECTION,  is  a  subsequent  form  of  consciousness. 
While  the  common  consciousness  is  a  spontaneous  and 
necessary  recognition  of  phenomena,  and  a  necessary  self- 
knowledge,  reflection  is  special  and  voluntary.  In  reflec 
tion,  my  immediate  aim  is  to  know  myself ;  and  it  gener 
ally  implies  a  proposing  to  one's  self  some  particular 
analysis  of  the  mind.  In  order  to  affect  this  analysis,  we 
first  reproduce  a  state  of  consciousness,  or  renew  former 
experiences,  by  bringing  into  view  the  correlative  objects  : 
and  then,  in  this  state  of  reproduced  consciousness,  or  re 
newed  experiences,  we  awaken  the  reason  to  acts  of  close 
attention  and  thought.  This  state  of  mind  is  exceedingly 
complex :  for  the  mind  must  at  the  same  time  keep  before 
it,  the  correlative  objects  which  are  to  awaken  the  re 
quired  phenomena,  and  bend  itself  to  the  work  of  examin 
ing  the  phenomena  in  their  subjective  relations.  But, 
still,  let  it  be  remembered  that  it  is  complex  only  as  all 
thought  and  investigation  are  complex.  In  investigating 
the  objective  world,  we  do  really  produce  within  ourselves 
certain  experiences  or  phenomena  of  consciousness,  by 
means  of  the  senses,  and  while  these  exist,  we  apply  to 
them  the  Keason,  in  order  to  determine  the  forms  and 
laws  of  nature. 

Spontaneous  consciousness  embraces  our  necessary  and 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  pp.  1,  2,  3. 


THE   REASON.  137 

natural  experiences  of  the  senses,  and  the  mental  acts 
which  necessarily  and  naturally  arise  in  connexion  with 
them. 

Reflection,  or  philosophical  consciousness,  embraces 
the  experiences  produced  intentionally  in  reference  to 
some  knowledges  to  be  attained  of  the  subjective  or  the 
objective. 


138  PRELIMINARY    VIEW   OF 


SECTION  III. 

EXPLICATION   OF   IDEAS. 

IN  the  "Introductory  View  of  Philosophy  in  General," 
much  has  been  said  respecting  Ideas,  and  I  cannot  but 
hope  some  explication  of  them  given  in  the  natural  un 
folding  of  the  line  of  thought  there  attempted.  In  bring 
ing  up  this  subject  in  this  place  directly,  my  aim  is,  if 
possible,  in  a  clear  and  simple  way  to  give  an  answer  to 
what  has  always  been  regarded  and  treated  as  a  very  diffi 
cult  question,  viz.  :  What  are  Ideas  ?  The  difficulty 
which  exists,  arises  chiefly,  I  think,  from  the  primordial 
and  predeterminative  character  of  Ideas.  Here  all  analo 
gies  must  be  exceedingly  distant  and  imperfect,  since 
Ideas  precede  every  form  of  cognition.  Thus,  when  it  is 
said  that  Ideas  are  the  moulds  of  the  understanding,  and 
sensations  the  materials  cast  in  them  and  taking  form,  we 
have,  perhaps,  the  most  striking  analogy  that  can  be 
found  ;  but,  nevertheless,  how  vague  the  resemblance  be 
tween  the  plastic  power  of  material  moulds  upon  material 
substances,  and  the  action  of  the  first  elements  of  thought 
in  determining  cognitions  upon  phenomenal  conditions  ! 

We  have  spoken  of  several  Ideas  incidentally  in  the 
preceding  pages,  such  as  Time,  Space,  Substance,  Cause, 
Beauty,  Eight,  and  Wrong.  Now,  the  Idea  of  Time  is 
not  Time,  the  Idea  of  Space  is  not  Space,  the  Idea  of  Sub 
stance  is  not  Substance,  and  so  also  of  the  others.  Nor, 


THE   KEASON.  139 

again,  are  the  acts  of  knowing  these  Ideas,  the  Ideas 
themselves.  That  is,  the  Ideas  are  neither  the  realities 
from  which  they  are  named,  nor  the  acts  in  which  the 
realities  are  known.  Time  and  space  are  realities ;  sub 
stance,  as  essential  being,  is  a  reality  ;  cause  is  a  reality  ; 
the  distinction  between  right  and  wrong  is  a  reality  ;  in 
finity  and  spirit  are  realities.  They  are,  even  although  I 
do  not  know  them.  But  how  do  I  know  them  ?  The 
mere  experience  of  sensations  does  not  give  them.  The 
Keason  knows  them  by  its  own  force  or  capacity.  The 
Keason  begins  to  act  only  when  the  sensations  are  expe 
rienced  ;  but  it  knows  not  only,  by  consciousness,  the 
sensations ;  it  knows,  by  intuition,  these  necessary  realities 
likewise.  But  what  is  the  force  or  capacity  of  the  Eeason 
to  know  the  metaphenomenal  truths  ?  We  say,  the  Kea 
son  has  in  its  own  constitution  as  the  faculty  of  knowledge, 
ideas  of  time,  space,  substance,  cause,  beauty,  right  and 
wrong,  and  so  on  ;  meaning  by  this,  that  the  faculty  of 
knowledge  is  preconstituted  to  know  these  objective  neces 
sary  realities ;  and  that,  that  within  itself  which  capaci 
tates  or  adapts  it  to  know  each  of  them,  is  called  the  Idea 
of  this  reality. 

The  word  Idea  itself  contains  no  mystery  or  magical 
power.  It  is  a  word  introduced  by  one  of  the  greatest 
philosophers  who  ever  thought,  and  using,  perhaps,  the 
most  perfect  language  in  which  thought  was  ever  ex 
pressed.  We  cannot  find  a  better  word  tor  our  purpose  ; 
and  there  is,  therefore,  no  good  reason  for  diverting  it  from 
its  original  use,  or  substituting  any  other  in  its  place. 

We  have  in  the  preceding  Section  divided  Ideas  into 
the  Metaphysical  and  the  Nomological.  The  first  express 
the  inherent  capacity  of  the  Keason  to  know  the  Keality 
of  Being ;  the  second,  its  inherent  capacity  to  know  the 


140  PRELIMINARY   VIEW   OF 

Keality  of  Law.  Mere  phenomena,  apprehended  by  con 
sciousness,  do  not  give  either.  These  phenomena,  as  we 
have  seen,  arise  from  objective  reality  without,  and  subjec 
tive  reality  within.  But  what  is  the  relation  between  the 
pure  Keason,  with  its  Ideas  prepared  to  know  Keality, 
and  the  phenomena  known  by  consciousness  which  form 
the  conditions  under  which  the  knowledge  of  Keality  be 
gins  ?  Recollect  Keality  is  of  two  kinds  :  the  Keality  of 
first  and  necessary  truths  and  principles,  relating  both  to 
being  and  law  ;  and  the  Keality  of  actual  being,  having 
specific  constitution  and  qualities,  and  reduced  under  de 
terminate  law.  Now,  under  the  constitution  of  humanity, 
it  is  not  intended  that  mind  should  attain  to  the  Keality 
of  truths,  principles,  and  laws,  separately  from  the  Keality 
of  actual  being.  As  man  is  himself  reason  and  sense  °— 
a  union  of  the  two  Realities  above  named, — it  seems  to  be 
designed  that  both  shall  be  developed  in  his  cognition, 
consentaneously,  and  at  the  same  time.  The  first  and 
second  Realities  are  related  to  each  other  in  so  much  as 
the  first  is  embodied  in  the  second.;  and  man  himself  be 
ing  the  type  of  this  union,  he  knows  the  two  in  their 
union.  When  he  first  awakes  to  consciousness,  sensations 
or  phenomena  of  the  exterior  consciousness  first  meet  him, 
because  thought  in  humanity  is  connected  with  physical 
life,  and  this  life  reveals  itself  in  sensation.  These  sensa 
tions  arise  from  the  action  of  exterior  causes  upon  his  sen 
suous  organism — the  world  without  thus  makes  its  approach 
to  the  Keason  within.  Here,  then,  is  the  occasion  for  cog 
nition.  If  the  mind  had  no  cognitive  power  of  its  own, — 
a  power  expressed  by  the  word  Ideas, — if  it  were  a  mere 
passive  recipient,  then  there  would  be  a  mere  conscious- 

*  Part  I.,  Sec.  V. 


THE   REASON.  141 

ness  of  sensations,  and  nothing  more  :  but  now  these  sen 
sations  are  like  telegraphic  signals  given  from  the  outer 
world,  and  the  Eeason  has  within  itself  the  key  or  alphabet 
wherewith  to  read  them.  The  Eeason  can  know  the 
world  without,  because  it  can  know  the  great  truths  and 
laws — the  first  form  of  Keality — which  are  embodied  in 
the  world  without — the  second  form  of  Reality.  The  first 
knowledges  thus  embrace,  as  we  have  said,  the  two  forms 
of  Reality  consentaneously.  The  second  could  not  be 
known  at  all  without  the  first — it  would  not  be  logically 
possible.  The  first  would  not  be  known  without  the 
second,  because,  in  the  constitution  of  humanity,  mind  is 
imprisoned  in  its  tabernacle,  until  the  windows  of  the 
senses  be  opened,  and  the  signals  of  life  and  being  come 
rushing  in. 

Let  me  recur  in  this  place  to  a  thought  thrown  out  in 
my  Introductory  View,  Section  VII.  The  Great  Creator, 
before  he  formed  the  worlds,  must  have  had  the  Ideas  of 
all  truth  and  law,  and  all  forms  of  being — He  knew,  and 
then  created.  He  foreknew  all  possible  being,  because  he 
had  the  Ideas  of  all  possible  being.  Man,  the  finite  mind, 
knows  after  creation  has  taken  place,  and  after  he  has  re 
ceived  in  his  sensitivity,  motions  from  that  creation  ;  but 
that  he  knows  at  all,  arises  from  a  Reason  made  in  the 
likeness  of  the  Divine,  and  having  pre-constituted  capaci 
ties  or  Ideas  adapted  to  primordial,  universal,  and  neces 
sary  truths — the  very  truths  in  which  the  outer  world, 
indeed  the  whole  world  of  created  being,  "  lives,  moves, 
and  has  its  being." 

That  man  knows  himself,  is  explained  in  the  same 
way.  He  has  the  Idea  of  subjective,  as  well  as  of  objec 
tive  reality  :  And  as  the  motions  given  in  his  sensitivity 
from  without,  and  known  by  consciousness,  give  the  call 


142  PRELIMINARY    VIEW    OF 

to  the  Keason  furnished  with  its  Ideas,  to  look  without ; 
so  the  action  of  the  mind  itself  gives  the  call  to  look 
within  also. 

The  two  forms  of  Reality,  which  at  first  are  concrete 
and  complicated,  are  afterwards  submitted  to  Reflection, 
and  by  Keflection  distinguished. 

It  may,  indeed,  require  a  high  effort  of  thought  to 
comprehend  Ideas  ;  but  let  this  effort  be  made,  and  in 
the  whole  range  of  philosophy  there  is  nothing  so  clear 
and  interesting.  Ideas  are  the  elements  of  thought,  the 
elements  of  philosophy,  because  the  elements  of  Keason 
itself.  A  Reason  without  Ideas  is  an  impossible  concep 
tion.  Ideas  are  the  cardinal  psychological  explication  of 
the  Reason 


THE   REASON.  143 


SECTION  IV. 

©? 

EXPLICATION  OF  THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  REASON. 

THE  Keason,  constituted  with  Ideas,  goes  into  action.  Its 
great  office  is  to  know.  But  the  objects  of  its  knowledge 
are  not  all  of  the  same  kind,  do  not  stand  in  the  same  re 
lations,  nor  under  the  same  conditions.  Some  of  these 
objects  are  truths  absolute  and  necessary  ;  some  are  phe 
nomena  variable  and  contingent ;  some  are  immediately, 
while  others  are  mediately  perceived  ;  some  precede,  while 
others  are  gathered  from  observation  ;  some  are  actual, 
while  others  are  only  possible  ;  some  are  in  time  present, 
others  in  time  past,  and  others  again  in  time  future ; 
some,  in  space,  are  contiguous  to  the  senses,  while  others 
are  distant.  Hence  arises  the  necessity  of  considering  the 
Keason  under  different  functions.  In  its  constitutive 
Ideas,  it  is  not  only  adapted  to  every  variety  of  know 
ledge  ;  it  has,  also,  the  power  of  searching  out  its  objects 
under  every  variety  of  condition  and  relation.  It  can 
know  phenomena  and  truths,  and  the  relations  between 
them  ;  it  can  know  immediately  and  mediately ;  it  can 
know  in  various  relations  of  time  and  space  ;  it  can  form 
pure  cognitions,  and  cognitions  upon  sensuous  conditions  ; 
it  can  go  out  to  the  actual,  and  conceive  of  the  possible. 
It  has  all  these  different  functions.  Its  functions  mani 
festly  express  the  variety  and  scope  of  its  activity. 


144  PRELIMINARY   VIEW   OP 


SECTION  V. 

DOES   LOGIC    COMPREHEND    ALL    THE    FUNCTIONS   OF 
THE   REASON  ? 

LOGIC  has  been  defined  in  the  general  as  comprising  the 
laws  which  determine  and  govern  the  activities  of  the  Eea- 
son.*  Unless  this  definition  receive  limitations,  Logic 
evidently  must  reach  to  every  function.  Limitations,  how 
ever,  exist,  and  the  reason  for  them  is  palpable. 

In  one  respect  Logic,  plainly,  has  general  relations, 
viz. :  in  so  far  as  it  determines  the  most  original  laws  of 
thought  and  cognition,  f 

But  when  we  enter  the  domain  of  particular  functions, 
we  find  much  that  legitimately  comes  under  other  divisions 
of  philosophy. 

Logic  comprises  those  laws  of  the  Keason  which  deter 
mine  the  processes  by  which  it  reaches  the  two  forms  of 
Keality — the  Keality  of  Truth  and  of  Actual  Being.  This 
is  its  separate,  unique,  and  peculiar  domain. 

But  memory  does  not  describe  a  process  by  which  new 
truths  are  arrived  at ;  it  expresses  simply  the  power  of  the 
cognitive  faculty  to  retain  old  truths,  or  truths  already 
gained.  Hence  it  cannot  belong  to  Logic.  Kecollection 
is  memory  permeated  by  the  will,  imagination,  and  fancy. 
It  evidently  can  belong  to  Logic  no  more  than  simple 
memory.  It  sometimes  even  becomes  a  mere  art. 

*  Page  83.  t  Page  84. 


THE    REASON.  145 

• 

Imagination  also  gives  origin  neither  to  ideas,  and 
truths,  nor  to  facts  of  reality.  It  is  a  mediatory,  repre 
sentative,  and  creative  function  ;  forming  ideals  upon 
ideas,  reviving  the  images  of  objects  when  the  objects  no 
longer  address  the  sense,  and  combining  forms  of  unreal 
beauty.  Neither,  therefore,  does  Logic  comprise  the  laws 
of  this  function. 

It  would,  indeed,  be  possible  to  give  Logic  a  designa 
tion  so  general  as  to  make  it  embrace  all  the  functions. 
In  this  case  Esthetics  would  cease  as  a  separate  branch  of 
Nomology.  But  the  distinction  between  Logic,  as  limited 
above,  and  Esthetics,  is  clear,  natural,  and  convenient. 
They  both,  indeed,  relate  to  forms  of  knowing  ;  but  the 
one  determines  the  laws  of  knowing  the  real ;  while  the 
other  determines  the  laws  of  mere  imitation  of  the  real, 
and  of  knowing  and  projecting  the  possible. 

Imagination,  therefore,  must  be  assigned  to  the  nomo- 
logical  determinations  of  Esthetics. 

Memory,  considered  as  an  inherent  property  of  the 
Eeason,  belongs  to  psychology  simply.  The  whole  doctrine 
of  the  association  of  Ideas,  which  figures  so  largely  in 
treating  of  this  function,  amounts  to  this  : — Whatever  is 
known,  is  known,  not  in  an  isolated  way,  but  in  various 
relations  ;  these  relations  themselves  making  up  a  part  of 
the  objective  reality.  When,  therefore,  past  perceptions 
are  renewed  in  the  consciousness,  whether  they  be  objects 
of  the  sense  or  pure  truths,  they  must  of  necessity  appear 
in  their  appropriate  relations.  Relations  and  parts  of 
thought  are  often  presented  accidentally,  or  suggested  by 
images  of  the  imagination  and  fancy  ;  and  when  so  pre 
sented,  they  are,  of  course,  apprehended  by  the  cognitive 
faculty,  and  the  whole  train  of  thought  carried  through, 
or  dismissed  in  its  unfinished  state,  at  pleasure. 
7 


146  PRELIMINARY    VIEW    OF 

« 

Recollection,  as  a  voluntary  process,  is,  indeed,  based 
upon  the  memory.  When,  however,  its  object  is  pure 
truth,  there  is  often  in  reality  a  renewal  of  the  process  of 
investigation  or  ratiocination,  by  which  it  was  originally 
arrived  at.  In  this  case,  it  is  difficult  to  determine  how 
far  the  recollection  arises  from  memory,  or  from  the  pure 
reasoning  power.  There  is  a  passage  in  Dugald  Stewart, 
which  illustrates  this  remark.  "  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  as  we 
are  told  by  Dr.  Pemberton,  was  often  at  a  loss,  when  the 
conversation  turned  on  his  own  discoveries.  It  is  probable 
that  they  made  but  a  slight  impression  on  his  mind,  and 
that  a  consciousness  of  his  inventive  powers  prevented  him 
from  taking  much  pains  to  treasure  them  up  in  his 
memory/' 

In  Newton's  mind  the  original  proofs  were  renewed 
with  little  aid  from  memory.  And  Stewart  farther  re 
marks,  that  generally,  while  men  of  little  inventive  power 
trust  to  memory  for  the  recollection  of  truths,  men  distin 
guished  for  this  power  are  prone  to  rely  upon  it.  What, 
therefore,  often  appears  to  others  as  memory,  is  in  reality 
reasoning,  and  consequently  comes  under  the  laws  of  Logic. 

The  other  functions,  for  the  most  part,  corne  under  the 
determinations  of  Logic,  inasmuch  as  they  contain  pro 
cesses  by  which  the  two  forms  of  Keality  are  attained. 

It  is  not  necessary,  however,  to  give  Logic  the  multi 
farious  divisions  of  these  functions.  The  functions  often 
co-work  together  ;  and  there  are  a  few  general  conceptions 
of  the  ends  of  Logic  which  happily  embrace  them  all. 

Logic  comprises  the  laws  which  determine  the  processes 
of  arriving  at  Reality — the  Reality  of  Truth  and  of  Actual 
Being. 

First,  therefore,  we  must  consider  the  laws  of  the  most 


THE    REASON.  147 

«» 

original  cognitions,  both  through  pure  intuition,  and 
through  sensuous  phenomena. 

Secondly.  The  laws  which  govern  the  observation  and 
classification  of  secondary  phenomena  ;  and  that  inductive 
process  by  which  general  principles  are  obtained. 

Thirdly.  The  laws  of  deduction,  or  inference. 

Fourthly.  The  laws  of  evidence,  and  the  method  of 
proof. 

This  is  the  outline  which,  in  the  next  Part,  we  shall 
attempt  to  fill  up. 


PART   III. 


LOGIC     PEOPEK 


BOOK    I. 

PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 


SECTION   I. 

GENERAL    LAWS    OF    THE    EVOLUTION    OF    IDEAS. 

IN  the  prolegomena  comprised  in  the  two  preceding  Parts, 
many  things  were  necessarily  anticipated  in  an  incidental 
way.  As,  however,  they  were  merely  preparatory  to  my 
main  purpose,  I  may  not  mar  the  development  contem 
plated  in  this  Part,  through  an  apprehension  of  appearing 
sometimes  to  repeat  what  had  already  been  announced. 
Wherever  this  does  happen,  it  will  be  found  that  a  more 
formal  and  scientific  announcement  is  attempted. 

On  the  subject  of  Ideas,  also,  it  is  somewhat  difficult 
to  mark  with  precision  what  strictly  belongs  to  Psychology, 
and  what  to  Logic.  Ideas,  regarded  as  the  determining 
powers  of  cognition,  do  certainly  belong  to  the  first ;  and 
I  have  so  endeavoured  to  treat  of  them  in  the  explication 
given  in  the  preceding  Part.  In  this  Part,  besides  giving 
the  general  laws  of  their  determination,  I  shall  weave  in 
much  respecting  the  mode  and  conditions  of  their  develop^ 
ment,  together  with  their  characteristics,  which  may  ap 
pear  more  justly  to  belong  to  psychological  disquisition. 


152  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

At  one  time,  I  had  well  nigh  concluded  to  bring  this  all 
into  the  '  Preliminary  View' ;  but  farther  reflection  has 
induced  me  to  believe  that  I  shall  make  a  more  simple 
and  satisfactory  presentation  of  the  subject,  and,  on  the 
whole,  more  philosophic,  by  comprising  all  these  particulars 
under  Primordial  Logic.  Lest  any  should  object  to  this 
course,  I  thought  it  best  to  say  thus  much  to  shew  that 
the  same  thoughts  had  occurred  to  my  own  mind,  and 
that  the  difficulties  had  not  been  passed  over  without 
consideration. 

I.  Humanity  being  the  union  of  body  and   spirit, — 
the  life  of  thought,  and  the  physical  life  of  the  full-formed 
and  constituted  being,  in  the  present  sphere,  begin,  go  on, 
and  end  together.     Hence,  even  before  birth,  as  Locke 
affirms,*  there  may  be  incipient  thought,  because,  there 
is  incipient  sensation. 

But  although  thought  begins  with  sensation,  sensation 
is  not  the  determinative  power  of  thought.  This  power 
lies  in  the  Ideas  of  the  Keason. 

II.  The  first  action  of  the  Keason  is  spontaneous,  and 
unattended  by  reflection.     Mind  in  humanity  being  finite 
and  dependent,  hath  not  its  starting  point  in  itself.     The 
main-spring  is  energised  by  an  invisible  and  infinite  power. 
But  when  it  has  reached  a  certain  development,  different 
in  different    individuals,    reflection   begins,   and   it   now 
traces  back  the  path  through  which  it  has  run  its  course. 

III.  By  reflection,  it  analyses  the  knowledges  actually 
attained,  together  with  the  simple  sensaftons.     By  this 
analysis  it  does  not  find  the  determining  powers  and  forms, 
nor  even  all  the  materials  of  thought  in  sensation  :  but  it 
finds  certain  conceptions  which,  when  separated  from  the 

*  Book  II.,  ch.  9,  §  5. 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  153 

sensations,  are  intuitively  apprehended  as  universal,  neces 
sary,  and  absolute. 

IV.  These  conceptions  must  have  been  given  in  the 
dawn  of  cognition,  as  well  as  during  the  whole  line  of  cog 
nition,  since  cognition  is  impossible  without   them ;  and 
yet  they  were  not  given  before  sensation,  because,  in  the 
first  place,  as  above  stated,  the  life  of  thought,  and  physi 
cal  life  showing  itself  in  sensation,  begin  together  ;  and  in 
the  second  place,  the  sensations  are  signals  from  the  out 
ward  world  of  reality,  that  the  time  and  occasion  of  thought 
have  arrived,  and  that  the  field  of  thought  stands  invit 
ingly  open. 

V.  Hence  arises  the  distinction  of  antecedence  in  time, 
and  in  necessary  existence,  or  chronological  and  logical 
antecedence.*      The    sensations  are  first  in  time;    but 
these  absolute  cognitions  are  first  in  necessary  existence. 
But  although  we  speak  of  an  antecedence  in  time  as  some 
thing  that  we  can  conceive  of,  it  is  so  slight,  that  con 
sciousness  cannot  appreciate  it,  for  no  sooner  does  the 
sensation  appear,  than  the  absolute   element   is  mingled 
with  it. 

VI.  The  first  cognitions,   or  judgments,  which  take 
their  expression  in  propositions,  are  not  to  be  confounded 
with  Ideas.     The  Ideas  are  the  determinative  power  of 
cognition,   which  exists  independently  of   all  cognition. 
When  the  phenomenal  conditions  of  thought  are  supplied, 
then  the  Ideas  manifest  themselves  through  the  different 
functions.     They  manifest  themselves  through  conscious 
ness  in  the  cognition  of  subject  and  object;  through  the 
imagination  in  the  cognition  of  ideals  ;  through  sensuous 
perception  in  the  cognition  of  exterior  substances,  causes, 

*  Part  I.,  Sec.  IX. 


154  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

and  laws.  That  is,  the  Ideas  determine  to  particular  cog 
nitions  of  an  objective  reality,  to  which  the  universal  is 
related — and  in  this  way  determine  to  the  cognition  of 
the  universal  itself.  For  example,  sensations  of  resistance, 
of  colour,  and  form,  are  given ;  upon  this,  the  ideas  of 
substance,  cause,  and  space,  determine  to  the  cognition  of 
a  particular  body,  with  its  primary  and  secondary  qualities  ; 
and  in  determining  to  this  particular  cognition  by  the 
function  of  sensuous  perception,  they  determine  at  the 
same  time  by  the  function  of  intuition,  to  the  universal 
and  necessary  cognitions  of  space,  substance,  and  cause, 
as  comprised  within  the  first  and  highest  form  of  reality. 
VII.  In  the  evolution  of  the  Ideas  we  have  thus  four 
particulars :  First,  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  as 
conditions  in  time,  and  effects  of  objective  reality  thrown 
within  the  sphere  of  the  subjective  simple  ;  Secondly,  the 
cognition  of  particular  objective  realities  ;  Thirdly,  the 
absolute  and  universal  cognitions  of  the  intuitive  function 
determined  by  the  Ideas  ;  and,  Fourthly,  the  Ideas  them 
selves.  The  Ideas  are  first  of  all  in  the  antecedence  of 
necessary  existence.  The  cognition  of  the  universal  in 
like  manner  is  the  antecedent  of  the  cognition  of  the  par 
ticular.  But  in  the  antecedence  of  timc^  the  reverse 
order  takes  place.  Keflection,  analysing  our  actual  cog 
nitions  first,  separates  the  metaphenomenal  from  the 
phenomenal  in  the  particular  ;  Secondly,  it  separates  the 
universal  from  the  particular;  and  Thirdly,  it  evolves  the 
Ideas  as  the  necessary  grounds  and  antecedents  in  the 
Keason  itself,  of  every  form  of  cognition. 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  155 


SECTION  II. 

METAPHYSICAL   IDEAS. 

I.— SUBJECT,  AND  OBJECTIVE  EXTERIORITY. 

THE  phenomena  of  the  exterior  and  the  interior  conscious 
ness  are  the  antecedents  in  time.  Among  the  phenomena 
of  the  interior  consciousness  there  is  one  class  which  have 
the  remarkable  characteristics  of  self-determination  and 
freedom,  showing  themselves  in  the  acts  of  attention,  or 
acts  appropriating  the  cognitive  faculty.  All  the  phe 
nomena  of  the  interior  consciousness  appear,  therefore, 
either  directly, — as  in  simple  volitions, — or  indirectly,  as 
in  cognitions  directed  by  volition,  with  these  remarkable 
characteristics. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  phenomena  of  the  exterior 
consciousness  manifest  themselves  independently  of  this 
inward,  self-determining  activity.  They  appear  in  me,  but 
are  in  no  sense  produced  by  me.  Upon  these  phenomena, 
the  Reason  is  determined  by  the  Ideas  of  Subject  and 
Object  to  cognize  the  particular  subject  myself,  and  an 
exterior  something  not  myself.  From  this  particular  cog 
nition,  as  the  initiative,  it  cognizes  the  universal  distinc 
tion  of  the  interior  subject  and  the  exterior  object. 

Reflection  now  analysing  the  mental  process,  it  becomes 
evident  that  the  Ideas  of  Subject  and  Object  must  have 
had  an  antecedent  necessary  existence,  or  the  several  cog- 


156  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

nitions  could  not  have  appeared  ;  since  the  bare  phenomena, 
whether  of  the  interior  or  exterior  consciousness,  present 
us,  in  themselves,  not  realities,  but  appearances  only,  as 
the  name  intimates.  The  two  classes  of  phenomena 
mentioned  above,  with  their  different  characteristics,  are 
the  conditions  on  which  the  cognitions  take  place,  bat  the 
Idea  can  alone  be  the  power  which  determines  the  form 
of  the  cognition. 


IL— TIME  AND  SPACE. 

That  part  of  our  knowledge  which  is  obtained  through, 
or  by  means  of  the  senses  and  muscular  resistance,  is  con 
nected  with  the  Ideas  of  TIME  and  SPACE.  All  the  phe 
nomena  of  body  are  given  in  space.  All  succession  of 
phenomena  is  given  in  time.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to 
conceive  of  body  without  space.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to 
conceive  of  succession  without  time.  In  order,  therefore, 
to  know  body,  I  must  have  the  idea  of  space  :  and  in 
order  to  know  succession,  I  must  have  the  idea  of  time. 

The  ideas  of  time  and  space  are  simple  and  primary ; 
— they  can  be  resolved  into  nothing  antecedent — they  are 
directly  intelligible  ;  they  neither  require,  nor  can  receive 
any  definition.  Their  characteristics  are  obvious.  They 
are  necessary,  that  is,  they  cannot  be  supposed  not  to  be, 
or  not  to  have  been  ;  they  are  infinite ;  and  they  admit 
of  no  representation  that  can  be  addressed  to  the  senses. 

It  is  impossible  that  they  should  have  their  origin  in 
sensation.  Neither  the  secondary  nor  the  primary  quali 
ties  of  bodies  bear  any  resemblance  to  them.  This  book 
which  I  hold  in  my  hand,  and  the  hand  itself,  are  in 
space  ;  but  clearly  they  are  not  space.  Form  and  solidity 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  157 

must  be  connected  with  space,  and  cannot  be  thought  of 
without  space,  but  they  have  nothing  in  common  with 
space,  and  nothing  analogous  to  space.  Body,  conceived 
of  under  any  modifications,  and  under  any  enlargement, 
is  still  in  space,  and  totally  distinct  from  space.  The 
characteristics  of  body  are  contingency,  form,  and  limita 
tion — the  very  opposite  of  those  of  space. 

Time,  if  representable  at  all  under  forms  addressed  to 
the  senses,  must  be  representable  by  a  succession  of  phe 
nomena  or  events.  But  here  we  find  the  same  opposition 
of  cardinal  characteristics.  Time,  taken  as  simple  dura 
tion — the  sense  in  which  I  here  employ  it,  is  necessary, 
without  form,  and  unlimited — as  simple  duration  it  is 
eternity.  Any  succession  that  may  be  given  is  contingent 
— that  is,  it  may  be  supposed  not  to  be,  or  not  to  have 
been :  it  is  limited — it  must  have  had  a  beginning,  and 
may  have  an  assigned  termination ;  and  lastly,  it  may  be 
represented  in  space,  by  the  revolutions  of  the  planets  and 
a  dial-plate.  Succession  must  be  in  time,  but  is  plainly 
totally  distinct  from  time. 

As  the  cognitions  of  time  and  space  cannot  have  their 
origin  in  sensation,  their  origin  must  be  assigned  to  the 
pure  Reason  itself. 

How  do  these  cognitions  arise  in  the  Reason  ?  Are  they 
innate  ?  The  just  reply  is,  that  the  Reason  has  no  innate 
or  inherent  power  of  forming  or  developing  those  ideas, 
when  the  proper  conditions  are  supplied.  The  conception, 
or  act  of  intelligence,  cannot  be  said  to  exist  before  it  ap 
pears  in  the  consciousness.  But  the  Reason,  undoubtedly, 
in  the  potentiality  of  its  substance,  contains  these  ideas 
as  constitutive  forms  of  thought :  and  with  these  forms  is 
prepared  to  give  out  true  knowledges  or  judgments,  when 
ever  the  sensations  shall  be  supplied  which  form  the  occa- 


158  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

sions  of  its  action.  Sensations  and  muscular  resistance 
are  conditional  to  the  development  of  these  ideas ;  but 
the  pure  Reason  is  the  origin  of  them. 

Hence  we  affirm,  that  time  and  space  are  to  be  set 
down  as  original  and  inherent  forms  of  the  Reason;— 
meaning  by  this,  that  it  is  of  the  essential  and  necessary 
nature  of  the  Reason,  to  think  and  form  cognitions  under 
these  ideas  ;  so  that  whenever  certain  conditions  and  oc 
casions  come  up,  the  Reason  moulds,  as  it  were,  into  an 
exact  knowledge,  the  sensations  which  otherwise  were 
fleeting.  If  we  were  to  suppose  the  Reason  incapable  of 
developing  the  ideas  of  time  and  space,  what  would  be 
come  of  all  our  notions  of  the  forms,  magnitudes,  motions, 
and  velocities  of  bodies?  What  would  become  of  the 
notion  of  body  itself?  Time  and  space  seem  two  very 
simple  ideas — and  so  they  are  :  but  how  vast  and  momen 
tous  their  relations  and  bearings  ! 

When,  however,  we  represent  these  ideas  as  inherent 
forms  of  the  Reason,  we  do  not  mean  to  affirm  that  time 
and  space  have  no  existence  independently  of  the  Reason  : 
this  would  be  contradictory  to  the  Reason  itself ;  for  in 
the  development  of  these  ideas,  the  Reason  assigns  time 
and  space  an  independent  existence.  Time  and  space 
are  necessary,  absolute,  and  infinite,  and  are  conceived  of 
as  existing,  although  theie  were  no  mind  to  recognize 
them,  and  to  contain  their  ideas  as  forms  of  its  thinking 
and  knowing.  Time  and  space  are  independent  realities, 
which  do  not  impress  themselves  upon  the  Reason  through 
the  sense ;  but  the  ideas  of  which,  Reason  potentially 
contains  within  itself  as  the  knowing  power,  and  brings 
out  into  consciousness,  whenever  sensations  or  any  pheno 
mena  appear  there,  whose  causes  hold  to  them  an  actual 
relation. 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  159 

III.— THE  INFINITE  AND  THE  FINITE. 

The  very  judgment  which  the  mind  passes  upon  any 
ohject  of  thought, — it  is  finite, — implies  a  conception  of 
the  infinite  :  for  how  could  it  affirm, — it  is  finite, — unless 
it  knew  the  infinite  ?  If  it  be  said  that  the  finite  is  a 
positive  idea,  and  the  infinite  only  negative  of  it ;  with 
equal  propriety,  to  say  the  least,  we  may  call  the  infinite 
the  positive,  and  the  finite  the  negative  idea. 

Does  not  the  mind  have  a  distinct  and  positive  cog 
nition  when  it  affirms  of  any  thing,  it  is  infinite  ?  Take 
space  for  example :  when  the  mind  affirms  that  space  is 
infinite,  does  it  not  mean  something  more  than  that  its 
limits  cannot  be  assigned  ?  Truly  we  say,  space  can  have 
no  limits, — it  is  necessarily  and  absolutely  infinite. 

When  we  can  assign  certain  limits  to  an  object,  we 
say  simply  it  is  finite ;  when  we  conceive  that  there  must 
be  limits,  while  still  we  are  unable  to  assign  them,  we  call 
it  the  indefinite ;  but  when  no  limit  is  conceivable  or  ad 
missible,  we  say,  it  is  infinite. 

Plainly,  no  phenomena,  whether  primary  or  secondary, 
present  us  the  infinite ;  it  can  be  a  cognition  of  pure 
Reason  alone.  Phenomena,  indeed,  are  the  conditions, 
but  nothing  more,  since  no  multiplication  of  the  finite  can 
realize  the  infinite.  Now,  when  through  reflection  we 
come  to  account  for  this  judgment  of  the  mind,  we  are 
inevitably  led  to  assign  the  Idea  of  the  Infinite,  in  the 
Reason,  as  the  determinative  power  and  only  sufficient 
ground. 

IV.— QUANTITY. 

Our  knowledges  are  connected,  also,  with  the  idea  of 
QUANTITY.  Quantity  comprehends  UNITY,  MULTIPLICITY, 
and  TOTALITY,  OT,  ONE,  MANY,  and  ALL. 


160  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

Unity  is  the  foundation  of  every  form  of  quantity. 
Many  is  unity  repeated  indefinitely.  All  is  the  total  sum 
of  unities. 

What  is  the  idea  of  unity?  Absolute  unity  is  absolute 
indivisibility. 

In  nature,  there  is  no  absolute  unity  in  the  sense  of 
absolute  indivisibility — matter  is  continuously  divisible. 
In  numbers,  there  is  no  absolute  unity  in  this  sense  ; — 
every  assumed  unit  is  continuously  divisible.  But  in  mat 
ter,  any  body,  any  mass,  or  any  organized  system,  may  be 
taken  as  a  unity  relatively  to  any  supposed  or  real  multi 
plication  of  such  body,  mass,  or  system  :  and  in  numbers, 
any  sum  may  be  taken  as  unity  relatively  to  any  larger 
sum  of  which  it  is  a  fractional  part.  Here,  every  unity 
is  made  up  of  parts,  and  is  itself  but  a  part  of  some  other 
unity.  In  matter,  and  in  numbers,  we  have  only  parts 
and  wholes;  and  no  absolute  unity.  In  geometry,  we 
have  the  indivisible  point,  but  this  is  not  really  quantity, 
but  the  negation  of  a  particular  kind  of  quantity — that 
is,  extension.  It  is  where  extension  begins.'-'  A  line  is, 
indeed,  often  represented  as  composed  of  an  infinite  num 
ber  of  points  ;  but  the  point  in  this  case  is  really  a  degree 
of  extension  indefinitely  and  immeasurably  small ;  and 
not  a  point  which  has  neither  length,  breadth,  nor  thick 
ness.  A  negation  of  all  extension  cannot  be  multiplied 
so  as  to  compose  a  line. 

Infinite  number  is  a  contradictory  idea ;  for  number 
precludes  the  idea  of  infinity,  as  well  as  the  idea  of  abso 
lute  unity.  Number  may  be  continuously  increased  and 
diminished  :  but  it  can  never  reach  the  infinite. 

When  infinity  and  unity  are  united  in  the  same  idea, 

*  Part  I.,  page  78. 


PKIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  161 

we  have  absolute  totality.  Thus  time  ana  space  have 
unity,  in  that  they  are  incapable  of  division  into  integral 
parts,  or  parts  going  to  make  them  up  :  They  are  like 
wise  infinite,  and  therefore  are  absolute  totalities.  God 
is  the  One,  and  Infinite  being,  and  therefore  an  absolute 
totality. 

There  are  successions  in  time,  but  they  are  not  time. 
There  are  bodies  in  space,  but  they  are  not  space. 
Figures  having  extension  may  be  imagined  as  drawn  in 
space,  but  they  are  no  integral  portions  of  space,  for  space 
cannot  be  divided  into  any  number  of  such  figures  as  shall 
measure  the  whole  of  space.  An  indefinite  variety  and 
number  of  beings  may  be  comprehended  within  the  being 
of  God  as  their  cause  ;  but  they  are  not  God,  nor  a  part 
of  God  :  any  possible  multiplication  of  finite  beings  would 
not  make  up  infinite  being. 

Pantheism  is  contradicted  by  our  very  senses,  in  con 
nection  with  our  Eeason ;  for  this  which  we  see,  we  can 
divide,  and  multiply,  and  measure ;  and,  therefore,  if  it 
were  a  part  of  God,  God  would  be  capable  of  division, 
multiplication,  and  measurement. 

In  our  own  minds  we  have  absolute  unity  again.  But 
we  have  here  only  finite  unity.  Consequently,  we  have 
not  absolute  totality.  There  can  be  but  one  absolute 
totality  of  being,  that  is,  God.  But  what  is  this  finite 
unity  which  I  affirm  of  myself— and  how  do  I  know  it  ? 
I  am  one  in  the  idea  which  I  cannot  but  have  of  my 
spritual  substance,  and  its  inherent  and  inseparable  attri 
butes.  In  my  consciousness  I  find  that  /  think,  /  feel,  / 
choose,  and  /  will. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  plain  that  this  7,  or  myself,  is 
not  capable  of  physical  division — it  cannot  be  distributed 
into  parts  separated  in  space.  Again :  it  cannot  be  logically 


162  PKIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

divided,  that  is,  distributed  into  genera  and  species.  It 
is  possible  that  its  phenomena  may  admit  of  such  a  distri 
bution  ;  but  the  spiritual  substance  itself  cannot  be  con 
ceived  of  under  any  such  distribution. 

Neither  can  mind  be  numerically  divided.  It  cannot 
be  identified  with  any  abstract  number ;  and  since  it  can 
not  be  resolved  into  physical  parts,  nor  into  mere  exten 
sion,  it  cannot  be  represented  ~by  the  relations  and  condi 
tions  of  abstract  numbers.  Numerical  multiplication  and 
division  do  not  apply  to  it. 

We  may,  indeed,  have  a  numerical  multiplicity  of 
minds,  and  a  numerical  totality  of  minds  ;  but  this  has  no 
bearing  upon  the  question  of  the  substance  of  the  mind 
itself. 

A  metaphysical  division  is  equally  out  of  the  question, 
for  such  a  division  is,  in  itself,  impossible.  A  metaphysical 
division  would  imply  either  a  division  of  the  spiritual  sub 
stance  itself,  or  a  division  of  the  attributes  from  the  sub 
stance  :  but  the  first  would  reduce  the  mind  to  the  con 
ditions  of  body,  and  remove  it  from  metaphysical  con 
sideration  ;  and  the  last  is  metaphysically  impossible,  for 
substance  and  attribute  mutually  and  necessarily  imply 
each  other,  and  cannot  be  conceived  of  as  divided. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  here,  that  time  and  space,  and 
God,  being  totalities,  as  well  as  unities,  do  not  admit  of 
the  idea  of  multiplicity.  It  is,  therefore,  only  in  ourselves 
that  we  gain  the  idea  of  perfect  unity,  and  yet  admitting, 
also,  the  idea  of  multiplicity,  and  of  totality  without 
absoluteness. 

Absolute  unity,  and  multiplicity  and  totality  based 
upon  it,  and  absolute  totality,  plainly,  cannot  be  gained 
from  the  senses.  These  give  the  continuously  divisible 
and  multiplicable. 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  163 

Upon  the  experience  of  my  own  personality,  in  my 
thinking,  feeling,  and  doing,  I  affirm  that  I  am  one,  that 
I  am  neither  a  sum  of  parts  which  are  separable  units, 
nor  is  it  possible  for  me  to  become  a  sum  of  parts.  A 
collection  of  beings  like  myself  will  constitute  multiplicity; 
a  complete  collection  will  constitute  totality :  and  upon 
this  judgment  respecting  myself,  arises  the  judgment  of 
an  absolute  unity  and  totality — A  ONE  AND  ALL. 

The  origin  of  the  cognition  of  absolute  unity  and 
totality  must,  therefore,  unquestionably  be  referred  to  the 
pure  Eeason,  as  constituted  with  the  determinative  Idea. 

But  what  is  the  origin  of  that  unity  which  appears  in 
one  and  many  of  a  kind,  where  the  particular  represent 
ing  unity  is  itself  divisible ;  and  of  that  unity  which  ap 
pears  in  abstract  numbers  ? 

The  relative  and  the  limited  must  have  its  origin  in 
the  absolute  and  unconditional.  It  is  impossible  that  the 
latter  should  have  its  origin  in  the  former. 

But  by  the  senses,  in  the  order  of  time,  the  relative 
and  limited  are  first  given :  and  thus  divisible  and  limited 
unity,  in  material  objects,  is  first  given.  But  were  the 
mind  unfurnished  with  the  idea,  or  the  potentiality  of 
the  absolute  conception,  of  unity,  the  impressions  of  the 
senses  could  not  lead  even  to  the  limited  cognition :  and 
thus  the  absolute  idea  becomes  the  logical  antecedent  of 
the  limited  cognition.  This  is  a  general  exposition  ;  the 
following  is  the  particular :  Through  the  impressions  re 
ceived  by  the  senses,  I  awake  to  the  conciousness  of  my 
existence — these  impressions  are  the  conditions  and  ante 
cedents  in  time,  of  knowing,  willing,  and  feeling.  In  know 
ing  myself,  I  have  the  knowledge  of  a  particular,  finite, 
but  absolute  unity — and  this  idea  of  unity,  realized  in  my- 
elf,  is  the  immediate  logical  antecedent  of  the  limited,  im- 


164  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

perfect  and  relative,  numerical  and  physical  unity.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  logical  antecedent  of  the  idea  of 
the  particular  unity,  myself,  is  the  absolute  and  infinite 
unity,  the  ONE  AND  ALL. 

Now,  when  we  affirm  that  the  idea  of  Quantity  is  a 
form  of  the  Keason,  we  mean  that  the  finite  Keason  is  so 
constituted,  that  when  it  comes  to  know  itself,  it  knows 
itself  as  an  absolute  and  finite  unity,  because  it  has  the 
power  of  conceiving  of  an  absolute  and  infinite  unity  ;  it  is 
prepared  to  judge  of  itself  as  a  unity  and  finite,  in  the  po 
tentiality  of  judging  of  a  unity  infinite  as  well  as  absolute. 
The  infinite  comprehends  the  finite  ;  the  finite  cannot  be 
augmented  to  the  infinite.  And  so,  likewise,  when  the 
phenomena  of  sense  are  given,  it  is  prepared,  in  this  ante 
cedent  conception  of  unity,  to  form  cognitions  of  material 
and  numerical  unity.  The  material  unity  is  concrete  ;  the 
numerical  unity  is  abstract. 

The  conception  of  the  divisibility  of  material  unity 
arises  upon  the  experience  that  that  which  is  assumed  as 
a  unity,  because  standing  alone  in  space,  is  separable  into 
parts,  each  standing  alone  in  space  ;  and  as  the  assumed 
material  unity  occupies  and  measures  a  portion  of  space  ; 
and  as  the  space  occupied,  taken  as  simple  extension,  is 
capable  of  constant  division  in  an  endless  approximation 
towards  the  point  absolute,  so,  likewise,  the  material  unity 
is  conceived  of  under  the  same  conditions.  Continuous 
divisibility  is  a  struggling  of  the  intellect  after  absolute 
unity  :  and  continuous  multiplication  is  a  struggling  after 
absolute  totality.  Numerical  division  and  multiplication 
bear  to  the  material  the  relation  of  the  abstract  to  the  con 
crete. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  165 

JuQ. 

V.— QUALITY. 

Our  intelligential  activity  developes  also  the  idea  of 
QUALITY.  The  quality  of  propositions  is  the  affirmation 
or  negation  contained  in  them  : — the  nature  or  kind,  that 
is,  the  quality,  of  a  given  proposition,  is,  that  it  affirms  or 
denies  the  predicate  of  the  subject.  But  a  proposition 
only  expresses  or  represents  a  judgment  :  and  hence, 
quality  belongs  to  the  judgment  itself.  Now,  all  judg 
ments  must  be  either  simple  or  comparative.  A  simple 
judgment  is  the  mere  affirmation  or  denial  of  the  existence 
of  an  object ;  a  comparative  judgment  is  the  affirmation 
or  denial  of  agreement,  relation,  or  connexion,  between 
two  simple  judgments ;  the  one  being  the  subject,  and 
the  other  the  predicate.  Comparative  judgments  do  thus 
evidently  depend  upon  simple  judgments  :  the  simple  are 
primitive,  or  the  first  outgoings  of  the  Intelligence  ;  the 
comparative  are  secondary  and  dependent.  In  the  simple, 
primitive  judgment,  the  decision  of  the  mind  respects  the 
reality  or  the  negation  of  the  object  of  thought  ;  and  so  in 
the  secondary  judgment,  the  reality  or  negation  of  the 
agreement  of  the  two  objects  of  thought  compared.  It 
will  thus  follow,  that  under  QUALITY,  as  the  general  cate 
gory,  are  embraced  the  particular  categories  of  Reality  and 
Negation.  In  addition  to  these,  a  third  particular  cate 
gory  must  arise,  which  is  in  some  sort  a  combination  of 
the  two,  and  that  is  Limitation.  Every  reality  of  the 
sensible  world  has  its  limitations.  It  is  a  reality,  but 
only  within  a  certain  limit,  and  at  this  limit,  negation 
takes  the  place  of  reality.  It  is  plain,  that  without  ne 
gation,  this  limit  could  not  be  conceived,  as,  without  re 
ality,  it  could  not  be  demanded. 

Now,  let  it  be  remembered,  that  the  reality  conceived 


166  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

of  by  the  intelligence  is  not  the  mere  reality  of  the  phe 
nomena  of  consciousness,  by  which  the  world  without,  as 
well  as  my  own  actual  existence,  are  given  ; — It  is  the 
reality  of  objects  lying  beyond  the  phenomena,  and  exist 
ing  independently  of  them .  If  the  intelligence  were  a  mere 
blank  before  sensation  began  ;  and  if  its  whole  capacity 
and  office  were  described  as  a  mere  receptivity  of  sensa 
tions  ;  then  there  never  could  be  in  the  intelligence  any 
thought  of  objective  reality.  Sensations  are  purely  sub 
jective  affections  :  external  causality  and  substance  are 
not  contained  in  them  ;  the  reality  of  any  being  or  thing  is 
not  contained  in  them  ;  not  even  is  the  reality  of  subjective 
existence  contained  in  them  ;  for  the  mere  sensations  do  not 
contain  the  subject  • — the  sensations  of  seeing,  hearing, 
and  smelling,  for  example,  no  more  contain  the  I,  or  myself, 
than  they  contain  any  external  object :  and  even  the 
sense  of  resistance,  as  it  is  but  an  internal  experience, 
does  not  contain  either  subjective  or  objective  reality. 

It  is  true,  that  without  sensations,  the  thought  of  re 
ality  would  not  arise  in  the  consciousness,  as,  indeed,  no 
thought  whatever  would  arise — no  knowledge — no  ex 
perience.  The  sensations  are  conditional  to  the  judgment 
of  reality.  But,  then,  whence  comes  the  judgment  of  re 
ality,  whether  objective  or  subjective  ?  There  is  but  one 
answer  that  can  be  given.  It  is  an  a  priori  judgment  of 
the  Keason,  or  a  judgment  determined  by  an  Idea. 

Now,  when  we  speak  of  Quality  as  an  Idea  of  the  Rea 
son,  we  mean  that  the  Reason  is  so  constituted,  that  when 
sensations  are  given,  it  on  its  part  gives  out  the  judgments 
of  reality,  negation,  and  limitation — it  does  not,  analyti 
cally,  draw  them  out  from  the  sensations,  but,  syntheti 
cally,  affirms  them  upon  the  sensations.  The  judgment 
of  reality  is  its  own,  added  to  the  experience  of  sensations. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  16*7 

The  mind  is  a  receptivity  of  the  sensations  on^y  ;  its  own 
inherent  form  of  thought  affirms  the  existence  of  a  real 
subject  and  a  real  object. 

The  judgment  of  reality  appears  first,  chronologically, 
in  the  particular  and  limited  subject  and  object  ;  but  the 
Reason,  as  the  faculty  of  the  universal,  extends  the  judg 
ment  to  universality,  and  affirms  that  all  sensations  must 
be  connected  with  subject  and  object — nay,  that  all  phe 
nomena  of  consciousness  whatever  must  be  thus  connected. 
The  judgment  of  reality  extends  to  all  our  thinking,  feel 
ing,  and  volition. 

Again  :  the  Reason,  as  the  faculty  of  the  absolute, 
upon  the  particular  and  limited  reality,  conceives  of  the 
absolute  and  unlimited  reality,  or  the  infinite. 

VI.— RELATION. 

RELATION  is  another  category  under  which  our  know 
ledges  appear.  If  relation  were  nothing  more  than  juxta 
position,  it  would  still  follow  that  a  priori  judgments 
would  be  necessary,  in  order  thus  to  comprehend  objects  ; 
— for  time  and  space,  which  are  a  priori  judgments,  would 
be  necessary.  But  relation  is  not  mere  juxtaposition. 
Juxtaposition  in  space  and  time  is,  indeed,  all  the  relation 
which  experience  of  the  senses  affords — immediate  con 
tiguity  of  objects,  and  immediate  contiguity  of  changes, 
forming  succession.  But  when  we  reflect  upon  the  objects 
of  knowledge,  we  conceive  of  them  as  having  interior  re 
lations,  which  are  not  representable  under  the  forms  of 
time  and  space.  These  relations  are  three  : — 

I.  SUBSTANCE  AND  ACCIDENTS,  OR  PROPERTIES.  2. 
CAUSE  AND  EFFECT.  3.  ACTION  AND  REACTION,  OR  RE 
CIPROCITY  BETWEEN  THE  AGENT  AND  THE  PATIENT. 


168  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

1.  External  objects  are  related  to  the  human  sensi 
tivity  in  the  production  or  development  of  sensations  ;  and 
are  related  to  each  other  in  the  production  or  develop 
ment  of  changes  in  form,  appearance,  and  properties  ;  all 
these  last  being  judged  of  again  through  the  new  sensa 
tions  produced.  The  subject,  also,  is  related  to  the  con 
sciousness  in  the  development  of  many  internal  phenomena 
within  its  field  of  view — as  the  phenomena  of  thinking, 
feeling,  and  willing ;  besides  those  phenomena  which  are 
marked  as  changes  in  external  objects  from  the  agency  of 
the  subject,  such  as  the  muscular  movements,  and  their 
extended  sequents.  Now,  while  nothing  is  immediately 
presented  to  the  consciousness  but  the  juxtaposition  of 
the  phenomena,  there  is  an  ci  priori  synthetical  judg 
ment  respecting  the  interior  relation  ;  and  the  object  and 
the  subject,  in  respect  of  the  changes  connected  with  them, 
are  affirmed  to  be  Substance  and  Cause.  Thus  the  ex 
ternal  objects,  in  their  connexion  with  the  human  sensi 
tivity,  develope  sensations  which  are  commonly  known  as 
the  result  of  properties  in  these  subjects  ;  form  and  so 
lidity  receiving  the  designation  of  primary  properties,  be 
cause,  without  them,  the  objects  cannot  be  conceived  ;  and 
heat  and  cold,  sweetness  and  sourness,  fragrance,  and  so 
on,  receiving  the  designation  of  secondary  properties,  be 
cause,  without  these,  the  objects  can  be  conceived,  namely, 
by  means  of  the  primary  properties  alone. 

Substance  and  property  are  thus  necessary  to  the  con 
ception  of  the  objects,  and  mutually  imply  each  other. 

So,  also,  with  respect  to  the  subject  and  its  thoughts, 
volitions,  and  emotions — we  cannot  avoid  taking  the  sub 
ject  as  substance,  and  as  such  developing  its  properties. 

It  is  unquestionable,  on  the  one  hand,  that  unless  the 
bare  phenomena  of  consciousness  were  given,  the  idea  of 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  169 

substance  and  property  could  not  make  its  appearance ; 
but,  then,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  unquestionable, 
that  this  idea  is  not  obtained  by  analysis  of  the  pheno 
mena — sensations,  emotions,  thoughts,  volitions.  These 
do  not  contain  substance  ;  but  here,  again,  the  synthetic 
judgment,  a  priori  of  the  Eeason,  affirms  the  relation. 

II.'  CAUSE  cannot  be  developed  from  bare  phenomena. 
Phenomena  are  not  cause,  nor  do  they  contain  cause  ;  but 
the  Keason  demands  to  account  for  their  existence  ;  and 
in  doing  this,  gives  again  a  synthetic  d  priori  judgment. 

Those  phenomena  which  connect  themselves  directly 
with  the  properties  of  substance,  as  well  as  those  which 
are  the  immediate  sequents  of  causality,  must  be  referred 
to  cause  ;  because  all  finite  substance  must  be  referred  to 
cause — cause  absolute  and  infinite.  It  is  impossible, 
therefore,  to  exercise  thought  without  the  judgment  of 
the  relation  of  cause  and  effect. 

The  Idea  of  cause  could  not  be  developed,  except  upon 
condition  of  phenomena.  The  phenomena  form  the  ante 
cedents  in  time.  But  neither  could  the  phenomena  lead 
to  knowledges  unless  the  Reason,  in  its  own  inherent  ca 
pacity,  contained  the  Idea  of  Cause  —as  the  idea  of  origi 
nating  power. 

The  idea  of  causality  is  first  given  specifically  in  the 
affirmation  of  the  causality  of  the  Will  in  every  individual ; 
and  then  generalized  by  the  Eeason,  as  the  faculty  of  the 
Universal,  into  the  axiom  which  connects  cause  with  every 
phenomenon  whatever,  past,  present,  or  to  come. 

But  the  individual  will,  as  a  finite  cause,  presupposes 
an  infinite  :  I  could  not  say  of  myself,  I  am  a  cause  and 
finite,  unless  I  had  already  the  idea  of  cause,  and  of  cause 
infinite.  The  antecedent  condition,  in  the  order  of  time, 
being  supplied,  the  true  logical  order  of  the  development 
8 


170  PRIMOKDIAL    LOGIC. 

must,  therefore,  be  as  follows  :  The  Keason  contains  the 
Idea  of  Cause,  and,  as  the  faculty  of  the  absolute  and  the 
infinite,  forms  the  pure  a  priori  cognition  of  an  absolute 
and  infinite  cause  ;  and  this  is  the  basis  on  which  I  af 
firm  of  myself,  I  am  cause  finite  ;  and  the  basis  on  which 
I  make  any  affirmation  of  causality  whatever.  As  there 
is  infinite  and  absolute  cause,  so,  likewise,  there  must  be 
infinite  and  absolute  substance.  Cause  and  substance  are 
inseparable. 

III.  The  third  particular  is  that  of  action  and  reaction, 
or  the  reciprocity  existing  between  two  substances  with  re 
spect  to  any  change  which  takes  place  in  one  or  both,  from 
their  correlation.  Thus,  when  one  body  impinges  upon 
another,  as  when  a  ball  is  thrown  against  a  wall  and  re 
bounds,  there  is,  plainly,  an  action  of  the  ball  upon  the 
wall,  and  a  reaction  of  the  wall  upon  the  ball ;  and  it  is 
in  consequence  of  this  reciprocity  that  the  effect  takes 
place.  When  fire  is  applied  to  a  combustible  substance, 
there  is  both  an  action  of  the  fire  upon  the  substance,  and 
a  reciprocal  action  of  the  elementary  particles  of  the  sub 
stance,  as  they  enter  into  new  combinations  and  increase 
the  action  of  the  fire,  until  its  visible  manifestations  cease 
in  the  entire  consumption.  In  all  chemical  changes  and 
combinations,  this  reciprocity  is  exhibited.  In  the  corre 
lation  of  the  human  sensitivity  with  external  objects,  it 
appears  again.  Indeed,  in  all  the  developments  of  sub 
stance  and  property,  and  of  cause  and  effect,  this  recipro 
city  comes  into  view. 

The  conception  of  this  relation  is,  that  in  the  system 
of  reality  and  being,  substances  and  properties  condition- 
ate  the  development  of  substances  and  properties ;  and 
causes  and  effects  conditionate  the  action  of  causes  and  ef- 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  171 

fects  ;  and  causes  and  substances  mutually  conditionate 
each  other. 

This  relation  obviously  depends  upon  the  ideas  of  sub 
stance  and  cause.  But  if  substance  and  cause  are  syn 
thetic  and  a  priori,  then  this  relation  must  have  an  a  priori 
ground. 

The  relation,  indeed,  could  never  be  known,  without 
the  chronological  antecedence  of  phenomena  ;  but  as  the 
phenomena  do  not  contain  the  ideas  of  substance  and 
cause — as  these  last  cannot  be  analytically  evolved — so, 
likewise,  the  phenomena  cannot  contain,  and  there  cannot 
be  analytically  evolved  from  them,  this  judgment  of  a  mu 
tual  conditionating. 

If  we  confine  ourselves  to  bare  observation,  we  not 
only  fall  short  of  the  idea  of  cause,  and  rest  in  mere  suc 
cession  unaccounted  for  ;  we  also  substitute  the  conditions 
of  the  development  of  substance,  and  of  the  activity  of 
cause,  for  the  ideas  themselves.  But  when  we  admit  the 
synthetic  d  priori  judgments  of  the  Reason  to  have  their 
place,  then  the  distinction  between  the  relation  of  mere  con 
ditions,  is  distinguished  clearly  from  the  relation  of  sub 
stances  and  causes  to  their  developments  and  effects. 

Finite  substances  and  causes  conditionate  each  other  : 
the  condition  is  not  the  substance  nor  the  cause,  and  yet 
the  substance  cannot  reveal  its  properties,  nor  the  cause 
its  effects,  without  the  chronological  antecedence  of  the 
condition.  Motives  are  not  the  causes  of  volitions,  and 
yet  the  Will  cannot  act  without  motives.  Sensations  are 
not  the  causes  of  cognitions,  and  yet  the  Eeason  cannot 
form  cognitions  without  sensations,  either  in  immediate  or 
remote  antecedence.  The  wall  or  the  pavement  is  not  the 
cause  of  the  rebounding  of  the  ball,  but  the  rebounding 
could  not  take  place  without  it,  or  some  similar  condition. 


172  PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC. 

But  the  distinctive  idea  of  condition,  given  in  respect 
of  the  finite,  although  a  logical  antecedent  of  our  particu 
lar  cognitions,  must  itself  have  an  absolute  ground.  The 
relation  of  cause  and  effect,  has  its  ultimate  ground  in 
cause  infinite  and  absolute  :  and  the  relation  of  substance 
and  property  has  its  ultimate  ground  in  substance  infinite 
and  absolute.  In  like  manner,  the  relation  of  reciprocal 
action  must  have  its  ultimate  ground  in  an  infinite  and 
absolute  concurrence.  The  movements  of  finite  mind,  and 
the  movements  of  nature,  cannot  at  once  be  resolved  into 
movements  of  the  infinite  and  the  absolute,  without  cre 
ating  a  system  of  Pantheism.  But  all  these  movements 
must  be  conditionated  by  the  infinite  and  absolute — the 
infinite  and  the  absolute  must  concur  with  them.  In  this 
way  it  holds  true,  that  "  in  God  we  live,  and  move,  and 
have  our  being." 

It  appears,  then,  that  RELATION,  in  its  three-fold  form, 
is  an  Idea  of  the  Keason. 

From  the  sensations  it  cannot  be  educed  ;  but  the  Rea 
son,  upon  its  own  inherent  fullness  and  capacity,  forms 
cognitions  from  the  sensations,  in  the  relations  of  substance 
and  property,  cause  and  effect,  action  and  reaction.  It 
comprehends,  evolves,  and  employs  the  idea  of  relation, 
when  the  appropriate  phenomena  require  it. 

•;>>.!iiO!> 
VII.— MODALITY. 

Modality  contains, 

POSSIBILITY  AND  IMPOSSIBILITY  ; 

EXISTENCE  AND  NON-EXISTENCE  ; 

NECESSITY  AND  CONTINGENCE. 

Every  thing  which  the  mind  conceives  of,  is  conceived 
of  as  possible  or  impossible  ;  as  existent,  or  non-existent ; 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  173 

as  necessary  or  contingent.  Mode  has  respect  to  causality 
and  substance.  The  enquiry  of  the  mind  is,  whether  a 
given  conception  can  be  realized,  or  whether  it  is  impossi 
ble  to  causality  :  whether  it  is  actually  existent,  or  not : 
whether  it  appears  of  necessity,  or  contingently?  The 
answer  to  this  enquiry  gives  us  the  mode  or  manner  of 
the  conception. 

No  one  will  deny  that  we  can  think  of  that  which  we 
know  to  be  impossible,  as  well  as  of  the  possible  :  that  we 
can  think  of  that  which  does  not  exist,  as  well  as  of  that 
which  does  exist  :  that  we  can  think  of  that  which  exists 
necessarily,  or  of  that  which  exists  contingently. 

But  how  do  we  come  to  think  of  the  possible,  contrast 
ed  with  the  impossible — the  existent,  contrasted  with  the 
non-existent — the  necessary,  contrasted  with  the  contin 
gent  ?  Can  these  ideas  be  analytically  derived  from  the 
sensations,  or  are  they  synthetic,  a  priori  judgments  of 
the  pure  Reason? 

I.  The  Possible  and  the  Impossible. 

Our  sensations  are  simple,  actual  phenomena ;  they 
are  nothing  more.  Whether  any  thing  beyond,  or  differ 
ent  from  these  sensations  can  exist,  is  a  question  which 
the  mind  starts,  and  thus  shows  that  it  has  an  idea  of  the 
possible  ;  but  this  idea  is  not  a  sensation,  nor  can  it  be 
comprehended  within  a  sensation  ;  it  is  something  which 
supervenes  from  the  mind  itself  upon  the  sensations. 

The  idea  of  the  possible  cannot  but  imply  its  opposite^ 
the  impossible  ;  as  the  latter  cannot  but  imply  the  former. 
The  idea  of  the  possible  and  impossible  shows  the  mind 
leaping  beyond  the  bounds  of  actual  experience  :  so  far 
from  being  confined  to  the  bare  sensations,  it  is  not  even 
confined  to  the  cognitions  of  the  actual,  formed  upon  the 
sensations ;  but  multiplies  forms  of  being  in  time  and 


174  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

space  indefinitely,  both  of  the  possible,  that  is,  such  as  in 
accordance  with  rational  laws  might  exist ;  and  of  the  im 
possible,  or  such  as  imply  a  violation  of  all  law,  and  there 
fore  cannot  be  supposed  to  exist.  It  affirms,  also,  the  in 
herent  impossibility  of  certain  conceptions,  e.  g.,  that  4+ 
5=12. 

II.  Existence  and  Non-existence. 

That  we  think  of  non-existence,  as  well  as  of  existence, 
is  undeniable.  And  that  we  form  conceptions  of  objects 
under  the  mode  of  non-existence,  as  well  as  under  that  of 
existence,  is  equally  undeniable.  A  point  which  has  nei 
ther  length,  breadth,  nor  thickness  ;  a  line  which  has 
length,  but  no  breadth  nor  thickness  ;  a  cube  which  is 
formed  of  six  planes  united  at  right  angles,  but  without 
solidity,  and  bodiless  ;  the  properties  of  a  geometrical 
arch  without  a  possible  realization  in  any  material  arch  ; 
the  conception  of  a  shadow ;  the  conception  of  empty 
space  ;  combinations  of  the  imagination  in  endless  diver 
sity  ;  the  conception  of  creation  out  of  nothing ;  and 
again,  the  possible  annihilation  of  creation— all  these,  and 
the  like  conceptions,  imply  the  opposition  of  existence  and 
non-existence,  as  a  mode  of  thought. 

But  it  is  quite  obvious  that  non-existence  could  never 
be  contained  in  any  mere  sensation.  As  our  sensations  do 
not  directly  give  us  reality,  neither  do  they  give  us  non- 
existence.  Here,  again,  we  must  refer  to  the  pure  Kea- 
son,  which,  from  the  fullness  of  its  own  ideas,  gives  out 
cognitions  and  supplies  the  forms  of  knowledge. 

III.  Necessity  and  Contingence. 

Two  conceptions  mutually  imply  each  other,  when  the 
one  cannot  be  thought  of  or  defined  without  the  other. 
It  is  thus  with  possibility  and  impossibility  ;  with  exist 
ence  and  non-existence  ;  and  again,  with  necessity  and 
contingency. 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  175 

That  these  conceptions  are  in  the  mind  is  plain,  be 
cause  we  are  now  speaking  of  them.  That  we  are  con 
tinually  applying  them  is  equally  plain.  There  cannot 
be  more  than  one  straight  line  drawn  between  any  two 
points — there  cannot  be — that  is,  it  is  impossible.  But 
how  impossible?  Is  it  impossible,  because  there  is  no 
power  or  skill  adequate  to  draw  more  than  one  line  ?  No, 
it  is  impossible  in  itself — it  cannot  be  conceived  of  under 
any  conditions — it  is  necessarily  impossible. 

Again  :  we  conceive  of  existence  absolute  and  neces 
sary,  namely,  the  existence  of  God.  God  cannot  be  sup 
posed  not  to  exist,  for  if  he  did  not  exist,  there  would  be 
no  existence  whatever.  We  have  thus  necessary  truth 
and  necessary  being. 

There  are  also  necessary  relations.  The  relation  be 
tween  the  substance  of  any  being  and  the  attributes  which 
go  to  make  up  our  conception  of  that  being,  is  necessary. 
The  relation  between  Infinite  Cause  and  the  effects  which 
it  wills,  is  necessary.  So,  likewise,  the  relation  between 
a  finite  cause  determining  itself  to  effects,  and  the  effects 
determined,  is  necessary  when  these  are  both  in  its  con 
stituted  energy. 

Necessity  is  absolute,  when  there  is  no  conceivable 
condition.  It  is  relative,  when  there  is  a  conceivable  con 
dition.  The  being  of  God  is  absolutely  necessary.  Pure 
mathematical  truths  are  absolutely  necessary.  The  move 
ments  of  the  planets  are  relatively  necessary  ;  because 
they  continue  to  move  upon  condition  that  the  system  of 
nature  remains  unchanged  :  but  it  is  conceivable  that  it 
may  be  changed. 

The  opposite  idea  of  contingency  is  clearly  applicable 
likewise.  That  which  is,  but  which  may  be  conceived  of 
both  as  not  having  been,  and  as  having  begun  to  be,  un- 


176  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

der  the  possibility  that  it  might  not  be,  is  a  contingent 
existence.  Hence,  whatever  is  created,  is  contingent  ex 
istence.  Hence,  also,  all  volitions  are  contingent. 

The  distinction  between  natural  and  moral  necessity, 
which  has  been  frequently  attempted,  is  absurd.  Neces 
sity  is  a  simple  idea,  and  entirely  independent  of  the  dis 
tinction  between  the  natural  and  the  moral.  Besides,  the 
distinction  between  the  natural  and  the  moral  cannot  be 
made  out  without  implying  the  ideas  of  necessity  and  con 
tingency  •  for  that  alone  is  moral  which  is  free  ;  and  that 
which  is  free  cannot  be  necessitated.  Hence,  again,  the 
terms  moral  necessity  are  contradictory. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC. 


SECTION  III. 

NOMOLOGICAL    IDEAS. 

I  AM  reminded  of  the  extensive  field  of  thought  I  have 
yet  to  travel  over  ;  and  since  under  the  preceding  head,  I 
have  been  particular  in  illustrating  the  laws  which  deter 
mine  the  evolution  of  Ideas,  it  will  be  admissible  under 
the  present  head  to  bring  the  explication  within  narrower 
limits. 

I.— LAW. 

Law  manifests  itself  in  the  orderly  succession  and  the 
stated  recurrence  of  phenomena. 

Phenomena,  as  barely  existent,  demand  causality. 
The  fixed  relations  and  the  uniform  succession  demand 
Law.  *.  How  beautiful  and  glorious  to  thought  is  Law  ! 
Law  governs  the  sun,  the  planets,  and  the  stars.  Law 
covers  the  earth  with  beauty,  and  fills  it  with  bounty. 
Law  directs  the  light,  moves  the  wings  of  the  atmosphere, 
binds  the  great  forces  of  the  universe  in  harmony  and  or 
der,  awakes  the  melody  of  creation,  quickens  every  sensa 
tion  of  delight,  moulds  every  form  of  life.  Law  governs 
atoms,  and  governs  systems.  Law  governs  matter,  and 
governs  thought.  Law  springs  from  the  mind  of  God, 
travels  through  creation,  and  makes  all  things  one.  It 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  pp.  28,  29. 
8* 


178  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

makes  all  material  forms  one,  in  the  unity  of  system  ;  it 
makes  all  minds  one,  in  the  unity  of  thought  and  love. 

The  observations  of  the  senses  yield  us  only  limited 
successions  and  recurrences  of  phenomena.  These  have 
an  antecedence  in  the  order  of  time.  But  Law,  eternal, 
absolute,  and  universal,  has  antecedence  in  the  order  of 
necessary  existence,  and  is  an  Idea  of  the  Keason.  It  is 
the  Idea  of  Ideas,  under  the  Nomological  conception. 

II.— MATTER  AND  SPIRIT. 

Is  Spirit  the  negation  of  Matter?  With  equal  force, 
at  least,  we  may  say,  Matter  is  the  negation  of  Spirit. 
Do  we  know  one  better  than  the  other  ?  Then  do  we  know 
Spirit  best,  for  we  ourselves  are  Spirit,  and  Matter  is 
without  us.  But  neither  Matter  nor  Spirit  are  contained 
in  the  phenomenal.  Here,  again,  the  phenomenal  is 
merely  the  condition,  the  antecedent  in  the  order  of  time. 
But  Matter  and  Spirit  is  a  general  cognition  founded  upon 
an  Idea  of  the  Eeason.  It  is  an  Idea  which  comprehends 
the  whole  actual  and  possible  sphere  of  cause  and  law. 
Whatever  exists  and  is  governed,  is  either  matter  or  spirit. 

III.— PERFECTION. 

Where  phenomena  are  compared — and  by  experience 
we  can  compare  nothing  else — it  is  impossible  to  judge 
even  of  relative  perfection,  unless  there  be  in  the  mind 
principles  and  archetypes  with  which  in  the  first  place  to 
compare  the  objects  of  experience.  For  how  shall  we  say 
of  this  particular,  It  is  more  beautiful  than  the  other  ;  or 
of  this,  It  is  better,  wiser,  more  just,  unless  there  be  in 
the  mind  a  conception  and  archetype  of  beauty,  and  a  con- 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  179 

ception  and  archetype  of  the  good  and  the  just,  by  which 
to  determine  the  intrinsic  character  of  each  particular,  in 
order  to  judge  of  their  comparative  perfection  ?  But  the 
conception  of  Perfection  appears  not  merely  in  the  com 
parison  of  qualities  in  particular  objects.  We  think  of  an 
absolute  justice,  truth,  wisdom,  and  goodness,  an  absolute 
beauty,  an  absolute  order,  harmony,  and  fitness.  It  is  ab 
solute  law  attaining  an  absolute  development.  We  think 
of  God  as  Infinite  Perfection — a  form  and  measure  of  being 
to  which  nothing  can  be  added,  and  from  which  nothing 
can  be  taken.  But  even  in  finite  modes  of  being,  we  con 
ceive  of  a  Perfection  which  relatively  to  their  archetypes, 
is  absolute.  There  is  an  absolute  beauty  of  the  human 
form  ;  an  absolute  truth  and  justice  in  human  action  ;  and 
an  absolute  loveliness  in  nature,  which,  if  not  realized  in 
experience,  is  nevertheless  represented  in  the  imagination. 
We  may  deny  absolute  perfection  to  the  mode  of  being, 
because  it  is  finite  :  but  we  can  represent  it  to  ourselves 
as  filling  out  its  measure,  as  reaching  the  excellence,  glory, 
and  beauty  of  its  archetype. 

Now,  so  far  from  absolute  Perfection,  under  the  form 
of  the  Infinite,  being  a  presentation  of  the  senses,  not  even 
in  finite  modes  is  it  such  a  presentation.  Actual  experi 
ence  gives  us  the  limited  and  variable  phenomena,  and 
nothing  more.  But  how  do  our  minds  come  to  leap  be 
yond  the  actual  realities  of  finite  being,  and  to  shape  out 
an  unseen  perfection  of  truth  and  beauty  ?  How  do  they 
ascend  up  to  the  conception  of  Infinite  Perfection  ?  There 
is  but  one  satisfactory  solution  :  the  Idea  of  Perfection  in 
the  Keason. 

Thus  constituted,  when  the  antecedent  conditions  in 
time  are  supplied  by  experience,  the  Keason  forms  those 
Ideal  cognitions,  through  its  function  of  the  Imagination^ 


180  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

which  inspire  to  works  of  art,  to  self-cultivation,  and  to  all 
great  and  good  deeds  ;  and  stretching  its  eye  beyond  all 
created  being,  sees  the  Infinite  himself  in  his  ineffable 
greatness  and  beauty. 

The  Idea  of  Perfection  thus  attaches  itself  to  the  whole 
sphere  of  human  activity.  It  is  the  leading  Idea.  In  the 
particular  development,  however,  we  have  several  Ideas 
which  we  shall  proceed  to  consider. 

IV.— RIGHT  AND  WRONG. 

This  antithesis  is  universally  recognized.  Men,  indeed, 
have  disagreed  as  to  the  particulars  to  be  placed  under  the 
two  terms — some  placing  under  the  first  what  others  place 
under  the  second  ;  but  the  two  terms  themselves,  as  ne 
cessarily  and  absolutely  opposed,  is  a  universal  conception : 
all  men  think  of  Eight  and  Wrong.  There  are,  also,  many 
particulars  which  men  agree  in  placing  under  the  same 
term  of  the  antithesis  :  there  is  a  code  of  ethics  embracing 
cardinal  principles,  which  is  well  nigh  universal. 

Again  :  the  diversities  of  sentiment  which  actually  ex 
ist,  can  be  explained  in  the  same  way  that  human  error  is 
explained  on  subjects  confessedly  admitting  of  exact  de 
termination,  namely,  the  want  of  sufficient  education  in 
general,  and  the  want  of  the  requisite  examination  and 
thought  in  respect  to  the  particular  subject,  unbiassed  by 
prejudice  and  passion. 

The  Eight  has  been  confounded  with  the  Useful.  The 
Useful  is  an  Idea,  or  it  is  a  mere  induction  of  consequences. 
If  the  latter,  then  certainly  it  cannot  be  identified  with  the 
Eight.  By  a  bare  induction  of  consequences,  we  can  never 
attain  to  an  absolute  and  fixed  judgment,  since  the  induc 
tion  can  never  be  complete.  But  the  judgment  of  Eight 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  181 

and  Wrong  is  absolute,  fixed,  and  universal.  The  Keason 
affirms  that  the  two  terms  can  never  be  transposed  ;  and 
where  any  particular  has  received  a  clear  and  positive  as 
signment  to  one  of  the  terms,  no  possible  consequences  can 
ever  change  its  character.  Thus,  lying,  injustice,  malice, 
cruelty,  blasphemy,  adultery,  murder,  and  many  other  par 
ticulars,  have  received  an  assignment  which  is  seen  to  be 
necessary  and  unalterable.  And  the  same  is  true  of  the 
opposite  virtues. 

But  if  we  take  the  Useful  as  an  Idea ;  the  impossibility 
of  identifying  it  with  the  Eight  is  equally  apparent.  Ideas 
are  distinguished  by  their  aims.  Now,  the  Idea  of  Utility 
aims  at  the  improvement  of  the  external  world,  so  as  to 
multiply  the  accommodations  and  comforts  of  man  in  his 
physical  relations.  But  the  Idea  of  Eight  and  Wrong 
aims  to  fix  the  great  law  of  duty  in  respect  to  both  God 
and  man,  in  the  imperishable  relations  of  moral  obligation. 
The  one  determines  what  will  minister  to  physical  com 
fort  and  enjoyment ;  the  other  determines  simply  what  is 
Eight,  in  distinction  from  Wrong,  irrespective  of  all  phy 
sical  comfort  and  enjoyment.  Nay,  it  commands  the 
Eight  in  opposition  to  physical  comfort  and  enjoyment, 
and  exalts  self-denial  into  one  of  the  most  glorious  and 
majestic  forms  of  virtue.  It  indeed  promises  to  persevering 
virtue  ample  rewards  in  the  ultimate  issue ;  but  it  at  the 
same  time  reveals  virtue  as  pursuing  its  end,  charmed  by 
its  own  convictions  and  sweet  consciousness,  and  in  this 
way  alone  gaining  its  title,  and  establishing  its  meritorious- 
ness.  The  judgment  of  Eight  and  Wrong  then  could  be 
derived  from  experience  only  as  a  distinct  induction  of 
consequences,  since  Utility  as  an  Idea  transcends  expe 
rience  ;  but  an  induction  of  consequences  being  inadequate 
to  account  for  this  judgment,  with  its  actual  characteris- 


182  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

tics  of  necessity  and  universality,  we  are  here  again  led 
to  the  conception  of  an  Idea  of  Eight  and  Wrong  in  the 
Eeason. 

Phenomena  comprising  the  volitions  of  a  free  and  re 
sponsible  being,  together  with  their  sequents,  form  the  an 
tecedents  in  time  conditional  to  the  development  of  the 
Idea.  Constituted  with  this  Idea,  no  sooner  does  an  act 
of  such  a  being  appear  in  the  consciousness,  than  the  Eea- 
son  affirms  of  it,  it  is  Right,  or,  it  is  Wrong.  Upon  this 
particular  judgment,  it  forms  the  axiomatic  judgment. 
Every  act  of  a  free  and  responsible  being  must  be  Eight 
or  Wrong  :  and  thence  proceeds  by  reflection  to  recognize 
its  own  Idea. 

The  Idea  of  Eight  and  Wrong,  projected  in  the  various 
relations  of  humanity,  determines  a  moral  law  for  the  gov 
ernment  of  human  conduct.  The  highest  determination 
of  a  moral  law  is  that  made  by  the  Divine  Eeason.  A 
moral  law,  thus  determined,  is  called,  in  respect  to  its  ori 
gin,  Divine  law.  The  human  Eeason,  although  it  may 
fail  to  determine,  of  itself,  an  adequate  moral  law,  never 
theless,  no  sooner  reads  the  Divine  law  with  a  clear  and 
open  eye,  than  it  beholds  the  marks  of  eternal  and  neces 
sary  truth,  and  bows  to  the  august  and  awful  authority. 
The  moral  Idea  within  determines  to  the  recognition  with 
out.  The  voice  which  speaks  from  Sinai,  and  the  voice  of 
the  Divine  Word,  who  walked  among  men,  find  their 
echoes  within,  in  thoughts  which  seem  to  connect  our 
being  with  a  past  Eternity. 

V.— FREEDOM  AND  RESPONSIBILITY. 

Eight  and  Wrong  can  be  affirmed  of  the  acts  of  a  free 
and  responsible  being  alone. 


PKIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  183 

The  conception  of  Freedom  is  involved  in  that  of  Con- 
tingence,  which  has  already  been  considered.  A  free 
being  is  one  endowed  with  the  power  of  contingent  deter 
mination  ;  that  is,  the  opposite  of  a  necessary  determina 
tion.  * 

Responsibility  is  involved  in  Freedom  and  Intelli 
gence.  A  being  who  knows  Law,  and  is  capable  of  obey 
ing  or  disobeying,  is  bound  to  account  for  his  acts  ;  and  is 
worthy  of  praise  or  blame,  according  to  the  account  which 
he  legitimately  renders.  •(• 

Freedom  and  Responsibility  are  affirmed  by  the  Rea 
son  upon  the  consciousness  of  self-determining  acts,  be 
cause  it  is  constituted  with  the  Idea  of  Freedom  and  Re 
sponsibility. 

The  Reason,  as  evolving  the  momentous  Ideas  of  Moral 
Law,  of  Right  and  Wrong,  of  Freedom  and  Responsibility, 
is  technically  called  the  CONSCIENCE. 

VI.— PERSONAL  IDENTITY. 

The  phenomena  of  consciousness  present  us,  in  them 
selves,  neither  Personality  nor  Personal  Identity.  They 
are  a  bare  flow  of  variable  appearances.  The  personality 
is  the  subjective  simple,  in  whose  consciousness  all  these 
appearances  pass  along  ;  and  who  knows  himself  both  as 
a  cause  and  recipient  of  them.  The  identity  of  this  per 
sonality  is  its  unchanged  substance  and  properties  in  all 
time  and  circumstances,  amid  every  variety  of  phenomenal 
presentation.  It  is  the  conception  of  identical  and  indi 
visible  oneness.  The  phenomena  here  again  take  ante- 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  Ch.  II.,  Sec.  III.  and  VII. 
f  Moral  Agency,  Ch.  III.,  Sec.  I. 


184  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

cedence  in  time  ;  while  the  unchanging  subject  holds  the 
antecedence  of  necessary  existence. 

When  the  conditional  phenomena  make  their  appear 
ance,  the  Reason,  furnished  with  the  Idea  of  Personal  Iden 
tity,  knows  itself  and  its  cognates  in  their  simplicity  and 
oneness.  The  cognition  of  Identity  does  not  appear  under 
any  limitation  of  time.  The  Reason  affirms,  What  I 
now  am  I  always  have  been,  and  always  shall  be,  in  the 
whole  circuit  of  my  being. 

VII.— IMMORTALITY. 

It  needs  no  argument  to  satisfy  any  mind,  that  im 
mortality  cannot  be  a  conception  of  experience.  Indeed, 
many  affirm  that  it  is  not  even  a  truth  of  philosophy,  but 
purely  a  doctrine  of  revelation.  It  appears  to  me  that  the 
history  of  this  doctrine  affords  unanswerable  proof  that  the 
conception  of  Immortality  is  developed  in  the  human  mind 
independently  of  a  Divine  Revelation.  But,  if  we  grant 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  it  was  not  developed  in  the  hu 
man  mind  until  it  was  formally  announced  by  Divine  Re 
velation,  it  is  nevertheless  necessary  that  the  Idea  of  Im 
mortality  should  belong  to  the  Reason,  in  order  to  make 
the  acceptance  of  the  doctrine  possible,  unless  it  can  be 
shown  to  be  comprehended  within  elements  of  thought 
furnished  by  the  senses.  Whatever  new  doctrine  is  taught 
us,  must  be  contained  under  facts  or  principles,  and  forms 
of  thought  which  we  already  have.  If,  therefore,  the  sense 
cannot  give  us  the  conception  of  Immortality — as  con 
fessedly  it  cannot — and  if  we  have  no  constituted  principle 
or  Idea  within  to  give  it,  then  the  doctrine  cannot  be  taught 
us  ;  just  as  a  moral  law  cannot  be  taught  us  unless  there 
be  a  Reason  or  Conscience,  furnished  with  Ideas  of  law  and 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  185 

moral  obligation,  to  respond  to  it,  by  forming  the  corres 
ponding  conceptions. 

Some  seem  to  entertain  the  very  strange  notion,  that 
Divine  Eevelation  is  dishonoured  by  granting  to  human 
reason  the  possibility  of  arriving  at  the  cognition  of  Im 
mortality  by  its  own  innate  powers.  Now,  it  ought  to  be 
recollected  that  the  human  reason  is  no  less  the  work  of 
God  than  the  written  Word,  and  hence,  that  the  acknow 
ledgment  of  the  glorious  constitution  of  the  former  is  doing 
honor  to  God  in  the  same  sense  as  the  acknowledgment  of 
the  latter.  The  latter  assumes  that  we  have  the  former, 
by  appealing  to  it.  The  mission  of  Divine  Revelation  is 
special,  to  renew  to  human  thought  truths  which  sensu 
ality  and  sin  had  lulled  to  repose  ;  and  to  bring  to  light 
that  extraordinary  system  of  grace  which  could  belong 
neither  to  Logic  nor  to  Observation  ;  but  which,  when 
brought  to  light,  appears  all  over  inscribed  with  those 
moral  characters  which  meet  the  moral  Ideas  as  the  light 
meets  the  eye  of  the  new-born  infant  —  a  blessed  visitation, 
for  which  it  is  prepared. 

The  above  are  strictly  the  Moral  Ideas.  We  next 
proceed  to  the  Esthetical.  These,  also,  are  allied  to  Per 
fection  as  the  leading  Idea. 


VIII.—  THE  BEAUTIFUL. 

The  PERFECT  is  the  conception  of  the  utmost  develop 
ment  of  Law  in  general.  Appearing  in  different  spheres, 
it  takes  different  denominations.  In  The  Morale,  it  is 
RECTITUDE  ;  in  Logic,  it  is  TRUTH  ;  in  Somatology,  it  is 
THE  USEFUL  ;  in  Esthetics,  it  is  THE  BEAUTIFUL. 


186  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

The  Useful  relates  to  the  physical  sensibilities  and 
well-being  of  creatures  that  can  enjoy  and  suffer. 

The  Beautiful  relates  to  a  peculiar  class  of  emotions 
belonging  only  to  creatures  endowed  with  Keason — a  Kea- 
son  constituted  with  Ideas  determining  to  cognitions  which 
stand  in  a  causal  relation  to  the  emotions. 

The  Useful  determines  the  constitution,  forms,  and 
relations  of  bodies  in  respect  to  physical  life  and  enjoy 
ment. 

The  Beautiful  determines  the  forms,  relations,  and 
properties  of  bodies  in  respect  to  its  peculiar  emotions. 
These  emotions  arc  explained  by  referring  simply  to  con 
sciousness. 

Emotions  are  clearly  distinguishable  from  sensations, 
in  this,  that  the  latter  precede,  while  the  former  follow 
cognitions.  Emotions  of  beauty  obviously,  therefore,  can 
not  arise  out  of  simple  sensations.  A  judgment  of  forms, 
relations,  and  properties,  intervenes  between  the  two. 

The  simple  cognition  of  objects  which  we  pronounce 
beautiful,  is  made  on  the  general  laws  of  sensuous  percep 
tion.  The  question  is,  Why  do  we  add  the  jugdment,  they 
are  beautiful  1 

It  may  be  replied,  we  experience  the  peculiar  emotions 
to  which,  likewise,  we  apply  this  epithet ;  and  then,  by 
analysis,  ascertaining  the  peculiar  forms  and  qualities 
which  are  invariably  connected  with  these  emotions,  we 
accordingly  pronounce  them  the  Objective  Beauty. 

Even  according  to  this,  the  conception  is  not  derived 
from  sensations,  but  from  emotions.  But  the  emotions 
are  preceded  by  cognitions,  and  these  not  merely  the  cog 
nitions  of  the  beautiful  objects  by  the  laws  of  ordinary 
perception  ;  but  cognitions  of  those  very  forms  and  quali 
ties  as  beautiful,  which  produce  the  emotions.  It  is,  in- 


PKIMOKDIAL    LOGIC.  187 

deed,  true,  that  the  experience  of  the  emotions  claim  an 
tecedence  in  time  •  and  a  particular  judgment  of  beauty 
assumes  the  appearance  of  a  result  of  a  mere  analysis  of 
properties  ;  but  the  conception  which  springs  up  in  the 
mind,  is  of  the  Beautiful  as  applying  universally  and  de 
termining  the  forms  to  which  the  emotions  correlate. 
We  think  of  Beauty  as  a  principle  on  which  the  Creation 
was  constituted  and  ordered.  We  are  conscious  of  con 
ceiving  of  a  Beauty  far  transcending  that  which  we  be 
hold.  Nay,  the  Imagination  forms  ideals  and  archetypes 
of  specific  forms  unrealized  in  nature.  The  mind  proceeds 
still  farther,  and  conceives  of  an  Infinite  and  Absolute 
Beauty.  The  Beautiful,  therefore,  has  its  constitutive 
Idea  in  the  Reason. 

The  Beautiful  is  the  generic  form  of  the  Idea.  It  is 
the  Perfect,  determining  outward  forms,  relations,  and 
properties,  in  respect  to  the  esthetical  sensitivity.  But 
when  we  come  to  the  particular  spheres  in  which  the  Idea 
goes  out  as  Law,  we  find  it  under  several  specific  forms. 

The  Beautiful  is  connected  with  the  objects  of  two 
senses,  the  Eye,*  and  the  Ear. 

The  Beautiful  in  the  World  of  the  Eye  becomes  spe 
cifically  : 

1.  SYMMETRY,  or  the  proper  relation  of  the  parts  en 
tering  into  an  organic  whole,  determined  by  a  common 
measure.  Thus,  the  parts  of  the  human  body  are  sym 
metrical,  when  in  size  and  form  they  seem  to  melt  into  a 
visible  harmony.  Thus,  too,  the  parts  of  a  building  are 
symmetrical,  when  the  dimensions,  in  relation  to  each 
other,  and  the  pillars  and  ornaments,  in  relation  to  the 

*  The  Eye,  of  course,  is  assumed  to  have  been  informed  by  the  muscular 
resistance  respecting  distance  and  motion. 


188  PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC. 

main  structure,  flow  into  one  common  unity  and  harmony. 
Symmetry,  as  an  Idea,  determines  the  Ideals  of  the  Imagi 
nation,  which  constitute  the  Archetypes  of  the  Artist. 
Mathematical  ratios  and  proportions  are  employed  to  de 
termine  precise  measures  and  rules  of  mechanical  execution. 
These,  however,  without  the  Idealized  eye,  would  present 
a  stiff  and  ungraceful  outline. 

II.  GRACE. — Grace  appears  in  motion.     Graceful  lines 
are  those  which  a  beautiful,  animated  body  naturally  and 
spontaneously  describes  in  space,  from  the  moving  power 
energizing  within.    Grace  is  symmetry  in  motion.    Never 
theless,  the  expression  of  Grace  does  not  always  demand 
actual  motion  ;  it  appears  no  less  in  attitude.     But  this 
always  relates  to  motion.     It  expresses  the  point  where 
motion  has  ceased,  and  where  motion  is  just  about  to 
begin.     There  is  Grace  in  a  motionless  statue,  because  the 
attitude  expresses  the  motion  which  has  been,  just  as  it  is 
passing  into  the  motion  which  is  about  to  be.    This  grace, 
this  moveable  beauty,*  is  the  life  of  painting  and  sculp 
ture.     A  dead  body  has  a  heavy,  painful  beauty,  because 
every  muscle  is  relaxed.     There  is  here  a  total  and  final 
cessation  of  motion,  and  no  prophecy  that  it  shall  begin 
again. 

III.  KEGULARITY,  UNIFORMITY,  VARIETY. — Kegularity 
is  the  indication  of  law,  and  is  opposed  to  confusion  and 
disorder.     Uniformity  expresses  the  recurrences  and  rela 
tions  which  indicate  the  presence  of  extended  system,  and 
is  opposed  to  isolation  and  accidental  production.    Variety 
expresses  the  multiformity  and  richness  of  the  beautiful. 
These  three  are  ever  united  in  beautiful  productions.    There 
is  no  beauty  in  a  straight  line, — it  has  regularity  and  uni- 

*  Schiller. 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  189 

formity,  but  no  variety.  But  a  curved  line,  as  it  possesses 
all,  is  beautiful.  A  simple  color  cannot  be  called  beauti 
ful  :  for  example,  look  at  colors  as  disposed  in  a  paint-box. 
Nor  yet  is  a  confused  jumble  of  colors  beautiful.  It  is 
when  beheld  in  connection  with  form,  and  regularly  blended, 
as  in  the  flowers,  the  foliage,  the  rainbow,  and  the  '  hu 
man  face  divine/  that  they  claim  to  be  beautiful.  The 
great  system  of  Nature  is  constructed  upon  these  Estheti- 
cal  Ideas. 

IV.  DETERMINATE  FORM. — All  forms  are  composed  of 
straight  or  curved  lines.  The  curved  line  is  beautiful. 
The  spiral  line  is  a  composition  of  curves.  The  straight 
line,  in  its  simplicity,  is  indifferent,  or  it  is  the  line  of 
utility.  When  two  or  more  straight  lines  are  joined  to 
gether  in  the  construction  of  regular  forms,  the  esthetical 
properties  begin  to  appear.  But,  what  determines  the  dif 
ferent  forms  of  bodies  and  the  lines  of  their  motions  ? 
Unquestionably,  somatological  necessities  and  laws  enter 
extensively  into  the  determination.  The  world  is  made  as 
it  is,  because  it  is  designed  for  use.  This  is  one  solution, 
but  not  of  itself  sufficient.  It  is  not  difficult  to  show  how 
mere  use  might  be  attained  without  a  thousand  particulars 
which  appear  both  in  the  works  of  God  and  man.  Man  is 
but  copying  the  Great  Maker,  when  he  aims  to  make 
beautiful,  as  well  as  useful.  The  union  of  the  two  is  the 
perfection  of  the  universe.  The  Idea  of  the  determinate 
form  of  beauty,  in  the  mind  of  God,  evolved  all  the  varie 
ties  of  beautiful  form  in  the  creation.  These  forms  are  not 
arbitrary  ;  nor  are  they  merely  the  best  for  use  ;  they  are 
the  proper  forms  of  the  beautiful  likewise.  The  human 
reason  hath  the  same  Idea  ;  and  hence,  it  both  recognizes 
the  beauty  of  actual  form,  and  projects  new  forms  of  beauty 
in  the  creations  of  Art. 


190  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

V.  THE  SUBLIME. — This  is  usually  embraced  under 
Esthetics.  The  fundamental  Idea,  however,  is  not  the 
Beautiful,  but  the  Infinite.  Strictly,  esthetical  properties 
are  gained,  when  the  Infinite  unites  itself  to  the  Beautiful, 
or  to  the  higher  Idea  of  the  Perfect.  This,  indeed,  is  the 
common  form ;  and  hence  the  reason  why  the  emotions  of 
grandeur  and  sublimity  are  assigned  to  Esthetics.  Infinite 
Beauty — Infinite  Perfection, — these  are  the  highest  sources 
of  the  Sublime. 

Sublimity  and  grandeur  are  scarcely  distinguishable  in 
the  emotion.  In  the  natural  world,  usage  has  applied  the 
one  to  the  lofty,  and  the  other  to  vast  extent. 

Those  objects  of  either  kind  which  awaken  the  emotion, 
are  objects  which  suggest  the  conception  of  the  Infinite,  by 
reason  of  their  magnitudes,  or  the  amazing  power,  wisdom, 
or  perfection  which  they  display. 

The  Moral  Sublime  can  be  traced  to  the  same  element. 
Prometheus  upon  the  rock,  fills  the  mind  with  a  sense  of 
its  own  greatness  and  nobleness  ;  and  we  think  on  in  the 
long  track  of  our  immortality  until  we  seem  lost  in  infinite 
being. 

The  objects  and  beings  of  our  experience  cannot  reveal 
to  us  the  Infinite  directly  ;  but  when  presented  under 
forms  of  indefinite  greatness — a  greatness  which  surpasses 
the  ordinary  standards  of  comparison — the  mind  instinc 
tively  springs  forward  to  meet  the  realization  of  its  own  Idea. 
It  seems  to  see  the  skirts  of  the  glory  of  the  Infinite. 

Majesty  and  dignity  belong  to  the  same  category. 
They  are  expressions  of  mental  power  and  greatness,  in  the 
corporeal  person  of  man.  In  the  Arts  of  Sculpture  and 
Painting,  they  are  capital  qualities. 

Thus  far  with  respect  to  the  World  of  the  Eye.  We 
proceed  to  the  beautiful  in  the  World  of  the  Ear. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  191 

Beauty  unquestionably  relates  to  sound.  The  emo 
tions  of  sweet  music  and  of  the  sight  of  loveliness,  melt 
together  into  one  harmonious  emotion. 

The  esthetical  qualities  of  sound  are  manifested  in 
three  ways  :  in  Music,  in  Language,  and  in  Tone. 

Beginning  with  Music,  we  have, 

I.  MELODY. — As  a  constitutive  Idea,  it  determines  the 
cognition  of  beauty  in  the  relations  of  sounds  flowing  on  in 
succession  ;  the  laws  which  are  to  govern  the  succession  ; 
and  the  movements  of  the  Creative  function  in  endless 
musical  production. 

II.  HARMONY. — The  Idea  of  Harmony  determines  the 
cognition  of  beauty  in  two  or  more  successions  of  sound 
flowing  on  in  the  same  time  ;  the  laws  which  govern  then- 
union  ;  and  the  creative  function  in  new  and  varied  pro 
ductions. 

Sensations  cannot  give  the  judgment  of  melody  and 
harmony.  If  the  judgment  were  derived  from  the  mere 
sensitivity,  it  would  belong  to  the  emotions.  But  emo 
tions  are  always  preceded  by  cognitions  ;  and  the  cogni 
tions  must  have  their  determinative  Idea. 

LANGUAGE  has  sound  for  its  material.  The  Idea  of 
melody  determines  the  construction  of  Language  likewise. 
This  appears  in  the  selection  of  elementary  sounds,  their 
combination  into  syllables  and  words,  and  the  arrangement 
of  words  in  propositions.  Smoothness,  euphony,  elegance, 
and  energy  of  style,  all  proceed  from  this  Idea. 

RHYTHM,  whether  in  music  or  verse,  is  comprehended 
in  the  general  Idea  of  melody.  It  expresses  the  relative 
proportion  of  sounds  as  measured  by  time. 

VERSB  is  language,  which,  while  used  as  the  proper 
vehicle  of  thought,  and  retaining  its  laws  as  such,  is 
wrought  into  the  highest  form  of  melody,  of  which  the 
capacities  of  the  constituent  sounds  will  admit. 


192  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

TONE,  in  music,  respects  the  intervals  of  sound,  and  is 
comprehended  under  the  general  Idea  of  melody. 

TONE,  in  speech,  comprehends  the  universal  language 
of  thought  and  passion,  superadding  itself  to  the  articulate 
and  conventional  sounds  of  language  ;  and  contains  the 
esthetical  properties  of  Oratory.  Accent,  emphasis,  and  all 
the  inflexions  accompanying  the  expression  of  thought ; 
majesty,  melody,  tenderness,  and  force,  accompanying  the 
words  of  passion,  make  up  its  varieties. 

We  here  end  our  outline  of  the  Esthetical  Ideas.  It  is 
by  these  that  we  know  and  enjoy  the  beauty  and  sublimity 
of  Nature.  It  is  by  these  also,  as  the  powers  of  creative 
thought,  that  all  the  wonders  of  art  are  produced. 


The  Ideas  which  follow  next  are  the  Stomatological. 
In  the  general  philosophical  classification  already  given  in 
Part  I.,  I  have  adverted  to  the  difficulties  attending  the 
determination  of  this  class  of  Ideas.*  What  follows  I  wish 
to  be  regarded  as  an  indication,  or  an  attempt,  rather  than 
a  pretension  to  be  a  complete  evolution.  Besides,  a  full 
development  of  this  very  extensive  subject,  were  it  possi 
ble,  would  inevitably  lead  me  to  transcend  the  proper 
limits  of  an  elementary  treatise.  A  strictly  primordial 
logic,  also,  requires  mainly  the  laws  which  regulate  the 
determination  of  Ideas,  and  not  their  application,  except 
so  far  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  illustration 
and  a  clear  understanding. 

Before  giving  Somatological  Ideas,  we  ought  to  sup 
pose  the  Dynamical  Ideas  already  to  have  been  deter- 

*  Pages  82,  83, 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  193 

mined.  But  a  reference  to  the  Metaphysical  Ideas  will 
show  that  no  further  determination  has  as  yet  been  at 
tempted,  save  those  included  under  the  category  of  Rela 
tion.  By  reflecting,  however,  we  shall  perceive  that 
every  form  of  Dynamical  Conception  is  embraced  by  this 
Category.  All  movement  and  change  lie  in  cause  produ 
cing  effects,  in  substance  developing  properties,  and  in 
action  and  reaction.  Advancing  into  the  world  of  bodies, 
we  are  introduced  to  various  classes  of  secondary  pheno 
mena;  and  these,  while  generally  connected  with  the 
Cardinal  Ideas  above  named,  are  still  farther,  in  their 
peculiarities,  conditional  of  the  development  of  particular 
Dynamical  Ideas. 

The  most  important  particular  Dynamical  Ideas,  are 
the  Idea  of  centripetal  and  centrifugal  forces  ;  the  Idea 
of  polarized  forces  ;  the  Idea  of  chemical  affinity  and  re 
pulsion  ;  the  Idea  of  vital  powers,  or  the  grand  Idea  of 
LIFE,  as  the  organific  power ;  and  the  Idea  of  instinctive 
activity.  All  these  are  powers  and  forces  recognized  in 
the  Science  of  Nature.  When  I  speak  of  the  Ideas  of 
these  powers  and  forces,  I  mean  that  they  are  not  deter 
mined  by  the  mere  observation  of  phenomena ;  but  that 
the  Eeason  contains  within  itself  the  constitutive  elements 
which  grasp,  distinguish,  and  arrange  the  phenomena,  and 
reduce  them  under  their  respective  powers. 

Cause  conceived  of  in  its  universality  is  metaphenome- 
nal,  known  on  condition  of  phenomena.  If,  then,  there 
be  specific  causes,  they  likewise,  as  causes,  must  be  meta^ 
phenomenal,  and  therefore  capable  of  determination  only 
by  the  supervention  of  Ideas. 

Cause,  however,  is  an  Idea  of  the  utmost  simplicity. 
It  is  that  which  accounts  for  actual  existence,  and  all 
changes  or  phenomena. 


194  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

The  diversity  of  causes  apprehended  and  described 
under  Dynamics  arises  fro.m  the  diversity  of  the  phe 
nomena.*  But  in  reality  have  we,  under  all  this  diver 
sity,  more  than  one  cause  in  nature — a  cause  universal  ? 
Admitting  this,  the  diversity  of  phenomena  arises  from 
the  various  spheres  in  which  cause  acts,  and  the  various 
laws  which  direct  and  govern  its  activity.  And  then,  in 
evolving  the  Idea  of  Cause  simply,  we  have  really  given 
all  necessary  consideration  to  pure  dynamical  philosophy  ; 
and  what  remains  to  us  legitimately,  is  the  evolution  of 
the  Somatological  Ideas,  or  the  Ideas  which  go  forth  into 
the  world  of  bodies,  and  give  the  law  to  all  its  forms,  re 
lations,  and  changes. 

All  Ideas  have  some  form  of  reality  answering  to 
them,  although  not  adequate  to  them.  The  great  law  of 
their  development  is,  that  the  reality  must  first  move  cer 
tain  phenomenal  conditions  in  the  consciousness,  and  then 
the  Ideas  come  forth  to  determine  cognitions  and  laws. 
There  may  be  in  the  human  Keason,  Ideas  yet  unde 
veloped,  because  the  realities  to  which  they  relate  have 
not  yet  come  within  the  field  of  Experience.  And  espe 
cially  may  this  be, true  in  respect  to  the  world  of  bodies 
where  there  is  such  vast  diversity  and  possibility.  Mind 
does  not  penetrate  matter  as  it  penetrates  itself.  Hence 
the  laws  of  bodies  appear  under  two  lands  or  degrees : 

THEORETICAL    AND    POSITIVE    LAW. 

The  first  is  the  conception  of  a  possible  constitution 
of  bodies,  and  one  which  will  embrace  and  account  for  a 
certain  number  of  the  phenomena  presented.  But  the 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  pp.  30-32  and  294. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  195 

Mind  still  remains  in  doubt,  first,  whether  its  conception 
be  realized  in  any  system,  or  be  a  mere  appearance ; 
secondly,  whether,  if  realized,  the  elements  of  universal 
ity  and  necessity  can  be  connected  with  it.  While  these 
doubts  remain,  it  is  relatively  to  the  Mind-judging,  a 
Theory,  or  a  mere  view  taken  for  the  occasion. 

When  we  speak  of  possible  systems,  we  speak  accord 
ing  to  a  limited  observation.  We  think  of  vast  diversity 
and  possibility  only  in  particular  spheres.  In  the  great 
universe  there  may  be  but  one  possible  system  determined 
by  absolute  and  necessary  laws,  comprehending  the  whole, 
and  yet  permeating  the  minutest  particulars :  and  all 
that  we  see  may  be  but  parts  of  this  grand  system,  ap 
pearing  imperfect  in  particulars,  because  these  are  imper 
fectly  seen  in  their  separation  from  the  whole.  Space  is 
thus  the  infinite  field  in  which  the  Infinite  Being  plants 
the  perfect  elements  of  worlds,  which,  under  perfect  and 
necessary  laws,  are  led  forth  to  perfect  developments  in 
long  successions  in  Infinite  Time. 

But  if  there  be  a  diversity  of  principles  possible,  on 
which  worlds  can  be  projected  into  being,  and  linked  to 
gether  on  this  extended  scale,  must  we  not  believe  that 
the  Infinite  and  Perfect  Being  has  chosen  the  best  ?  Can 
his  work  be  less  than  the  best  and  the  perfect  ? 

The  absolute  and  perfect  laws— if  such  they  be — which 
are  embodied  in  the  Creation,  must  have  their  correspond 
ing  Ideas  in  the  Divine  Mind ;  and  therefore,  as  far  as  we 
are  constituted  to  apprehend  them,  must  have  their  cor 
responding  Ideas  in  our  minds  likewise. 

According  to  this  view,  every  law  realized  will  appear 
under  the  characteristics  of  universality  and  necessity. 
The  first  it  certainly  must  have,  and  the  last  can  be  sus 
pended  only  upon  the  question,  whether  Somatological 


196  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

laws  in  the  Divine  determination  are  of  fixed  and  absolute 
perfection,  or  are  arbitrary,  and  of  various  degrees  of  per 
fection.  And  again,  on  the  other  hand,  every  conception 
of  law  appearing  under  these  characteristics,  even  if  sup 
posed  not  to  be  realized  in  any  known  system,  must  find 
its  reality  somewhere, — either  in  some  other  part  of  space, 
or  in  some  other  period  of  time ; — it  must  be  a  prophecy 
of  the  distant  or  the  future.  But  such  a  prophetic  Idea 
could  be  developed  only  in  connexion  with  some  form  of 
reality  in  some  degree  symbolising  with  it.  Could  this  be 
called  Theory  ?  I  think  the  mind  would  repose  in  it  as 
something  higher  than  Theory.  Newton's  mind  grasped 
the  great  law  of  gravitation  before  he  verified  it.  He  did 
not  yield  to  it  as  the  actual  law  of  our  system,  until  he 
had  verified  it :  but  it  always  seems  to  me  to  have  lain 
in  his  mind  from  its  first  conception,  as  a  law  which  must 
find  its  verification  somewhere.  It  was  a  law  penetrated 
by  an  Idea. 

Theory  strictly  is  an  ingenious  conjecture — a  tentative 
act — a  feeling  after  a  law,  determined  by  the  mere  nascent 
development  of  an  Idea,  and  serving  the  purpose  of  gene 
ralizing  the  phenomena,  reducing  them  to  order,  and  pre 
paring  them  for  exact  and  proportionate  expressions. 
This  is  exemplified  in  the  Theory  of  Atoms,  employed  to 
represent  the  determinate  proportions  of  chemical  af 
finities. 

In  attempting  an  enumeration  of  cardinal  Somatologi- 
cal  Ideas,  I  shall  begin  with 

TX.— THE   USEFUL. 

I  have  already  introduced  this  Idea  in  distinguishing 
between  it  and  the  Beautiful.  It  comprehends  the  final 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  197 

end  of  Material  Creation  in  respect  to  creatures  endowed 
with  natural  sensibilities — with  the  capacity  of  physical 
enjoyment  and  suffering.  The  Useful,  as  an  Idea,  reaches 
to  the  perfect  constitution  and  development  of  the  world 
under  this  point  of  view. 

The  universe,  as  far  as  presented  to  our  observation, 
does  not  fully  meet  this  Idea.  When  we  reflect  upon  the 
character  of  the  Great  Creator,  and  the  beneficent  designs 
which  every  where  appear,  taken  in  connexion  with  the 
glorious  prospects  opened  to  our  view  in  Divine  Kevela- 
tion,  we  must  believe  that  the  universe  is  constituted  upon 
this  Idea,  and  that  all  things  are  tending  to  its  realization. 
Nay,  may  it  not  be  already  realized  in  other  parts  of  the 
vast  whole  ;  and  is  not  the  Christian's  heaven  those  per 
fected  worlds  ? 

This  Idea  has  stimulated  human  industry  to  work  its 
wonders.  Man  finds  the  world  a  rude  uncultivated  wilder 
ness  before  he  begins  to  exert  his  industry.  He  fills  it 
with  comfortable  dwellings,  transforms  it  into  smiling 
harvest  fields,  appropriates  its  mineral  resources  in  a 
thousand  useful  arts,  and  even  controls  its  powerful  ele 
ments,  to  accomplish  his  designs.  He  refines  and  multi 
plies  his  wants,  and  by  contriving  to  gratify  them,  multi 
plies  his  enjoyments. 

God  has  made  his  highly  endowed  creature  the  skilful 
instrument  of  perfecting  for  kindly  uses,  a  world  which  he 
has  filled  with  ample  resources.  Human  industry  has  not 
yet  attained  its  limit  :  the  resources  of  the  world  are  not 
yet  exhausted :  this  beneficent  Idea  has  new  wonders  yet 
in  store. 

The  world  was  made  under  the  Idea  of  Utility,  as  one 
of  the  constitutive  elements  ;  and  the  improvements 
which  are  in  progress,  whether  by  physical  laws  in  their 


198  PKIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

necessary  development,  or  by  human  industry,  are  gov 
erned  by  this  Idea.  But  this  Idea  is  general  and  com 
prehensive  ;  and  gives  only  the  most  general  form  of 
Somatological  law.  We  have  yet  to  enquire  into  the 
Ideas  which  determine  its  interior  forms,  relations,  and 
qualities. 

X.— CENTRALIZATION  AND  DIFFUSION. 

V 

The  Idea  of  Centralization  is  that  of  perfect  depen 
dency  and  union.  The  conception  of  body  involves  the 
conception  of  parts  and  a  whole.  But  no  whole  is  possi 
ble  without  centralization. 

If  there  were  but  one  vast  Whole  existent,  a  law  of 
centralization  would  be  sufficient.  But  if  distinct  wholes 
are  to  be  arranged  into  a  system  with  mutual  relations 
and  dependencies,  and  with  one  common  and  universal 
dependency  constituting  the  unity  of  the  system ;  then 
there  must  be  likewise  a  law  of  diffusion,  harmoniously 
opposing  itself  to  the  law  of  centralization,  and  preventing 
a  universal  consolidation.  This  is  the  grand  Idea  upon 
which  the  universe  is  constituted.  Gravitation,  or  the 
Centripetal  force  and  law,  is  the  great  principle  of  centra 
lization  ; — the  Centrifugal  force,  the  great  principle  of 
diffusion. 

That  it  is  an  Idea,  and  not  a  mere  theoretical  concep 
tion,  cannot  well  be  questioned  ;  for  the  characteristics  of 
universality  and  necessity  seem  plainly  to  belong  to  it. 
In  the  wide  space,  beyond  the  utmost  limits  of  observa 
tion,  whatever  worlds  and  systems  may  there  exist,  we 
believe,  under  all  the  force  of  a  commanding  Idea,  to  be 
arranged  and  governed  on  these  two  stupendous  and  all- 
sufficient  principles.  The  history  of  science  shows  the 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  199 

constant  tendency  of  the  human  Keason  to  the  evolution 
of  this  Idea  :  and  now  that  it  is  evolved,  no  other  can  be 

f*m 

admitted  as  the  Idea  of  the  Universe. 


XI.— AFFINITY  AND  REPULSION. 

This  is  akin  to  the  preceding,  and  perhaps  compre 
hended  within  it.  There  is  this  important  distinction, 
however,  which  is  obvious  :  centralization  and  diffusion 
relate  to  cosmical  masses  ;  whereas,  affinity  and  repulsion 
relate  to  the  constitution  of  the  generic  and  specific  vari 
eties  of  the  particular  and  minute  masses  which  enter  into 
the  great  wholes  which  are  governed  by  the  former. 

Affinity  is  of  two  kinds  :  First,  the  cohesion  of  homo 
geneous  matter ;  secondly,  chemical  affinity.  The  first  is 
permanent  affinity,  existing  independently  of  change  ; 
the  second  takes  place  through  change. 

Repulsion  is  likewise  of  two  kinds  :  First,  mechani 
cal  ;  secondly,  chemical.  The  first  relates  to  the  motion 
of  bodies  by  mechanical  force  ;  the  second,  to  the  motion 
of  chemical  decomposition. 

No  less  universal  and  necessary  is  the  principle  of  Af 
finity  and  Kepulsion,  than  that  of  Centralization  and 
Diffusion.  One  is  the  Idea  of  the  great  harmonious  and 
all-comprehending  system  ;  the  other,  the  Idea  of  the 
minute  and  interior  composition  of  the  forms  and  orders 
of  particular  bodies.  One  determines  the  laws  which 
grasp  the  wholes,  without  respect  to  their  interior  consti 
tution  ;  the  other  determines  the  laws  of  this  interior 
constitution. 

XII.— LIFE. 

Life  is  the  Idea  of  the  Organific  power.  Organic 
bodies  are  distinguished  from  inorganic  in  three  ways: 


200  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

First,  they  possess  determinate,  generic,  and  specific 
forms,  which  remain  unchanged  amid  the  ceaseless  flux  of 
the  particles  which  enter  into  them.  Secondly,  the 
actuating  or  moving  power  here  tends  to  an  unceasing 
change  of  particles ;  while  mechanical  forces  tend  to 
equilibrium,  chemical  to  composition  or  to  decomposition, 
and  then  pause.  Thirdly,  in  inorganic  bodies  accretions 
are  made  either  by  a  simple  cohesion  of  homogeneous 
matter,  or  by  a  simple  union  of  particles,  determined  by 
inherent  affinities ;  while  in  organic  bodies,  a  new  power, 
acting  from  within,  resists  cohesion  and  affinities ;  and, 
by  a  process  of  assimilation,  projects,  as  from  a  centre, 
distinct  particles  metamorphosed  into  substances  of  quali 
ties  and  forms  determined  by  its  own  inward  law. 

Wonderful  is  the  law  of  life  !  Under  the  myriad 
varieties  of  vegetable  and  animal  bodies,  it  still  preserves 
its  identity.  Observation  gives  us  only  the  phenomena  : 
the  law  is  metaphenomenal.  We  think  of  it  too  as  a  law 
universal  and  necessary.  It  springs  therefore  from  an 
Idea  of  the  Eeason. 


XIIL— POLARITY. 

Polarity,  as  thus  far  determined,  is  magnetic,  electric, 
chemical,  crystalline,  and  optical.  It  is  the  conception 
of  disturbance,  repulsion,  and  separation,  produced  by  the 
attempted  union  of  like  kinds  ;  and  of  harmony  and  re 
pose,  produced  by  the  actual  union  of  unlike  kinds. 

That  an  Idea  lies  behind  all  the  observations  which 
have  been  made  respecting  polarity,  determining  their 
processes  and  results,  is  manifest  :  and  that  the  concep 
tion  of  polarity,  as  an  attempted  expression  of  the  Idea, 
has  been  the  guiding  star  to  the  most  eminent  philoso- 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  201 

phers  in  their  investigations  in  magnetism,  electricity, 
chemistry,  crystallization,  and  light,  is  abundantly  at 
tested  :  nevertheless,  it  does  not  yet  appear,  notwith 
standing  the  confident  assertion  of  Schelling,  that  the 
conception  fully  embodies  the  Idea,  and  leads  it  forth  to 
the  determination  of  a  universal  and  necessary  law.  As 
yet,  it  is  a  theory,  like  a  thin  and  almost  transparent 
cloud,  with  the  sun  behind  it. 


XIV.— INSTINCT. 

In  vegetables  we  have  vital  forces,  and  the  law  of  life, 
in  its  beautiful  and  wonderful  variety  of  manifestation, 
[n  animals,  as  the  genus,  we  have  life  and  instinct.  In 
man,  the  thinking  species,  we  have  life,  instinct,  and 
spirit.  Instinct  and  spirit  manifesting  themselves  in  the 
sphere  of  observation,  are  not  organific,  but  motive.  Vital 
forces  produce  motion,  but  it  is  the  motion  of  the  organific 
process.  Instinct  and  spirit  produce  muscular  activity  in 
the  accomplishment  of  an  end. 

The  motion  produced  by  spirit,  or  voluntary  motion, 
belongs  to  psychology  :  Instinctive  motion  belongs  to  so- 
matology.  Instinct  is  not  volition,  it  is  the  shadow  of  vo 
lition  in  the  animal  sphere.  In  both  activities,  ends  are 
proposed,  intelligent ial  ends.  In  volition,  the  ends  are 
deliberated  upon  and  estimated  by  the  agent  himself,  and 
selected  by  an  act  of  freedom.  In  instinct,  the  ends  are 
proposed  by  the  infinite  and  all-governing  intelligence, 
just  as  ends  are  proposed  by  this-  intelligence  for  all  the 
movements  of  nature  :  and  then  the  activities  of  the  ani 
mal  are  determined  to  these  ends  by  necessary  laws  mani 
festing  themselves  in  the  constitution  of  the  animal,  un 
accompanied  by  deliberation  and  exclusive  of  choice.  The 
9* 


202  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

all-comprehensive  law  of  the  mere  animal  nature  is  in 
stinct.  It  is  a  universal  and  necessary  law,  governing  a 
mode  of  being,  and  springing  from  a  constitutive  Idea. 


XV.    REGULARITY.    UNIFORMITY,    VARIETY,    SYMMETRY, 
AND  DETERMINATE  FORM. 

These  have  already  been  considered  in  their  esthetical 
relations.  They  exist  likewise  in  somatological  relations. 
They  bear  a  relation  to  the  useful,  analogous  to  the  rela 
tion  which  they  bear  to  the  beautiful.  They  all  neces 
sarily  result  from  determinate  and  yet  diffusive  law.  This 
appears  palpably  in  the  action  of  centripetal  and  centri 
fugal  forces,  in  vital  forces,  and  in  crystallization. 

In  the  absolutely  perfect,  they  will  not  appear  in  con 
flict  under  the  two  Ideas  of  Beauty  and  Utility.  In  the 
actual  nature  submitted  to  observation,  they  do  appear  in 
conflict.  In  the  arts  cultivated  by  man,  this  conflict  is 
constantly  experienced  ;  for  example,  in  the  form  and  ap 
portionment  of  buildings.  The  Grecian  Temple  is  a  pure 
development  of  beautiful  symmetry ;  a  commodious  dwell 
ing-house  is  a  development  of  useful  symmetry.  There  is 
a  constant  struggle  in  human  art  to  unite  the  two  ;  and 
they  appear  together,  in  consequence,  in  a  union  of  com 
promise. 

The  determinate  form  of  nature  viewed  on  a  grand 
scale,  as  in  the  shapes  of  the  planets,  the  line  of  their  or 
bits,  and  the  vast  arrangements  of  the  starry  heavens,  pre 
sent  us  a  perfect  union  of  the  two  Ideas.  It  is  only  in  the 
details  of  the  particular  orbs  that  we  perceive  the  opposi 
tion,  and  especially  in  the  sphere  of  human  activity.  In 
these  details,  we  judge  under  the  light  of  Astronomy  and 
Geology,  that  a  mighty  progress  is  making  from  lower  to 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  203 

higher  states.  The  intelligential  activity,  too,  in  being 
brought  to  task  itself  in  the  field  which  it  occupies,  is  at 
the  same  time  developing  its  own  greatness,  and  reaching 
forward  to  its  ultimate  destiny. 

XVI.— IDENTITY,  DIFFERENCE,  RESEMBLANCE. 

Identity  and  Difference  are  antithetical  conceptions. 
Resemblance  is  the  union  of  the  two,  in  two  or  more  ob 
jects  compared  together.  Personal  Identity  is  the  same 
ness  of  the  individual  being  in  substance  and  essential  pro 
perties,  taken  in  different  and  indefinitely  distant  times 
and  places. 

In  material  particles  or  parts,  there  is  no  necessary 
identity,  for  matter,  under  the  forces  and  laws  of  nature, 
is  liable  to  indefinite  change.  The  identity  of  bodies  is  an 
identity  of  certain  forms  and  qualities,  admitting  differ 
ences  in  other  forms  and  qualities.  Here  an  identity  of 
substance  cannot  be  considered,  for  the  reason  above  stated 
— the  constant  flux  of  matter. 

Identity  and  Difference  actually  existing  in  nature, 
lays  the  ground  for  the  classification  of  bodies  into  genera, 
species,  and  individuals.  Generic  forms  and  qualities  are 
those  which  are  the  most  general  and  comprehensive  ;  thus 
animal,  for  example,  embraces  only  the  forms  and  qualities 
which  distinguish  all  animals  from  all  other  living  organ 
isms.  But  in  man,  forms  and  properties  are  added  which, 
as  differentia,  distinguish  him  from  all  other  kinds  or 
species  of  animals,  and,  at  the  same  time,  identify  all  the 
individuals  of  his  own  species  :  while  in  the  individual  man 
George,  or  Thomas,  forms  and  properties  are  added  which 
distinguish  him  from  every  other  individual  of  his  kind, 
and  of  course  identify  him  with  no  one. 


204  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

It  has  been  said  that  genera  and  species  are  names  of 
general  conceptions,  which  we  may  form  and  vary  at  plea 
sure  ;  and  that  consequently  they  have  no  corresponding 
realities.  It  is  indeed  true  that  we  have  no  such  living 
and  real  being  as  animal,  comprising  only  generic  forms 
and  qualities  ;  and  no  such  living  and  real  being  as  man, 
comprising  only  specific  founts  and  qualities.  It  is  true, 
also,  that  we  can  widely  vary  our  classifications  by  uniting 
together  different  particulars  under  new  points  of  agree 
ment.  But  let  it  be  recollected,  that  the  words  animal 
and  man  do  express  forms  and  qualities  which  really  exist : 
The  forms  and  qualities  indicated  by  animal  are  found 
really  existing  in  every  particular  animal ;  and  the  forms 
and  qualities  indicated  by  man,  are  found  in  every  indi 
vidual  man.  And  when  we  vary  our  classifications,  we  are 
still  conversant  with  realities,  for  our  classification  still  cor 
responds  to  real  identities  and  differences.  We  indeed 
view  them  in  different  relations,  and  invent  new  names  to 
represent  our  new  views  ;  but,  nevertheless,  we  cannot 
view  them  out  of  actually  existing  relations. 

The  truth  is,  that  the  determinate  forms  and  qualities 
of  bodies  exhibit  both  identity  and  difference  ;  and  these 
in  their  universality  constitute  the  possibility  of  all  classi 
fication.  If  there  were  all  difference,  there  would  be  all 
variety,  and  of  course  no  classification.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  there  were  all  identity,  there  would  be  no  variety,  and 
here  again  no  possibility  of  classification.  Identity  enables 
us  to  bind  together  in  classes  and  systems  :  Difference 
enables  us  to  separate  the  classes,  systems,  and  particulars : 
so  that,  when  we  view  parts,  we  still  assign  them  their 
general  relations  :  and  when  we  view  wholes,  we  still  dis 
tinguish  and  comprehend  the  particulars  which  go  to  make 
them  up.  We  thus  know  the  harmony  and  variety  of  the 
Universe. 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  205 

If  any  one  were  to  remark,  that  universal  identity 
would  not  be  incompatible  with  some  diversity,  inasmuch 
as  the  identical  forms  and  qualities  might  be  presented  in 
different  relations  of  time  and  space  ;  it  would  be  sufficient 
to  reply,  that  as  we  should  in  this  case  have  continually 
the  same  recurring  perception,  we  in  reality  would  be  un 
able  to  distinguish  different  points  in  space,  and  different 
periods  in  time. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  any  one  were  inclined  to  merge 
identity  into  mere  resemblance,  by  calling  it  the  most  per 
fect  resemblance,  he  might  be  convinced  of  the  utter  im 
possibility  of  this  conception,  by  reflecting,  that  resem 
blance  cannot  be  constituted  without  identity.  There 
must  be  sameness  in  some  forms  or  qualities,  to  enable  us 
to  bring  them  together  ;  and  the  union  of  points  of  same 
ness  with  points  of  difference,  in  fact,  makes  resemblance. 

The  conception  of  Identity  and  Difference,  and  their 
common  relation  in  resemblance,  is  a  universal  and  neces 
sary  conception.  We  extend  it  not  only  to  what  we  see, 
we  know  it  must  pervade  all  worlds.  As  a  necessary  so- 
matological  conception,  it  must  find  in  the  reason  its  cor 
responding  and  constitutive  Idea.  Hence,  when  pheno 
mena  are  given  as  the  required  conditions  and  antecedents 
in  Time,  the  Keason  under  this  constitutive  Idea — the  Idea 
from  which  sprang  forth  the  perfect  system  and  the  mani 
fold  variety  of  the  Universe — begins  to  cognise  resemblance, 
to  classify  the  objects  of  perception,  and  to  seize  upon  the 
glorious  unity  reigning  amid  the  glorious  diversity. 

XVII.— DESIGN,  FINAL  CAUSE,  MEANS  AND  END. 

These  are  only  different  ways  of  expressing  the  same 
Idea.  The  great  Architect  of  the  Universe  forecasted  his 


206  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

design  ;  this  design,  contemplated  by  himself,  is  the  final 
cause  of  the  Creation  ;  and  the  Creation  itself  is  a  great 
system  of  means  and  ends,  in  which  the  means  are  ends, 
and  the  ends  means,  in  a  long  chain  of  linked  and  harmo 
nious  subordination,  and  all  connected  with  an  ultimate 
end  which  is  not  a  means,  upon  which  the  eye  of  God  re 
poses  in  infinite  and  quiet  delight. 

This  Idea  of  the  Infinite  Keason,  is  found  also  in  the 
human  reason.  Hence  nothing  is  more  natural  and  spon 
taneous  than  the  enquiries  which  the  mind  makes  after 
final  causes  in  the  structure  of  plants  and  animals,  nay,  in 
the  whole  order  of  Creation. 

As  a  principle  of  philosophical  research,  the  conception 
of  Final  Causes  has  been  adopted  chiefly  in  respect  to  or 
ganised  bodies,  because  here  more  manifest  and  certain  ; 
and  here  unquestionably  it  has  achieved  stupendous  re 
sults,  of  which  the  labors  of  Cuvier  alone  are  a  sufficient 
attestation. 

The  conception  of  final  causes,  like  other  universal  and 
necessary  conceptions,  accepts  the  observations  of  the  sen 
ses  as  its  condition  and  antecedent  in  time  ;  but  it  can  rest 
upon  an  Idea  of  the  Keason  alone  as  its  constitutive  ele 
ment.  Phenomena  fleeting  and  apparently  irregular  and 
confused,  are  grasped  by  this  idea  and  reduced  to  orderly 
and  beautiful  relations.  And  it  is  not  only  in  fields  of  ob 
servation  actually  presented,  that  it  arranges  and  composes 
phenomena,  and  educes  system  ;  as  a  watchful  and  expec 
tant  eye,  it  is  ever  looking  about  to  find  phenomena  that 
shall  fall  in  with  its  own  preconceptions.  It  is  a  necessary 
prophetic  thought,  which  wanders  through  the  universe. 
Where  no  observation  can  reach,  it  has  full  assurance 
there  is  design. 

I  here  close  my  view  of  Somatological  Ideas.    However 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  207 

brief  and  imperfect,  it  will  answer  the  end  I  have  in  view, 
namely,  Logical  Construction. 

I  will  complete  this  outline,  with  the  Logical  Ideas. 

XVIII.— TRUTH. 

Truth  is  an  antithetical  idea  :  its  opposite  is  Falsehood. 

The  great  aim  of  the  Reason  is  Truth  :  and  Logic  com 
prises  the  Laws  which  govern  the  Eeason  in  its  searches 
after,  in  the  processes  by  which  it  arrives  at,  Truth. 

Truth  in  itself  is  identical  with  the  highest  form  of 
Reality — with  absolute  and  necessary  Reality  ;  and  it  is 
the  parent  of  all  other  reality — the  Reality  of  actual  objec 
tive  Being.  The  Ideas,  and  the  necessary  and  universal 
conceptions  which  immediately  spring  out  of  them,  are  the 
essential  body  of  Truth :  Actual  Being  is  the  exterior 
embodiment  of  Truth.  Hence  Truth  is  that  in  which  the 
Reason  ultimately,  necessarily,  and  securely  reposes. 

When  the  Reason,  contemplating  Ideas  and  necessary 
conceptions,  and  their  exterior  embodiment  in  the  consti 
tution  of  the  Universe,  gives  the  judgment  of  Truth,  it 
does  so  under  the  great  Idea  of  Truth.  Mere  phenomena 
contain  no  truth,  because  they  contain  no  reality,  and  con 
sequently  they  cannot  contain  the  judgment  of  Truth. 
The  phenomena  being  given  as  conditions  or  occasions  an 
tecedent  in  time,  the  Reason  under  the  Idea  of  Truth 
forms  the  conception  of  the  subjective  and  objective  Real 
ities — it  affirms  that  they  are  true. 

Falsehood  is  the  opposite  or  negative  of  Truth,  with 
the  appearance  or  pretension  of  being  Truth.  In  the  high 
est — the  pure  region  of  Truth,  Falsehood  cannot  well  find 
place.  Ideas,  and  primary  absolute  conceptions,  have  such 
decided  characteristics  that  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  how  a 


208  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

falsehood  can  disguise  itself  in  their  habiliments.  They 
are  necessary,  universal,  and  intuitively  clear.  How  can 
a  falsehood  put  on  the  appearances  of  these  ?  The  very 
supposition  seems  to  involve  an  absurdity.  If  it  were  so, 
could  we  ever  have  a  certain  and  infallible  test  of  truth  ? 
Is  not  this  the  great  distinction  between  a  presumed  truth 
and  a  presumed  falsehood,  that  when  carried  up  to  the 
primary  conceptions  and  their  determining  ideas,  the  first 
quietly  flows  into  these  as  a  congenial  essence,  while  the 
latter  is  repelled  and  flows  back  to  seek  its  home  elsewhere  ? 
The  necessity,  the  universality,  the  intuitive  clearness,  of 
the  conception,  are  what  give  it  the  character  of  absolute 
Truth.  Unless  it  attain  these  characteristics  it  cannot  be 
absolute  Truth  ;  and  when  it  does  attain  them,  it  cannot 
but  be  absolute  Truth.  Falsehood  here  then  must  be  ex 
cluded.  In  this  pure  region,  a  mind  may  mislead  itself 
by  bringing  along  with  it  the  gross  prejudices,  the  wild  and 
baseless  theories,  which  it  has  collected  in  a  lower  region, 
and  dogmatically  investing  them  with  the  attire  of  Truth. 
But  it  is  a  wilful  act — the  act  of  a  professed  Sophist  and 
Sectarian.  But  to  the  humble,  sincere,  open-eyed,  and 
pure-hearted  child  of  Truth,  falsehood  can  find  no  en 
trance  among  these  primary  ideas  and  principles.  It  is 
in  the  lower  region  itself — the  region  of  observation,  in 
duction,  and  deduction,  of  human  will  and  human  passion, 
that  falsehood  finds  a  wide  and  natural  field  to  walk  in. 
Here  the  sense  may  be  deceived  by  appearances,  and  the 
intellect  amused  and  led  astray  by  "  Idols  of  the  Tribe, 
the  Den,  the  Market-place,  and  the  Theatre." 

But  in  whatever  region  of  Knowledge  the  Reason  takes 
its  stand,  Truth  is  its  great  and  legitimate  object.  The 
Idea  of  Truth  is  the  spring  of  all  its  activity. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  209 

XIX.— THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  IDEA. 

This  is  the  Idea  of  accounting  for  the  development 
and  progress  of  humanity  in  science,  art,  government,  and 
religion.  It  is  the  Idea  of  accounting  for  every  thing  per 
ceived  or  thought  of. 

Enquiry  supposes  that  the  mind  cannot  rest  satisfied 
with  phenomena,  whether  of  immediate  consciousness,  or 
taken  in  their  secondary  state,  and  representing  the  actual 
objects  and  events  of  the  external  world.  No  enquiry 
would  indeed  be  made,  if  there  were  no  phenomena  pre 
sented.  But  why  is  not  the  mind  satisfied  with  its  sensa 
tions,  and  spontaneous  and  natural  perceptions  ?  Why 
does  it  raise  enquiries  respecting  causes  and  laws  ?  Not 
only  is  the  Idea  of  Cause  and  Law  here  presumed,  but 
also  the  Idea,  that  if  causes  and  laws  can  be  assigned,  the 
phenomena  will  be  accounted  for.  This  restlessness  of  the 
human  mind,  when  dealing  with  mere  phenomena  ;  this 
conception,  that  there  must  be  causes  and  laws  ;  this  firm 
conviction,  that  science  is  gained,  when  the  causes  and 
laws  are  determined  ;  and  this  quiet  satisfaction  in  the  re 
sult — all  show  the  working  of  the  philosophical  Idea,  or 
element  of  our  being. 

That  this  is  an  Idea,  cannot  be  doubted,  for  it  is  both 
necessary  and  universal.  The  Eeason  affirms  that  all 
phenomena  are  to  be  accounted  for  ;  and  that  the  princi 
ple  of  every  phenomenon  really  and  necessarily  exists,  or 
the  phenomenon  would  not  be  possible. 

Tlfe  connection  between  this  Idea  and  the  preceding  is 
very  close  :  and  some,  at  first  thought,  may  even  look 
upon  them  as  identical.  There  is,  however,  one  obvious 
distinction  :  Truth  embraces  all  absolute  and  necessary  prin 
ciples,  and,  although  gained  upon  phenomenal  conditions, 


210  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

it  may  be  contemplated  separately  from  all  phenomena : 
the  philosophical  Idea,  on  the  other  hand,  always  connects 
itself  with  phenomena,  as  determining  the  activity  of  the 
Intelligence  in  respect  to  them.  Truth  is  the  cardinal 
Idea  of  Primordial  Logic  ;  the  philosophical,  the  cardinal 
Idea  of  Inductive  Logic.  Truth  is  the  simple  Idea  of  the 
primal  and  absolute  authority ;  the  philosophical,  the  Idea 
of  reducing  every  thing  under  that  authority. 

XX.— INTUITION. 

Intuition  has  already  been  represented  as  one  of  the 
functions  of  the  Keason — the  function  of  immediate  in 
sight.  Now,  connected  with  this  function,  is  the  Idea  of 
the  perfect  and  the  absolute  authority  of  such  an  insight. 
Hence  we  assign  the  name  of  the  function,  to  express  the 
corresponding  Idea.  Thus  the  Keason,  by  the  function  of 
Intuition,  perceives,  directly,  that  there  are  three,  and 
only  three,  dimensions  in  space.  Such  is  its  immediate 
and  necessary  perception.  Now,  this  is  a  particular  per 
ception,  or  one  instance  of  Intuition :  but,  upon  this  one 
instance,  or  upon  any  similar  instance,  there  appears  the 
universal  affirmation,  that  Intuition  is  an  absolute  and 
perfect  law  of  cognition, — that  whatever  is  known  by  In 
tuition,  is  ultimately  and  certainly  known.  All  axioms — 
all  first  principles,  and  all  primary  sensuous  perceptions, 
are  thus  legitimated.  But  the  universal  affirmation,  or 
conception,  itself  reposes  upon  an  Idea  of  the  Reason,— 
namely,  the  Idea  of  Intuition,  as  the  primal  and  Highest 
and  most  authoritative  form  of  Cognition.  This  Idea 
permeates  Primordial  Logic,  and  governs  all  its  particular 
determinations. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  211 


XXI.— INVOLUTION  AND  EVOLUTION. 

Besides  Intuition,  there  are  two  other  forms  of  cognis 
ing  truths  or  realities.  These  are  Induction  and  Deduc 
tion.  In  the  inductive  form,  we  cognise  universal  truths 
through  particular  phenomena  in  which  the  truths  are 
embodied.  In  the  deductive  form,  we  cognise  particular 
truths  through  universal  truths  which  comprehend  them, 
and  out  of  which  they  are  evolved.  The  two  forms,  in 
relation  to  each  other,  may  be  represented  under  the  fol 
lowing  formulae : 

(  a,  b,  c,  d,  &c.  are  X 
Induction  1  Z  is  a,  b,  c,  d,  &c. 
(  Therefore  Z  is  X. 

f  ZisX 

Deduction  •<  a,  or  5,  or  c,  or  d,  &c.  is  Z 
(  Therefore  a,  or  &,  &c.  is  X. 

The  first  is  an  involution  of  inducted  particulars,  into  a 
general  expression.  The  second  is  an  evolution  of  the 
general  expression  to  a  particular  determination. 

According  to  these  formulae,  it  is  evident  that  the 
Induction  must  precede  the  Deduction,  and  that  the  lat 
ter  is  a  return  to  the  elementary  particulars  of  the  former. 

If  the  mind  be  supposed  to  be  placed  at  the  point  of 
observing  the  particulars,  then,  by  the  Inductive  formula, 
it  arrives  at  the  general  expression.  If  the  general  prin 
ciple,  or  expression,  be  already  gained  by  a  previous  In 
duction,  and  the  mind  be  placed  at  this  point,  then  it  can 
perceive  each  particular  through  the  Deductive  formula. 

But  here  the  question  may  be  started,  what  value  is 


212  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

there  in  the  Deductive  formula,  since  it  is  a  mere  return 
to  particulars  which  were  grasped  by  the  Inductive  at  the 
outset  ? 

First.  There  is  a  more  perfect  comprehension  of  the 
general  truth  when  viewed  under  the  two  forms,  in  their 
reciprocal  relation. 

Secondly.  The  Induction,  as  an  inference,  does  not 
measure  itself  by  the  Induction,  as  a  mere  bringing  in  of 
the  facts.  The  grounds  of  the  general  inference,  made 
upon  the  limited  colligation,  will  be  hereafter  explained. 
But  this  general  inference  upon  the  limited  colligation,  is 
the  fact  which  shows  the  necessity  of  deductions,  subse 
quent  to  the  induction  which  establishes  the  general  prin 
ciple  from  which  the  deductions  are  made ;  for,  since  all 
the  particulars  were  not  really  brought  in  and  colligated, 
the  general  principle,  when  once  established,  becomes  an 
authority  for  conclusions  respecting  particulars  not  origi 
nally  inducted. 

Thirdly.  The  Deductive  formula  does  not  invariably 
connect  itself  with  the  Inductive,  as  above  exhibited. 
General  principles  are  not  universally  the  result  of  Induc 
tive  inferences,  but  are  often  ti  priori  and  intuitive.  The 
first  principles  of  morals  and  mathematics  are  palpable 
instances.  These  principles  are  established  as  d  priori 
and  intuitive  judgments  ;  and  then  sciences,  vast,  compli 
cated,  and  momentous,  are  evolved  by  the  Deductive 
formula. 

Fourthly.  In  the  practical  affairs  of  life,  there  are  re 
ceived  principles  which  are  constantly  applied  by  all  men, 
without  instituting  anew  enquiries  respecting  their  origin 
and  basis.  Indeed,  multitudes  who  are  capable  of  apply 
ing  the  principles,  are  unfitted  for  the  investigations 
through  which  they  were  originally  obtained.  This  practi- 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  213 

cal  application  is  made  in  a  series  of  deductions,  which, 
although  not  assuming,  in  the  common  language  of  men, 
the  syllogistic  form,  nevertheless  admit  of  being  reduced 
to  it. 

These  considerations  are  sufficient  to  show  the  value 
of  the  Deductive  formula. 

The  fundamental  Ideas  of  the  Inductive  and  Deduc 
tive  formulae,  and  of  the  modes  of  cognition  which  they 
represent,  are  Involution  and  Evolution.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  Keason  does  not  contemplate  any  phenomenon 
or  fact  apart  and  isolated.  It  must  be  colligated  with 
some  other  fact,  and  these  again  with  others,  and  so  on 
until  we  have  a  mass  of  facts  bound  together  in  the  unity 
of  system,  and  involved  in  a  great  central  law. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  the  Keason  seizes  upon  any 
law,  axiom,  or  first  principle,  it  does  not  contemplate  it 
as  dormant,  unproductive,  or  ever  revolving  within  itself. 
It  feels  impelled  by  its  own  Idea  to  look  out  for  an  ex 
terior  sphere  in  which  the  great  truth  shall  unfold  itself 
in  manifold  varieties. 

The  Reason  takes  these  two  directions  necessarily  and 
universally ;  and  hence  manifests  here  again  the  determi 
native  power  of  Ideas. 

XXII.— ANALYSIS  AND  SYNTHESIS. 

According  to  a  general  definition,  Synthesis  is  the  con 
ception  of  the  composition  of  systems — of  systems  of 
Truth  according  to  logical  principles  and  formulae ;  and 
systems  of  bodies  according  to  natural  and  mechanical 
laws :  while  Analysis  is  the  conception  of  the  decomposi 
tion  of  systems  reversing  the  order  of  the  Synthesis,  and 
running  back  in  the  chain  of  principles,  formulae,  and 


214  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

laws.  Geometry  is  a  completed  synthesis  of  principles 
and  consequences.  When  taught,  the  synthetical  order 
is  observed — the  pupil  being  instructed  how  to  put  to 
gether  the  several  theorems  in  a  way  to  show  their  depend 
ence  upon  the  axioms  and  definitions,  and  upon  preced 
ing  demonstrations  constantly  accumulating  in  the  progress 
of  the  synthesis.  A  watch,  also,  or  any  piece  of  ma 
chinery,  when  its  separated  parts  are  taken  up  and  put 
together  according  to  the  laws  of  the  mechanism,  presents 
us  a  synthesis.  On  the  other  hand,  we  may  begin  with 
the  remotest  deductions  of  Geometry,  and  enquire  upon 
what  grounds  they  rest ;  these  grounds,  in  part  at  least, 
will  prove  to  be  other  propositions  deduced  from  something 
still  going  before  :  in  this  way  we  may  continue  to  unwind 
the  whole  concatenation  of  dependent  demonstrations 
until  we  arrive  at  the  self-evident  principles.  So,  like 
wise,  we  may  take  in  pieces  the  watch  in  the  order  of  the 
mechanical  dependency,  until  we  arrive  at  the  main-spring. 
We  thus  accomplish  an  analysis.  He  that  has  a  perfect 
knowledge  of  Geometry,  and  of  the  watch,  can  readily 
synthesise  or  analyse  both ;  and  the  same  kind  of  know 
ledge  enables  him  to  do  one  or  the  other.  To  one  ignorant 
of  Geometry,  and  just  setting  out  to  gain  a  knowledge  of 
it,  the  synthetical  mode  is  the  true  and  certain  mode ;  for 
every  step  here  is  made  according  to  established  principles 
and  demonstrations,  which  are  continually  evolving.  Here 
the  analytical  mode,  by  constantly  referring  to  previous 
demonstrations  which  are  not  yet  comprehended,  is  liable 
to  produce  perplexity  and  confusion.  In  respect  to  the 
watch,  also,  an  ingenious  learner  would  more  safely  make 
experiments  in  putting  together  than  in  taking  apart. 

In    the   construction   of  -scientific    systems,    and   in 
mechanical  constructions,  a  synthesis  of  the  parts  neces- 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  215 

sarily  precedes  an  analysis  of  the  whole.  The  natural 
mode  of  constructing  is  likewise  the  natural  mode  of  learn 
ing.  But  where  wholes  are  presented  us,  as  in  pieces  of 
machinery  which  are  strange  to  us,  and  in  natural  organ 
isms  such  as  animals  and  plants,  and  in  the  subtile  com 
binations  of  chemical  affinities,  analysis  of  necessity  pre 
cedes  synthesis.  In  such  cases  analysis  cannot  at  once 
proceed  with  the  nice  accuracy  of  geometry  and  the  watch, 
where  the  geometer  and  the  mechanician  know  precisely 
where  to  begin,  and  how  to  separate,  because  they  know 
the  beginning,  the  continuity,  and  the  completion  of  the 
systematic  and  the  organic  wholes  before  them.  Instead 
of  this,  many  tentative,  and  even  destructive  and  futile 
experiments  are  made  before  the  laws  and  the  harmony 
of  the  construction  appear. 

Analysis  and  Synthesis  do  not  correspond  to  Induction 
and  Deduction,  but  precede  or  accompany  them.  In  geo 
metry  there  is,  in  the  progress  of  the  evolution,  a  constant 
synthesis  of  axioms,  definitions,  previous  demonstrations, 
and  new  forms  and  relations.  The  whole  putting  together 
must  be  made  accordingly  to  a  rigid  logic :  but  neverthe 
less,  there  is  an  ingenuity  exercised  in  the  combinations 
and  ordering  of  the  parts,  for  the  purpose  of  eliciting 
conclusions  or  evolving  proof,  which  is  not  provided  for  in 
the  rules  of  deduction.  This  belongs  in  reality  to  another 
function  of  the  Eeason,  which  we  have  named  Invention* 

Analysis  precedes  Induction  with  experiments  which 
are  often  the  starting  point ;  and  then  accompanies  it,  by 
evolving  in  the  continued  experiments  new  and  important 
phenomena. 

Synthesis  also  accompanies  Induction,  arranging  and 

*  Supra,  p.  131. 


216  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

combining  the  discovered  truths  so  as  to  form  a  compact 
and  harmonious  system. 

Analysis  and  Synthesis  are  thus  subsidiary  to  Induc 
tion  and  Deduction.  The  Inductive  Function  is  striving 
to  see  the  general  truth  through  the  manifold  particulars 
in  which  it  is  manifested,  in  the  unity  of  system.  The 
Deductive  Function  is  striving  to  see  the  particular  and 
remote  conclusions  comprehended  in  the  general  truth,  in 
the  unity  of  system  also.  The  Inventive  Function,  by 
its  analysis  and  synthesis,  presents  the  requisite  media  of 
the  Inductive  and  Deductive  cognitions,  and  preconceives 
and  suggests  the  systematic  construction. 

All  these  functions  are  related  in  their  operations  to 
the  Intuitive  Function,  as  will  appear  in  subsequent  de 
velopments. 

Analysis  and  Synthesis,  considered  as  Ideas  in  the 
Keason,  are  certainly  nearly  akin  to,  if  not  identical  with, 
the  Ideas  of  Involution  and  Evolution.  If  the  Ideas  be 
regarded  as  Identical,  then  Analysis  and  Synthesis  are 
only  conceptions  under  the  common  Ideas  distinguishable 
from  Induction  and  Deduction  by  the  characteristics  above 
given. 

It  appears  to  me,  however,  that  Analysis  and  Synthesis 
are  distinct  Ideas  determining  Invention  ;  while  Involution 
and  Evolution  determine  Induction  and  Deduction.  In 
volution  and  Evolution  are  Ideas  which  determine  the 
conception  of  phenomena  running  together  and  colligated 
in  general  laws,  and  general  laws  reciprocally  governing 
the  development  of  phenomena;  and  the  conception  of 
particular  truths  and  conclusions  comprehended  in  general 
truths,  and  general  truths  evolved  into  the  particular 
truths  and  conclusions.  But  Analysis  and  Synthesis, 
taken  as  Ideas,  determine  the  conception  of  a  system  of 


PKIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  217 

laws  governing  a  system  of  bodies — where  the  whole  im 
plies  constituent  parts,  and  the  parts  imply  an  harmonious 
whole ;  and  the  conception  of  a  system  of  truths,  where 
each  particular  truth  with  the  long  chain  of  consequences 
which  it  involves  is  interlinked  with  other  truths  and  con 
sequences,  constituting  the  unity  of  absolute  science,  and 
where  the  particular  truths  and  consequences  ultimately 
lead  back  to  pure  intuitions. 

It  thus  becomes  plain  how  Analysis  and  Synthesis  aid 
Induction  and  Deduction.  While  inducting  facts  for  the 
purpose  of  finding  a  law  in  relation  to  any  subject  of  en 
quiry,  there  must  be  some  preconception  or  Idea  to  guide 
in  the  selection  of  phenomena,  and  the  form  of  the  ex 
periments  :  and  now  the  Inventive  function  is  busy  in 
arranging  and  combining,  and  in  various  tentative  sugges 
tions.  But  what  governs  the  Inventive  function  ?  Is  it 
not  the  great  Idea  of  System,  where  constituted  wholes 
and  constitutive  parts  are  reciprocal ;  or,  in  other  words, 
is  it  not  Analysis  and  Synthesis?  And  so  again,  when 
engaged  in  demonstrating  theorems,  and  solving  problems, 
the  Idea  of  the  wide-spread  relations  of  truths  and  prin 
ciples — the  Idea  of  their  synthetical  and  analytical  capa 
city — determines  the  Inventive  function  in  searching  for, 
and  finding,  the  material  of  the  ratiocination. 

The  same  appears  also  in  our  reasonings  on  moral  and 
all  practical  questions.  We  find  arguments,  because, 
under  the  Ideas  of  Analysis  and  Synthesis — the  Ideas  of 
the  wide-spread  and  systematic  relations  of  truth — we 
know  where  to  look  for  them. 

It  is  sufficiently  obvious  that  the  Ideas  of  Analysis 

and  Synthesis  are  necessary  and  universal.     Whatever  be 

the  scope  or  the  subject  of  our  reasoning,  they  inevitably 

make  their  appearance.     Nor  is  it  conceivable  that  any 

10 


218  PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC. 

course  of  reasoning  can  be  conducted  independently  of 
them,  since  truth,  in  its  very  nature,  is  analytical  and 
synthetical. 

I  here  close  the  outline  of  Ideas.  Next  in  order  will 
be  the  consideration  of  axioms,  and  of  primary  cognitions 
and  definitions — those  which  belong  to  the  Intuitive 
Function.  We  shall  thus  complete  Primordial  Logic. 


PRIMOKDIAL  LOGIC.  219 


SECTION  IV. 

PRIMARY    SENSUOUS    COGNITIONS,    OR  COGNITIONS    OF 
THE    EXTERIOR    CONSCIOUSNESS. 

THE  primary  sensuous  cognitions,  in  general,  are  those 
which  are  formed  intuitively  by  the  Keason,  respecting 
the  exterior  world,  through  the  force  of  its  constitutive 
Ideas,  and  upon  condition  of  sensuous  impressions  in  the 
exterior  consciousness. 

When  these  impressions  are  received  in  the  exterior 
consciousness,  the  Keason,  under  the  Idea  of  objective 
exteriority,*  conceives  of  an  outer  world.  This  is  its  first 
sensuous  cognition. 

Exerting  the  muscular  activity  under  the  Idea  of  our 
personal  causality,  and  experiencing  a  resistance  in  this 
outer  world,  we  now,  under  the  Ideas  of  cause,  space, 
limitation,  and  substance,  cognise  body.  In  this  cognition 
are  involved  at  once  what  are  commonly  called  the  pri 
mary  qualities  of  body,  namely,  hardness  or  resistance, 
extension  and  form.  They  are  primary,  because  they  com 
prise  the  necessary  contents  of  the  cognitions.  Indeed, 
the  cognition  is  now  complete.  Secondary  qualities  are 
cognised  in  particular  bodies  through  the  appropriate 
organs,  under  the  Idea  of  Cause,  or  of  determinate  law. 

*  Supra,  p.  155. 


220  PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC. 

When  body  is  known,  then  the  sensations  of  which  we 
are  immediately  conscious,  are  referred  to  causes  inhering 
in  bodies,  or  to  their  specific  constitution,  correlating  with 
the  human  sensitivity. 

The  cognitions  of  body  involving  the  primary  qualities, 
are  thus  primary  sensuous  intuitions. 

The  knowledge  of  specific  forms,  of  relative  magni 
tudes,  and  of  relative  distances,  implies  acts  of  memory,  in 
connecting  the  successive  impressions  made  upon  the  mus 
cular  organism,  in  handling  bodies,  and  in  locomotion. 
There  are  also  various  acts  of  calculation,  and  inferences 
from  comparison. 

Introduced  into  the  external  world,  phenomena  now 
put  on  their  secondary  *  form  :  we  are  no  longer  engaged 
with  the  simple  sensations  of  our  being,  but  with  the 
realities  from  which  they  spring ;  and  which,  in  the  case 
of  the  secondary  qualities  of  bodies,  we  name  from  the 
very  sensations  which  they  supplant  in  our  habitual 
thought. 

Next  in  the  order  of  this  development  of  sensuous  cog 
nition,  is  to  be  noticed  the  remarkable  transfer  which  is 
made  of  the  knowledge  originally  belonging  to  the  muscu 
lar  organism,  as  the  medium,  to  the  organs  of  the  secon 
dary  qualities,  and,  as  chief  of  these,  to  the  eye.  The 
colors  of  objects,  and  the  varieties  of  light  and  shade,  be 
come  early  associated  with  the  primary  qualities  of  bodies, 
with  their  specific  forms,  relative  magnitudes,  and  dis 
tances  ;  so  that,  the  simple  sensations  of  color  become 
such  ready  and  familiar  signs  of  the  external  world,  that 
we  now  know  every  thing  by  the  eye  alone.  Next  to  the 
eye,  in  importance,  is  the  ear,  in  this  acquired  system  of 

*  Supra,  p.  59. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  221 

signs.    The  other  senses,  however,  play  a  part  by  no  means 
insignificant. 

Thus,  by  the  power  of  Ideas,  man  steps  out  from  his 
internal  sensations  into  the  world  which  is  correlated  to 
him  ;  and  so  appropriates  these  sensations,  that  every  act 
of  consciousness  becomes  an  act  of  observation. 


-n 


222  PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC. 


SECTION   V. 

PRIMARY    SUBJECTIVE    COGNITIONS,   OR    COGNITIONS  OF  THE 
INTERIOR    CONSCIOUSNESS. 

THESE  are  the  cognitions  which  are  formed  intuitively  by 
the  Keason,  respecting  the  simple  subjective,  through  the 
force  of  its  Ideas,  and  upon  condition  of  the  phenomena 
which  arise  from  the  subjective  activity. 

When  these  phenomena  are  recognised  in  the  interior 
consciousness,  the  Keason,  under  the  Idea  of  subject,* 
conceives  of  the  simple  subjective,  or  the  Me. 

Under  the  appropriate  Ideas,  we  are  next  determined 
to  cognise  the  Me  as  the  spiritual  substance,  antithetical 
to  the  material  substance  which  we  have  cognised  without. 

Here  the  same  remarkable  transfer  of  phenomena, 
which  we  have  noticed  in  the  preceding  Section  in  respect 
to  bodies,  takes  place  in  respect  to  the  spiritual  being,  f 
Having  cognised  the  subject,  we  no  longer  think  of  bare 
phenomena  of  the  consciousness,  but  of  effects  and  mani 
festations  of  spiritual  faculties  ;  and  the  intelligence,  caus 
ality,  and  sensitivity  which  constitute  our  triune  being,  are 
known  and  distinguished.  The  Ideas  of  personality,  Eight 
and  Wrong,  Freedom,  Kesponsibility,  and  Immortality, 
now  clothe  this  being  with  lofty  and  glorious  attributes  ; 
and  through  the  simple  consciousness  of  interior  phenomena, 
as  conditions,  we  have  the  intuitions  of  self-knowledge. 

*  Supra,  p.  155.  f  Supra,  pp.  56,  57. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  223 

It  will  be  understood  both  in  respect  to  sensuous,  and 
to  subjective  intuitive  cognitions,  that  when  I  undertake 
to  point  out  their  progressive  development  ;  and  the  trans 
fer  of  phenomena  from  the  consciousness  to  the  objective 
and  subjective  realities  —  thus  associating  the  phenomena 
with  the  causes  which  produce  them,  instead  of  viewing 
them  in  the  field  of  their  immediate  manifestation,  —  I 
nevertheless  do  not  mean  to  aver  that  this  progressive  de 
velopment  and  this  transfer  are  really  recognised  in  the 
consciousness  in  relation  to  successive  and  marked  periods 
of  time  ;  but  only  to  indicate  the  logical  order  and  relations 
of  the  facts.  In  the  very  dawn  of  our  being  in  the  world 
of  the  senses,  our  faculties  open  their  play  unitedly  and 
harmoniously  ;  and  ere  we  begin  to  exercise  reflection,  we 
find  ourselves  in  a  world  already  realized.  But  when  we 
attempt  to  know  ourselves,  we  must  of  necessity  represent 
to  ourselves  in  clear  propositions  the  logical  order  of  the 
cognitive  development.  In  doing  this,  we  assume  periods 
of  time  corresponding  to  the  order  of  this  development  for 
the  sake  of  distinctness,  while  yet,  in  relation  to  time, 
there  was  actually  simultaneity. 


GTJS 


224  PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC. 


SECTION  VI. 

AXIOMS. 

AXIOMS  *  are  those  truths  which  depend  neither  upon  In 
duction,  nor  upon  previous  deductions  ;  but  which  are  in 
tuitively  cognised  under  determinate  Ideas. 

It  is  evident  that  before  deductions  are  possible,  there 
must  be  judgments  expressed  in  propositions.  Now  these 
judgments  must  of  necessity  be  resolved  either  into  intu 
itions,  or  into  Inductions.  If  into  the  latter,  even  then, 
in  the  last  result,  we  come  to  intuitions,  since  all  facts  of 
observation,  whether  belonging  to  the  interior  or  exterior 
consciousness,  must  ultimately  rest  in  simple  intuitions. 

The  consciousness  of  phenomena,  if  regarded  as  a  form 
of  perception,  is  manifestly  immediate  and  intuitive.  But 
beyond  this,  the  primary  sensuous  and  subjective  cogni 
tions,  as  we  have  seen,  are  intuitive  likewise.  The  Keal 
is  not  an  induction  from  the  phenomenal :  The  latter  is  a 
condition  ;  the  former  an  Intuition. 

But  Axioms,  while  they  are  independent  of  Induction 
and  Deduction  on  the  one  hand, — on  the  other,  must  not 
be  confounded  with  the  primary  cognitions  whether  sen 
suous  or  subjective.  These  primary  cognitions  relate  to 
the  Keality  of  Being  ;  axioms  relate  to  the  Eeality  of 
Truth,  f  A  primary  cognition  expressed,  becomes  a  pro- 

*  Greek  'Al/aym,  Authority,  Worth.     Hence,  an  established  principle — 
one  the  authority  of  which  cannot  be  called  in  question, 
t  Supra,  p.  140. 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  225 

position  which  affirms  existence.  Thus  a  primary  sen 
suous  cognition  expressed,  becomes  an  affirmation  of  the 
existence  of  bodies  and  their  qualities  :  and  a  primary  sub 
jective  cognitive  expressed,  becomes  an  affirmation  of  the 
existence  of  the  simple  subjective  with  its  faculties  and 
functions. 

But  an  axiom  is  a  proposition  expressing  a  judgment 
of  universal  and  absolute  truth — of  truth  which  indeed 
holds  important  connexions  with  actual  Being,  when  ac 
tual  Being  is  given  ;  but  which,  nevertheless,  is  no  less 
true,  if  being  be  not  given,  or  only  hypothesised.  For  ex 
ample,  the  axiom,  If  equals  be  added  to  equals,  the  sums 
will  be  equal,  is  a  truth  no  less,  if  there  be  no  actual 
Being.  And  the  axiom,  every  body  must  be  in  space,  de 
mands  merely  a  hypothesis  of  body,  and  not  an  affirma 
tion  of  the  existence  of  body.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the 
mind  does  not  proceed  to  form  axioms  antecedently,  in  the 
order  of  time,  to  judgments  of  actual  Being  ;  *  but  still, 
when  the  axioms  are  formed,  they  are  seen  to  have  a 
necessary  and  independent  existence,  and  a  logical  ante 
cedence. 

Axioms  are  determined  immediately  by  Ideas.  The 
judgments  which  they  express  are  the  first  judgments  of 
Truth  ;  and  they  in  themselves  are  the  first  propositions 
of  TrutL 

Axioms  may  be  classified,  according  to  the  philosophi 
cal  divisions  above  given,  into  the  metaphysical,  and  the 
nomological.  The  Reason,  with  its  Ideas  entering  into  the 
world  of  Reality,  forms  not  only  its  cognitions  of  that  which 
is,  conceived  of  as  mere  facts  of  existence,  but  affirms  also 
truths  universal  and  absolute.  The  Keason  again,  by  its 

*  Supra,  pp.  60  and  140. 
10* 


226  PKIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

Ideas,  not  only  determines  the  laws  which  actually  govern 
the  Real,  but  here  likewise  makes  universal  and  absolute 
affirmations  respecting  the  necessary  forms  of  law.  These 
axiomatic  affirmations  reach  the  spheres  of  determinate 
science,  and  constitute  the  starting  points  of  the  scientific 
construction. 

METAPHYSICAL    AXIOMS. 

I.  AXIOM  OF  SUBSTANCE  AND  ATTRIBUTES. — The  Rea 
son  not  only  cognises  particular  substances  and  attributes, 
but  upon  such  particular  cognitions  as  the  chronological 
conditions,  makes  the  universal  affirmation,  Every  sub 
stance  implies  attributes,  and  every  attribute  implies  sub 
stance. 

II.  AXIOM  OF  CAUSE  AND  EFFECT. — The  Reason  first 
cognises  a  particular  cause  upon  certain  phenomenal  con 
ditions  ;  and  then  upon  this  particular  cause,  taken  in  its 
turn  as  a  condition,  it  affirms  the  axiom,  Every  pheno 
menon  implies  a  cause. 

III.  AXIOM  OF  BODY  AND  SPACE. — Body  is  a  primary 
sensuous  cognition  ;  but  no  sooner  does  the  cognition  take 
place,  than  the  Reason  affirms,  Every  body  must  be  in 
space. 

IV.  AXIOM  OF  TIME  AND  SUCCESSION. — The  cognition 
of  some  particular  succession  is  the  conditional  starting 
point  ;   upon  this  the  Reason  affirms,  Every  succession 
must  be  in  time. 

V.  AXIOM  OF  THE  FINITE  AND  THE  INFINITE. — Time 
and  Space  and  the  Deity  are  cognised  under  the  Idea  of 
the  Infinite.     In  the  antecedence  of  Time,  the  limited  and 
finite  are  indeed  first  cognised  ;  but  it  is  only  by  the  Idea 
of  the  Infinite  that  it  becomes  possible  for  us  to  affirm  of 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  227 

any  thing,  It  is  finite.  Thus  a  particular  instance  of  the 
Finite  becomes  to  us  a  condition  of  the  judgment  of  the 
Infinite.  The  axiom  which  immediately  follows  this  judg 
ment  in  the  order  of  Time  is,  Every  Finite  implies  the  In 
finite. 

VI.  AXIOM  OF  THE  OBJECTIVE  AND  THE  SUBJECTIVE. 
—The  Subjective  and  Objective  are  cognised  on  the  con 
dition  of  particular  phenomena,  and  their  relations  seen 
in  particular  instances.     But  here  again  the  Reason  af 
firms,  Universally  the  Objective  implies  the  Subjective. 

VII.  AXIOM  OF  UNIVERSAL  BEING. — The  Reason  cog 
nises  matter  and  spirit  in  the  particular,  and  then  goes  on 
to  affirm,  All  being  must  be  either  matter  or  spirit. 

These  are  the  fundamental  and  most  general  meta 
physical  axioms.  My  object,  however,  in  the  above,  as 
well  as  in  what  follows,  is  not  to  give  a  complete  enumer 
ation  of  the  axioms,  but  only  so  far  as  shall  serve  to  illus 
trate  their  peculiar  characteristics,  and  the  law  under 
which  they  are  determined.  The  characteristics  of  axioms 
are  manifest :  they  are,  absoluteness,  independency,  and 
universality.  The  law  of  their  determination  is  equally 
clear  ;  they  are  affirmed  by  the  Reason,  under  the  com 
prehension  and  force  of  its  Ideas.  In  the  general  view  al 
ready  given  of  the  evolution  of  Ideas,  *  the  axioms  will  be 
recognised  in  the  separation  of  the  universal  from  the  par 
ticular.  In  the  order  of  time,  we  have  the  phenomenal, 
the  particular,  and  the  real,  before  we  have  the  Axioms 
and  Ideas  ;  but  when  we  have  arrived  at  Axioms  and 
Ideas,  we  perceive  that  in  necessary  existence  they  claim 
antecedence.  Ideas  determine  those  universal  judgments 
of  truth  which  are  expressed  in  axioms  ;  and  these  univer- 

*  Page  154. 


228  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

sal  judgments  make  the  particular  cognitions  logically  pos 
sible.  For  example,  although  I  cognise  a  particular  body 
in  space,  before  I  affirm  the  axiom,  Every  body  must  be  in 
space,  nevertheless,  the  potential  existence  of  this  judg 
ment  in  the  Keason  constitutes  the  possibility  of  the  par 
ticular  cognition.  This  two-fold  order, — the  order  of  ac 
tual  development  in  time,  and  the  order  of  logical  deter 
mination, — is  the  all-important  principle  to  be  kept  in 
mind. 

NOMOLOGICAL    AXIOMS. 

I.  AXIOM  OF  UNIVERSAL  LAW. — The  Idea  of  Law  de 
termines  this  axiom,  in  the  same  way  that  the  Idea  of 
Cause  determines  the  axiom  of  Causality.     When  partic 
ular  phenomena  are  given,  the  Idea  of  Cause  determines 
to  the  assignment  of  a  particular  cause  ;  and  then  upon 
this  determines  the  affirmation,  Every  phenomenon  must 
have  a  cause  :  so  here,  likewise,  when  particular  pheno 
mena  are  given,  the  Idea  of  Law  determines  to  the  as 
signment  of  some  law  ;  and  then  upon  this  determines  the 
affirmation,  Every  phenomenon  must  have  a  law.     The 
Keason  does  not  admit  the  possibility  of  chance.    No-Law 
is  as  great  an  absurdity  as  No-Cause.     A  violation  of  law 
is  conceivable  only  in  the  case  of  free,  and  therefore  moral, 
agents  ;  *  but  even  here  the  violation  takes  upon  itself  a 
form  of  law — a  law  of  evil. 

II.  AXIOM   OF   THE   UNIFORMITY   OF   NATURE. — In 
volved  in  the  Idea  of  Law  is  that  of  order,  harmony,  and 
system.     Order,  harmony,  and  system  are  the  develop 
ments  of  law.     The  Keason,  therefore,  not  only  affirms  on 
the  presentation  of  phenomena,  there  must  be  law  govern- 

*  Moral  Agency,  Chap.  VII.,  Sec.  1. 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  229 

ing  them  ;  but  still  farther,  these  phenomena,  thus  gov 
erned,  must  present  uniform  recurrences  and  adjusted  re 
lations.  The  judgment  thus  formed  is  as  universal  and 
absolute  as  law  itself.  The  axiom  which  has  obtained  as 
the  expression  of  this  judgment  is  as  follows  :  Nature  is 
uniform  in  her  operations.  By  this  axiom,  we  are  led  to 
bring  together  the  homogeneous  phenomena  under  the 
laws  ;  and  to  expect  with  certainty  the  reappearance  of 
phenomena. 

III.  AXIOM  OF  UNIVERSAL  DESIGN. — This  Axiom  is 
determined  by  its  appropriate  Idea,  and  is  as  follows  : 
Whatever  exhibits  marks  of  design,  is  the  work  of  an  In 
telligent  Creator. 

The  Ideas  of  Law  and  Design  being  developed,  upon 
the  condition  of  particular  phenomena,  the  Axiom  is 
thereupon  immediately  affirmed  by  the  Reason,  and  be 
comes  thenceforth  the  starting  point  and  guide  in  all  sub 
sequent  observations  and  experiments.  This  Axiom  lies 
at  the  foundation  of  the  so-called  a  posteriori  argument 
for  the  existence  of  a  God.  Hence  the  ultimate  basis  of 
this  argument  is  an  a  priori  principle.  But  the  ultimate 
basis  of  all  cognition  and  ratiocination  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
composed  of  a  priori  principles. 

IV.  AXIOM  OF  THE  CORRESPONDENCE  OF  IDEAS  AND 
REALITY. — Every  Idea  implies  a  Eeality  of  Actual  Being 
or  of  Truth  ;  and  every  Reality  of  Actual  Being  or  of 
Truth,  implies  an  Idea.     Every  Idea  developed  is  devel 
oped  in  connexion  with  some  form  of  Reality,  *  in  the  ef 
fort  of  the  Reason  to  grasp  Reality.     On  the  other  hand, 
let  us  place  ourselves  in  the  world  of  Reality,  and  all  our 
attempts  at  rational  explanation  lead  us  back  to  the  Con- 

*  Supra,  Part  II.,  Sec.  3. 


230  PKIMOKDIAL    LOGIC. 

stitutive  Ideas.  *  Now,  upon  the  particular  instances  of 
this  two-fold  movement,  the  Keason  supervenes  with  the 
universal  affirmation  which  we  have  given  above.  All 
Ideas  must  attach  themselves  to  Kealities. '  All  Realities 
must  correspond  to  Ideas.  It  is  the  cardinal  Axiom  of 
pure  Philosophy. 

V.  MORAL  AXIOMS. — I  have  given  the  cardinal  moral 
Idea,  namely,  the  Idea  of  Right  and  Wrong ;  but  have 
not,  for  obvious  reasons,  entered  into  an  explication  of  the 
particular  Ideas  of  Justice,  Benevolence,  and  so  on,  con 
tained  under  it.     It  would,  in  like  maaner,  transcend  the 
objects  of  this  elementary  Treatise  to  attempt,  in  detail, 
a  presentation  of  the  Moral  Axioms.     I  will  only  remark, 
that  the  Divine  Code  announced  at  Sinai,  and  afterwards 
expounded  and  exemplified  by  the  Redeemer  of  men,  is 
in  truth  a  collection  of  the  fundamental  Moral  Axioms. 
They  are  indeed  given  under  the  form  of  ]aws,  but  they, 
at  the  same  time,  contain  the  affirmation  of  great  and  uni 
versal  truths,  uttered  by  the  Infinite   Reason,  and  re 
sponded  to  and  re-affirmed  by  the  Reason  of  every  moral 
being. 

VI.  ESTHETICAL  AXIOMS. — These  are  determined  by 
the  Idea  of  Beauty,  and  comprise   the  first  principles  of 
Esthetical  Science  and  of  the  rules  of  Art.     I  will  adduce 
only  two  or  three.     These  will  answer  the  end  of  illustra 
tion.     And  I  propose  nothing  further. 

1.  Beauty  of  every  species  and  form  has  its  Ideal  or 
Archetype  in  the  Imagination. 

2.  Every  particular  form  of  Beauty  presents  a  union 
of  regularity  and  variety. 

3.  Nature  and  Art  are  homogeneous  ;  but  the  former 
does  not  limit  the  latter. 

*  Supra,  Part  L,  Sec.  10. 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  231 

VII.  SOMATOLOGICAL  AXIOMS. — A  complete  exhibition 
of  these  would  strictly  belong  to  a  Philosophy  of  Nature. 
Here,  also,  I  am  aiming  only  at  an  illustration  of  the  great 
law  of  determining  Axioms  by  the  Ideas  of  the  Reason. 

1.  Axiom  of  the  Inertia  of  Bodies. — This  Axiom  is 
determined  by  the  Idea  of  Matter,  as  a  passive,  and  not  a 
self-moving  substance.     Our  actual  experience  is  limited ; 
nay,  as  to  one  part  of  the  Axiom,  we  have  no  experience 
whatever,  namely,  that  a  body,  when  put  in  motion,  will 
continue  to  move  on  for  ever  in  the  line  of  the  impulse, 
unless  it  meet  with  resistance  from  another  force  :  for  we 
have  no  example  of  a  body  moving  on  without  meeting 
with  a  resistance,  tending  either  to  bring  it  to  a  state  of 
repose,  or  to  change  the  direction  of  its  motion.     Besides, 
the  universality  and  absoluteness  of  the  entire  affirmation 
must  carry  it  beyond  the  possibility  of  experience. 

2.  Axiom  of  Action  and  Reaction. — The  equality  of 
reaction  to  action  in  an  opposite  direction,  is  an  affirmation 
of  universal  and  necessary  truth,  and  therefore  transcends 
the  reach  of  experience.     It  is  determined  by  the  Idea  of 
Relation  under  the  third  form.* 

3.  Axiom  of  the  Centre  of  Gravity. — That  every  body 
has  its  centre  of  gravity,  or  a  point,  around  which,  when 
supported,  all  the  parts  of  the  body  are  balanced  by  the 
gravitating  force,  is  unquestionably  a  universal  and  neces 
sary  conception.     By  mere  experience  it  could  not  be  de 
termined  ;  nor  has  any  one  ever  attempted  to  determine  it 
by  experience.     On  the  other  hand,  the  Ideas  of  Action 
and  Reaction,  and  of  Centralization,  cannot  but  determine 
it.     It  is  a  truth  with  which  we  begin  our  investigations 
in  Nature,  and  of  which  no  subsequent  experience  renders 
us  more  certain  and  confident. 

*  Supra,  p.  171. 


232  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

It  will  be  seen  by  reflecting  upon  these  and  other 
axioms,  which  might  be  adduced  from  mechanical  science, 
that  the  order  of  development  is  as  follows  : 

First.  The  Reason,  by  its  function  of  consciousness, 
comes,  in  the  order  of  time,  in  connection  with  the  phe 
nomena  of  the  external  world. 

Secondly.  Its  constitutive  Ideas  now  form  the  original 
sensuous  cognitions. 

Thirdly.  Thus  introduced  to  particular  Realities,  the 
Ideas  determine  the  universal  judgments,  which,  when  ex 
pressed  in  clear  and  convenient  language,  become  axioms. 

VIII. — AXIOMS  OF  PURE  SCIENCE. — These  belong  to 
the  Mathematics.  They  are  universal  and  intuitive  affirm 
ations  of  the  Reason  respecting  the  two  forms  of  quantity, 
namely,  continued  and  discrete* 

The  most  remarkable  of  these  Axioms  are  those  gener 
ally  laid  down  in  mathematical  treatises  as  Axioms  of 
Equality  and  Inequality.  The  Ideas  which  determine 
these  Axioms  are  Quantity,  Identity,  and  Difference. 

Unity,  multiplication,  and  diminution  are  the  funda 
mental  conceptions  of  the  Science  of  Numbers  :  and  these 
are  contained  in  the  Idea  of  Quantity.  Equation  is  the 
fundamental  conception  of  Geometry  and  Algebra  ;  and 
this  is  given  in  Identity.  Proportion,  as  an  equation  of 
ratios,  is  embraced  by  the  same  conception  :  and  Ratio  is 
but  a  comparison  of  quantities  in  respect  to  a  common 
unit. 

What  remains  to  be  remarked  respecting  axioms  of  this 
class  will  naturally  come  up  under  the  following  section. 

-  *'.  >iad' 

*  Supra,  p.  92. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  233 

IX.— LOGICAL  AXIOMS. 

Axioms  of  this  class  relate  to  the  processes  of  the  Kea- 
son  in  general  in  its  truth-seeking  activity.  We  have  seen 
that  there  are  three  cardinal  forms  of  this  activity,  Intui 
tion,  Induction,  and  Deduction.  Logical  Axioms,  there 
fore,  may  be  classed  under  three  corresponding  heads. 

AXIOMS  RELATING  TO  INTUITION. — 1.  Whatever  the 
Reason  intuitively  knows,  it  knows  under  the  characteris 
tics  of  Universality  and  Necessity.  Intuitive  truths  are 
universal,  that  is,  true  without  any  exception  ;  and  neces 
sary,  that  is,  their  opposites  are  impossible. 

2.  Whatever  is  known  intuitively  neither  requires  nor 
admits  of  demonstration.      Demonstration   always   pre 
sumes  something  going  before  which  is  already  known. 
An  endless  retrogression  of  demonstrations  is  an  absurdity. 
There  must  be  some  first  truths  which  do  not  require  de 
monstration  ;  and  which,  because  they  are  first,  do  not 
admit  of  demonstration,  since  there  is  nothing  by  which  to 
demonstrate  them. 

3.  Whatever  is  known  intuitively  must  reach  beyond 
any  induction  of  particulars,  and  be  antecedent  to  them 
in  the  order  of  necessary  existence.     All  induction  is  to 
us  unavoidably  limited,  and  must  be  led  on  by  some  ante 
cedent  and  guiding  principle.     Induction  without  a  pur 
pose  does  not  belong  to  philosophy. 

AXIOMS  RELATING  TO  INDUCTION. — Axioms  relating 
to  Intuition  properly  belong  to  this  division  of  our  Trea 
tise.  Axioms  relating  to  Induction  cannot  be  discussed 
here  without  anticipating  what  properly  belongs  to  the 
next  division.  I  shall,  therefore,  adjourn  any  statement 
of  them. 

AXIOMS  RELATING  TO  DEDUCTION. — The  reason  above 


234  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

given  applies  to  this  class  of  Axioms  likewise.  I  shall  ac 
cordingly  adjourn  them  to  the  appropriate  division,  only 
remarking,  that  the  "Dictum  de  omni  et  nullo" — that 
whatever  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  any  term  distributed, 
or,  taken  universally,  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  every  par 
ticular  comprehended  under  it, — which  Aristotle  employs 
for  explaining  the  validity  of  Deduction, — is  a  cardinal 
Axiom  of  this  class. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  235 


$£ 


SECTION  VII. 

OF  THE  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  AXIOMS  IN  GENERAL. 

THESE  characteristics  have  appeared  in  the  course  of  the 
preceding  section  ;  they  are  Universality,  Necessity,  and 
Logical  Antecedence  to  Induction  and  Deduction.  My 
principal  object  in  presenting  them  in  a  separate  section, 
is  to  meet  certain  objections  which  have  been  urged  against 
them. 

It  has  been  said  that  Axioms  are  merely  statements  of 
general  observations.  For  example,  that  "Every  body 
must  be  in  space,"  means  nothing  more  than  that  "  Every 
body,"  as  far  as  observation  goes,  is  in  space  ; "  and  that 
the  Axiom,  "  If  the  same  or  equal  quantities  be  added  to 
equal  quantities,  their  sums  will  be  equal,"  and  all  the 
other  Axioms  of  Equation,  are  merely  of  the  same  nature 
— expressions  of  general  observations,  unattended  by  any 
exception.  Here,  it  will  be  perceived,  that  universality  is 
merged  into  generality  ;  the  necessary  into  the  inconceiv 
able  ;  and  absolute  truth  into  phenomenal  conditions. 
That  "  Every  body  is  in  space "  is  thus  merely  a  fact  in 
the  experience  of  all  men ;  and  it  is  inconceivable  that  any 
body  should  not  be  in  space,  because  no  fact  of  this  kind 
has  ever  appeared  in  human  experience.  And  if  it  be  af 
firmed  in  opposition  to  this,  that  our  thought  at  least  sur 
passes  our  observation  when  passing  beyond  the  possibility 
of  actual  observation — beyond  all  visible  stars, — we  think 


236  PBIMOKDIAL   LOGIC. 

that  if  bodies  be  there  also,  they  must  there  also  be  in 
space  ; — then  it  is  replied  that  we  make  to  ourselves  in 
this  case  an  imaginary  representation  of  facts,  which  are 
merely  copies  of  real  facts,  and  that  we  are  thus  still  in 
the  region  of  observation  : — The  imagination  takes  the 
place  of  the  sense,  and  wherever  it  goes,  it  only  represents 
facts  of  the  sense  ; — wherever  it  goes,  it  still  makes  for  it 
self  locality  and  particular  facts.  It  does  not  fill  immensity, 
nor  grasp  the  universal, — it  is  only  extending  observation, 
and  multiplying  facts  in  another  way. 

The  above  is  the  argument  fully  stated.  The  answer 
does  not  appear  to  me  difficult. 

First.  Before  we  can  determine  the  validity  of  Axioms 
as  necessary,  universal,  and  intuitive  truths,  we  must  de 
termine  the  validity  of  Ideas.  Have  we  ideas  of  Space, 
of  Necessity,  of  the  Infinite,  and  so  on  ?  It  does,  indeed, 
seem,  that  if  we  have  any  positive  cognition  whatever, 
space  is  such  an  one.  Equally  positive  is  our  cognition  of 
its  characteristics.  Space  is  necessary  and  infinite,  and 
having  no  limits,  it  has  no  form.  And  when  we  affirm 
that  it  is  infinite,  we  do  not  mean  to  express  merely  our 
incapability  of  conceiving  of  limits  ;  but  the  utter  impos 
sibility  of  limits.  And,  again,  when  we  affirm  that  space 
is  necessary,  we  do  not  mean  to  express  merely  our  inca 
pability  of  conceiving  of  no  space,  but  the  absolute  being 
of  space  independently  of  all  conception  whatever.  To 
make  all  cognitions  personal  and  relative — deriving  their 
characteristics  from  the  individual  constitution,  is  to  deny 
to  Truth  any  independent  and  absolute  foundations.  Then 
are  we,  for  aught  we  know,  only  entertained  with  shadows, 
and  without  any  fixed  certainty  of  Keality.  But  we  can 
not  yield  to  such  doctrines  ;  because  we  have  that  within 
us  which  assures  us  of  their  falsity.  Our  cognitions  are 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  237 

facts,  which  are  explained,  and  can  only  be  explained  by 
referring  to  the  Ideas  of  the  Eeason. 

Secondly.  It  has  been  shown  in  the  preceding  pages 
that  the  primary  phenomena  are  simple  sensations  and  af 
fections  of  our  own  being  revealed  to  consciousness  ;  and 
that  they  assume  their  secondary  character  as  manifesta 
tions  of  Reality,  only  through  the  supervention  of  Ideas. 
Without  Ideas  we  should  never  attain  substance,  cause,  or 
law,  nor  the  exterior  sphere  of  their  manifestation.  The 
very  cognition  of  Body,  therefore,  depends  upon  Ideas 
which  assign  it  substance  and  qualities,  connect  it  with 
causes,  and  give  it  limits,  and  form  and  place.  Not  even 
a  particular  body  can  be  cognised  in  space  without  Ideas. 

Now,  when  we  have  the  Idea  of  Space  and  the  Cogni 
tion  of  Body  with  their  opposite  characteristics,  the  Eeason 
cannot  but  affirm  i  Every  Body  must  be  in  space/  It  is 
by  no  means  an  affair  of  observation  and  induction — it 
does  not  depend  upon  looking  at  this  body  and  that  body, 
in  order  to  see  whether  they  really  are  in  space,  and 
thus  from  multiplied  observations  drawing  a  general  con 
clusion  :  On  the  contrary,  no  sooner  do  we  cognise  Space 
and  Body,  than  we  affirm  absolutely  and  necessarily, 
6  Every  Body  must  be  in  space/  So  far  from  requiring 
imagination  beyond  actual  observation,  actual  observation 
itself  is  anticipated. 

The  same  reasoning  will  apply  to  all  other  Axioms. 
Take  the  Axiom,  l  If  equals  be  added  to  equals,  the  sums 
will  be  equal/  This  Axiom  is  not  a  general  conclusion 
from  repeated  trials  and  observations  ;  but  no  sooner  have 
we  cognitions  of  Quantity,  Identity,  and  so  on,  under  the 
corresponding  Ideas,  than  we  make  this  and  the  kindred 
affirmations  as  universal  and  necessary  affirmations.  Here, 
again,  instead  of  multiplying  observations  by  imaginary 


238  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

cases,  we  pause  for  no  observation  whatever,  but  directly 
determine  the  Axioms  by  the  Ideas. 

Take  another  Axiom  :  i  If  two  straight  lines  intersect 
or  cross  each  other,  they  can  never  meet  again ;  but  if  pro 
duced,  must  go  on  diverging  for  ever/  Now,  having  formed 
the  conception  of  two  straight  lines,  drawn  in  space  in  the 
position  above  stated,  we  require  no  observation  along  the 
course  of  their  production,  either  actually  or  by  the  imagi 
nation,  in  order  to  gather  facts  for  a  general  conclusion  : 
the  instant  the  thought  is  fixed  upon  the  lines  at  the  point 
of  intersection,  the  affirmation  is  made  under  the  charac 
teristics  of  Universality  and  Necessity. 

The  distinction  between  a  conclusion  gained  by  extended 
and  careful  observation,  and  a  truth  which  at  once  flashes 
upon  the  mind — between  the  result  of  a  long  drawn  out 
induction,  and  an  immediate  determination  of  the  Keason, 
— is  clear  and  palpable.  The  phenomenal  conditions,  under 
which  such  a  truth  is  given,  are  easily  separable  from  the 
truth  itself ;  since  they  neither  contain  nor  measure  it :  for 
example,  the  sensation  of  hardness  which  is  conditional  to 
our  cognition  of  Space,  neither  contains  nor  measures 
Space.  Again,  the  universality  of  such  a  truth  is  clearly 
distinguishable  from  the  generality  of  an  observation  ; — for 
the  truth  is  affirmed  without  admitting  the  possibility  of 
limits  or  exceptions,  as  that  l  Every  body  must  be  in 
space  ; ;  but  an  observation,  as  that  of  the  rising  and  set 
ting  of  the  sun,  and  that  of  the  rising  and  falling  of  the 
tides,  admits  of  the  possibility  of  limits  and  exceptions. 
Omnipotence  can  change  the  whole  order  of  the  system, 
but  not  even  Omnipotence  can  form  a  body  not  in  space. 
Once  more,  the  inconceivableness  of  a  fact,  and  the  neces 
sity  of  a  Truth,  are  also  clearly  distinguishable.  A  fact  is 
inconceivable,  when  it  is  both  removed  from  the  sphere  of 


PBIMOKDIAL   LOGIC.  239 

our  observation,  and  unlike  any  fact  which  has  co'me  under 
our  observation.  Thus  a  person  residing  within  the  Trop 
ics,  and  who  has  never  seen  ice,  cannot  conceive  of  freezing 
water.  The  Cartesians  rejected  the  Newtonian  doctrine 
of  the  gravitation  of  bodies,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  in 
conceivable  that  a  body  can  act  where  it  is  not.  Their 
error  lay  in  adopting  a  theory  of  causality  which  made  the 
causal  activity  a  matter  of  sensuous  conception.  The 
Newtonian  doctrine  is  inconceivable  as  a  sensuous  fact,  if 
causes  act  only  in  the  contact  of  material  particles.  But 
the  doctrine  was  to  be  determined  on  other  grounds  than 
the  possibility  of  observing  the  attractive  force  itself.  A 
necessary  truth,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  received,  because 
it  is  conceivable  as  an  observed  fact,  nor  because  its  oppo 
site  is  simply  inconceivable  :  It  is  received  because  it  is 
absolute  and  fixed  as  a  cognition  of  the  Keason,  and  its 
opposite  impossible.  That  l  Every  body  must  be  in 
space,  that  '  Two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space/ 
are  necessary  truths,  because  seen  by  intuition  to  be  such 
that  their  opposites  are  impossible.  You  may  say,  if  you 
please,  that  their  opposites  are  inconceivable,  taking  this 
term  in  an  intense  and  superlative  sense,  and,  indeed, 
identifying  it  with  the  impossible  :  but  the  term  is  objec 
tionable,  because  ambiguous,  and  liable  to  confound  pure 
intuitions  of  the  Reason  with  facts  of  observation. 


240  PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC. 


SECTION  VIII. 

GENERAL    RELATIONS    OF   AXIOMS. 

I.  AXIOMS,  in  themselves,  primary  universal  and  neces 
sary  intuitive  truths,  are  related  as  logical  antecedents  to 
universal  and  necessary  deductive  truths.  The  science  of 
Geometry  affords  us  a  perfect  and  stupendous  example  of 
this  relation. 

II.  Axioms  are  related  also  as  logical  antecedents  to 
our  cognitions.  The  Axiom  '  Every  body  must  be  in 
space'  offers  an  illustration.  When  we  come  to  cognise 
any  particular  body,  we  of  necessity  must  cognise  it  in 
space  ;  but  we  can  cognise  it  in  space  only  upon  the 
ground  of  the  Axiom,  6  Every  body  must  be  in  space/ 
As  the  idea  of  space  is  the  logical  antecedent  of  the  cog 
nition  of  the  body,  so  also  the  universal  affirmation  is  the 
logical  antecedent  of  any  particular  designation,  for  a  par 
ticular  designation  implies  the  general  truth.  The  sensa 
tion  of  resistance  is  the  antecedent  in  time — the  condition 
or  occasion  of  the  cognition  of  both  body  and  space  :  and 
as  comprehending  the  cognitions  in  their  relation  to  each 
other,  appears  the  Axiom,  i  Every  body  must  be  in 
space/  The  same  course  of  remark  applies  to  the  Axioms, 
e  Every  phenomenon  implies  a  Cause/  and  '  Every  phe 
nomenon  implies  a  Law/  and  other  similar  Axioms.  To 


PKIMOBDIAL   LOGIC.  241 

attempt  to  establish  these  Axioms  by  induction,  is  for  ever 
to  travel  in  a  circle,  since  every  fact  inducted  implies  the 
Axioms  themselves. 

III.  Axioms  either  take  immediately  the  form  of 
Laws,  or  determine  Laws.  As  instances  of  the  first,  we 
may  adduce  the  great  moral  laws  announced  at  Sinai.  I 
have  already  referred  to  these.  Every  one  of  these  utters 
a  universal  and  necessary  moral  truth.  Duty  as  here  pre 
sented  is  not  arbitrary,  but  rational. 

In  the  department  of  Physics,  we  have  a  striking  illus 
tration  in  the  Three  Laws  of  Motion.  The  first  Law  is 
the  Axiom  of  the  inertia  of  bodies,  the  Axiom  itself  being 
determined  by  the  Idea  of  Cause  :  The  second  law  is  the 
Axiom  of  Effects  proportioned  to  their  causes,  and  is  de 
termined  by  the  same  Idea  :  The  third  law  is  the  Axiom 
of  Action  and  Eeaction.  These  are  Axioms,  because  uni 
versal  and  necessary  truths  determined  by  ideas. 

They  are  universal,  for  no  exception  is  admissible  ; 
they  are  necessary,  for  the  Keason  affirms  the  impossibility 
of  their  opposites.  They  are  true  on  a  mere  hypothesis 
of  bodies.  But  when  taken  in  their  relations  to  actually 
existing  bodies,  they  become  actual  primary  laws. 

All  primary  laws  are  Axiomatic  :  but  there  are  secon 
dary  laws  which  proceed  from  the  Axioms.  All  ethical 
laws  for  the  specific  regulation  of  human  conduct,  and  all 
civil  jurisprudence,  are  thus  derived. 

All  the  secondary  laws  of  Physical  Science  are  depend 
ent,  in  like  manner,  upon  the  primary  Axiomatic  laws. 
Here,  too,  the  Mathematics  are  applied,  inasmuch  as  the 
motions,  magnitudes,  distances,  times,  weights,  and  forces 
of  bodies  are  representable  either  as  continued  or  discrete 
quantities.* 

*  Supra,  pp.  92—5. 
11 


242  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

I  have  already  shown  *  that  science  in  general  is  con 
structed  out  of  phenomena  by  the  aid  of  Ideas  and  Axioms. 
In  the  pure  Mathematics,  the  phenomenal  material  belongs 
to  the  interior  consciousness — that  is,  is  given  in  reflection 
— and  comprises  particulars  comparatively  few  in  number, 
simple,  and  definite. 

In  physical  science,  on  the  contrary,  the  phenomena 
belong  to  the  exterior  consciousness,  that  is,  are  given  in 
sensation,  and  are  various,  complicated,  and  multitudinous. 
In  the  latter,  therefore,  observation  and  experiment,  nice, 
laborious,  and  extensive,  are  required.  And  here  it  is 
that  Inductive  Logic  receives  its  widest  and  most  im 
portant  application. 

*  Part  I.,  Sec.  XII. 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  243 


SECTION  IX. 

DEFINITION. 

"  THE  end  or  scope  of  all  definition,  is  to  make  any  given 
object  clearer,  plainer,  and  more  distinct  to  the  Intelli 
gence.  Adopting  the  usual  division  of  logicians,  we  re 
present  definition  as  either  nominal  or  real.  A  nominal 
definition  is  merely  substituting  one  name  for  another, — 
the  name  substituted  being  supposed  to  be  better  under 
stood.  A  real  definition  aims  to  explain  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  by  enumerating  its  parts,  assigning  its  classification, 
pointing  out  its  substance,  describing  its  properties  and 
relations,  or  fixing  its  limits  and  distinctions. 

"  A  real  definition  may  be  accidental  or  essential. 
When  accidental,  it  explains  merely  those  accidents  or 
properties  of  an  object  which  are  not  constitutive  of  it, 
and  without  which  it  can  be  conceived  ; — for  example,  the 
name,  time,  place  of  birth,  and  employment  of  an  indi 
vidual,  are  accidents.  When  essential,  it  explains  the 
essence  and  properties  of  an  object  which  are  constitutive 
of  it,  and  without  which  it  cannot  be  conceived  ; — for  ex 
ample,  mind  and  body  are  essential  parts  of  an  individual 
man. 

"  Again  :  an  essential  definition  is  logical,  when  it  as 
signs  the  object  its  place,  under  generical  and  specific 
classification.  Thus  man  is  logically  defined  an  intellec 
tual  animal — animal  being  the  genus,  intellectual  the 


244  PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC. 

differentia,  or  that  which  distinguishes  him  essentially 
from  all  other  animals. 

"  An  essential  definition  is  physical,  when,  where  the 
ohjects  admits  of  it,  the  physical  parts  are  enumerated, 
meaning  by  physical  parts  those  which  are  presented  to 
the  observation  of  the  senses. 

"  An  essential  definition  is  metaphysical,  when  it  as 
signs  essence  and  properties  to  the  object,  which  are  me 
taphysical — meaning  by  metaphysical  that  which  is  not 
known  by  observation  of  the  senses,  but  by  intuition  of 
Keason  ;  — for  example,  Man  is  a  spiritual  being  ;  body  is 
a  resisting  substance.  From  this  it  appears  that  a  logical 
definition  is  dependent  upon  antecedent,  physical,  and 
metaphysical  definitions. 

"  Now,  it  is  plain,  that  in  order  to  define,  we  must 
have  some  prior  conceptions  by  which  to  define.  In  a 
mere  nominal  definition,  we  must  have  a  prior  word  al 
ready  better  understood  than  the  word  we  are  about  to 
define.  In  a  real  definition,  we  must  already  have  a  clear 
knowledge  of  the  essences,  properties,  and  accidents  we 
may  make  use  of  for  this  purpose.  A  definition,  there 
fore,  which  we  are  at  this  moment  framing,  must  be  pre 
ceded  either  by  definitions  already  made,  or  by  concep 
tions  which  do  not  require  or  admit  of  antecedent  defini 
tions. 

"  When  present  definitions  presume  antecedent  defi 
nitions,  these  antecedent  definitions  must  be  preceded  by 
other  antecedent  definitions,  or  by  conceptions  which  do 
not  require  or  admit  of  antecedent  definitions.  We  must, 
therefore,  in  all  cases,  at  length  come  to  conceptions  which 
do  not  require  or  admit  of  antecedent  definitions ;  for  a 
retrogression  of  definitions  ad  infinitum,  is  an  absurdity. 

"  These    starting  points  of  thought — these   primary 


PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC.  245 

conceptions  and  beliefs,  are  logically  necessary  to  account 
for,  explain,  and  define  all  our  other  knowledges.  They 
are  like  the  light,  which,  while  it  reveals  all  objects  of 
sight,  can  find  nothing  by  which  it  itself  can  be  more 
plainly  revealed.  That  we  cannot  analyse  light  proves 
nothing  against  its  existence  :  we  know  it  must  exist,  be 
cause  we  see  all  things  by  means  of  it.  Indeed,  we  must 
affirm  in  general,  that  whatever  is  clearest  to  our  minds, 
and  really  best  known,  must  be  incapable  of  explanation, 
definition,  or  demonstration  :  for  if  these  were  required  in 
reference  to  the  objects  supposed,  then  it  would  follow 
that  there  must  be  something  beyond  these  still  clearer, 
and  still  better  known,  namely,  that  by  which  the  ex 
planation,  definition,  or  demonstration  is  to  be  effected, — 
which  is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis."  * 

The  distinction  above  made  between  a  nominal  and  a 
real  definition  is  palpable  ;  for  to  give  the  signification  of 
one  word,  by  means  of  another  more  familiar,  is  widely 
different  from  pointing  out  what  is  designed  to  be  ex 
pressed  by  the  word  itself.  But  inasmuch  as  a  real  defi 
nition  -is  designed  to  point  out  what  is  expressed  by  the 
word  itself,  it  has  been  contended  that  no  definition  can 
properly  be  said  to  explain  the  nature  of  a  thing  ;  but 
only  to  determine  the  appropriation  of  a  word  :  Thus,  to 
define  Man  is  not  to  point  out  the  nature  of  man,  but  to 
show  what  is  intended  to  be  expressed  by  it. 

Now  it  seems  to  me  that  to  determine  the  appropria 
tion  of  a  word  is  equivalent  to  defining  the  nature  of  the 
thing  for  which  the  word  stands.  Take  the  usual  defini 
tion  of  a  circle,  for  example  : — '  A  circle  is  a  figure  con 
tained  by  one  line,  which  is  called  the  circumference,  every 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  Ch.  II.,  Sec.  1. 


246  PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC. 

point  of  which  is  equally  distant  from  a  common  point 
called  the  centre/  Here  it  is  evident  that  the  word  circle 
cannot  be  defined,  or,  in  other  words,  its  appropriation  de 
termined  without  explaining  that  foi  which  it  stands.  In 
the  course  of  this  real  definition  we  give  also  two  nominal 
definitions,  when  we  call  the  containing  line  the  circum 
ference,  and  the  comn^on  point  the  centre.  We  may  also 
nominally  define  a  circle  by  saying,  ( it  is  a  figure  bounded 
by  a  circumference/  But  taken  together  as  above,  we 
have  a  real  definition  of  circle.  In  this  definition  we  have 
undoubtedly  an  intuitive  cognition  expressed  ;  for  in  de 
fining  a  circle  it  is  implied  that  it  is  an  actual  magnitude. 
We  may  indeed  define  that  which  "has  no  real  existence, 
as  a  griffin,  a  centaur,  or  a  harpy  ;  but  then  it  is  under 
stood  that  we  are  referring  to  imaginary  beings. 

Real  definitions,  in  so  far  as  they  contain  or  imply 
judgments  of  truth,  are  authoritative.  This  is  true  of 
geometrical  definitions,  with  the  exception  of  those  which 
are  merely  nominal.  {  A  surface  is  that  which  has  length 
and  breadth  without  height  or  thickness/  is  a  real  defini 
tion,  because  it  points  out  and  affirms  two  dimensions  in 
space  ;  and  it  is  authoritative  just  to  the  extent  of  this 
affirmation.  Strictly  nominal  definitions  can  be  made  out 
only  by  synonymes  or  by  a  circumlocution. 

A  real  definition  is  complete  or  incomplete.  It  is  com 
plete,  only  when  all  that  is  comprehended  by  the  word 
which  represents  the  object  of  thought  is  expressed.  Thus 
that  '  Man  is  a  rational  animal '  is  a  real  definition,  but 
still  an  incomplete  one ;  for  the  object  of  thought  repre 
sented  by  the  word  i  Man '  comprehends  more  than  is 
expressed  by  the  genus  i  Animal/  and  the  differentia 
*  Rational.' 

Definitions  are  varied  according  to  different  ends  pro- 


PRIMORDIAL    LOGIC.  247 

posed.  The  definition  is  always  adequate  when  it  meets 
the  end  proposed.  To  define  (  Man '  as  a  ( rational  ani 
mal  '  is  sufficient  in  ordinary  classification  to  distinguish 
him  from  all  other  animals.  According  to  a  distribution 
which  Cuvier  made  of  the  species  of  the  Animal  King 
dom,  he  found  it  necessary  to  define  '  Man '  "  a  mammife- 
rous  animal  having  two  hands."  Both  definitions  are  real, 
because  giving  in  part  what  really  belongs  to  Man :  both 
are  incomplete,  considered  in  respect  to  the  whole  subject 
£  Man ; '  and  yet  both  are  adequate  when  considered  in 
respect  to  their  particular  ends.  Indeed,  what  are  tech 
nically  called  definitions  must  of  necessity,  in  numerous 
instances,  be  incomplete,  either  from  our  imperfect  know 
ledge  of  the  subject,  or  from  its  manifold  richness ;  so 
that  to  give  a  complete  definition  would  be  equivalent  to 
a  scientific  disquisition. 

In  Geometry,  and  in  all  absolute  science,  the  defini 
tions  are  complete.  They  express  a  complete  and  per 
fectly  clear  cognition,  and  give  a  name  to  the  object  of  the 
cognition.  That  '  a  straight  line  is  the  shortest  distance 
between  two  points/  and  that  i  a  curve  line  is  one  which 
changes  its  direction  at  every  point/  are  cognitions  clear 
and  full,  while  the  objects  of  the  cognitions  are  distinc 
tively  named.  Were  not  this  the  case,  the  definitions 
could  not  be  received  as  a  basis  of  the  exact  and  rigid 
scientific  construction. 

There  is  one  enquiry  which  yet  remains.  What  dis 
tinguishes  an  Axiom  from  a  real  Definition  ?  An  Axiom 
has  been  shown  to  be  a  universal  and  necessary  truth  de 
termined  immediately  by  Ideas.  A  real  definition  is  the 
explication  of  a  cognition  represented  or  expressed  by 
some  particular  word  or  phrase.  Cognition  may  be  primi 
tive  and  intuitive,  or  secondary  and  derived.  If  the  latter, 


248  PRIMORDIAL   LOGIC. 

it  plainly  cannot  be  axiomatic.  But  suppose  it  be  the 
former,  like  the  definitions  of  Geometry  ?  Then,  in  this 
case,  it  is  unquestionably  authoritative  as  an  original  in 
tuition  : — the  definitions  of  a  straight  and  of  a  curve  line, 
of  a  circle,  of  a  triangle,  of  a  right  angle,  of  a  parallelo 
gram  and  so  on,  must  be  rigidly  adhered  to  in  all  the  sub 
sequent  demonstrations  ;  but  still  they  are  only  cognitions, 
of  certain  magnitudes.  Now,  an  Axiom  does  not  respect 
any  particular  magnitude,  but  comprehends  all  alike. 
Thus  when  it  is  affirmed  that  i  things  which  are  equal  to 
the  same  thing,  are  equal  to  each  other ; '  that,  i  if  equals 
be  added  to  equals,  the  wholes  will  be  equal/  no  respect 
is  had  to  any  particular  magnitude  or  quantity :  the 
Axioms  are  true  alike  of  all  Geometrical  magnitudes,  of 
all  real  quantities,  or  of  quantities  represented  generally 
under  Algebraic  Symbols.  We  have  thus  a  very  plain 
distinction — the  distinction  between  an  original  intuitive 
cognition  in  relation  to  a  particular  subject,  and  a  univer 
sal  judgment  limited  to  no  particular  subject.  The  defini 
tion  of  a  circle  is  authoritative,  but  it  is  so  only  in  rela 
tion  to  a  circle ;  while  the  Axiom,  "  If  equals  be  added  to 
equals,  the  wholes  will  be  equal/'  is  so  manifestly  univer 
sal,  and  independent  of  any  particular  subject,  that  it  not 
only  appears  just  as  clear  in  the  general  expression  as  in 
the  particular,  but  really  takes  logical  antecedence  in  the 
general  expression,  and  determines  by  its  authority  the 
truth  of  the  particular. 

I  here  complete  the  view  I  proposed  to  take  of  Pri 
mordial  Logic.  Next  in  order  is  Inductive  Logic.  Before 
we  can  proceed  to  Deduction,  we  must  have  truths  and 
principles  from  which  to  deduce.  These  are  furnished 
by  Intuition  and  Induction.  Hence  the  two  correspond 
ing  forms  of  Logic. 


BOOK    II. 

INDUCTIVE     LOGIC. 


SECTION  I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

IT  is  sometimes  said,  that  to  an  Omniscient  Being  neither 
Induction  nor  Deduction  are  necessary ;  but  that  to  such 
a  Being  all  truth  and  knowledge  are  intuitive.  Induction 
and  Deduction  indeed  are  not  necessary  to  an  Omniscient 
Being,  considered  as  indispensable  means  of  knowledge. 
Such  a  Being  must  have  the  power  of  seeing  all  truth 
directly.  It  is  told  of  Newton  that  his  mind  grasped  the 
conclusions  of  Geometry  without  laboriously  passing  through 
the  usual  process  of  reasoning.  This  indicated  a  mental 
energy  superior  to  that  of  men  in  general.  But,  never 
theless,  the  truths  and  knowledges,  at  which  we  arrive  by 
Induction  and  Deduction,  do  not  stand  in  the  same  rela 
tion  to  the  mind  with  intuitive  truths.  An  intuitive 
truth  is  not  only — in  respect  to  the  mode  of  knowing — 
seen  directly ; — it  is  also  seen  to  be  true  in  itself — true 
independently  of  all  antecedents.  But  a  deductive  truth, 
even  if — in  respect  to  the  mode  of  knowing — seen  to  be 
true  without  passing  through  the  deductive  process  ;  still, 
11* 


250  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

if  a  reason  be  given  for  its  truth,  and  it  be  minutely 
analysed,  it  must  to  every  mind  be  seen  to  be  true,  not  in 
itself  and  independently  of  all  antecedents,  but  true, 
because  something  going  before  and  upon  which  it  depends, 
is  true.  So  also  an  inductive  truth,  although  known 
directly  by  the  power  of  an  Omniscient  mind,  must  be 
known  in  all  its  relations  and  dependencies ;  otherwise  it 
is  not  truly  and  perfectly  known.  It  thus  appears,  that 
when  we  speak  of  Intuitive,  Deductive  and  Inductive 
truths,  we  refer  not  merely  to  modes  of  knowing,  but  to 
the  intrinsic  character  of  the  truths  themselves. 

What,  then,  are  those  truths  and  knowledges,  which 
are  arrived  at  in  the  way  of  Induction  ?  In  other  words, 
what  is  the  field  of  Induction  ? 

The  field  of  Induction  is  that  in  which  we  find  the 
secondary  phenomena. 

The  primary  phenomena  are  simply  the  conditions  of 
the  primary  cognitions.  In  these  we  attain  objective 
reality.  Then,  the  phenomena — thenceforward  recognized 
as  the  phenomena  of  objective  reality — become  the  ma 
terials  of  Induction. 

Phenomena  have  Cause  and  Law  as  necessary  antece 
dents.  The  phenomena  do  not  by  generalization  make  up 
the  Cause  and  Law ;  but  the  Cause  and  Law  are  the 
ground  of  the  phenomena.  The  mere  classification  of 
phenomena  under  Eesemblance  and  Difference,  for  the 
purpose  of  affixing  a  common  name,  is  widely  different 
from  assigning  them  Cause  and  Law.  In  attempting  to 
account  for  the  resemblance  and  difference,  we  of  course 
have  to  proceed  to  Cause  and  Law ;  but  the  classification 
itself  gives  us  neither  the  one  nor  the  other. 

In  the  Divine  Mind,  cause  and  law  existed  before  phe 
nomena  were  developed.  Here  was  the  actual  necessary 


INDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  251 

antecedence.  The  mind  which  conceived  and  created, 
conceived  and  created  from  its  own  plenitude.  The  Divine 
Mind,  therefore,  foresaw  the  phenomena  in  the  cause  and 
law  which  it  contained  within  itself.  The  phenomena 
must  have  been  connected  with  cause  and  law  in  the 
Divine  Conception,  since  the  connexion  is  necessary  to  the 
completeness  of  the  knowledge.  But  here  we  see  that 
the  order  of  knowing  is  identical  with  the  order  of  neces 
sary  existence. 

It  is  conceivable  that  the  Divine  Being  might  have 
constituted  finite  minds  with  such  lofty  powers  as  directly 
to  know  the  causes  and  laws  of  the  Universe,  and  through 
them  the  appropriate  and  necessary  phenomena.  Now, 
that  these  causes  and  laws  are  attained,  phenomena 
through  them  can  be  known  in  regions  of  space  where  the 
eye  has  yet  made  no  observations,  and  predicted  in  periods 
of  time  lying  far  away  in  the  future.  And  these  lofty 
minds,  in  possession  of  the  causes  and  laws  by  a  superior 
intuition,  might  in  like  manner  grasp  the  phenomena 
springing  out  of  and  depending  upon  them.  But  man  is 
not  a  being  thus  constituted.  The  order  of  his  develop 
ment  presents  us — First,  simple  sensations  :  Secondly, 
the  realization  of  the  objective  world  by  Ideas  appropriat 
ing  the  sensations :  Thirdly,  the  observation  of  the  phe 
nomena  of  this  objective  world  in  order  to  determine  its 
causes  and  laws.  Now,  under  the  last,  we  have  the  field 
of  Induction  as  before  stated :  and  the  great  point  to  be 
determined  is,  how  by  the  observation  of  phenomena  the 
causes  and  laws  are  arrived  at. 


252  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 


SECTION  II. 

CAUSES    AND    LAWS. 

THE  philosophical  distinction  between  Cause  and  Law  is 
perfectly  clear.  Cause  is  that  which  accounts  for  the  ex 
istence  of  being  and  phenomena  :  Law  is  that  which  ac 
counts  for  the  order  and  relations  of  being  and  phenomena. 

Cause  may  be  divided  into  two  grand  classes,  spiritual 
or  mental,  and  physical ;  the  former  presenting  two  grades, 
the  infinite  and  the  finite,  the  latter  presenting  the  finite 
only. 

Now,  in  philosophical  strictness,  the  only  enquiry  that 
can  arise  here  respecting  Cause  is,  Whether  the  physical 
cause  is  really  distinct  from  the  spiritual.  In  respect  to 
all  our  enquiries  into  the  constitution  of  the  objective 
world,  every  end  is  answered  by  granting  at  once — First, 
that  in  every  finite  intelligence  there  is  a  proper  Cause 
which  accounts  for  all  the  voluntary  acts  :  Secondly,  that 
in  the  universe  of  matter  all  causality  is  resolvable  into 
the  First  and  all-comprehending  Cause.  Physical  causes, 
viewed  in  philosophical  simplicity,  are  invisible  powers  ly 
ing  behind  the  phenomena  of  the  universe.  Whenever  we 
attempt  to  classify  these,  we  in  reality  classify  only  the 
phenomena  which  are  received  as  the  signs  or  expressions 
of  the  Causes.  * 

*  Phenomena,  and  phenomena  alone,  are  classed  into  genera  and  species 
on  the  grounds  of  resemblance  and  difference.     We,  indeed,  speak  of  a  mag- 


INDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  253 

What  are  ordinarily  termed  physical  causes  are  merely 
phenomena  which  are  stated  and  invariable  antecedents, 
or  fixed  conditions  of  other  phenomena  :  for  example,  the 
sun  and  moon  in  the  changes  of  the  tide  ;  visible  fire  in 
combustion ;  water  and  steam  as  propelling  powers,  the 
conjunction  of  substances  in  chemical  changes  ;  light,  heat, 

netic  cause,  a  healing  cause,  a  consuming  cause,  and  so  on ;  but  these  differ 
entia  really  refer  to  the  phenomena ; — the  phenomena  of  magnetism,  of  heal 
ing,  and  of  combustion,  all  differing  from  each  other ;  but  Cause  is  one  simple 
Idea,  the  Idea  of  that  which  accounts  for  the  possible  and  actual  existence  of 
these  various  phenomena.  Indeed,  we  can  conceive  of  the  same  cause  as  pro 
ducing  them  all ;  as  when  we  conceive  of  the  Divine  Being  as  the  universal 
and  sole  Cause.  This  plainly  is  possible  :  and  in  the  case  of  second  causes  we 
do  actually  attribute  a  vast  variety  of  phenomena  to  one  cause  ;  the  phenomena 
being  capable  of  being  reduced  to  genera  and  species,  while  the  cause  retains 
all  its  simplicity. 

"  Human  power,  taken  under  any  point  of  view,  is  one  of  perfect  sim 
plicity  ;  it  is  nothing  that  can  be  described  under  any  form  ;  it  can  neither  be 
physically  separated  into  parts,  nor  logically  distributed  into  genera ;  it  always 
manifests  itself  by  volition ;  and  yet  how  various  are  the  phenomena  produced 
— the  phenomena  of  which  volition  is  the  immediate  antecedent ! 

"  There  may,  however,  be  differences  in  degree ;  one  cause  may  produce 
a  greater,  variety  of  phenomena  than  another;  and  thus,  causes  which  produce 
certain  phenomena,  and  act  in  relation  to  certain  substances  only,  may  be 
conceived  of  as  simply  limited  in  power  without  implying  difference  in  kind. 
If,  for  example,  I  were  gifted  with  the  power  of  regulating  my  digestive  func 
tions,  or  the  circulation  of  my  blood,  or  of  moving  my  ears  after  the  manner 
of  a  dog  or  a  horse,  it  would  argue  no  new  power  differing  in  kind,  but  merely 
the  extension  of  my  causality.  My  volition  now  is  limited  to  the  movement 
of  certain  members,  and  cannot  influence  others ;  if  I  could  move  my  ears  as 
I  do  my  hands,  then  my  volition  would  do  one  thing  more  than  it  is  now 
capable  of  doing. 

"  Again,  water  is  known  to  hold  salt  in  solution  :  Now,  if  we  were  to  sup 
pose  water  to  have  the  additional  power  of  dissolving  wood  and  holding  the 
potassium  in  solution,  we  would  not  be  altering  in  our  conception  the  nature 
or  kind  of  solvent  power  in  water : — We  would  only  be  enlarging  that  power. 
It  is  manifest  that  if  we  had  made  the  experiment  of  the  solvent  power  of 
water  only  upon  sugar,  we  might  with  as  much  reason  conjecture  that,  if  fur 
ther  tried,  it  would  dissolve  wood,  as  that  it  would  dissolve  salt." — Doctrine  of 
the  Witt,  pp.  31,  32.  See  also  p.  301. 


254  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

air,  and  moisture  in  vegetation,  and  so  on.  In  making 
out  a  science  of  nature  it  is  immaterial,,  as  before  inti 
mated,  what  we  conceive  the  invisible  and  real  causes  to  be  ; 
or  whether  we  conceive  of  only  one  universal  cause  pro 
ducing  all  this  variety  of  effect.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
very  determination  of  such  a  science  depends  upon  ob 
serving  the  order  and  relations  of  the  phenomena.  But 
the  order  and  relations  of  the  phenomena  do  not  truly  be 
long  to  cause,  but  to  law.  Hence  the  aim  of  Induction, 
when  expressed  with  philosophic  precision,  is  not  to  arrive 
at  causes,  but  to  arrive  at  laws.  Thus  in  gravitation,  the 
great  enquiry  did  not  so  much  respect  the  nature  of  the 
cause,  as  the  fact  of  the  regulated  central  determination 
of  bodies.  The  expansion  of  steam  is  a  phenomenon  ;  and 
other  phenomena  are  connected  with  it  as  invariable  con 
sequents  :  We  know  there  must  be  cause  lying  behind 
the  phenomena — of  this  we  are  satisfied — whether  it  be  a 
physical  cause,  distinct  and  measured  in  its  own  sphere, 
or  the  all-pervading  universal  Cause  :  but  the  great  points 
of  interest  to  us  in  science  and  practical  mechanics  are 
the  order  and  relations  of  the  phenomena ;  in  other 
words,  the  law  which  governs  the  evolution  of  the  pheno 
mena. 

If  the  undulatory  theory  of  light  be  established,  the 
interest  of  the  thing  does  not  arise  from  having  arrived  at 
an  ultimate  cause  ;  but  in  having  gained  new  phenomena 
with  wider  relations  and  more  comprehensive  laws.  An 
ultimate  cause  we  have  not  attained  ;  the  ethereal  undu 
lations  precede  the  sensations  of  light,  and  the  presence 
of  the  sun  precedes  the  undulations  ;  and  thus  we  have  a 
succession  of  related  phenomena  ; — while  enquiries  still 
arise  respecting  the  correlation  of  the  sun  and  the  all-per 
vading  elastic  ether  which  may  bring  to  light  other  ante- 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  255 

cedent  phenomena.  The  real  enquiry  then  is,  not  after 
the  ultimate  cause  of  light,  but  after  the  whole  succession 
of  inter-dependent  phenomena  connected  with  the  sensa 
tion  under  all  its  phases.  Throughout  the  whole  succes 
sion  of  phenomena  there  is  cause  acting,  cause  developing 
the  phenomena ;  but  that  which  we  seek  after — the 
characteristics  of  phenomena,  their  order  and  relation,  is 
comprehended  by  law.  We  can  conceive  of  one  universal 
cause  producing  from  its  own  fulness  every  variety  of 
phenomena ;  but  this  variety  itself  denotes  diversity  of 
design  and  therefore  diversity  of  law. 

The  attraction  of  gravitation  draws  bodies  towards  the 
centre  of  the  earth.  Suppose  it  were  ascertained  that  an 
exceedingly  subtile  ether  exists  between  the  particles  of 
matter,  having  in  itself  a  central  determination  by  which 
all  bodies  are  made  to  tend  toward  the  centre  :  Then  in 
deed  we  should  have  a  new  class  of  antecedent  pheno 
mena  ;  but  the  tendency  of  bodies  towards  the  centre 
would  be  no  more  explained  than  before,  as  far  as  cause  is 
considered  ;  we  would  only  be  carried  one  step  farther 
back  in  our  observations  ;  and  we  might  now  institute  en 
quiries  respecting  the  force  acting  upon  or  in  the  particles 
of  the  subtile  ether.  Unquestionably,  however,  were  such 
an  ether  discovered,  we  should  enlarge  our  view  of  the 
laws  and  order  of  creation. 

To  revert  to  the  theories  of  light.  By  the  common 
theory,  luminous  particles  are  supposed  to  be  thrown  off 
in  straight  lines  from  the  luminous  body,  the  phenomena 
of  this  emission  being  the  antecedent  phenomena  deemed 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  consequent  phenomena  .  By 
the  undulatory  theory,  the  sensation  of  light  and  all  the 
phenomena  are  supposed  to  find  their  sufficient  antecedent 
phenomena  in  the  undulations  of  the  elastic  medium  ; 


256  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

that  is,  the  ethereal  undulations  being  granted  as  the  in 
variable  antecedent  to  the  sensation  of  light,  and  the  ces 
sation  of  these  undulations  as  the  invariable  antecedent 
of  darkness  or  the  absence  of  this  sensation,  then  the 
movement  of  these  undulations  will  serve  to  explain  all 
the  phenomena  of  vision.  In  both  theories  we  have  in 
part  a  hypothesis  of  phenomena,  and  in  part  a  statement 
of  actual  phenomena  ;  and  the  object  in  both  is  so  to  con 
nect  the  hypothetical  with  the  actual  as  to  exhibit  not  the 
cause  of  the  actual  phenomena,  but  the  law.  That  light 
consists  of  fine  particles  thrown  off  from  luminous  bodies 
and  moving  in  straight  lines  with  an  inconceivable  velocity, 
is  a  theory  which  legitimately  connects  itself  with  the  phe 
nomena  of  reflection  and  refraction  as  exhibited  in  specu- 
lums,  prisms,  lenses,  and  so  on.  These  phenomena  can 
also  be  legitimately  connected  with  the  undulations  of  the 
imponderable  medium.  Other  phenomena,  however,  are 
deemed  by  philosophers  to  be  legitimately  connected  only 
with  the  last  theory.  But  in  neither  theory  do  the  hy 
pothesised  constitute  the  cause  of  the  actual  phenomena, 
but  only  the  required  conditions  of  their  manifestations. 
If  now  we  conceive  of  the  great  and  all-comprehending 
Mind  designing  to  produce  the  phenomena  of  light  and 
vision,  whether  by  his  direct  agency,  or  by  second  causes 
permeating  and  acting  in  material  substances,  then  the 
manner  in  which  different  substances  are  related  to  each 
other,  and  the  fixed  order  and  dependency  of  the  pheno 
mena,  become  to  us  the  exponent  of  the  law,  which  the 
Great  Designing  Mind  ordained  for  his  own  efficiency,  or 
for  the  governance  of  the  secondary  powers.  The  two 
theories  present  us  in  part,  two  different  orders  of  pheno 
mena,  and  hence  two  different  laws  of  light  and  vision. 
In  the  minute  and  complete  determination  of  these  laws, 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  257 

so  far  as  the  conception  of  quantity  comes  in,  the  mathe 
matics,  as  the  science  of  quantity,  is  employed  to  give  the 
expressions. 

What  then  is  law  ?  Is  it  only  the  invariable  succes 
sion  of  phenomena?  May  the  Creator,  by  his  omnipo 
tence,  fix  the  succession  of  phenomena  in  any  order  he 
pleases,  and  is  this  fixed  and  arbitrary  succession  the  law 
of  Nature  ? 

Law  is  not  arbitrary  in  the  morale.  Hence  that  suc 
cession  of  phenomena  which  comprises  the  conduct  of  re 
sponsible  beings  can  be  right  and  fit  only  when  conformed 
to  one  law. 

Equally  clear  is  it  that  the  law  of  the  Beautiful  is  not 
arbitrary. 

But  how  stands  this  question  in  Somatology  ?  This  is 
the  point  now  to  be  considered. 

In  the  first  place,  in  any  system  of  bodies  there  can  be 
no  room  for  arbitrary  laws,  so  far  as  the  conditions  of  the 
system  bring  the  bodies  under  mathematical  formulae. 
And  bodies,  since  they  must  have  magnitudes  and  deter 
minate  forms,  and  be  related  to  each  other,  and  have  mo 
tion  as  the  resultant  of  forces,  cannot  escape  these  formulae. 
It  is  inconceivable  and  impossible,  that  a  universe  of  bodies 
should  have  been  constituted  in  violation  of  the  principles 
of  the  science  of  quantity. 

In  the  second  place,  the  very  notion  of  arbitrary  law  is 
absurd.  Law  is  the  work  of  the  Eeason — the  necessary 
outflow  of  its  Ideas.  The  will  may  institute  arbitrary 
rules,  as  the  word  arbitrary  indicates.  The  Will  may 
violate  the  Keason  ;  but  the  institutions  of  arbitrary 
choice  in  opposition  to  Keason,  or  in  the  mere  freakish- 
ness  of  Fancy,  are  not  to  be  dignified  with  the  name  of 
laws,  in  the  high  and  proper  sense. 


258  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

In  the  third  place,  arbitrary  choice  cannot  be  ascribed 
to  Infinite  Intelligence.  He  who  is  the  Fountain  of  truth, 
law,  beauty,  benignity,  and  order,  cannot  be  thought  of  as 
creating  the  universe  otherwise  than  under  the  light  of 
his  Eternal  Ideas.  And  when  we  come  to  look  into  his 
works,  we  find  everywhere  the  resplendent  marks  of  law : 
and  the  farther  our  observation  penetrates,  the  more 
varied,  resplendent,  and  positive  do  these  marks  become. 

The  axiom,  "  that  every  phenomenon  presumes  a  law," 
or  that  every  phenomenon  is  the  result  of  intelligent  de 
sign,  is  affirmed  by  the  Keason  in  the  clear  insight  that 
Infinite  Intelligence,  and  not  arbitrary  choice,  decided  the 
system  of  Nature. 

There  might  indeed  have  been  a  variety  of  systems 
governed  by  laws  more  or  less  benign  and  perfect,  a  con 
ception  which  we  allow  in  the  various  theories  by  which 
we  attempt  to  express  the  laws  of  given  phenomena  ;  but 
nevertheless,  we  are  constrained  to  believe  that  an  infi 
nitely  perfect  Intelligence  could  not  but  have  projected 
the  best  possible  system,  taking  it  in  all  its  relations. 
When  we  look  therefore  into  Nature,  we  expect  not  only 
to  find  laws  properly  so  called  ;  but  we  expect  also  to  find 
the  wisest  and  most  benign  laws. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  259 


SECTION  III. 

THE    HUMAN    REASON    AS    RELATED    TO    THE    OBJECTIVE 
WORLD. 

THE  great  and  all- wise  Being,  who  constituted  the  outer 
world,  constituted  also  the  Mind  which  is  to  investigate  its 
laws.  The  Mind  does  not  go  to  its  work  unfurnished. 
Made  after  the  likeness  of  the  Creator — after  the  likeness 
of  that  Keason  from  whose  Ideas  all  law  sprang  forth  ;— 
constituted  therefore  with  Ideas,  and  thus  having  sources 
of  law  within  itself,  it  cannot  go  out  into  the  world  where 
law  is  embodied  and  realized,  without  waking  up  the 
glorious  recognition.  Having  eyes  to  see,  the  light  which 
pours  in  upon  it  seems  not  a  strange,  but  an  expected  and 
genial  visitation.  The  human  mind  is  prepared  to  know 
a  world  which  had  its  origin  in  mind.  As  an  artist  com 
prehends  the  works  of  art,  so  does  the  mind  of  man  com 
prehend  the  works  of  Grod. 

I  have  already,  in  the  preceding  Parts,  said  so  much 
of  the  Ideas  of  the  Keason,  that  I  need  here  barely  allude 
to  the  subject,  or  call  it  up  again  only  so  far  as  to  apply  it 
to  the  matter  in  hand. 

The  development  of  the  Ideas,  as  we  have  seen,  does 
not  take  place  separately  from  Eeality  ;  but  when  the  re 
ality  is  present  in  relation  to  which  they  are  to  act,  then 
they  manifest  themselves.  The  manifestation  is  spon- 


260  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

taneous — the  earnest  outflow  of  the  mind  to  reach  its 
proper  objects. 

In  the  first  place,  Ideas  of  cause  and  law,  and  of  con 
sequent  system  and  order,  Ideas  psychological  and  soma- 
tological,  as  soon  as  phenomena  are  given,  determine  the 
mind  to  undertake  investigation,  and  hold  up  the  objects 
to  be  attained. 

Then,  inasmuch  as  Ideas  comprehend  the  constitution 
of  the  universe,  just  so  far  as  in  the  presence  of  the  con- 
ditionating  and  quickening  Reality  they  are  developed, 
does  there  appear  a  prophetic  power  of  the  Intellect  pre 
conceiving,  suggesting,  theorizing,  and  sometimes,  as  in 
the  case  of  Newton,  seeming  to  grasp  at  once  the  great 
system  of  things.  It  is  impossible  to  express  the  extent  to 
which  the  spontaneous  inspiration  of  Ideas  carries  the 
mind,  or  all  the  modes  of  their  action.  Like  the  forma 
tion  and  growth  of  a  common  Language  in  masses  of 
mind,  like  the  development  of  Music  without  rules  of  art 
in  popular  tunes,  or  the  growth  of  Poetry  from  rude  bal 
lads  to  the  Iliad  of  Homer,  like  the  spontaneous  inventions 
and  discoveries  of  man  before  he  began  to  philosophise, 
from  the  results  we  feel  assured  there  is  law  exact  and 
beautiful ;  but  still,  as  in  the  fine  vibrations  of  the  air,  and 
in  the  more  subtile  oscillations  of  the  ethereal  medium  of 
light,  no  representation  is  possible  :  The  movement  lies  so 
far  behind  all  ordinary  and  familiar  forms,  and  is  so  much 
more  delicate  and  subtile  than  any  thing  we  are  accus 
tomed  to  handle,  to  speak  of,  or  to  represent,  that  we  can 
find  nothing  by  which  to  convey  it.  In  the  germination 
and  growth  of  plants,  how  many  fine  influences  are  at 
work  of  which  the  physiologist  presents  us  no  diagram, 
and  which  he  can  command  by  no  formula  ;  so  likewise  in 
mind,  the  germs  of  thought,  their  first  springing  forth. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  261 

and  their  infinite  and  beautiful  complexities  in  reasoning, 
invention,  memory,  imagination,  and  taste,  while  exhibit 
ing  in  their  result  the  commanding  presence  of  law,  sur 
pass  the  finest  skill  of  the  analyst. 

The  superior  power  which  some  minds  display  in  in 
ductive  reasoning  may  be  accounted  for  mainly  by  the  re 
markable  degree  in  which  they  are  endowed  with  three 
qualities,  Clearness,  Candor,  and  Patience.  Clearness  of 
mind,  the  result  of  exact  and  laborious  discipline,  prevents 
uncertain,  confused,  and  inapposite  observations  and  ex 
periments,  and  leads  to  accurate  and  sound  judgments- 
Candor  purifies  the  mind  from  aU  "  idols,"  and  makes  it 
an  honest  truth-seeker.  Patience  disposes  to  undistracted 
attention,  quiet  and  protracted  thought,  cheerfulness  in 
undertaking  labors,  perseverance  in  overcoming  difficulties, 
and  willingness  to  wait  until  investigation  shall  ripen  the 
harvest  of  knowledge. 

But  Ideas  not  only  impel  the  philosopher  to  undertake 
investigation,  and  suggest  the  route  he  is  to  pursue,  and 
foreshadow  the  results  at  which  he  is  to  arrive, — they  also 
determine  the  Method  of  Investigation. 

There  are  three  particulars  in  relation  to  which  this 
method  requires  to  be  expounded  : 

I.  The  induction  of  phenomena  for  the  purpose  of 
classifying  them  into  genera  and  species. 

II.  The  induction  of  phenomena  for  the  purpose  of 
arriving  at  the  expression  of  a  general  fact,  or  a  general 
order  of  sequence,  but  without  determining  a  fixed  and 
absolute  law. 

III.  The  induction  of  phenomena  leading  to  the  de 
termination  of  a  fixed  and  absolute  law. 


262  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 


SECTION  IV. 

GENERAL    VIEW    OF    CLASSIFICATION. 

CLASSIFICATION  is  dependent  upon  abstraction  and  gener 
alization.  When  phenomena  are  realized  under  their 
secondary  form,  the  first  impression  must  be  that  of  an 
undistinguished  totality.  By  abstraction  the  mind  fastens 
upon  a  particular  quality  or  feature,  and  separates  it  from 
the  mass.  This  quality,  or  feature,  is  then  noted  in  other 
objects  ;  and  at  length  generalized  as  a  common  sign  for 
the  whole  class  to  which  it  belongs.  In  the  next  place,  a 
name  is  given  to  the  common  sign,  which  thenceforth  be 
comes  the  name  of  the  class.  When  there  is  but  one 
quality  generalized,  the  class  must  be  exceedingly  general, 
and  described  in  great  incompleteness.  As  we  add  on 
qualities,  we  narrow  the  limits  of  the  class,  and  at  the 
same  time  describe  with  greater  completeness. 

The  most  general  arrangement  of  classes  is  that  of 
GENUS  and  SPECIES.  The  Genus,  or  kind,  expresses  only 
the  particular,  or  particulars,  in  which  all  the  species  com 
prehended  under  it  are  identified.  The  Species,  or  the 
particular  forms  of  tlie  kind,  express  all  of  the  Genus, 
and  in  addition  to  this,  the  differentiae,  or  points  of  differ 
ence  between  one  species  and  another.  The  Genus  is  thus 
divided  into  Species  by  the  addition  of  qualities.  Every 
Species  is  made  up,  in  the  last  analysis,  of  INDIVIDUALS. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  263 

An  individual  is  that  which  admits  of  no  farther  division, 
because  all  the  qualities  belonging  to  the  object  are  sup 
posed  to  be  indicated  by  the  name  assigned  to  it.  The 
above  may  be  conveniently  represented  as  follows  : 

Genus=The  common  Essence  or  Quality. 

Species = Genus + Differentia. 

Individual=Genus-|-Differentia+ Accidents. 

By  Accidents  are  meant  the  individual  peculiarities. 
We  will  illustrate  by  an  example  : 

Genus  Animal=The  common  property  or  essence  by 
which  animals  are  distinguished 
from  vegetables. 

Species  Man = Animal +Kational. 

Individual  Caesar=Animal-}-Kational4-All  the  quali 
ties  which  distinguished  Caesar 
from  all  other  men,  and  made 
him  particularly  Caesar. 

There  are  different  orders  of  Genera  ;  for  a  genus  may 
be  a  species  *  in  relation  to  some  higher  genus,  while  a 
genus  truly  in  relation  to  orders  comprehended  under  it. 
Thus  Animal  may  be  said  to  be  a  species  of  Creature, 
understanding  by  Creature  any  thing  created  ;  Vegetable 
being  another  species  of  creature.  The  distinction  thus 
arises  between  a  Maximum  and  a  Proximum  Genus, — 
Maximum  denoting  a  genus  which  is  not  a  species,  and 
Proximum  a  genus  next  above  a  species,  but  yet  not  the 
highest  genus.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  in  our  Classi 
fication  we  are  not  necessarily  limited  to  a  certain  number 
of  divisions  :  on  the  contrary,  we  can  multiply  them  ac 
cording  to  our  convenience.  Hence  we  find  naturalists 
making  Orders  and  Classes,  in  addition  to  Genera  and 
Species. 

*  Species  here  is  taken  in  an  imperfect  sense. 


264  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

Classification  is  either  NATURAL,  SCIENTIFIC,  or  ARBI 
TRARY. 

I.  NATURAL    CLASSIFICATION.      This    is   that    spon 
taneous  Classification  which  appears  in  all  language,  in 
dependently   of  scientific   investigation.      Thus   all   the 
objects  of  nature,  as  Animals,  Vegetables,  and  Metals,  in 
their  different  kinds,  and  all  the  products  of  human  art, 
are  distinguished  and  classed. 

II.  SCIENTIFIC  CLASSIFICATION.     This  is  the  result  of 
scientific  and  elaborate  investigations,  and  appears  in  books 
of  Science  and  Natural  History.     The  terms  here  em 
ployed  are  invented  for  the  purpose,  and  are  generally  un 
intelligible  to  the  vulgar,  because  remote  from  common 
use. 

Scientific  Classification  is  strictly  natural,  also,  in  one 
point  of  view ;  that  is,  it  is  conformed  to  the  actual  Sys 
tem  of  Nature.  Natural  spontaneous  Classification  arises 
from  that  striking,  palpable,  and  outside  view  of  Nature, 
which  all  men  readily  and  unavoidably  take :  Scientific 
Classification  arises  from  a  more  intimate  and  curious,  and 
an  interior  view  of  Nature,  determined  by  philosophical 
aims  and  principles,  formally  laid  down  and  reflected 
upon. 

III.  ARBITRARY  CLASSIFICATION.     This  is  an  inten 
tional  violation  of   natural  identity  and  difference.     It 
consequently  is  altogether  distinct  from  the  two  preceding 
forms  of  Classification.    It  is  an  incongruous  and  grotesque 
assemblage  of  particulars  produced  by  the  sportive  fancy 
for  humorous  and  witty  effect. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  265 

;i..|   fiim  ::?  •-.  &&A4&*   t  J 


SECTION  Y. 

PRINCIPLES  DETERMINING  THE  INDUCTION  OF  PHENOMENA 
IN   CLASSIFICATION. 

IDEAS  of  Identity  and  Difference,  Ideas  of  Synthesis  and 
Analysis,  belong  to  the  common  human  mind,  and  impel 
it,  whether  spontaneously  and  without  reflection,  as  in  the 
first  form  of  Classification,  or  whether  through  reflection 
and  investigation,  as  in  the  second  form,  to  classify  and 
distinguish  the  objects  of  perception.  The  world  without, 
made  after  the  Ideas  of  the  Divine  Architect,  derives 
from  these  Ideas  its  diversity  and  unity.  And  here,  again, 
the  mind  of  man,  made  after  the  likeness  of  its  great 
Original,  is  prepared  to  read  this  diversity  and  unity. 
The  Identities  and  Differences  of  all  created  things,  the 
beautiful  variety  amid  perfect  system  and  order,  find 
within  our  reason  the  key  of  interpretation.  We  do  not 
really  classify :  the  Classification  is  already  made  in  the 
constitution  of  the  world ;  We  only  read  and  compre 
hend  it. 

And  even  Arbitrary  Classification  has  its  law  within 
ourselves ;  for  it  is  only  the  nice  perception  of  natural 
and  rational  identity  and  difference  which  enables  us  to 
make  those  violations  of  congruity  which  produce  the 
humorous  and  ludicrous  effect.  Hence  we  find  that  minds 
of  the  most  delicate  and  perfect  structure  are  most  keenly 
12 


266  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

alive  to  genuine  wit  and  humor.  In  Addison,  we  have 
a  striking  exemplification  of  this  fact. 

After  pointing  out  the  Ideas  which  lead  us  to  classify 
all,  it  still  remains  to  explain  the  principles  on  which 
the  different  classifications  arise. 

The  conception  of  general  Classes,  such  as  Genera, 
comprehending  other  Classes  such  as  Species,  the  concep 
tion  of  divisions  and  subdivisions,  until  we  arrive  at 
Classes  composed  barely  of  individuals,  naturally  arises 
out  of  the  Idea  of  the  unity  and  variety  of  system.  But 
the  particular  question  to  be  determined  is,  How  do  we 
select  the  distinct  characteristic  of  the  Genus  and  the 
Species  ?  In  other  words,  Why,  amid  many  identities 
and  differences,  do  we  fix  upon  the  particular  ones  ? 

I.  We  have  seen*  that  the  Idea  of  Determinate 
Form,  both  esthetically  and  somatologically,  enters  into 
the  structure  of  all  things.  Hence  the  identities  and 
diversities  of  the  world  appear  in  the  forms  of  things  as 
limited  in  space.  Nothing  is  more  obvious  to  the  common 
eye  than  these,  and  therefore  no  classification  springs  up 
more  readily  and  spontaneously.  Thus  animals  and  plants 
are  known,  distinguished,  arranged,  and  named.  The 
Idea  of  Determinate  Form  within  the  human  mind  pre 
pares  and  predisposes  it  for  the  actual  knowledge  of  the 
generic  and  specific  forms  of  nature.  The  conception  of 
the  determinate  forms  of  objects,  however,  is  connected 
with  that  of  interior  functions  and  properties ;  and  even 
in  the  most  unreflective  and  spontaneous  judgments,  the 
two  are  not  entirely  separated.  Thus  the  distinction 
between  the  animate  and  inanimate  never  lies  wholly  in 
form,  but  in  the  Idea  of  Life,  as  an  organific  power  deter- 

*  Pages  189,  202. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  267 

mining  the  difference.  And,  again,  the  distinction  be 
tween  animals  and  plants  never  lies  wholly  in  the  form, 
but  in  sensibility,  locomotive  activity,  voluntary  appropria 
tion  and  skill,  and  various  functions  belonging  only  to 
the  former.  There  is,  in  fine,  a  conception  of  different 
laws  governing  these  different  forms  of  life. 

Specific  identity  may  be  defined  by  the  form  alone. 
It  is  the  Identity  of  the  outline  drawn  and  limited  in 
space,  and  the  Identity  of  proportion  and  of  mechanism, 
making  together  one  distinct  picture  for  the  imagination. 

Generic  Identity,  on  the  contrary,  lies  not  in  the  col 
lective  outline  of  form,  but  in  the  outline  of  capital  parts, 
and  in  connection  with  this,  in  the  oneness  of  relations, 
ends,  and  functions. 

The  Individual  embodies  the  generic  and  specific 
identities,  and  superadds  all  the  lineaments,  shades,  and 
expressions,  which  combined  constitute  the  finished  and 
unique  picture. 

II.  Another  ground  of  Classification  is  found  in  the 
Identities  and  differences  of  the  order  of  antecedence  and 
sequence  of  phenomena.  The  important  ideas  which 
govern  here  are  Cause  and  Law.  But  nevertheless  we 
have  not  in  the  mere  classification,  the  determination 
specifically  of  causes  and  laws,  but  only  the  arrangement 
and  naming  of  phenomena,  from  the  fact  that  they 
uniformly  precede  as  immediate  antecedents  certain  other 
phenomena,  or  uniformly  succeed  them  as  immediate 
sequent  s. 

This,  like  visible  form,  is  a  principle  of  ordinary 
classification :  for  although  the  uniformities  imply  Law, 
and  would  not  excite  attention  unless  the  Idea  of  Law 
were  in  the  mind,  still  they  are  not  contemplated  in  par 
ticular  reference  to  Law,  or  with  a  view  at  once  to  es- 


268  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

tablish  Law,  but  simply  to  obtain  a  convenient  arrange 
ment  and  nomenclature.  Such  a  classification  is  indeed 
subsidiary  to  the  determination  of  Law— a  preparatory 
process  of  the  highest  moment.  We  have  a  striking 
exemplification  of  its  importance,  as  well  as  of  its  mere 
subsidiary  character,  in  the  history  of  Chemical  Science. 
Experiments  were  multiplying  from  the  age  of  the 
alchymists,  and  the  observed  uniformities  of  the  pheno 
menal  sequence  as  they  continually  became  enlarged  and 
modified,  suggested  new  classifications  and  new  terms. 
The  facts  were  thus  preserved,  disseminated,  and  handed 
down ;  philosophical  meditation  had  distinct  objects  before 
it ;  new  investigations  had  their  obvious  starting  points ; 
and  a  widening  avenue  of  knowledge  gave  still  more  invit 
ing  prospects.  But  it  was  reserved,  at  a  late  period,  for 
Dalton  and  Faraday  to  propound  Theories  which,  if  indeed 
still  theories,  approach  very  near  the  line  where  theory 
merges  into  law,  and  proclaims  the  ultimate  end  of  human 
thought  attained. 

III.  The  highest  ground  of  classification  is  the  con 
ception  of  a  fixed  law  comprehending  and  governing  the 
phenomena. 

The  determinate  forms  of  bodies  spring  from  some 
law,  whether  somatological  or  esthetical,  or  from  a  union 
of  both ;  and  the  uniform  sequences  of  phenomena  have 
likewise  their  law  somewhere.  Now,  before  any  law  is 
distinctly  conceived  of,  the  classification,  as  we  have  repre 
sented,  takes  place  by  the  mere  marks  of  likeness  and  un- 
likeness  in  form,  and  the  mere  correspondency  of  the 
sequences.  Thus  arise  the  classifications  which  obtain 
commonly  among  men,  and  which  are  expressed  in  the 
general  terms  of  ordinary  language.  Thus  also  arise  the 
earlier  classifications  of  Science,  while,  by  various  tenta- 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  269 

tive  efforts,  it  is  groping  its  way  to  stupendous  and  sure 
results.  But  no  sooner  have  conceptions  of  general  and 
fixed  laws  become  developed,  than  the  human  mind 
attempts  classifications  from  a  higher  point  of  view. 
Now  the  law  which  is  conceived  of  as  binding  together 
the  widely  diffused  and  multiform  parts  of  an  extended 
system,  gives  the  generical  designations ;  while  the  species 
show  the  complete  unfolding  of  formative  powers,  whether 
by  a  plastic  force  impressed  from  without,  or  by  an  organ- 
ific  energy  acting  from  within.  If  the  laws  which  govern 
the  widely  extended  systems  in  their  unity,  and  those 
which  control  the  specific  developments  in  their  complete 
ness,  be  accurately  discovered,  then  the  classification  will 
attain  its  highest  perfection.  And  just,  as  under  theoreti 
cal  conceptions,  an  approximation  is  made  towards  the 
point  of  accurate  discovery,  will  an  approximation  be 
made  towards  a  perfect  classification — a  classification 
which  at  the  same  time  is  the  most  philosophical  and  the 
most  natural. 

The  history  of  Natural  Science  affords  us  abundant 
illustrations  of  the  progress  of  classification.  I  have 
already  referred  to  Chemistry.  Botany  and  Zoology 
afford  perhaps  the  most  striking  illustrations,  since  on 
account  of  the  multitude  of  particulars,  classification 
becomes  at  once  an  object  of  paramount  importance. 
The  earlier  classifications  in  these  sciences  were  formed 
by  arranging  the  particulars  according  to  their  external 
parts.  Hence  they  were  merely  descriptive ;  and  as 
description  must  vary  according  to  the  accuracy  and 
variety  of  the  observations,  new  systems  were  continually 
appearing,  and  endeavoring  to  supplant  one  another. 
Linngeus,  by  introducing  the  sexual  principle,  henceforth 
gave  to  the  classification  of  plants  a  phytomological 


270  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

character,  and  advanced  Botany  to  the  dignity  of  deter 
minate  Science.  Cuvier  accomplished  a  similar  reforma 
tion  in  Zoology.  With  him  the  interior  organization, 
as  manifesting  a  wise  and  harmonious  design,  became  the 
great  object  of  research.  Under  this  great  Idea  he  not 
only  arranged  the  tribes  of  animals  at  present  existent, 
but  even  called  forth  into  beautiful  and  rational  symmetry, 
the  fossil  and  fragmentary  remains  of  ancient  and  extinct 
generations.  It  was  the  apprehension  of  the  rational 
design  and  of  the  organific  law,  which  led  these  great 
philosophers  to  their  invaluable  and  immortal  achieve 
ments. 

Having  distinguished  the  cardinal  principles  of  classi 
fication,  we  may  next  proceed  to  enquire  particularly  into 
the  distinctive  characteristics  of  genus  and  species. 

I  have  already  remarked,  that  we  are  not  necessarily 
confined  to  the  particular  classes  of  genus  and  species. 
In  reality,  wherever  a  number  of  particulars  have  any 
common  characteristic,  they  may  be  classed  together  on 
this  ground.  And  so  also,  on  the  other  hand,  any  point 
of  difference  between  particulars  may  be  assumed  as  a 
ground  for  separating  them,  and  seeking  for  them  some 
other  distribution.  But  we  have  seen  that  there  are 
principles,  which,  amid  the  vast  number  of  possible 
classifications,  demand  a  limitation  ;  and  even  spon 
taneously  constrain  the  common  mind  to  conform  to  it. 
Besides  genus  and  species,  which  have  universally  obtained, 
and  which  therefore  seem  to  be  a  most  natural  division, 
we  have  Orders  of  a  widely  comprehensive  character, 
including  genera ;  and  again,  Orders  of  a  limited  charac 
ter,  included  under  species.  The  comprehensive  orders, 
however,  are  only  a  higher  description  of  genera,  and  the 
limited  orders  a  variety  of  the  species ;  so  that  an  exposi- 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  271 

tion  of  genus  and  species  must  include  the  main  principles 
of  logical  division. 

I  shall  begin  with  Species.  In  respect  to  form,  I  have 
already  defined  species,  a  completed  picture  for  the  imagi 
nation.  If  we  take  the  species  on  the  higher  ground  of 
law  working  in  the  interior  organization,  the  same  concep 
tion  of  completeness  becomes  the  governing  conception. 
In  the  species  we  have  the  completed  organization. 
Every  individual,  of  course,  is  a  completed  organization. 
But  the  individual  contains  no  organism,  powers  or  pro 
perties,  which  do  not  belong  to  the  species.  Indeed, 
every  individual  may  be  taken  as  a  representative  of  the 
species  to  which  he  belongs  ;  and  the  species  is  but  a  col 
lection  of  individuals  identified  in  the  whole  organism, 
and  in  all  the  powers  and  properties  which  go  to  make  up 
the  distinct  and  complete  being  under  its  organific  and 
determining  law.  The  individual  is  justly  said  to  be  dis 
tinguished  from  the  species  only  by  accidents,  and  not  by 
essential  constitution  and  properties.  These  accidents 
are  either  circumstantial  and  separable,  that  is,  they 
stand  around  the  individual,  describing  locality,  position!, 
and  exterior  relations  generally,  but  forming  no  part  of 
the  essential  being;  or  they  are  modifications  of  the 
essential  and  constitutive  organism  and  properties  of  the 
species.  The  clear  conceptions  of  Identity  and  Constitu 
tive  Law  enable  us  to  compare  and  limit  the  species ; 
and  the  equally  clear  conception  of  difference  enables  us 
to  detect  those  higher  modifications  which  do  not  affect 
the  identity  of  the  species,  and  only  form  the  accidents 
which  serve  to  distinguish  the  individuals.  These  con 
ceptions  are  developed  under  their  proper  Ideas  in  the 
process  of  making  comparisons  of  phenomena.  There  is 
thus  the  union  of  a  certain  tact  acquired  by  experience, 


272  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

and  of  rational  d  priori  determination.  It  is  this  union 
which  makes  classification  truly  philosophical. 

The  orders  formed  under  species  are  based  upon  modi 
fications  more  remarkable,  yet  not  destructive  of  the  pal 
pable  identity  of  the  species. 

Genus  differs  from  species  in  this,  that  while  the  last 
expresses  a  completed  organization,  and  all  the  essential 
properties,  and  is  capable  of  full  representation  in  the  in 
dividual,  the  former  comprises  only  a  part  of  the  organiza 
tion  and  properties,  and  cannot  take  the  individual  as  its 
representative.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  common  mark 
by  which  several  species  are  united  under  one  genus, 
must  be  found  in  every  individual  of  the  several  species  ; 
but  then  it  appears  in  the  individual  in  the  unity  of  all 
the  parts,  while  in  the  genus  it  is  abstracted  from  them. 

The  all-important  inquiry  here  is,  what  shall  govern 
us  in  the  selection  of  the  generic  mark  ?  Having  a  clear 
conception  of  species  as  determined  by  the  identity  of  the 
constitutive  law  of  the  complete  organization,  and  of  the 
essential  properties,  we  now,  under  the  idea  of  system, 
proceed  to  consider  the  relations  between  the  several 
species.  Here  identities  are  also  perceived  ;  and  it  is 
possible  to  select  any  one  of  them  as  the  generic  mark. 
But  suppose  an  identity  be  perceived  in  a  certain  number 
of  instances,  with  respect  to  a  particular  mark,  how  can 
we  be  certain  of  its  universality  ?  We  cannot  be  certain 
of  its  universality,  unless  it  be  a  mark  which  is  the  ex 
ponent  of  a  universal  law.  The  occurrence  of  the  mark  in 
a  great  number  of  instances,  and  to  the  extent  of  our  ob 
servation,  would  lead  us  to  suspect  the  presence  of  a  law  • 
and  therefore  the  selection  of  this  mark  as  a  generic  desig 
nation  becomes  a  convenient  and  wise  expedient,  until  we 
are  enabled  to  reach  a  higher  ground.  A  proper  generic 


INDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  273 

classification  then  cannot  be  based  upon  a  trivial  and 
doubtful  mark.  It  must  be  one,  which,  by  its  importance 
and  prevalence,  points  at  least  towards  a  law.  But  where 
the  law  is  gained,  there  the  generic  mark  becomes  per 
manently  fixed,  and  there  alone.  We  may  take  as  an  il 
lustration,  the  generical  distinction  between  the  animate 
and  the  inanimate.  Here  the  great  Idea  and  the  laws  of 
life  are  the  ground  of  the  distinction  ;  and  here  we  are  as 
sured  that  it  is  fixed  unalterably.  Of  equal  clearness  and 
fixedness  is  the  distinction  between  the  animal,  and  the 
vegetable,  because  we  comprehend  clearly  the  peculiar 
laws  of  their  organizations. .  And  so  universally,  wherever 
we  perceive  a  common  mark  in  several  species,  which 
stands  as  the  exponent  of  a  law  working  in  all  these 
species,  there  we  have  the  sure  and  proper  element  of  the 
genus. 

As  several  species  are  embraced  by  a  genus  under  a 
common  mark,  so  again  several  genera  may  be  embraced 
by  a  higher  genus  under  a  common  and  more  comprehen 
sive  mark.  This  mark  is  the  exponent  of  a  higher  and 
more  comprehensive  law,  binding  together  laws,  which, 
in  their  particular  spheres,  govern  and  explain  the  phe 
nomena.  The  human  mind  is  ever  intent  upon  system, 
and  hence  is  ever  seeking  for  higher  generalizations.  By 
synthesis,  it  aims  at  a  universal  unity,  and  by  analysis, 
developes  unity  into  constituent  parts  harmoniously  col 
ligated. 

From  the  foregoing,  I  think  it  must  be  clear  that  clas 
sification  has  its  starting-point  in  Ideas  of  the  Eeason  ; 
and  that  definite  laws  already  known,  or  the  theoretical 
conception  of  laws,  form  the  determining  principles. 

These  principles  undoubtedly  obtain  an  expression  in  the 
form  of  axioms  and  definitions,  which,  if  they  have  not 
12* 


274  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

been  formally  laid  down,  have  nevertheless,  as  current 
and  generally  understood  judgments,  formed  the  immedi 
ate  authority  and  guide  of  all  just  and  philosophical  classi 
fication. 

A  statement  of  the  leading  axioms  and  definitions  be 
longing  here  will  close  this  part  of  our  subject. 

I.  Every  universal  is  made  up  of  particulars  identified 
either  in  their  determinate  form,  or  in  their  cardinal  pro 
perties,  or  in  their  organific  or  constitutive  law,  or  in  all 
conjointly. 

II.  Every  particular  is  comprehended  within  a  univer 
sal  by  the  identity  either  of  determinate  form,  or  of  cardi 
nal  properties,  or  of  organific  or  constitutive  law,  or  of  all 
conjointly. 

III.  Species  is  the  identity  of  determinate  form,  car 
dinal  properties  and  organific  or  constitutive  law,  con 
jointly,  where  all  these  exist  in  the  subject,  so  that  every 
particular  is  essentially  complete  in  the  description  of  its 
species. 

IV.  Genus  is  the  identity  of  several  species  in  a  car 
dinal  form,  property,  or  law,  which  comprehends  them  in 
the  unity  of  system. 

V.  The  unity  of  nature  lies  in  identity  ;  the  variety  of 
nature  lies  in  difference. 

VI.  Where  difference  consists  in  the  opposition  of  de 
terminate  forms  in  the  organisms  compared,  and  in  essen 
tial  properties,  while  at  the  same  time  there  is  an  identity 
in  some  constitutive  law  comprehending  all  alike,  there 
arises  the  distinction  of  species. 

VII.  Where  the  difference  consists  in  the  opposition 
of  determinate  forms  in  the  organisms,  and  of  essential 
properties,  without  identity  in  some  general  comprehend 
ing  law,  there  arises  the  distinction  of  genera. 


INDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  275 

VIII.  Where  several  genera  are  comprehended  within 
an  order  or  higher  genus,  the  identity  which  binds  them 
together,  appears  also  in  the  several  species  under  each 
particular  genus  ;  but  then  it  appears  alone  in  the  higher 
generalization,  leaving  behind  in  the  lower  classes  the  other 
points  of  identity. 

Scholium.  Species  is  an  identity  throughout.  Genus 
is  an  identity  in  part.  As  the  points  of  identity  diminish, 
the  generalization  advances.  Thus  from  the  individual  we 
advance  to  the  species,  from  the  species  to  the  proximum 
genus,  from  the  proximum  to  the  maximum.  The  uni 
versal  law  sits  like  a  sovereign  in  lofty  state,  regulating 
all  ;  but  having  under  it  a  multitude  of  subordinates, 
which  it  binds  together  in  an  intimate  and  harmonious 
co-working. 


276  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 


SECTION  VI. 

DISTINCTION    BETWEEN    A    GENERAL    FACT    AND    A    FIXED 
AND    ABSOLUTE   LAW. 

THE  relation  between  Ideas  and  Laws  has  been  treated  of 
in  a  preceding  Part.  *  If  the  views  there  presented  are 
just,  then  that  alone  is  entitled  to  the  name  of  law  which 
finds  its  correspondent  and  basis  in  an  Idea.  Moral  laws 
thus  answer  to  the  Ideas  of  right  and  wrong,  freedom  and 
responsibility,  personal  identity,  and  immortality.  Esthe- 
tical  laws  answer  to  the  Idea  of  the  beautiful,  under  its 
different  modifications.  And  so,  likewise,  somatological 
laws  must  answer  to  their  appropriate  Ideas.  This  I  have 
attempted  to  exhibit  under  Primordial  Logic.  The  charac 
teristics  of  Ideas  are  necessity  and  universality  in  their 
proper  spheres.  Hence  the  axioms,  definitions  and  laws, 
must  be  necessary  and  universal  likewise  in  their  proper 
spheres. 

The  Intuitive  Function,  in  connection  with  sufficient 
observation,  perceives  these  laws.  The  law  is  seen  to  com 
prehend  the  facts  of  observation,  and  thus  to  be  the  law  of 
the  facts  ;  while,  as  a  law,  it  is  seen  to  be  universal  and 
necessary. 

Now,  on  the  other  hand,  a  general  fact  is  the  mere 
statement  of  a  series  of  facts,  appearing  to  the  extent  of 

*  Part  I.,  Section  VII. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  277 

our  observation  in  a  uniform  relation  of  sequence.  We 
may  proceed  to  give  a  theory,  or  even  to  determine  a  law 
of  the  facts  ;  but  this  is  another  affair.  Taken  as  a  mere 
general  fact,  the  series  is  neither  theory  or  law. 

But  the  enquiry  may  here  be  made,  How,  then,  does 
a  general  fact  differ  from  generalization  under  genus  and 
species  ?  Generalization  is  a  grouping  of  phenomena  on 
the  ground  of  identity  in  one  or  many  particulars,  for  the 
purpose  of  assigning  a  common  name,  which  may  thence 
forth  be  employed  in  our  thinking  and  reasoning,  as  the 
sign  of  all  contained  under  it.  But  the  general  fact  is  the 
affirmation  of  the  identity  itself  as  a  truth  belonging  to 
the  whole  class  of  things  contemplated.  The  identity 
affirmed  in  the  general  fact,  however,  is  not  always  the 
one  upon  which  the  generalization  is  based.  For  example : 
upon  the  observation  of  certain  identities  and  differences 
we  have  classed  certain  animals  under  the  terms  sheep,  ox, 
deer.  Upon  a  farther  observation  of  these  animals,  we 
find  that  they  are  deficient  in  the  upper  cutting  teeth,  and 
that  they  ruminate.  We  extend  our  observations,  and  we 
find  that  all  animals,  deficient  in  the  upper  cutting  teeth, 
ruminate.  Now,  upon  these  identities  we  may  class  to 
gether  all  these  animals  as  ruminating  animals.  But  the 
general  fact  is  the  affirmation  that  all  sheep,  oxen,  deer, 
and  so  on — that  is,  all  animals  already  classed  by  certain 
identities  and  differences — have  this  additional  identity, 
of  being  deficient  in  the  upper  cutting  teeth  ;  and  again, 
that  all  animals  thus  deficient,  ruminate.  So,  also,  in 
chemistry,  we  call  all  substances  which  change  vegetable 
blues  into  red,  acids  ;  and  those  which  change  them  into 
green,  alkalies  ;  but  the  general  fact  is  the  affirmation 
that  all  acids,  and  all  alkalies,  possess  these  respective 
properties ;  and  again,  that  acids  and  alkalies  neutralise 


278  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

each  other.  In  the  general  fact  is  contained  the  affirma 
tion  of  a  uniform  order  of  sequence,  upon  which  we  may 
base  a  classification  or  not,  as  we  please,  e.  g.  when  we  ob 
serve  that  the  animals  above  described  ruminate,  we 
are  under  no  necessity  of  classing  them  as  ruminants  :  but 
whether  we  do  so  or  not,  the  general  fact  remains.  In 
fine,  in  the  one  case  we  are  aiming  simply  to  arrange  and 
name  :  in  the  other,  we  are  affirming  a  truth  and  the 
semblance  of  a  law.  To  name  all  animals  which  have  the 
above-mentioned  characteristics,  ruminating  animals,  is 
plainly  different  from  affirming,  generally,  all  animals 
which  want  the  upper  cutting  teeth  ruminate. 

I  call  the  general  fact  the  semblance  of  a  law,  for  the 
general  fact,  as  such,  is  not  a  law.  But,  nevertheless,  it 
answers  the  most  important  ends  in  calling  before  the 
mind  the  stated  connections  existing  between  phenomena. 
"  Bakewell,  the  celebrated  cattle-breeder,  observed,  in  a 
great  number  of  individual  beasts,  a  tendency  to  fatten 
readily  ;  and  in  a  great  number  of  others,  the  absence  of 
this  constitution :  in  every  individual  of  the  former  de 
scription,  he  observed  a  certain  peculiar  make,  though 
they  differed  widely  in  colour,  &c.  Those  of  the  latter 
description  differed  no  less  in  various  points,  but  agreed 
in  being  of  a  different  make  from  the  others.  These  facts 
were  his  data  :  from  which,  combining  them  with  the 
general  principle  that  Nature  is  steady  and  uniform  in  her 
proceedings,  he  logically  drew  the  conclusion,  that  beasts 
of  that  specified  make  have  universally  a  peculiar  tendency 
to  fattening."  *  This  was  the  general  fact  at  which 
Bakewell  arrived,  a  fact  of  great  practical  moment  to  all 
cattle-breeders.  But  as  announced  by  him,  it  was  no  law, 

*  Whateley's  Logic,  Book  IV.,  ch.  ii.,  §  2. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  279 

because  connected  with  no  Idea.  Now  let  us  suppose  that 
the  peculiar  make  was  one  connected  in  respect  to  climate, 
food,  &c.,  with  the  freest  and  most  genial  development  of 
the  organific  power  of  life  ;  and  also,  that  it  combined  the 
finest  esthetical  proportions,  so  that  the  conclusion  might 
have  been  announced  as  follows  : — The  most  genial  culture 
gives  the  highest  animal  beauty,  and  the  highest  animal 
beauty  is  connected  with  the  highest  animal  utility,  ex 
hibited  in  strength,  activity,  and  a  tendency  to  fattening. 
Should  we  not  here  be  advanced  beyond  a  general  fact  to 
the  conception  of  a  universal  law,  and  that  because  we 
have  brought  in  points  of  consideration  connected  immedi 
ately  with  Ideas? 

That  bodies  fall  to  the  earth,  was  a  fact  of  general  ob 
servation  before  Newton  saw  the  apple  fall ;  and  as  a  gen 
eral  fact,  it  was  of  eminent  and  daily  use  among  men  ;  but 
it  was  not  until  this  general  fact  had  been  elaborated  in 
the  mind  of  Newton  that  it  became  the  exponent  of  a  law. 
But  what  gave  to  gravitation  now  the  characteristics  of  a 
law?  Was  it  not  the  Idea  of  centralization — the  Idea  of 
the  universal  and  necessary  arrangement  of  matter  in  or 
der  to  form  a  system?  The  centrifugal  law  is  no  less 
based  upon  an  Idea  ;  for  the  Reason  sees  with  intuitive 
certainty  that  without  a  diffusive  movement  harmoniously 
united  with  the  central  movement,  matter  could  not  exist 
in  space  in  separate  masses.  * 

Chemistry  has,  until  very  recently,  been  a  science  of 
general  facts,  and,  therefore,  an  imperfect  science.  Now, 
the  great  advance  made  by  the  combined  labors  of  Dalton, 
Davy,  and  Faraday,  and  especially  by  the  investigations 
and  acute  reasonings  of  the  last,  are  just  an  advance  from 

*  Supra,  p.  198. 


280  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

a  mass  of  general  facts  to  a  comprehensive  law,  developed 
under  the  force  of  an  Idea  :  at  least,  it  is  a  near  approxi 
mation  to  such  a  result.  The  identification  of  chemical 
and  electrical  attractions  is  a  lofty  generalization.  But 
the  Idea  and  the  law  are  indicated,  if  not  fully  expressed, 
in  the  conception  of  Polarity,  *  or,  to  use  Faraday's  lan 
guage,  in  the  conception  of  "  an  axis  of  power  having 
equal  and  opposite  forces/'  In  the  law  of  gravity  and  of 
the  centrifugal  force,  we  have  the  law  of  the  cosmical 
masses  :  in  Polarity,  or  the  ec  axis  of  power,"  we  have  the 
dawn  at  least  of  the  law  which  governs  the  interior  con 
stitution  of  bodies.  These  are  the  great  laws  of  the  uni 
verse. 

The  method  of  arriving  at  general  facts  is  the  empiri 
cal  method.  It  is  the  method  of  the  earlier  processes  of 
science,  and  preparatory  to  the  determination  of  laws. 
On  many  subjects  the  human  mind  has  not  advanced  be 
yond  these  general  facts.  This  is  true  of  medicine,  for  ex 
ample.  From  accident  and  investigation,  certain  substances 
have  been  found  to  possess  a  remedial  effect ;  until  at 
length  something  like  general  rules  have  been  instituted 
for  the  treatment  of  various  diseases.  The  whole  history 
of  Therapeutics  exhibits  a  conflict  of  theories,  and  a  mass 
of  conjectures  often  sagacious,  but  more  frequently  wild 
and  loose.  The  subject  is  one  of  extreme  difficulty,  on 
account  of  the  multitudinous  influences  which  have  to  be 
taken  into  the  account.  Even  at  the  present  day,  more 
reliance,  perhaps,  is  to  be  placed  upon  individual  expe 
rience,  judgment,  and  tact,  than  upon  any  established 
general  principles.  Curious  and  hopeful  generalization 
may  have  been  made,  but  no  law  has  as  yet  appeared. 

*  Supra,  p.  200. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  281 

But  the  defect  in  Therapeutics  is  not  merely  the  want 
of  laws,  but  the  want  of  clearly  ascertained  general  facts ; 
for  were  it  certainly  known  that  certain  substances  could 
expel  disease,  for  instance,  as  certainly  as  that  a  particular 
breed  of  cattle  fatten  easily,  we  should  obtain  practical 
rules  of  the  highest  value. 

General  facts,  when  once  established  by  a  sufficient 
number  of  experiments,  show  the  presence  of  law,  although 
the  law  has  not  yet  attained  to  an  expression,  and  they 
may,  therefore,  be  applied  as  authoritative.  Numerous 
chemical  compositions  and  decompositions  were  settled  as 
unquestionable  facts,  before  the  later  great  chemists  ap 
peared.  Hules  of  practical  mechanics  obtained  before  the 
laws  of  the  science  were  discovered.  On  all  subjects  open 
to  common  observation,  the  uniform  order  of  sequences  has 
been  noted  among  the  multitude,  and  general  facts  have 
been  attained  with  more  or  less  accuracy. 

But  notwithstanding  the  many  beneficial  results  arising 
from  spontaneous  observations  of  the  uniformities  of  Na 
ture,  it  must  be  confessed  that  errors  have  likewise  arisen 
in  this  way.  Observations  may  be  defective  in  many 
ways  :  They  may  be  made  hastily  and  inaccurately ;  they 
may  not  be  sufficiently  varied,  nor  often  enough  repeated ; 
and  they  may  be  'made  under  prejudice,  with  an  excited 
imagination,  or  with  a  concealed,  obstinate  determination 
to  arrive,  at  all  events,  at  a  particular  conclusion.  These 
defective  observations  have  been  so  rife  in  Therapeutics, 
that  the  word  empiricism  has  in  common  usage  become  di 
verted  from  its  original  and  just  meaning,  and  is  applied 
to  express  those  loose  and  baseless  methods  of  treating  dis 
ease  which  are  enveloped  in  mystery,  at  once  to  excite  the 
imagination  of  the  multitude,  and  to  conceal  their  own  ab 
surdity.  Popular  beliefs,  also,  in  dreams  and  omens,  are 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

only  another  form  of  empiricism,  or  loose  and  insufficient 
observation.  And  yet,  even  these  errors  show  the  noble 
constitution  of  the  human  mind ;  for  it  is  the  strong  sense 
of  law  which  creates  the  tendency  to  draw  general  conclu 
sions,  wherever  uniform  sequences  appear. 

The  importance  of  establishing  principles  and  rules  of 
observation  in  view  of  arriving  at  general  facts  and  laws, 
is  apparent  to  every  one.  This,  indeed,  comprises,  in  the 
main,  the  Logic  of  Induction.  To  this  we  shall  now  pro 
ceed.  In  the  first  place,  we  shall  speak  of  observation  in 
respect  to  general  facts ;  and  in  the  next  place,  in  respect 
to  laws.  The  distinction  between  the  two  which  I  have 
attempted  to  draw,  I  think,  will  not  be  misconceived.  It 
may,  indeed,  be  summed  up  as  follows  :  General  facts  are 
the  uniform  sequences  of  phenomena — or  the  uniform  de 
pendence  and  involution  of  phenomena,  so  that  a  given 
consequent  cannot  exist  without  a  certain  antecedent,  nor 
a  given  antecedent  without  involving  a  certain  consequent : 
Law,  in  distinction  from  the  orderly  sequence  itself,  is  that 
which  governs  it  and  accounts  for  it,  and  without  which 
the  sequence  would  not  have  been  possible. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  283 


SECTION  VII. 

THE  LOGIC  OF  GENERAL  FACTS. 

THE  great  Francis  Bacon,  the  first  who  labored  at  a  full 
exposition  of  the  Inductive  Philosophy,  himself  signally 
failed  in  all  his  attempts  to  give  an  exemplification  of  its 
principles.  The  catalogues  of  facts  which  he  has  left  are 
of  little  or  no  value.  The  reason  is  obvious  : — The  facts 
are  heterogeneous,  mixed,  scattered,  casual,  and  often 
trivial.  The  observations  appear  to  have  been  governed 
by  no  principle,  no  definite  aim,  no  prophetic  thought,  in 
fine,  by  no  Idea.  As  the  observation  of  facts  and  ideas 
are  both  demanded  in  a  philosophy  of  Nature,  so  the 
omission  of  one  or  the  other  must  be  fatal  to  any  attempt 
to  arrive  at  such  a  philosophy.  Bacon  exposed  the  errors 
of  those  who  had  attempted  this  work  by  Ideas  alone. 
He  himself  failed,  because  he  attempted  it  by  observation 
alone. 

The  point  now  distinctly  before  us  is  to  ascertain  the 
true  logical  grounds  of  deciding  when  phenomena  have  a 
real  and  fixed  connection,  as  antecedent  and  consequent, 
so  that  we  may  affirm,  as  a  general  fact,  that  they  are  thus 
connected. 

The  connection  of  phenomena,  as  stated  antecedent 
and  consequent,  is  the  exponent  of  law.  Hence,  we  are 
determined  to  the  observation  of  orderly  sequences  as 
naturally  presented,  and  to  make  experiments  in  order  to 


284  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

enlarge  the  field  of  observation  by  the  Idea  of  law.  If  we 
do  not  find  the  law  itself,  we  shall  find  its  beautiful  mani 
festations — we  shall  know  at  least  that  we  are  dwelling  in 
the  light  of  its  countenance. 

The  Idea  of  law  gives  rise  to  the  axioms  of  universal 
law  and  of  the  uniformity  of  Nature.*  These  axioms  are 
like  the  voices  of  the  Idea,  ever  speaking  to  our  thoughts 
as  we  search  about  and  pry  into  the  phenomena  of  Nature. 

Thus,  then,  in  seeking  to  establish  general  facts,  we 
are  looking  out  for  the  uniformities  of  Nature. 

The  phenomena  which  we  examine  and  compare,  must 
stand  in  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  relations  of  ante 
cedent  or  consequent,  for  phenomena  are  in  a  continual 
flux,  and  conditionate  one  another  in  this  way,  the  same 
phenomena  being  consequents  of  antecedents,  and  antece 
dents  to  consequents.  The  flux  of  phenomena,  however, 
is  not  a  lengthening  chain  of  succession,  ever  presenting 
new  particulars,  but  is  composed  of  cycles,  where  the  end 
returns  into  the  beginning :  and  the  complexity  of  Nature 
presents  us  cycle  winding  within  cycle,  cycle  crossing 
cycle,  and  all  in  perfect  harmony  •  for  not  only  are  the 
particulars  of  each  cycle  related,  but  cycle  also  is  related 
to  cycle  in  the  unity  of  one  vast  system.  The  acid  which 
is  itself  a  consequent  of  the  union  of  two  simples,  returns 
by  one  cycle  into  these  simples  again  ;  and  by  another  re 
lation,  becomes  an  antecedent  in  another  cycle,  and  aids 
its  movements,  as  in  double  elective  affinity.  General 
facts,  therefore,  may  be  more  or  less  extensive.  The 
perpetual  relation  of  a  particular  antecedent  and  con 
sequent  is  in  itself  a  general  fact ;  an  established  cycle 
of  antecedents  and  consequents  is  a  general  fact ;  and 

*  Supra,  p.  228. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  285 

the  established  connexion  between  different  cycles  is 
another  form  of  general  fact.  But  the  principles  are  the 
same  which  govern  the  whole ;  for  the  observation  in  all 
is  the  observation  of  recurring  antecedents  and  conse 
quents. 

There  is  one  thing  here  worthy  of  being  remarked, 
namely,  that  when  we  are  seeking  for  the  stated  conse 
quent  of  an  antecedent,  we  may  employ  experiment  as 
well  as  observation,  since  being  already  in  possession  of  the 
antecedent,  we  can  place  it  in  different  relations  in  order 
to  see  what  consequents  are  connected  with  it ;  but  that, 
on  the  contrary,  when  we  are  seeking  for  the  stated  ante 
cedent  of  a  consequent,  we  can  employ  observation  only, 
for  the  consequent  being  subsequent  to  the  antecedent, 
we  cannot  place  it  in  different  relations  in  order  to  see 
how  it  arises,  since  it  already  is ;  and,  therefore,  we  have 
to  watch  for  new  instances  where  the  consequent  in  ques 
tion  is  presented  together  with  its  proper  antecedent. 

Our  object  being  to  establish  the  fact  of  uniformity,  it 
is  necessary  to  settle,  as  a  preliminary  question,  how  many 
instances  are  demanded  to  this  end.  As  Nature  is  gov 
erned  throughout  by  exact  law,  if  it  can  be  shown,  in  re 
spect  to  any  succession,  that  a  given  consequent  does  take 
place  when  a  certain  antecedent  is  present,  all  other  ante 
cedents  being  excluded,  then  if  there  be  only  one  instance, 
this  one  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  fact  of  the  sequence. 
Suppose,  for  example,  that  we  exclude,  in  the  combustion 
of  a  metal,  all  antecedents  but  oxygen  gas,  then  it  becomes 
certain,  upon  the  axiom  of  the  uniformity  of  Nature,  that 
the  presence  of  oxygen  is  a  condition  of  this  phenomenon. 
But  it  does  not  appear  from  this  that  oxygen  is  a  general 
condition  of  combustion.  We  may,  therefore,  proceed  to 
observe  and  experiment  other  combinations,  excluding 


286  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

oxygen — and  if  we  find  that  in  all  such  instances  no  com 
bustion  takes  place,  then,  and  not  until  then,  we  infer  that 
oxygen  is  a  general  and  indispensable  condition  of  this 
phenomenon.  Here  one  instance  is  not  sufficient,  since, 
although  oxygen  is  a  supporter,  there  may  be  other  sub 
stances  which  act  in  the  same  way.  When  several  instances 
concur,  the  conclusion  becomes  strong ;  and  when  all 
known  observation  and  experiment  give  the  same  result, 
no  doubt  is  any  longer  entertained,  for  the  uniformity 
seems  now  fully  developed.  The  case  in  which  we  deter 
mine  that  oxygen  is  a  condition  of  combustion,  and  the 
case  in  which  we  determine  that  it  is  a  general  condition, 
are  widely  different,  since  one  instance  is  sufficient  for  the 
first,  whereas  the  induction  must  be  extended  in  the 
second.*  Wherein  lies  the  distinction  between  the  two 
cases  ?  Is  it  not  that  in  the  first  case  we  take  a  given 
antecedent,  and  excluding  from  it  all  other  antecedents, 
we  observe  it  in  circumstances  where,  if  any  consequent 
ensue,  it  alone  can  be  the  condition  and  antecedent  of 
that  consequent ;  while,  in  the  second  case,  we  take  a 
given  consequent,  and  observe  it  as  it  occurs  in  a  variety 
of  circumstances,  in  order  to  see  whether  in  all  these  cir 
cumstances  there  is  a  general  difference,  and  but  one  uni 
form  point  of  agreement,  and  that  point  the  presence  of 
the  oxygen  ? 

Here,  then,  we  see  the  greater  advantage  we  possess  in 
following  the  sequence  from  the  antecedent  to  the  conse 
quent,  than  in  the  reverse  order.  In  the  first,  having  the 
antecedent,  we  can,  as  before  remarked,  by  experiment 

*  Oxygen,  for  some  time,  was  considered  the  only  supporter  of  combustion. 
This  was  the  general  fact  until  subsequent  discoveries  brought  to  light  other 
supporters  of  combustion.  In  no  general  fact,  therefore,  do  we  attain  the  neces 
sary — this  belongs  only  to  law. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  287 

place  it  in  different  circumstances  and  isolate  it ;  but  in 
the  second,  we  cannot  experiment,  but  must  merely  ob 
serve  the  instances  in  which  the  consequent  appears  in 
connection  with  an  antecedent :  and  here  the  circumstances 
may  be  so  numerous  as  to  require  many  comparisons  in 
order  to  detect  the  particular  antecedent  required.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  antecedent  itself  may  be  complex, 
and  require  analysis  in  order  to  determine  the  force  of  the 
different  elements.  Where  this  analysis  is  possible,  so 
that  we  may  separate  the  elements,  we  can  reduce  the 
experiment  again  to  the  utmost  simplicity.  If  we  have 
established  that  common  air  is  necessary  to  combustion, 
and  afterwards  find  that  combustion  takes  place  in  another 
gas  different  from  common  air,  we  may  be  led  to  en 
quire  whether  this  gas  is  present  in  common  air;  and 
when  by  analysis  we  have  arrived  at  the  composition  of 
the  atmosphere,  we  may  test  the  elements  in  order  to 
determine  whether  one  element  alone  is  the  condition  of 
combustion. 

But  it  often  happens  that  we  cannot  analyse  the  com 
plex  antecedent.  For  example,  a  certain  remedy  appears 
to  be  efficacious  in  a  particular  disease ;  now,  if  all  the 
circumstances  are  precisely  the  same  in  any  other  case  of 
the  disease,  the  remedy  may  here  be  expected  on  the  gen 
eral  uniformity  of  Nature  to  be  equally  efficacious.  But 
the  complexity  of  the  antecedents  creates  a  two-fold  diffi 
culty.  Do  we  have  such  a  perfect  knowledge  of  all  the 
circumstances  in  the  first  case — the  constitution  of  the  in 
dividual,  the  influences  of  regimen,  &c.,  the  nature  of  the 
disease  itself,  and  the  force  of  the  recuperative  power  of 
nature,  as  to  be  confident  to  what  extent,  or  even  if  at  all, 
the  remedy  is  to  be  taken  as  an  antecedent  to  the 
recovery  ?  And  if  all  this  were  granted,  is  our  knowledge 


288  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

of  all  the  circumstances  in  the  second  case  sufficiently 
minute  and  accurate  to  enable  us  to  decide  upon  the 
identity  of  the  two  cases  ?  Now,  it  is  evident  that  where 
antecedents  are  thus  complicated,  observations  and  experi 
ments  need  to  be  multiplied  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  general 
expression  in  any  degree  satisfactory. 

It  appears  from  the  preceding  remarks,  that  the  num 
ber  of  instances  necessary  to  enable  us  to  decide  upon  a 
prevailing  uniformity,  depends  upon  our  success  in  elimi 
nating  all  the  antecedents  and  consequents  foreign  to  the 
particular  sequence  we  are  contemplating.  If,  in  the  case 
of  the  treatment  of  disease,  we  can  eliminate  every  thing 
but  the  disease  and  the  remedy,  then  we  shall  at  once  be 
in  a  condition  to  decide  upon  the  sequence.  We  shall 
proceed,  therefore,  to  consider  the 

PRINCIPLES    OF    ELIMINATION. 

I.  GENERAL  DIFFERENCE  WITH  UNIFORM  AGREEMENT 
IN  ONE  POINT. — Here  we  suppose  several  instances  of  con 
joined  antecedents  to  be  brought  under  observation,  in 
each  instance,  all  the  antecedents  being  different  but  one. 
Now,  if  in  all  these  instances  a  particular  consequent  uni 
formly  appears,  then  we  infer  the  general  fact  that  the  un 
varying  antecedent  is  connected  with  the  unvarying  con 
sequent.  Two  instances  thus  agreeing  would,  on  the 
axiom  of  uniformity,  lead  us  to  a  conclusion.  This  con 
clusion,  however,  attains  its  greatest  force  only  where  the 
agreement  is  verified  by  general  observation  and  experi 
ment,  that  is,  by  all  the  observation  and  experiment,  not 
only  of  the  individual  philosopher,  but  also  of  the  whole 
fraternity  engaged  in  the  same  course  of  investigation. 
Thus,  if  in  several  combinations  of  elements,  all  differing 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  289 

except  in  the  single  circumstance  of  the  presence  of  oxy 
gen,  and  if  in  all  these  an  acid  is  uniformly  produced, 
then  we  would  conclude,  under  the  conditions  above  laid 
down,  that  oxygen  is  the  acidifying  element. 

The  same  principle  applies  to  the  observation  of  an 
unvarying  sequent  appearing  amid  varying  sequents : 
here,  if  the  antecedents  generally  appear  irregular  and 
indeterminate,  but  among  these  there  is  one  antecedent, 
which,  in  all  the  observed  instances,  is  uniformly  present, 
then  we  infer  that  it  is  connected  with  the  unvarying  se 
quent. 

There  is  another  mode  of  applying  this  principle, 
which,  wherever  it  is  possible  to  combine  it  with  the  pre 
ceding,  makes  the  elimination  far  more  perfect.  Suppose 
that,  after  having  determined,  in  several  instances  gene 
rally  unlike,  the  connexion  of  an  unvarying  antecedent 
with  an  unvarying  consequent,  we  are  able  next  to  com 
pare  instances  which  are  also  generally  unlike,  and  agree 
only  in  the  uniform  absence  of  the  particular  antecedent 
noted  before,  and  in  the  absence  of  the  corresponding 
consequent,  or  in  the  absence  of  the  consequent  and  the 
absence  of  the  corresponding  antecedent, — then  we  have 
here  an  indication  of  uniformity  tending  to  the  same 
general  result.  By  the  first  mode  of  applying  the  princi 
ple,  we  eliminate  all  the  unlike  and  varying  antecedents 
and  consequents  from  the  particular  antecedent,  and  con 
sequent  on  the  ground  of  their  unvarying  co-presence  : 
by  the  second,  on  the  ground  of  their  unvarying  joint  ab 
sence. 

II.  GENERAL  AGREEMENT  WITH  UNIFORM  DIFFERENCE 
IN  ONE  POINT. — By  this  principle,  we  effect  a  complete 
elimination.  There  are  three  modes  of  applying  it. 

First :  Let  there  be  a  number  of  antecedents  and  con- 


290  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

sequents  conjoined  :  remove  one  of  the  antecedents,  the 
consequent  which  disappears  with  it  is  its  particular  con 
sequent.  Or  if  we  observe  the  disappearance  in  some  in 
stance  of  one  of  the  consequents,  and  find  that  a  certain 
antecedent  has  also  disappeared,  then  we  infer  again  the 
sequence  of  the  two.  In  the  first  case,,  we  may  experi 
ment  as  well  as  observe  ;  in  the  second,  we  can  only  ob 
serve  ;  since  we  can  compel  the  disappearance  of  a  conse 
quent  by  the  removal  of  its  antecedent,  but  we  cannot 
act  upon  the  antecedent  through  its  consequent.  Where 
we  repeat  the  experiment  or  the  observation,  and  in  every 
instance  remove,  or  note  the  disappearance  of,  the  same 
element,  and  in  every  instance  find  that  the  same  corre 
sponding  antecedent  or  consequent  is  likewise  wanting, 
we  of  course  confirm  the  general  fact  by  a  wider  induc^ 
tion. 

Second  :  Let  there  be  several  antecedents  attended 
with  certain  consequents  ;  and  among  these  let  there  be 
introduced  a  new  antecedent,  the  new  consequent  which 
now  appears  we  infer  to  be  in  sequence  with  the  new  an 
tecedent.  Let  this  be  repeated  in  other  instances,  and  if, 
wherever  we  introduce  the  particular  antecedent  the  same 
consequent  uniformly  appears,  and  there  only,  then  the 
elimination  of  all  foreign  influences  is  complete,  and  the 
sequence  under  investigation  firmly  established. 

On  the  other  hand,  if,  among  several  phenomena,  a 
new  phenomenon  should  make  its  appearance,  and  if,  upon 
examination,  a  new  antecedent  should  be  found  to  be  also 
present,  then  a  connexion  between  the  two  would  be  in 
ferred.  If,  in  repeated  instances,  the  same  concurrence 
takes  place,  nothing  seems  wanting  to  the  elimination. 

Third  ;  Let  there  be  a  number  of  antecedents,  pre 
senting  complicated  effects,  concurrent,  opposing,  or  inde-» 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  291 

pendent  of  each  other.  If,  upon  examination,  we  can 
trace  certain  of  the  consequents  to  particular  antecedents, 
then  we  may  at  once  subduct  these  consequents  with  their 
antecedents  from  the  sum  total.  What  remains  now,  be 
comes  the  subject  of  new  investigations  ;  and  thus  we  may 
successively  eliminate  antecedents  and  consequents,  until, 
we  will  suppose,  only  one  consequent  remains.  Now,  if 
there  be  only  one  antecedent  also  remaining,  then  we  in 
fer  its  connexion  with  the  consequent.  This  remaining 
consequent  is  what  Sir  John  Herschel  calls  the  residual 
phenomenon.  I  borrow  from  him  the  following  illustra 
tion  :  "  The  return  of  the  comet  predicted  by  Professor 
Encke,  a  great  many  times  in  succession,  and  the  general 
good  agreement  of  its  calculated  with  its  observed  place 
during  any  one  of  its  periods  of  visibility,  would  lead  us  to 
say  that  its  gravitation  towards  the  sun  and  planets  is  the 
sole  and  sufficient  cause  of  all  the  phenomena  of  its  orbit- 
ual  motion  ;  but  when  the  effect  of  this  cause  is  strictly 
calculated  and  subducted  from  the  observed  motion,  there 
is  found  to  remain  behind  a  residual  phenomenon,  which 
would  never  have  been  otherwise  ascertained  to  exist, 
which  is  a  small  anticipation  of  the  time  of  its  re-appear- 
ances,  or  a  diminution  of  its  periodic  time,  which  cannot 
be  accounted  for  by  gravity,  and  whose  cause  is  therefore 
to  be  inquired  into.  Such  an  anticipation  would  be  caused 
by  the  resistance  of  a  medium  disseminated  through  the 
celestial  regions  ;  and  as  there  are  other  good  reasons  for 
believing  this  to  be  a  vera  causa,  it  has  therefore  been  as-* 
cribed  to  such  a  resistance/'  * 

III.  ELIMINATION  BY  CORRESPONDING  QUANTITIES  AND 
INTENSITIES. — Antecedents  and  sequents  may  be  brought 

*  Discourse  on  the  Study  of  Natural  Philosophy,  p.  156, 


292  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

under  the  conception  of  Quantity  ;  and  as  Quantity  has 
its  exact  science,  antecedents  and  sequents  are  reducible 
to  precise  expressions.  Now,  there  are  certain  antecedents 
which  never  entirely  disappear,  and  therefore  we  cannot 
effect  an  elimination  on  the  preceding  principles.  For  in 
stance  :  heat  is  always  present,  so  that  we  can  never  de 
termine  by  actual  experiment  what  consequent  would  dis 
appear  if  heat  were  entirely  withdrawn.  But  if,  by  chang 
ing  the  quantity  of  heat,  we  find  corresponding  changes  in 
the  consequents,  then  we  know,  as  before,  that  a  sequence 
exists.  We  do  not  remove  the  antecedent,  nor  change  the 
essential  order  of  the  sequence, — we  only  modify  the  ante 
cedent,  and  uniformly  a  like  modification  takes  place  in  a 
stated  consequent.  Thus,  we  notice,  in  the  first  place, 
certain  changes  in  our  sensations  with  respect  to  heat  and 
cold  ;  then,  observing  quicksilver,  we  see  that  as  our  sen 
sations  of  heat  increase  in  intensity,  a  corresponding  ex 
pansion  of  its  bulk  takes  place,  and  that,  as  our  sensations 
moderate,  its  bulk  contracts,  and  that  this  contraction  re 
gularly  goes  on  as  the  cold  becomes  more  and  more  severe, 
until  at  length  we  make  out  an  exact  scale  of  temperature. 
Now,  having  determined  that  quicksilver  regularly  ex 
pands  and  contracts,  as  the  temperature  increases  or  de 
creases,  we  apply  the  scale  to  the  observations  we  make 
upon  other  metals,  and  then  upon  bodies  indiscriminately ; 
and  thus  the  general  fact  appears,  that  all  bodies  are  ex 
panded  by  heat,  and  contracted  by  a  loss  of  heat.  In  the 
same  manner,  we  may  determine  that  all  bodies,  when  put 
in  motion,  will  continue  to  move  until  brought  to  a  state 
of  rest  by  an  opposing  force,  taking  this  in  the  light  of  a 
general  fact :  We  continue  to  remove  obstacles,  and  as 
the  obstacles  are  removed,  the  time  of  the  continuation 
of  motion  is  increased,  and  thus,  although  we  can  never 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  293 

remove  all  obstacles,  we  may  infer  that  if  all  obstacles 
were  removed,  the  body  would  continue  to  move  on  for 
ever.  * 

"  Sound  consists  in  impulses  communicated  to  our  ears 
by  the  air.  If  a  series  of  impulses  of  equal  force  be  com 
municated  to  it  at  equal  intervals  of  time,  at  first  in  slow 
succession,  and  by  degrees  more  and  more  rapidly,  we 
hear  at  first  a  rattling  noise,  and  then  a  hum,  which  by 
degrees  acquires  the  character  of  a  musical  note  rising 
higher  and  higher  in  acuteness,  till  its  pitch  becomes  too 
high  for  the  ear  to  follow.  And  from  this  correspondence 
between  the  pitch  of  the  note  and  the  rapidity  of  succes 
sion  of  the  impulse,  we  conclude  that  our  sensation  of  the 
different  pitches  of  musical  notes  originates  in  different 
rapidities  with  which  their  impulses  are  communicated  to 
our  ears."f 

There  is  another  form  of  the  method  to  be  noticed. 
We  may  succeed  in  removing  entirely  the  antecedent,  but 
the  consequent,  instead  of  disappearing  with  it,  may  only 
undergo  some  modification, — perhaps  a  mere  change  in 
the  degree  of  its  intensity.  If  this  modification  of  the 
consequent  be  uniform,  then  we  cannot  but  infer  a  real 
sequence  ;  but  inasmuch  as  the  consequent  is  modified 
only,  and  does  not  disappear  with  the  removal  of  the  an 
tecedent  in  question,  it  must  be  consequent  to  some  other 
antecedent  or  antecedents  also.  This,  then,  becomes  a 
case  of  compound  sequence  ;  and  the  only  way  to  arrive 
at  the  several  antecedents  is  by  tentative  experiments,  in 

*  I  introduce  this  merely  as  an  illustration  of  the  process  of  elimination 
under  the  principle  laid  down.  The  proposition  is  really  an  axiom — a  univer 
sal  and  necessary  affirmation,  determined  by  the  idea  of  matter  itself. —  Vide 
supra,  pp.  158  and  219. 

t  Herschel's  Discourse,  p.  153. 


294  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

which  we  eliminate  successively  various  circumstances  of 
the  phenomena,  or  introduce  new  circumstances.  In  this 
Way  we  enlarge  our  knowledge  of  the  antecedents,  or  at 
length,  by  making  the  phenomenon  disappear  in  conjunc 
tion  with  the  eliminations,  ascertain  the  entire  compound 
antecedent. 

IV.  ELIMINATION  OF  THE  TERMS  OF  A  SEQUENCE,  IN 

ORDER    TO    DETERMINE    WHICH    IS    THE   ANTECEDENT,    AND 

WHICH  THE  CONSEQUENT. — Phenomena  may  be  invariably 
concomitant,  and  therefore  be  known  to  have  a  fixed  con 
nexion,  as  antecedent  and  consequent,  but  the  order  of  the 
sequence  may  not  at  once  appear.  Now,  inasmuch  as  the 
causal  influence  acts  through  the  antecedent  to  the  pro 
duction  of  the  consequent,  it  follows  that  a  consequent  can 
be  made  to  disappear,  or  be  modified  only  by  the  elimina 
tion  or  modification  of  the  antecedent.  Hence,  if  in  at 
tempting  to  eliminate  or  modify  one  of  the  terms  of  a  se 
quence,  we  hit  upon  the  consequent,  we  shall  soon  find 
that  it  is  the  consequent,  by  being  compelled  to  introduce 
an  antecedent  in  order  to  accomplish  our  purpose : 
whereas,  if  we  hit  upon  the  antecedent,  we  shall  remove 
or  modify  it  without  introducing  the  other  term,  and  its 
removal  or  modification,  immediately  acting  upon  the 
other  term,  will  show  the  order  of  sequence. 

We  have  an  illustration  of  this  in  the  Theory  of  Dew, 
by  the  late  Dr.  Wells,  and  which  Sir  John  Herschel,  in 
his  Discourse  already  referred  to,  introduces  as  throughout 
"  one  of  the  most  beautiful  specimens  of  inductive  experi 
mental  enquiry  lying  within  a  moderate  compass/'  * 

We  propose  dew  as  a  phenomenon  whose  invariable 
antecedent  we  would  ascertain.  "  In  the  first  place,  we 

*  Ibid,  &c.,  pp.  159-163. 


INDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  295 

must  separate  dew  from  rain  and  the  moisture  of  fogs,  and 
limit  the  application  of  the  term  to  what  is  really  meant; 
which  is,  the  spontaneous  appearance  of  moisture  on  sub 
stances  exposed  in  the  open  air  when  no  rain  or  visible 
wet  is  falling.  Now,  here  we  have  analogous  phenomena 
in  the  moisture  which  bedews  a  cold  metal  or  stone  when 
we  breathe  upon  it ;  that  which  appears  on  a  glass  of 
water  fresh  from  the  well  in  hot  weather  ;  that  which  ap 
pears  on  the  inside  of  windows  when  sudden  rain  or  hail 
chills  the  external  air ;  that  which  runs  down  our  walls, 
when,  after  a  long  frost,  a  warm,  moist  thaw  comes  on  : 
all  these  instances  agree  in  one  point,  the  coldness  of  the 
object  dewed,  in  comparison  with  the  air  in  contact  with 
it."  In  the  above  we  have  an  illustration  of  our  first 
principle,  there  is  here  a  general  difference  with  uniform 
agreement  in  one  point. 

But  with  respect  to  night  dew,  is  this  the  real  antece 
dent  ?  "  Is  it  a  fact  that  the  object  dewed  is  colder  than 
the  air?  Certainly  not,  one  would  be  at  first  inclined  to 
say ;  for  what  is  to  make  it  so  ?  But  the  analogies  are 
cogent  and  unanimous  ;  and,  therefore,  we  are  not  to  dis 
card  their  indications/'  The  similarity  of  the  consequents 
argue  a  similarity  of  the  antecedents.  In  this  case,  to 
settle  the  question,  we  have  only  "  to  lay  a  thermometer 
in  contact  with  the  dewed  substance,  and  hang  one  at  a 
little  distance  above  it,  out  of  reach  of  its  influence.  The 
experiment  has  been  therefore  made  ;  the  question  has 
been  asked,  and  the  answer  has  been  invariably  in  the 
affirmative.  Whenever  an  object  contracts  dew,  it  is 
colder  than  the  air.  Here,  then,  we  have  an  invariable 
concomitant  circumstance."  But  is  cold  the  antecedent 
or  the  consequent  of  dew?  The  vulgar  prejudice  would 
make  it  the  consequent.  "We  must,  therefore,  collect 


296  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

more  facts,  or?  which  comes  to  the  same  thing,  vary  the 
circumstances  ;  since  every  instance  in  which  the  circum 
stances  differ  is  a  fresh  fact ;  and,  especially,  we  must 
note  the  contrary  or  negative  cases,  i.  e.  where  no  dew  is 
produced." 

"  Now,  1st,  no  dew  is  produced  on  the  surface  of 
polished  metals,  but  it  is  very  copiously  on  glass,  both  ex 
posed  with  their  faces  upwards,  and  in  some  cases  the 
under  side  of  a  plate  of  glass  is  also  dewed  ;  which  last 
circumstance  excludes  the  fall  of  moisture  from  the  sky 
in  an  invisible  form."  Here,  then,  according  to  our  second 
principle  of  elimination,  is  a  general  agreement  with  a 
difference  in  one  point,  namely,  the  substance  of  the 
material.  But  what  relation  have  the  metal  and  glass  to 
the  invariable  concomitant  circumstance  of  cold  in  the 
production  of  dew  ?  Have  we  removed  the  dew,  and 
thus  prevented  the  cold  in  the  case  of  the  metal,  or  have 
we  removed  the  cold  and  prevented  the  dew  ?  Unques 
tionably  the  latter  ;  for  the  metal  being  a  good  conductor 
of  heat,  has  continually  brought  the  heat  from  within 
itself,  or  from  the  earth  beneath,  upon  its  surface,  while 
the  glass,  being  a  poor  conductor,  has  suffered  its  surface 
to  become  cooled. '  "  This  done,  a  scale  of  intensity 
becomes  obvious.  Those  polished  substances  are  found 
to  be  most  strongly  dewed  which  conduct  heat  worst  ; 
while  those  which  conduct  well  resist  dew  most  effectually." 
We  have  thus  determined  that  cold  is  the  antecedent  of 
dew,  and  not  dew  the  antecedent  of  cold. 

The  same  fact  is  confirmed  by  other  striking  experi 
ments.  Thus,  rough  surfaces,  which  radiate  heat  most 
freely,  are  most  copiously  dewed,  the  substance  remaining 
the  same.  Again,  substances  of  a  loose  texture,  such  as 
cloth,  wool,  eider-down,  cotton,  velvet,  &c.,  contract  dew 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

more  readily  than  substances  of  a  close  texture,  such  as 
stones,  metals,  &c.,  and  the  former  are  precisely  those 
which  are  selected  for  clothing,  since,  on  account  of  their 
feeble  conducting  power,  they  do  not  carry  away  the  heat 
from  the  skin  to  the  air.  ['*•#  . 

"  Lastly  :  among  the  negative  instances,  it  is  observed 
that  dew  is  never  copiously  deposited  in  situations  much 
screened  from  the  open  air,  and  not  at  all  in  a  cloudy 
night;  but  if  the  clouds  withdraw,  even  for  a  few  minutes, 
and  leave  a  clear  opening,  a  deposition  of  dew  presently 
begins,  and  goes  on  increasing."  This  remarkable  fact 
shows  the  same  order  of  sequence.  "  Those  surfaces  which 
part  with  their  heat  outwards  most  readily,  and  have  it 
supplied  from  within  most  slowly,  will  of  course  become 
coldest,  if  there  be  an  opportunity  for  their  heat  to  escape, 
and  not  be  restored  to  them  from  without.  Now,  a  clear 
sky  affords  such  an  opportunity.  It  is  a  law  well  known 
to  those  who  are  conversant  with  the  nature  of  heat,  that 
heat  is  constantly  escaping  from  all  bodies  in  rays,  or  by 
radiation,  but  is  constantly  restored  to  them  by  the 
similar  radiation  of  others  surrounding  them.  Clouds  and 
surrounding  objects,  therefore,  act  as  opposing  causes,  by 
replacing  the  whole  or  a  great  part  of  the  heat  so  ra 
diated  away,  which  can  escape  effectually,  without  be 
ing  replaced,  only  through  openings  into  infinite  space." 
We  are  thus  led  to  the  general  fact,  that  any  surface 
"cooling  by  radiation  faster  than  its  heat  can  be  re 
stored  to  it  by  communication  with  the  ground,  or  by 
counter-radiation,  so  as  to  become  colder  than  the  air," 
condenses  the  moisture  of  the  air  upon  itself  in  the  form 
of  dew. 

Herschel  remarks,  "  In  the  analysis  above  given,  the 
formation  of  dew  is  referred  to  two  more  general  pheno 
ls* 


298  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

mena  :  the  radiation  of  heat,  and  the  condensation  of  in 
visible  vapor  by  cold.  The  cause  (antecedent)  of  the 
former  is  a  much  higher  enquiry,  and  may  be  said  indeed 
to  be  totally  unknown ;  that  of  the  latter  actually  forms  a 
most  important  branch  of  physical  enquiry.  In  such  a 
case,  when  we  reason  upwards  till  we  reach  an  ultimate 
fact,  we  regard  a  phenomenon  as  fully  explained ;  as  we 
consider  the  branch  of  a  tree  to  terminate  when  traced  to 
its  insertion  in  the  trunk,  or  a  twig  to  its  junction  with 
the  branch ;  or  rather,  as  a  rivulet  retains  its  importance 
and  its  name  till  lost  in  some  larger  tributary,  or  in  the 
main  river  which  delivers  it  into  the  ocean."  Now,  the 
ultimate  fact  upon  which  all  enquiry  reposes  can,  in  respect 
to  cause,  be  nothing  less  than  the  Divine  volition ;  and 
the  ultimate  fact  in  respect  to  law  can  be  that  law  only 
which  rests  immediately  upon  an  Idea.  We  may  con 
tinue,  by  observation  and  experiment,  to  enlarge  our  know 
ledge  of  the  order  and  relations  of  phenomena — of  antece 
dents  and  consequents  indefinitely,  reaching  from  one  ante 
cedent  to  another ;  but  no  mere  antecedent  phenomenon 
gives  a  place  for  the  repose  of  thought.  The  radiation  of 
heat,  and  the  condensation  of  vapor  by  cold,  are  antece 
dents  to  the  formation  of  dew.  Could  we  now  discover 
their  antecedents,  we  should  only  have  new  phenomena 
calling  for  other  antecedents  again.  We  thus  accumulate 
general  facts,  but  we  want  still  the  centralising,  all-com 
prehending,  and  necessary  Law.  An  infinite  series  of 
sequences  there  cannot  be.  But  if  the  ultimate  fact  be  a 
mere  antecedent  like  the  other  antecedents,  that  is, 
uniformly  preceding  its  consequent,  and  having  no  dis 
tinguishing  characteristic  except  that  of  being  the  last, 
then  must  enquiry  cease  here  by  a  mere  arbitrary  decision 
of  the  Deity  or  of  Fate.  It  does  not  cease  because  the  mind 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  299 

feels  satisfied,  but  because  it  is  permitted  to  go  no  farther. 
But  if  the  ultimate  fact  be  not  a  phenomenon,  but  a  law, 
affirming,  in  the  light  of  Ideas,  what  must  be,  not  a  tiling 
of  observation,  but  an  intuitive  thought,  then  indeed  must 
enquiry  cease,  not  by  a  necessity  of  compulsion,  but  by  a 
necessity  of  pure  Keason  itself. 

I  have  already  remarked  that  the  flux  of  phenomena 
is  not  to  be  represented  as  a  lengthening  series  of  particu 
lars,  which,  as  it  runs  back,  is  ever  evolving  some  new 
antecedent,  until  we  reach  an  ultimate  phenomenon ;  but 
that,  on  the  contrary,  this  flux  goes  on  in  cycles  where  the 
end  runs  into  the  beginning.*  In  a  series  of  the  first 
kind,  the  ultimate  fact  would  be  either  an  unconditional 
phenomenon,  which  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  pheno 
mena  ;  or  it  would  be  law  as  we  have  defined  it,  removed 
from  the  sphere  of  phenomenal  development ;  whereas  the 
rational  conception  of  law  demands  that  it  be  everywhere 
present,  permeating  the  whole  development.  But,  in  a 
series  of  the  second  kind,  all  the  phenomena  are  both 
conditionated  and  conditionating,  and  the  law,  as  from  a 
centre,  radiates  into  the  whole  cycle,  filling  out  and  govern 
ing  the  whole. 

It  ought  to  be  remarked  here,  also,  that  theory  applies 
to  general  facts  as  well  as  to  law.  In  the  latter  applica 
tion,  the  conception  has  already  been  given.f  In  the 
former  application,  we  mean  by  it  the  hypothesis  of  an 
antecedent  general  fact  for  the  purpose  of  conditionating 
a  known  fact,  and  thus  enabling  us  to  give  a  more  full  and 
rational  explication  of  the  whole  series  under  considera 
tion.  As  instances,  we  may  cite  the  undulating  theory 
of  Light ;  and  Dalton's  theory  of  Ultimate  Atoms.  In 

*  Supra,  p.  269.  t  Supra,  p.  194. 


300  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

both  instances,  we  have  antecedents  hypothesised  and 
connected  with  actual  phenomena.  We  hypothesise,  in 
order  to  supply  undiscovered  parts  of  a  cycle  of  pheno 
mena,  the  parts  which  are  known  suggesting  those  which 
are  unknown :  or  the  unknown  facts  may  be  hypothesised 
on  the  basis  of  a  theory  or  a  law,  which,  already  compre 
hending  the  known  facts,  demands  certain  other  facts  to 
complete  the  cycle. 

In  making  observations,  we  may  hit  upon  any  part  of 
a  cycle  of  facts,  and  thence  be  led  through  the  relations 
of  antecedents  and  consequents  to  other  parts.  Herschel 
remarks,  in  respect  to  the  induction  in  the  case  of  dew, 
"  Had  we  no  previous  knowledge  of  the  radiation  of  heat, 
this  same  induction  would  have  made  it  known  to  us, 
and,  duly  considered,  might  have  led  to  a  knowledge  of 
many  of  its  laws."  That  is,  any  part  may  serve  as  a  good 
starting  point.  "  In  the  study  of  nature,"  he  adds,  "  we 
must  not,  therefore,  be  scrupulous  as  to  how  we  reach  to 
a  knowledge  of  such  general  facts :  provided,  only,  we 
verify  them  carefully  when  once  detected,  we  must  be  con 
tent  to  seize  them  wherever  they  are  to  be  found."  * 
Now,  it  is  because  the  development  of  phenomena  moves 
in  a  cycle  that  we  may  begin  at  any  point  indifferently, 
since,  beginning  wherever  we  please  or  happen  to,  we 
cannot  lose  the  connected  particulars.  If  we  go  back 
from  consequent  to  antecedent,  the  last  antecedent  becomes 
the  consequent  of  the  first  consequent,  which,  relatively 
to  it,  becomes  an  antecedent ;  and  if  we  go  from  antece 
dent  to  consequent,  the  last  consequent  becomes  an  ante 
cedent  to  the  first  antecedent,  which,  relatively  to  it, 
becomes  a  consequent. 

-*  Supra,  p.  174. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  301 

Were  the  cycles  of  phenomena  completed,  then  ob 
servation  and  experiment  would  have  done  their  work  in 
respect  to  establishing  general  facts  ;  then  the  uniform 
antecedents  and  consequents  would  all  be  known. 

I  shall  close  this  section  by  summing  up  the  cardinal 
points. 

I.  The  governing  ideas  are  Cause  and  Law. 

II.  The  leading  axioms  are  those  of  Universal  Law, 
and  of  the  Uniformity  of  Nature. 

III.  The  last  named  axiom  may  be  conveniently  ex 
panded  into  two  particular  axioms  :  * 

1.  Like  antecedents  involve  like  consequents. 

2.  Like  consequents  imply  like  antecedents. 

IV.  General  facts  may  be  determined  to  an  indefi 
nite  extent  before  the  law  is  arrived  at,  but  whenever 
a  law  is  arrived  at,  or  a  theory  adopted,  the  cycle   of 
facts  may  be  enlarged  or   completed  by  their  necessary 
demands. 

V.  Hypothesis  relates  either  to  fact  or  to  law.     Hypo 
thesised  laws  are  theories. 

VI.  In  the  observation  of  phenomena  we  must  be  both 
general  and  minute  ;  noting  all  the  phenomena,  and  all 
their  characteristics. 

VII.  Uniform  antecedence  and  sequence  of  pheno 
mena,  the  semblance  and  exponent  of  law,  is  determined 
by  a  method  of  elimination  which  excludes  whatever  is 
foreign  to  the  particular  relation  to  be  determined. 

VIII.  The  formulae  of  Induction  f  comprehends  every 
mode  of  elimination,  since  it  determines  the  general  ex 
pression  of  the  uniform  sequences. 

IX.  When  general  facts  are  attained,  they  may  be 

*  Supra,  page  228.  t  Page  211. 


302  INDUCTIVE  LOGIC. 

verified  by  returning  to  the  particular  instances  from 
which  they  were  derived,  or  by  multiplying  instances. 
There  are  often  accidental  and  unlooked-for  verifications, 
which  are  of  great  weight,  because  they  seem  like  a  spon 
taneous  testimony  of  nature. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  303 


SECTION  VIII. 

INDUCTIVE    LOGIC    OF    UNIVERSAL   AND    NECESSARY   LAWS. 

LAWS  are  determined  in  two  ways,  either  directly  in  the 
form  of  axioms ;  *  or  indirectly,  through  an  induction  of 
facts.  The  ultimate  determining  power  in  both  cases  lies 
in  Ideas  of  pure  Reason. 

We  have  seen  that  even  Ideas  and  Axioms  demand 
phenomenal  conditions  for  their  development ;  but  this  is 
widely  different  from  that  induction  of  facts  which  at  the 
first  leads  us  to  uniform  antecedents  and  consequents,  and 
in  the  end  to  universal  and  necessary  laws. 

The  axiomatic  forms  of  law  appear  in  the  most  origi 
nal  laws,  such  as  the  laws  of  Logic  itself,  and  The  Moral ; 
but  the  great  laws  of  Nature,  those  which  comprehend 
the  interior  constitution  of  substances,  and  the  constitu 
tion  of  systems  of  bodies,  are  laws  arrived  at  by  Induc 
tion. 

The  Idea  of  Law,  that  sublime  Idea  so  quickening  to 
thought,  leads  on  all  observation  and  experiment,  whether 
the  result  be  merely  general  facts  of  uniform  sequences,  or 
universal  and  necessary  laws.  Uniform  sequences  are  the 
exponents  of  law ;  hence,  in  seeking  for  them,  we  are 
really  seeking  ultimately  for  law.  In  the  progress  of  our 
research  we  pass  from  one  generalization  to  another  more 

*  Snpra,  p.  242. 


304  INDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

extensive  and  comprehensive,  until  at  length  we  seem  to 
reach  an  ultimate  generalization,  and  this  we  call  the 
great  and  ultimate  law.  But  it  is  not  the  great  and  ulti 
mate  law  simply  because  it  is  at  present  the  ultimate 
point  of  investigation  ;  it  may  be  only  the  most  general 
fact,  or  an  antecedent  the  most  remote,  which  we  have  as 
yet  reached.  To  make  it  law,  something  is  required  in 
its  own  intrinsic  nature,  as  exhibited  to  the  eye  of  Reason. 
Law,  fcaken  on  its  highest  ground,  lies  in  the  pure  Idea  ; 
taken  under  its  highest  manifestation,  it  is  the  determi 
nate  purpose  or  design  of  the  Creative  Mind.  And  in  its 
sphere  ;  in  relation  to  its  appropriate  phenomena,  it  is 
universal  and  necessary.  Thus  the  great  moral  law  in  its 
sphere,  that  is,  responsible  being  ;  in  relation  to  its  ap 
propriate  phenomena,  that  is,  the  conduct  of  responsible 
being,  is  universal  and  necessary  :  it  is  the  law  without 
exception  and  in  every  instance  ;  and  it  is  the  necessary 
law,  no  other  being  admissible.  It  lies  originally  in  the 
Idea  of  Right  and  Wrong  ;  it  appears  as  the  wise  design 
in  the  Creative  Mind  which  bodied  forth  this  noblest 
form  of  being ;  and  it  gives  birth  to  every  rule  of  moral 
action. 

So  also  in  Somatology,  law  taken  on  its  highest  ground 
lies  in  the  pure  Idea  ;  taken  under  its  highest  manifesta 
tion,  it  is  the  determinate  purpose  or  design  of  the  Crea 
tive  Mind.  In  its  sphere — e.  g.  the  interior  constitution 
of  bodies  or  their  arrangement  into  system,  in  relation  to 
its  appropriate  phenomena — e.  g.  the  changes  of  bodies  in 
composition  and  decomposition,  or  their  motions  in  masses 
through  space,  it  is  universal ;  and,  considered  as  the 
wisest  and  the  best,  *  it  is  necessary.  Now,  that  upon 

*  Part  I.,  Sect.  VII.     Also,  Part  III.,  pp.  194,  195. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  305 

which  the  Keason  fastens  when  it  becomes  satisfied  that  a 
law  is  attained,  is  the  correspondence  between  the  out 
ward  generalization  and  its  own  Idea,  and  the  presence  in 
the  generalization  of  the  characteristics  of  universality  and 
necessity.  Thus,  Gravitation  is  an  ultimate  generaliza 
tion  ;  but  it  is  more,  for  the  Eeason  perceives  its  corres 
pondency  with  its  own  Idea  of  Centralization,*  and  there 
fore  judges  not  only  that  it  is  the  ultimate  generalization 
actually  attained,  but  also  that  there  is  no  other  beyond  it 
that  can  be  attained,  and  affirms  that  it  is  the  law,  and 
the  necessary  law,  of  all  systems  of  bodies. 

The  logical  process  by  which  we  arrive  at  universal 
laws  is  akin  to  that  by  which  we  arrive  at  general  facts. 
Indeed  the  establishment  of  general  facts  is  a  part  of  the 
process.  The  principles,  therefore,  laid  down  in  the  pre 
ceding  Section,  are  applicable  here  also. 

It  is  impossible  to  prescribe  the  number  of  general 
facts  which  are  demanded  as  conditions  of  the  determina 
tion  of  a  universal  law.  Sometimes  the  law  is  precon 
ceived  at  a  very  early  stage  of  the  investigation  ;  such 
was  the  fact  in  the  case  of  Newton  in  respect  to  gravita 
tion.  Although  believed  to  be  a  law,  it  can,  under  these 
circumstances,  be  received  only  as  a  hypothesis,  until  ve 
rified  in  numerous  and  decisive  applications.  But  the 
secret  conviction,  the  earnest  hope,  and  the  indomitable 
purpose  of  investigation,  inspired  by  the  conception  from 
the  beginning,  proves  it  to  lie  deeper  in  the  soul  than  a 
fortunate  guess  or  an  enticing  fancy. 

The  verification  of  a  law  hypothesised  is  strikingly 
illustrated  in  Physical  Astronomy.  "  The  law,  for  ex 
ample,  which  asserts  that  the  planets  are  retained  in  their 

*  Page  198. 


306  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

orbits  about  the  sun,  and  satellites  about  their  primaries, 
by  an  attractive  force,  decreasing  as  the  square  of  the  dis 
tances  increases,  comes  to  be  verified  in  each  particular 
case  by  deducing  from  it  the  exact  motions  which,  under 
the  circumstances,  ought  to  take  place,  and  comparing 
them  with  the  fact.  This  comparison,  while  it  verifies  in 
general  the  existence  of  the  law  of  gravitation  as  supposed, 
and  its  adequacy  to  explain  all  the  principal  motions  of 
every  body  in  the  system,  yet  leaves  some  small  deviations 
in  those  of  the  planets,  and  some  very  considerable  ones  in 
that  of  the  moon  and  other  satellites,  still  unaccounted 
for  ;  residual  phenomena,  which  still  remain  to  be  traced 
up  to  causes.  By  further  examining  these,  their  causes 
have  at  length  been  ascertained,  and  found  to  consist  in 
the  mutual  actions  of  the  planets  on  each  other,  and  the 
disturbing  influence  of  the  sun  on  the  motions  of  the  satel 
lites."  *  And  thus  these  residual  phenomena  turn  out  an 
additional  verification  of  the  law  of  gravitation. 

In  other  instances  the  law  dawns  slowly,  and  is  pre 
ceded  by  many  vague  and  inadequate  hypotheses,  which 
have  to  be  overcome  before  the  true  light  can  shine  clearly. 
And  when  it  begins  to  shine,  hypotheses  appear,  which  in 
deed  are  more  or  less  ingenious  and  satisfactory,  but  still 
indecisive.  And  thus  there  appears  a  gradual  convergence 
from  many  points  to  the  all-comprehending  law.  But 
when  the  law  is  attained,  whatever  be  the  process  by 
which  we  attain  it,  it  is  known  to  be  the  law  by  its  suffi 
ciency  in  respect  to  the  phenomena  to  be  explained,  by  its 
universality  and  necessity,  and  its  echo  to  the  Idea  of  the 
Eeason  within. 

There  is  also  to  be  remarked  a  difference  in  the  men- 

*  Herschel's  Discourse,  p.  166. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  307 

tal  constitution,  by  which  a  superior  degree  of  the  intui 
tive  function  seems  to  be  awarded  to  some  individuals. 
These  are  the  chosen  interpreters  of  nature.  By  a  sudden 
and  wonderful  leap  they  are  seen  to  pass  from  a  limited 
induction  to  a  stupendous  conclusion.  With  a  prophetic 
power  they  seem  to  fore t el  the  law,  which,  before  ordinary 
minds,  lies  only  as  the  result  of  an  immense  and  laborious 
observation.  The  mere  experimenter  and  observer  collects 
facts,  but  does  not  gain  laws.  On  the  other  hand,  a  mind 
of  high  intuitive  energy  cannot  make  itself  independent 
of  experiment  and  observation  ;  for  those  high  prophecies 
require  the  verification  of  facts.  It  is  the  union  of  the 
two  which  makes  the  finished  philosopher  of  nature,  for  it 
is  the  union  of  the  two  which  constitutes  the  true  Induc 
tive  Logic.  And  indeed,  where  these  high  gifts  are  found, 
we  may  generally  expect  a  corresponding  skill  and  dili 
gence  in  collating  facts  ;  for  the  mind  that  can  penetrate 
the  laws  of  nature  under  her  simplest  manifestations,  will 
be  prone  to  seek  the  fullest  confirmations  of  these  laws 
from  observation  and  experiment. 

In  the  discovery  of  laws  there  is  so  much  that  appears 
like  inspiration,  and  indeed  so  much  that  is  really  inspira 
tion,  if  Reason  be  the  inspiration  of  the  Almighty  in  man, 
that  to  lay  down  exact  logical  rules  and  formulae  designed 
to  govern  and  represent  the  process  of  discovery,  would 
appear  puerile  in  the  attempt,  and  prove  impracticable  if 
attempted. 

The  great  principle,  however,  can  be  clearly  expressed. 
It  is  that  which  has  already  been  alluded  to,  namely,  the 
union  of  Ideas  and  Observation.  It  is  the  force  and  light 
of  the  cardinal  Ideas  of  Cause  and  Law  which  at  first  im 
pel  and  guide  us  in  investigation.  Ideas  of  Time  and 
Space  open  to  us  the  possibility  of  succession  and  arrange- 


308  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

ment.  But,  beyond  this,  the  laws  which  govern  the  world, 
inasmuch  as  they  had  their  origin  in  the  Divine  Mind, 
cannot  be  strange  to  us.  While,  therefore,  the  perceptive 
and  inductive  functions  are  busy  in  collecting  facts,  the 
mind  is  intensely  meditative,  and  intuition  is  awake. 
Now  it  is  that  the  Ideas  which  are  to  spring  forth  into 
law  are  quickened  and  called  upon.  The  orderly  and  uni 
form  sequences  of  phenomena  are  noted  ; — these  we  have 
called  the  exponents  of  law.  Generalization  follows  gen 
eralization.  Hypotheses  are  framed.  Observation  is  en 
larged,  and  rendered  more  exact  by  experiment.  The 
Keason  conceives  more  and  more  clearly.  All  that  lies  be 
fore  it  in  the  phenomenal  world,  having  proceeded  from 
the  Divine  Ideas,  is  ready  to  meet  corresponding  Ideas  in 
the  human  mind.  At  length  the  required  Idea  is  devel 
oped,  and  it  projects  itself  into  the  external  world  as  the 
law  of  the  phenomena. 

It  will  be  perceived  that  we  have  limited  the  term  laiv 
to  the  universal  and  necessary.  In  common  usuage  the 
term  is  applied  to  uniform  sequences  in  general.  The 
former  is  the  strictly  philosophical  use.  While  we  are 
looking  at  particular  sequences  separately  from  the  uni 
versal  law,  or  in  ignorance  of  it,  it  may  perhaps  be  con 
venient  to  call  them  laws  of  nature  ;  but  when  viewed  in 
connexion  with  the  law,  they  are  seen  to  be  only  forms  of 
its  manifestation  or  exponential  facts.  For  example,  it 
might  be  called  a  law  of  wood,  and  of  vegetable  matter 
generally,  to  float  in  water, — and  of  metals  and  minerals, 
to  sink  ;  a  law  of  vapour  to  rise,  in  the  atmosphere  ;  a  law 
of  water,  to  flow  down  descents  of  any  degree, — and  of  bo 
dies  generally,  to  roll  down  declivities  when  moved  oft' 
their  balance  ;  a  law  of  the  tides,  to  rise  and  fall ;  a  law 
of  the  pendulum,  to  preserve  a  determinate  vibration  ;  and 


INDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  309 

so  on.  But  when  the  law  of  universal  gravitation  is  un 
derstood,  then  these  particular  laws,  so-called,  are  per 
ceived  to  be  mere  uniform  sequences  determined  by  the 
universal  law. 

And  here  we  may  understand  the  difference  in  the  in 
telligent  apprehension,  between  uniform  sequences  and 
universal  laws.  All  these  particular  laws,  taken  in  them 
selves  as  uniform  sequences,  are  mere  arbitrary  facts. 
We  come  to  know  them  familiarly  ;  and,  indeed,  we  seem 
to  understand  them,  because  we  are  accustomed  to  their 
appearance  ;  but  still,  all  we  can  say  of  them  is,  that  such 
is  the  order  of  nature.  But  when  we  can  refer  them  all 
to  one  universal  law,  we  gain  a  deeper  and  more  satisfac 
tory  insight.  Now  we  perceive  a  unity  and  simplicity  in 
nature  which  awakens  admiration,  like  that  which  we  ex 
perience  when  we  view  a  grand  and  perfect  mechanism. 
But  still  more,  we  now  perceive  the  great  comprehending 
law  to  be  a  universal  and  necessary  law — the  law  of  the 
universe  springing  from  an  Idea.  Nothing  is  so  intelligi 
ble  as  Ideas,  for  they  are  the  elements  of  the  Keason  it 
self,  "  the  light  of  all  our  seeing."  In  the  Idea  of  cen 
tralization  we  perceive  how  the  universe  must  be  consti 
tuted,  and  in  the  law  of  gravitation  we  find  the  realiza 
tion  of  the  Idea.  Equally  satisfactory  is  the  law  of  cen 
trifugal  force,  as  the  realization  of  the  Idea  of  Diffusion.  * 

The  human  intellect  has  oftentimes  expended  its  force 
in  hypothesising  new  and  more  remote  antecedents,  instead 
of  directing  itself  through  an  induction  of  unquestionable 
facts  to  the  discovery  of  a  law.  Des  Cartes  hypothesised 
vortices  as  antecedents  to  the  primary  phenomena  of  the 
planets  in  their  revolution  about  the  sun,  and  of  the 

*  Page  198. 


310  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

satellites  about  the  planets.  And  Bernoulli  attempted, 
in  accordance  with  this  hypothesis,  to  explain  the  elliptical 
form  of  the  orbits  by  the  shape  of  the  planets,  acting  like 
the  rudder  of  a  boat  in  the  stream  of  the  vortices.  But 
how  were  the  vortices  themselves  to  be  explained  ?  A 
mere  multiplication  of  the  antecedents  only  threw  the 
difficulty  farther  back  without  overcoming  it.  Nay,  more  ; 
it  introduced  new  difficulties,  in  the  necessity  of  sustaining 
the  hypothesis. 

Chemistry,  the  science  of  material  elements  and  their 
mutual  relations  in  the  composition  and  decomposition  of 
bodies,  was,  until  a  late  period,  a  mere  collection  of  uni 
form  sequences.  As  such,  it  was  of  immense  practical 
importance.  And  as  the  facts  of  chemistry  had  to  be 
elicited  by  nice,  ingenious,  and  difficult,  and  often 
dangerous  experiments,  the  discovery  of  a  new  fact  often 
formed  an  epoch  in  the  science,  and  conferred  a  just  and 
lasting  fame  on  the  discoverer.  But  still  the  facts  stood 
out  to  view  simply  as  facts,  unexplained  by  any  central 
and  comprehensive  law.  They  indeed  revealed  a  beautiful 
and  benign  constitution  of  nature — they  connected  them 
selves  with  the  idea  of  paternal  wisdom  and  goodness  ;  but 
this  was  accounting  for  them  only  under  a  moral  aspect. 
The  same  wise  and  benign  ends  might  perhaps  have  been 
reached  equally  well  by  a  different  constitution.  What 
was  required,  was  the  intellectual  purpose  growing  neces 
sarily  out  of  an  Idea,  and  projecting  itself  in  the  outer 
world  as  the  all-pervadihg  law  of  the  interior  constitution 
of  bodies. 

I  have  already  had  occasion  to  refer  to  the  stupendous 
results  to  which  the  genius  of  Faraday  has  conducted  us. 
In  these  results,  chemistry  attains  to  simplicity  and  unity. 
All  chemical  changes  are  now  made  to  appear  under  one 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  311 

great  law,  by  whatever  name  we  call  it,  whether  of  Polarity 
or  of  Electrical  Induction.  Behind  the  law  there  lies  an 
Idea.*  Neither  the  Idea  nor  the  law  have  as  yet  reached 
a  full  development,  hut  to  this  point  we  are  evidently 
tending.  The  Idea  must  be  an  Idea  of  the  pure  Reason, 
related  to  the  elemental  constitution  and  changes  of  bodies 
analogously  to  the  Idea  of  centralization  and  diffusion  in 
its  relation  to  the  masses  of  constituted  bodies ;  and  the 
corresponding  law  must  comprehend  and  govern  in  its 
sphere,  analogously  to  the  law  of  gravitation  in  its  sphere. 
In  Faraday  we  perceive,  in  an  extraordinary  degree,  the 
union  of  the  most  exact,  elaborate,  and  extensive  experi 
mentation  with  Ideal  conceptions.  It  is  a  union  of  the 
Senses  with  the  world  of  the  Reason ;  like  the  union  of 
those  opposite  polar  forces  by  which  he  solves  the  mys 
teries  of  his  favorite  science,  and  brings  to  light  the  order 
and  harmony  of  Nature  in  her  elements. 

The  application  of  the  mathematics  to  the  expression 
of  physical  laws  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  subjects  of 
these  laws  are  real  quantities,  such  as  magnitude,  motion, 
time,  and  distance.  For  example,  gravitation  implies 
motion,  and  motion  is  related  to  space ;  the  intelligible 
expression  of  the  law,  therefore,  requires  its  expression  hi 
the  relation  of  space. 

Ere  we  close  this  part  of  our  investigation,  we  must 
return  for  a  moment  to  the  cyclical  order  of  phenomena, 
and  the  central  position  of  law.  Receiving  this,  at  least, 
as  a  convenient,  if  not  a  purely  rational  conception,  it  must 
be  evident  that  the  law,  as  law,  cannot  be  absent  from 
any  point  of  the  phenomenal  movement ;  but  is  like  an 
indefinite  number  of  radii  drawn  from  the  centre  to.  the 

*  Page  200, 


312  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

circumference,  which  are  many,  and  yet,  in  their  perfect 
identity,  one  ;  so  that  we  may  regard  the  circumference  as 
formed  either  by  the  extremities  of  an  indefinite  numher 
of  equal  radii  projected  from  a  common  centre,  or  by  the 
extremity  of  one  of  the  radii  revolving  about  the  centre. 
Now,  suppose  our  observation  were  fixed  upon  only  one 
point  of  the  circumference,  we  might  account  for  its  exist 
ence  by  conceiving  of  it  as  merely  the  extremity  of  a 
straight  line  :  or,  suppose  we  were  to  observe  several  points 
in  curvilinear  juxtaposition,  then  we  might  account  for 
them  by  conceiving  of  an  angle  of  which  the  whole  arc 
formed  the  measure.  But  as  our  observation  became  more 
extended,  we  might  be  led  to  the  conception  of  a  circle, 
and  then  every  point  would  be  explained  in  reference  to  it 
alone,  and  the  particular  straight  line  and  the  particular 
angle  would  pass  out  of  thought  in  the  wider  generaliza 
tion.  Now,  our  first  conclusions  were  true,  but  they  did 
not  contain  the  whole  truth ;  and  when  the  whole  truth 
is  ascertained,  we  no  longer  require  our  first  conclusions. 
In  like  manner,  in  a  cycle  of  phenomena,  our  observation 
is  fixed  at  first  upon  a  certain  antecedent  and  consequent, 
and  we  name  the  particular  end  of  the  uniformity,  a  law. 
Here  indeed  is  no  error,  for  the  law  from  the  centre 
radiates  into  this  particular  uniformity,  and  is  the  true 
source  of  it.  But,  inasmuch  as  the  particular  sequence 
in  question  is  only  one  of  a  wide  circle  of  sequences,  we 
require  the  law  of  the  whole  ere  we  have  the  sufficient 
law  of  the  part.  This  law  of  the  whole  permeating  every 
part  explains  every  part  ;  and  like  the  centre  and  radii  of 
a  circle,  is  a  conception  of  pure  Keason  based  upon  an 
Idea. 

The  Reason  in  its  Ideas  enjoys  a  perfect   and  quiet 
cognition  ;  and  when  phenomena  are  explained  by  laws. 


INDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  313 

whicn  again  are  explained  by  Ideas,  then  we  have  reached 
the  clearest  light,  and  the  highest  satisfaction  of  know 
ledge.* 

The  leading  Axioms  and  definitions  of  the  Inductive 
Logic  of  Universal  and  Necessary  Laws,  so  far  as  implied 
in  the  foregoing,  may  be  summarily  stated  as  follows  : 

I.  Every  particular  phenomenon  is  both  an  antecedent 
and  a  consequent,  taken  in  different  relations ;  and,  as  a 
part  of  a  harmonious  whole,  is  comprehended  by  a  law. 

II.  Every  law  is  the  projection  of  an  Idea. 

III.  Observation  and  experiment  supply  the  orderly 
sequences  of  phenomena,  and  thus  conditionate  the  de 
velopment  of  law ;  but  the  law  itself,  with  its  character 
istics  of  universality  and  necessity,  is  a  conception  of  the 
Reason. 

IV.  A  rational  hypothesis  is  an  effort  to  find  a  law  by 
tentative  acts ; — it  is  feeling  after  a  law  by  rational  fore 
thought,  if  haply  we  may  find  it. 

V.  Observation  and  experiment,  without  a  rational 
hypothesis,  is  like  a  man  groping  at  objects  at  random 
with  his  eyes  shut.     But  even  rational  hypothesis,  un 
accompanied  by  the  former,  is  only  felicitous  dreaming. 

VI.  Inasmuch  as  the  world  of  the  senses  was  created 
by  the  Divine  Keason  from  its  own  Ideas ;  and  inasmuch 
as  the  mind  of  man  is  made  after  the  likeness  of  the 
Divine  Mind,  therefore  can  it  truly  be  said  to  know  the 
world  of  the  senses  only  so  far  as,  like  the  Divine  Mind, 
it  finds  its  Ideas  there  projected. 

VII.  Hence  the  Science  of  Nature  can  be  determined 
only  by  a  union  of  Sensuous  Phenomena  with  Ideal  Con 
ceptions. 

VIII.  The   criteria   of  a  law  are,  its  sufficiency  in 

*  Part  I.,  Section  X. 
14 


314  INDUCTIVE  LOGIC. 

respect  to  the  phenomena,  its  characteristics,  viz.,  univer 
sality  and  necessity,  and  its  correspondence  to  an  Idea. 

IX.  Law  implies  Cause.  Cause  is  present  wherever 
law  is  manifested.  Law  expresses  the  rational  plan,  the 
wise  and  fit  developments  of  Cause. 


INDUCTIVE  LOGIC.  315 


SECTION  IX. 

THE     LOGIC     OF     ART. 

ART  depends  upon  the  Inventive  Function.*  There  is  a 
Logic  of  Science  ;  is  there  also  a  Logic  of  Art  ? 

Art  exists  before  Science.  Sometimes  it  is  th6  effect 
of  accident.  Generally,  in  its  earlier  stages,  it  is  the 
effect  of  human  wants  inspiring  an  unreflecting  ingenuity 
to  empirical  efforts.  Art,  in  its  highest  state,  is  an  effect 
of  ripened  science. 

Pure  accident  and  empiricism  reach  art  by  mere  felici 
ties.  But  even  where  there  is  no  science,  there  is  often 
exhibited  an  ingenuity  and  skill  which  impress  us  as  a 
manifestation  of  high  and  extraordinary  powers.  Men  of 
this  mould  seem  to  invent  by  a  sort  of  inspiration.  They 
seem  prepared  for  every  difficulty,  and  arrive  at  results 
the  most  curious  with  wonderful  ease  and  tact.  These 
instances  are  found  both  in  the  mechanical  and  the  fine 
arts.  There  must  be  here  an  exceedingly  vigorous  spon 
taneous  development  of  Ideas,  together  with  a  nice  and 
quick  observation,  and  a  vivid  imagination. 

There  is,  therefore,  a  true  Inductive  Logic,  leading 
virtually  to  important  conclusions,  although  they  be  not 
stated  in  the  form  of  distinct  propositions.  These  con 
clusions  really  direct  the  hand  of  the  mechanician  and 

*  Page  231. 


316  INDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

the  artist.  They  are  not  reflected  upon  as  universal  prin 
ciples,  and  therefore  are  not  elaborated  into  a  scientific 
system ;  they  appear  to  the  individual  as  something 
belonging  to  him,  something  that  answers  his  special  pur 
pose,  and  with  this  he  remains  content.  In  his  use  they 
soon  become  reduced  to  mere  rules  of  art.  This  natural 
and  spontaneous  Logic  plays  an  important  part  in  the 
development  of  humanity ;  and  that  which  we  call  Genius, 
and  which  so  proudly  overcomes  all  obstacles,  presenting 
us  the  unscientific  but  skilful  mechanician  and  artist ;  or 
leading  onward  the  untutored,  as  in  the  case  of  Ferguson 
and  Corregio,  and  a  multitude  of  others,  to  the  loftiest 
eminence  of  science  or  art,  is  chiefly  a  natural  logical 
power,  lying  in  the  proper  union  of  Ideas  and  external 
observations — a  union  of  the  Ideal  and  the  sensuous. 
Unite  with  this  the  highest  form  of  the  imagination,  and 
you  have  the  most  splendid  form  of  genius :  for  it  is  the 
imagination  which  from  Ideas  creates  those  ideal  repre 
sentations  which  constitute  archetypes  of  all  that  man 
accomplishes  of  the  great,  the  beautiful,  and  the  sublime. 

Where  all  the  lights  of  science  are  enjoyed,  invention 
exhibits  a  chain  of  the  nicest  reasoning,  both  inductive 
and  deductive.  The  latter  form  of  reasoning  appears 
indeed  in  the  cases  above  mentioned  ;  but  more  remarkably 
here,  inasmuch  as  the  invention  sets  out  with  principles 
already  ascertained.  In  its  progress  it  may  have  to  mako 
many  inductions,  and  to  exert  that  high  prophetic  power 
which  gives  birth  to  rational  hypotheses.  Indeed,  the 
imagination  is  here  also  tasked  in  ideal  representations  of 
mechanism.  The  steam  engine  from  its  conception  to  its 
present  state,  exhibits  a  constant  series  of  scientific  in 
ventions  springing  from  a  rigid  logic. 

One  of  the  most  beautiful  instances  of  scientific  in- 


INDUCTIVE  LOGIC.  317 

vention  is  Davy's  safety-lamp.  Here  conclusions  were 
drawn  from  established  scientific  principles ;  new  induc 
tions  were  made ;  a  hypothesis  formed ;  an  ideal  of  the 
invention  represented  in  the  imagination,  from  whence  an 
external  model  or  diagram  could  be  produced ;  and  thus 
every  thing  was  made  ready  for  that  simple  effort  of 
mechanical  skill  which  completed  the  great  achievement, 
— great  as  a  work  of  the  intellect,  and  no  less  great  as  a 
merciful  visitation  to  poor  and  laboring  men. 


BOOK  in.  : 

•  ' 
DEDUCTIVE     LOGIC. 


SECTION  I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

WE  have  hitherto  been  engaged  with  the  Logic  of  First 
Truths,  General  Facts,  and  Universal  Principles  and  Laws. 
We  are  now  to  consider  the  Logic  of  drawing  inferences 
from  a  comprehending  or  containing  Whole,  to  particulars 
concluded  under  it.  In  Inductive  Logic,  particulars  were 
shown  to  be  involved  into  universals  :  In  Deductive  Logic, 
we  must  show  that  universals  may  be  evolved  into  par 
ticulars.* 

Deductive  Logic  implies,  1.  That  some  first  truths, 
general  facts,  and  universal  principles  have  been  estab 
lished  :  it  implies,  therefore,  a  considerable  advance  of  hu 
man  knowledge.  2.  It  implies  that  a  cultivated  language 
exists,  one  adequate  to  express  truths,  principles,  and 
facts,  in  clear  and  precise  propositions. 

It  is,  therefore,  with  propositions  that  we  begin  in  De 
ductive  Reasoning.  These  propositions  may  themselves 

*  Pages  211-213. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  319 

be  conclusions  drawn  from  antecedent  propositions,  or 
they  may  be  primary  and  underived.  They  may  be  ana 
lytical  or  synthetical  ;  and  synthetical  &  priori  or  a  pos 
teriori.  *  But  the  manner  in  which  they  may  have  been 
obtained  is  not  taken  into  account  in  the  particular  deduc 
tion  with  which  we  may  be  engaged.  Neither  do  we  take 
into  account  the  subject  matter  of  the  propositions  ;  this 
is  referred  to  particular  sciences.  If  the  subject  matter 
be  pure  quantity,  it  is  referred  to  the  mathematics  ;  if  it 
be  composed  of  natural  phenomena,  it  is  referred  to  phy 
siology,  natural  philosophy,  or  chemistry,  and  so  on.  In 
considering  any  branch  of  science,  or  any  subject  whatever, 
we  may  have  occasion  to  make  many  deductions — these 
may  be  a  means  to  one  end  :  but  in  each  particular  de 
duction  we  have  only  to  pay  regard  to  the  proper  relation 
between  those  propositions  which  form  our  premises,  and 
the  conclusion  we  deduce.  This  part  of  Logic,  therefore, 
aims  to  express  a  universal  form  of  deduction, — one  that 
shall  apply  to  every  subject  indifferently. 

*  Vide  Part  I.,  Sec.  X. 

if  i  y  ••  •    ?•  -.  •-  •    - 


320  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 


SECTION  II. 

ANALYSIS   OF   PROPOSITIONS. 

A  JUDGMENT  is  an  affirmation  of  the  mind.  When  ex 
pressed  in  language,  it  becomes  a  proposition,  because  it 
is  then  propounded  to  general  attention.  Every  proposi 
tion  consists  of  a  subject  and  a  predicate.  The  subject  is 
that  of  which  the  affirmation  is  made  ;  the  predicate  is 
that  which  is  affirmed  of  the  subject. 

The  affirmation  is  either  positive  or  negative  ;  that  is, 
an  affirmation  of  agreement  or  of  disagreement.  * 

The  subject  and  predicate  are  collectively  called 
terms.  Each  term  expresses  an  object  of  thought  com 
plete  in  itself. 

That  which  connects  the  terms  together  in  a  propo 
sition,  is  called  the  Copula.  This  copula  must  always  be 
is,  in  positive  propositions  ;  and  is  NOT,  in  negative.  The 
reason  is  obvious,  viz.,  that  the  verb  to  be  enters  neces 
sarily  into  the  simple  and  direct  form  of  affirmation.  In 
the  ordinary  forms  of  language,  propositions  do  not,  in 
deed,  generally  employ  the  substantive  verb ;  but  they 
are  always  capable  of  being  reduced  to  this  form,  by  using 
a  participle  or  an  adjective,  in  connection  with  the  verb  : 
e.  g.  "  Caesar  conquered,"  may  be  reduced  to  the  form, 
"  Caesar  was  victorious/'  in  which  the  copula  appears.  A 

*  Supra,  p.  64. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  321 

term  may  consist  of  one  or  of  several  words.  No  single 
word  is  capable  of  being  a  term  in  itself,  except  a  nomina 
tive  noun,  because  no  other  word,  in  itself,  expresses  a 
complete  object  of  thought.  The  infinitive  mood  of  the 
verb  is  not  an  exception,  for  this  is  really  a  noun :  e.  g. 
"  To  be  loved  is  to  be  happy  : "  i.  e. 

Sub.  Pred. 

<  A "i  (  "> 

"  The  state  of  being  loved         is         a  state  of  happiness." 

When  the  adjective  appears  as  a  predicate,  the  noun, 
of  course,  is  understood  in  connection  with  it.  Where  a 
term  consists  of  one  word,  it  is  called  a  simple  term ; 
where  it  consists  of  several,  a  complex  term. 

Sometimes  no  little  circumlocution  is  necessary,  in  or 
der  to  reduce  a  proposition,  consisting  of  complex  terms, 
to  its  exact  form  :  e.  g.  "  If  he  starts  to-day,  he  will  pro 
bably  arrive  the  day  after  to-morrow  : "  i.  e. 

Sub. 


"  The  event  of  his  starting  to-day 
Pred. 


an  event  which  makes  it  probable  he  will  arrive  the  day  after  to-morrow.' 

Again  :  "I  am  sure  he  said  so  : "  i.  e. 

Sub.  Pred. 


"  The  thing  referred  to  by  '  so/         is         what  I  am  sure  he  said." 

Simple  terms  are  singular  or  common.  A  singular 
term  stands  for  an  individual,  and  can  be  predicated  only 
of  itself.  A  common  term  stands  for  many,  and,  of  course, 
can  be  predicated  of  many. 

Propositions  are  categorical  or  hypothetical.  The  for 
mer  is  an  unconditional  affirmation ;  the  latter  a  con 
ditional. 

14* 


322  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

Propositions  are  distinguished  again  by  Quality  and 
Quantity. 

The  Quality  of  a  proposition  refers  to  its  positive  or 
negative  character:  e.  g.  "A  horse  is  a  quadruped,"  is 
positive  ;  "  A  covetous  man  is  not  contented,"  is  negative. 
We  must  be  careful  to  distinguish  between  a  strictly  ne 
gative  proposition,  i.  e.  one  which  connects  the  negative 
particle  with  the  copula,  and  one  which  contains  a  de 
scriptive  negative  particle  in  one  of  its  terms  :  e.  g.  "  He 
was  conversing  with  a  man  not  like  the  one  you  describe," 
is  positive  ;  "  He  was  not  conversing  with  a  man  like  the 
one  you  describe,"  is  negative.  Sometimes  it  is  conven 
ient  to  transfer  the  negative  particle  from  the  copula  to 
one  of  the  terms,  and  thus  to  change  the  negative  form 
for  the  positive  :  e.  g.  "  Man  is  not  perfect "  is  equivalent 
to  "  Man  is  imperfect." 

The  logical  use  of  the  negative  particles  must  be  dis 
tinguished  from  those  uses  which  obtain  in  the  familiar 
idioms  of  conversation.  In  the  latter,  they  sometimes  not 
only  deny,  but  affirm  the  contrary  :  e.  g.  the  remark  some 
times  playfully  made,  "  He  is  no  fool,"  is  intended  not 
merely  to  deny  one  kind  of  quality,  but  to  attribute  no 
common  share  of  the  opposite  kind  ;  whereas,  in  the  logi 
cal  use,  the  negative  particles  simply  deny,  and  never  im 
ply,  an  affirmation  of  the  contrary. 

The  Quantity  of  a  proposition  expresses  the  extent  of 
the  affirmation  or  negation.  When  the  predicate  is 
affirmed  or  denied  of  the  whole  of  the  subject,  the  propo 
sition  is  universal  ;  when  it  is  affirmed  or  denied  only  of 
apart  of  the  subject,  the  proposition  is  particular  :  e.  g. 
"  All  men  are  mortal,"  "  No  miser  is  happy,"  are  univer 
sal ;  "  Some  men  are  prudent,"  "  Some  animals  are  not 
sagacious,"  are  particular. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  323 

Propositions,  as  positive,  and  negative,  and  universal, 
and  particular,  are  distributed  into  four  kinds.     These 
are  generally,  for  the  sake  of  brevity,  represented  by  the 
symbols  A,  E,  I,  and  0.     And  since  Deductive  Logic 
considers  the  form  of  propositions,  and  not  the  matter,  we 
may  conveniently  represent  the  subject  ~and  predicate  by 
symbols.     The  whole,  then,  may  be  represented  as  follows : 
A,  Universal  affirmative.     Every  X  is  Y  ; 
E,  Universal  negative.     No  X  is  Y  ; 
I,  Particular  affirmative.     Some  X  is  Y  ; 
0,  Particular  negative.     Some  X  is  not  Y. 

In  conversational  idiom,  when  we  affirm  a  part,  we  in 
tend  to  deny  the  remainder.  Thus,  when  we  say,  "  Some 
of  the  company  have  arrived,"  we  intend  to  signify  that  a 
part  have  not  arrived.  But,  in  logical  language,  on  the 
contrary,  we  intend  to  signify  no  more  than  we  express. 
Thus,  when  we  say  some  X  is  Y,  we  do  not  mean  to  imply 
that  some  X  is  not  Y  ;  this  may  or  may  not  be,  and  no 
doubtful  form  of  predication  is  admissible. 

Indefinite  propositions,  e.  g.  "  Birds  have  wings," 
"  Food  is  necessary  for  life,"  "  Fish  live  in  the  water," 
are  those  whose  quality  is  left  unexpressed.  These  do  not 
belong  to  the  province  of  Logic,  for  here  no  proposition 
can  be  indefinite,  but  to  that  of  Rhetoric.  The  truth  is, 
that  indefinite  propositions  never  appear  in  correct  writing 
— unless  the  intention  be  to  mislead — except  where,  from 
the  connection,  or  from  the  well-known  nature  of  the  mat 
ter,  every  reader  at  once  is  able  to  supply  the  true  quan 
tity.  Thus,  when  it  is  said  "  Food  is  necessary  to  life," 
the  writer  is  sure  he  will  not  be  misunderstood  ;  otherwise, 
he  ought  to  supply  the  quantitive  particle. 

Where  the  subject  of  a  proposition  is  a  singular  term, 
the  proposition  is  reckoned  among  universals,  because  the 


324  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

whole  subject  is  spoken  of:  e.  g.  "  Socrates  was  an  Athe 
nian  philosopher,"  means  the  whole  of  Socrates. 

Propositions  may  be  universal,  without  having  both 
their  terms  taken  universally  :  e.  g.  when  it  is  said,  "  All 
horses  are  quadrupeds,"  the  term  "  horses  "  is  taken  uni 
versally,  but  not  the  term  "  quadrupeds  ; "  for  it  is  not 
true  that  all  quadrupeds  are  horses  :  but  in  the  propo 
sition,  "  No  merciful  man  will  abuse  dumb  animals,"  both 
terms  are  taken  universally  ;  for,  in  excluding  merciful 
men  from  that  class  who  abuse  dumb  animals,  we  do  also 
exclude  the  latter  from  the  former.  In  the  other  example, 
although  all  horses  are  affirmed  to  be  contained  in  the 
class  "  quadrupeds,"  this  does  not  imply  that  all  quadru 
peds  are  contained  in  the  class  "  horses."  In  particular 
affirmative  propositions,  it  is  evident  that  neither  term  is 
taken  universally :  e.  g.  "  Some  undeserving  men  are 
prosperous." 

In  particular  negatives,  the  subject  plainly  is  not  taken 
universally  ;  but  the  whole  of  the  predicate  being  excluded 
from  the  subject,  must  be  regarded  as  taken  universally  : 
e.  g.  "  Some  good  men  are  not  prosperous."  Here  the  sub 
ject  enters  only  partially  ;  but  the  predicate  composed  of 
the  class  "  prosperous,"  is  entirely  excluded  from  the  sub 
ject  "  Some  good  men."  When  any  term  is  taken  uni 
versally,  it  is  technically  said  to  be  distributed.  Employ 
ing  the  symbols  already  introduced,  the  whole  can  be  pre 
sented  at  one  view. 

A,  X  is  Y.     Subject  distributed. 

E,  X  is  Y.     Subject  and  predicate  distributed. 

I,  X  is  Y.     Neither  term  is  distributed. 

0,  X  is  Y.     Predicate  distributed. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  325 


SECTION  III. 

OF   PROPOSITIONS   AS   OPPOSED    TO   EACH   OTHER. 

PROPOSITIONS  are  opposed  to  each  other  when  the  subject 
and  predicate  remain  the  same  ;  and  they  differ  in  quan 
tity  or  quality,  or  in  both. 

I.  Opposition  in  quantity.     A  is  opposed  to  I  ;  and  E 
to  0.     The  nature  of  this  opposition  is  such,  that  A  being 
affirmed,  I  must  be  affirmed  likewise  ;  and  the  same  in 
respect  to  E  and  0  :  and  the  denial  of  I  and  0  respec 
tively  involves  the  denial  of  A  and  E  ;  but  the  denial  of 
A  and  E  does  not  involve  the  denial  of  I  and  0. 

This  results  from  the  axiom,  That  the  affirmation  of 
the  universal  is  the  affirmation  of  the  particular  :  and  the 
negation  of  the  particular  destroys  the  universal  ;  but  the 
negation  of  the  universal  does  not  destroy  the  particular. 

II.  Opposition  in  quality.     A  is  opposed  to  E  ;  and  I 
to  0.     The  nature  of  this  opposition  is  such  that  A  being 
affirmed,  E  must  be  denied  ;  but  I  being  affirmed,  0  is 
not  to  be  denied  ;  and  vice  versa.     The  denial  of  A  or  E 
does  not  involve  the  affirmation  of  the  other  ;  but  the  de 
nial  of  I  or  0  does  involve  the  affirmation  of  the  other. 

This  results  from  the  following  axioms  :  1.  A  univer 
sal  positive  and  a  universal  negative  being  contraries 
throughout  their  whole  extent,  cannot  both  be  true.  2. 
A  particular  positive  and  a  particular  negative  being  con- 


326  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

traries  within  limitation,  may  lie  upon  different  parts  of 
the  same  field,  and  therefore  both  be  true.  3.  The  de 
nial  of  a  universal  of  one  quality  does  not  legitimate  the 
affirmation  of  a  universal  of  the  opposite  quality,  since 
both  universals  may  be  false,  and  the  truth  lie  only  in 
the  particulars  :  but  both  the  particulars  cannot  be  false, 
for  then  both  the  universals  would  be  true. 

III.  Opposition  in  both  quantity  and  quality.  A  is 
opposed  to  0  ;  and  E  to  I.  The  nature  of  this  opposition 
is  such  that  A  being  affirmed,  0  must  be  denied  ;  and  E 
being  affirmed,  I  must  be  denied  ;  and  vice  versa.  And 
again  :  A  being  denied,  0  must  be  affirmed  ;  and  E  be 
ing  denied,  I  must  be  affirmed  ;  and  vice  versa. 

This  results  from  the  axioms  : 

1.  Opposition  in  quantity  and  quality,  inasmuch  as  it 
excludes  all  agreement,  amounts  to  positive  contradiction, 
so  that  the  affirmation  of  one  form  of  the  proposition  can 
not  be  less  than  the  destruction  of  the  other  form. 

2.  The  opposition  of  a  universal  positive  to  a  particu 
lar  negative,  or  of  a  universal  negative  to  a  particular 
positive,  constitutes  a  perfect  alternative, — the  denial  of 
the  one  being  the  affirmation  of  the  other. 

The  most  general  form  of  this  axiom  is  as  follows  :  To 
deny  a  positive,  is  equivalent  to  affirming  a  negative; 
and  to  deny  a  negative,  is  equivalent  to  affirming  a  posi 
tive.  In  this  form,  quantity  is  not  taken  into  the  account ; 
but  the  introduction  of  the  idea  of  quantity  modifies  the 
expression  of  the  axiom  ,  since  to  deny  a  universal  posi 
tive,  is  not  to  affirm  a  universal  negative,  inasmuch  as 
this  may  also  be  false,  i.  e.,  the  universality  may  be  false ; 
but  it  is  to  affirm  a  negative,  i.  e.,  the  negative  must  be 
true  in  some  form  ;  and  therefore,  as  it  is  not  necessarily 
true  in  the  universal  form,  it  remains  that  it  must  be  true 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  327 

in  the  particular  form  :  and  so  also  of  denying  a  universal 
negative  in  relation  to  a  particular  positive. 

The  following  table  presents  the  whole  at  one  view  : 

AFFIRMING  is  equivalent  to  DENYING  and  AFFIRMING. 
A  E;0,      =  I, 

E  =  A,  I,       =  0, 

I  E, 

0  A. 

DENYING  is  equivalent  to  AFFIRMING  and  DENYING, 
A  0, 

E  I, 

1  E,0,         =        A, 
0                   =              A,  I,          =        E. 


328  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 


SECTION  IV. 

OF    THE    CONVERSION    OF    PROPOSITIONS. 

A  PROPOSITION  is  converted  by  the  transposition  of  its 
terms :  i.  e.,  the  subject  becomes  the  predicate,  and  the 
predicate  the  subject. 

The  proposition  as  given,  is  called  the  exposita;  when 
converted,  it  is  called  the  converse. 

The  law  which  governs  the  conversion  of  propositions  is 
as  follows :  No  converse  may  assert  more  generally  than 
the  exposita.  This  law  results  from  the  axiom,  that,  A 
consequence  cannot  transcend  its  premises.  Hence,  what 
is  affirmed  in  the  exposita  of  a  part  only,  cannot,  in  the 
converse,  be  affirmed  of  the  whole.  The  application  of 
this  law  is  very  evident. 

1.  Universal  affirmative.     A,  X  is  Y,  does  not  distri 
bute  the  predicate,  but  only  the  subject :  all  the  X's  are 
in  the  Y's,  but  the  Y's  may  contain  more  than  X's ;  and, 
therefore,  from  the  affirmative,  every  X  is  Y,  we  can  only 
affirm  some  Y  is  X  ;  i.  e.,  as  much  of  the  Y  as  answers  to 
the  X. 

2.  Universal  negative.      E,  X  is  Y  distributes  the 
predicate  as  well  as  the  subject.     If  there  is  No  X  in  Y, 
then,  consequently,  there  is  No  Y  in  X. 

3.  Particular  affirmative.  I,  X  is  Y  distributes  neither 
one  nor  the  other  :   If  only  Some  X  is  Y,  then  only  Some 
YisX. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  329 

4.  Particular  negative.  0,  X  is  Y  distributes  only 
the  predicate  :  only  some  X's  are  not  contained  in  the  Y, 
but  all  the  Y's  are  excluded  from  the  some  X's  in  ques 
tion.  Hence,  a  simple  conversion  cannot  take  place  ;  for 
this  would  distribute  the  X,  and,  of  course,  make  it  to  as 
sert  more  generally  than  the  exposita  :  From  some  X  is 
not  Y,  we  cannot  infer  some  Y  is  not  X,  for  then,  by  the 
converse,  all  the  X's  are  excluded  from  the  some  Y's  in 
question.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  some  Y  is  not  X  may, 
in  some  instances,  be  consistent  with  the  exposita  some 
X  is  not  Y,  but  it  is  consistent,  not  as  the  converse  of  this 
form,  but  as  a  deduction  from  another  form  of  the  propo 
sition  :  e.  g.j  "  Some  soldiers  are  not  brave  men,"  is  con 
sistent  with  the  exposita,  "  Some  brave  men  are  not 
soldiers  ; "  but  the  first  is  not  true,  as  the  converse  of  the 
last,  which  plainly  it  is  not ;  but  as  the  contradictory  of 
the  universal  affirmative,  "  All  soldiers  are  brave  men," 
this  contradictory,  from  our  knowledge  of  the  matter,  being 
first  denied. 

In  like  manner,  the  several  forms  A,  Y  is  X  ;  E,  Y  is 
X ;  I,  Y  is  X,  may  be  consistent  with  0,  X  is  Y,  in  par 
ticular  instances,  where  the  matter  is  such  as  to  admit  of 
it.  But  legitimate  conversion  takes  place  independently 
of  the  matter.  According  to  a  strict  exposition  of  the 
form,  therefore,  a  particular  negative  exposita  has  no  con 
verse.  A  negative  proposition,  however,  may  be  changed 
into  a  positive,  by  connecting  the  particle  of  negation 
with  one  of  its  terms  :  e.  g.} 

Sub.  Pred. 


"  Some  brave  men         are         not  soldiers," 

may  be  converted  as  a  particular  positive,  thus, 

Sub.  Pred. 


Some  not  soldiers        are        brave  men.' 


330  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

Here  the  exposita  and  converse  are  identical,  and  may 
be  represented  under  the  bare  form  thus,  some  X  is  not  Y  ; 
converse,  some  not  Y  is  X.  Where  the  particle  of  nega 
tion  is  a  component  of  the  term  which  it  affects,  the  con 
version,  by  a  particular  positive,  is  peculiarly  graceful : 
e.  g.,  "  Some  good  men  are  not  fortunate  ; "  converse, 
"  Some  unfortunate  men  are  good  men." 

To  deny  a  negative  being  equivalent  to  affirming  a 
positive,  we  may  convert  a  positive,  under  a  form  of  nega 
tion,  or  contraposition  :  e.  g.,  "  Every  poet  is  a  man  of 
genius."  This  is  equivalent  to  "No  poet  is  not  a  man  of 
genius  ;  "  which  may  be  converted  by  "  He  who  is  not  a 
man  of  genius  is  not  a  poet."  ** 

The  following  table  contains  the  different  kinds  of  con 
version  under  the  bare  form  : 

EXPOSITA.  CONVERSE. 

A,  X  is  Y  I,   Y  is  X, 

E,  X  is  Y  E,  Y  is  X, 

I,  XisY  I,  YisX, 

0,  X  is  Y  I,  notY  is  X. 

By  contraposition. 
A,  X  is  Y  E,  ^tY  is  X. 

Some  universal  positive  propositions,  such  as  defini 
tions,  for  example,  have  convertible  terms,  i.  e.,  exactly 
equivalent  terms,  and,  in  this  case,  are  said  to  admit  of  a 
universal  positive  as  a  converse  :  e.  g.,  "  All  equilateral 
triangles  are  equiangular  ; "  but  to  state  this  strictly,  we 
should  say,  "All  the  equilateral  triangles  are  aU  the 

*  Whateley's  Logic,  Book  II.,  ch.  ii.,  §4. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  331 

equiangular  triangles."  And  so,  again,  the  example,  "  A 
good  government  is  that  which  has  the  happiness  of  the 
governed  for  its  object,"  and  which  also  seems  to  admit  of 
conversion  by  a  universal  positive,  if  stated  strictly,  be 
comes,  "  All  the  good  governments  are  all  those  which 
have  the  happiness  of  the  governed  in  view."  But  these 
propositions  need  not  be  considered  universal,  for,  in 
the  first  example,  we  are  speaking  not  of  "all  triangles," 
but  only  of  some  triangles,  i.  e.,  those  which  are  "  equi 
lateral  : "  and  in  the  second  example,  we  are  speaking, 
not  of  "  all  governments,"  but  only  of  some  governments, 
i.  e.j  "good  governments."  We  may,  therefore,  convert 
them  by  particular  positive  propositions,  as  follows  : 

"  Some  triangles,  i.  e.,  the  equilateral,  are  equiangular." 
"  Some  triangles,  i.  e.,  the  equiangular,  are  equilateral." 
"  Some  governments,  i.  e.,  the  good,  have  the  happi 
ness  of  the  governed  in  view." 

"  Some  governments,  i.  e.,  all  which  have  the  happi 
ness  of  the  governed  in  view,  are  good  governments."  * 

*  Whateley's  Logic,  ibid. 


Im 

S?? 


332  DEDUCTIVE  LOGIC. 


SECTION  V. 

PROPOSITIONS  CONSTRUCTED  INTO  SYLLOGISMS. 

A  SYLLOGISM  *  is  the  formula  of  the  most  direct  and  simple 
deduction  possible. 

Let  X  is  Y  represent,  as  before,  any  proposition.  If 
the  agreement  of  X  and  Y  is  directly  perceived,  then  in 
tuition  supersedes  the  necessity  of  deduction  :  but  if  it 
cannot  be  perceived  directly,  then  we  must  enquire  for  a 
medium.  Now,  suppose  this  medium  to  be  Z,  and  that 
we  perceive  by  intuition,  or  as  the  result  of  a  previous  de- 
duction,f  that  X  and  Y  respectively  agree  with  Z,  then 
we  infer  that  they  agree  with  each  other.  We  have  thus 
the  formula  of  positive  conclusions  : 

XisZ, 
YisZ, 
therefore 

Xis  Y.J 

The  axiom  which  determines  this  formula  is  the  fol 
lowing  :  If  two  terms  agree  with  one  and  the  same  third 
term,  they  agree  with  each  other. 

Again  :  Let  X  is  not  Y  represent  any  proposition  in 
which  disagreement  is  affirmed  between  two  terms.  If 
this  disagreement  be  not  intuitively  perceived,  we  must 
once  more  seek  for  a  medium  through  which  to  deduce  it. 

*  Vide  supra,  p.  84.  f  Pages  64,  66.  I  Page  211. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  333 

Let  Z,  again,  be  that  medium  ;  and  suppose  that  either, 
by  intuition,  or  as  the  result  of  a  previous  deduction,  we 
perceive  that  X  agrees  with  Z,  but  that  Y  disagrees  with 
Z  ;  then  we  infer  that  X  and  Y  disagree  with  each  other. 
We  have  thus  the  formula  of  negative  conclusions  : 

XisZ, 

Y  is  not  Z, 
therefore 

X  is  not  Y. 

The  axiom  which  determines  this  formula,  is  the  fol 
lowing  :  If  of  two  terms,  one  agrees,  and  the  other  disa 
grees  with  the  same  third  term,  they  disagree  with  each 
other. 

If  the  two  terms  both  disagreed  with  the  third  term, 
no  inference  could  be  made,  because  no  relation  could  be 
established  between  them. 

The  above  axioms  are  really  axioms  of  pure  science.* 
They  apply  rigidly  to  the  formula  of  deduction,  because 
this  formula  is  wholly  independent  of  the  matter  of  propo 
sitions. 

It  is  evident  that  the  syllogism  can  have  neither  more 
nor  less  than  three  terms.  If  it  had  two  terms,  there  would 
be  no  deduction,  but  merely  a  proposition.  If  it  had  four 
terms,  it  would  have  one  term  more  than  is  required  for  a 
simple  deduction  ;  and  this  fourth  term  would  either  be 
irrelevant,  or  would  be  a  term  in  another  link  of  a  chain 
of  deduction.  A  chain  of  deduction  may  be  of  an  indefi 
nite  length,  as  in  geometry,  for  example,  where  the  whole 
science  is  a  chain  of  deduction  from  the  axioms  and  pri 
mary  definitions  ;  but  the  links  of  the  chain  must  each 
consist  of  the  syllogism, — this  being  necessarily  the  ever- 
recurring  form. 

*  Vide  supra,  p.  232. 


334  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

As  the  syllogism,  or  formula  of  deduction,  has  three, 
and  only  three,  terms,  so  also  it  has  three,  and  only  three, 
propositions.  Two  of  the  propositions  contain  the  com 
parisons  of  the  two  terms,  respectively,  with  the  third 
term.  The  third  proposition  contains  the  comparison  of 
the  two  terms  with  each  other,  in  which  their  agreement 
or  disagreement  is  inferred.  The  term  with  which  the 
two  are  compared  is  called  the  middle  term ;  the  term 
compared  with  the  middle  in  the  first  proposition,  is  called 
the  major  term  ;  the  term  compared  with  the  middle  in 
the  second  proposition,  is  called  the  minor  term.  The 
first  two  propositions  are  together  called  the  premises; 
and  the  last  proposition  is  called  the  conclusion.  The 
proposition  which  contains  the  major  term,  i.  e.,  the  first, 
is  called  the  major  premiss ;  and  that  which  contains  the 
minor  term}  i.  e.,  the  second,  is  called  the  minor  premiss. 

But  now  the  question  arises,  what  determines  the 
order  of  comparisons,  or  the  major  term,  and  the  major 
premiss  ?  Before  we  can  answer  this,  several  principles 
must  be  considered. 

1.  It  is  evident  that  if  all  the  terms  were  distributed, 
it  would  be  quite  immaterial  how  we  arranged  the  pre 
mises.     If  all  X  be  contained  in  all  Z,  and  all  Y  be  con 
tained  in  all  Z,  then  X  and  Y  cannot  be  otherwise  than 
compared  through  Z,  in  their  whole  extent. 

2.  If  the  middle  term  be  not   distributed,  then  the 
two   terms   or   extremes  cannot   be   certainly  compared 
through  it,  for  one  of  them  might  agree  with  one  part  of 
it,  and  the  other  with  another  part,  and  thus  no  relation 
between  them  be  established  :  but  a  distribution  of  the 
middle   in  one  of  the  premises  is   sufficient,   for  if  one 
extreme  has  been  compared  to  the  whole  of  the  middle 
term,  and  the  other  to  only  a  part  of  it,  a  relation  is 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  335 

evidently  established  between  them,  since  every  part  of 
the  middle  term,  in  this  case,  presents  the  extreme  com 
pared  with  the  whole  of  it,  to  the  extreme  compared  with 
SL  part  of  it. 

3.  Hence  it  appears,  again,  that  where  there  are  two 
particular  premises,  no  legitimate  conclusion  can  be  drawn ; 
for  we  shall  then  have  either  an  undistributed  middle,  e.  g. 

Some  Z  is  X, 

Some  Y  is  Z ; 

or  we  shall  fail  in  establishing  a  relation  between  the  two 
extremes ;  for  the  only  case  of  a  distributed  middle  with 
particular  premises,  is  where  the  middle  term  is  the  predi 
cate  of  a  particular  negative,  e.  g. 

Some  Z  is  X, 

Some  Y  is  not  Z, 

in  which  some  Z  and  X  being  first  affirmed  to  agree,  and 
then  some  Y  only  being  excluded  from  Z,  it  cannot  follow 
certainly  that  some  Y  is  not  X,  since  some  other  part  of 
X  may  not  agree  with  Z,  and  some  other  part  of  Y  may 
agree  with  Z,  for  particulars  of  opposite  qualities  may 
both  be  true ;  and  thus  the  conclusion  is  left  wholly  in 
definite. 

4.  But  the  case  is  widely  different  where  one  of  the 
premises  is  universal,  and  the  middle  term  is  distributed, 
e.g. 

All  Z  is  X, 

Some  Y  is  Z  ; 

here  all  Z  being  contained  in  X,  the  some  Y  contained  in 
Z  must  be  contained  in  X  also.  Again :  in  the  premises, 

No  Z  is  X, 

Some  Y  is  Z, 

inasmuch  as  the  whole  of  Z  is  excluded  from  X,  and  some 
Y  is  contained  in  Z,  it  follows  that  some  Y  is  not  in  X. 


336  DEDUCTIVE  LOGIC. 

Hence  if  one  of  the  premises  is  a  universal,  it  is  suffi 
cient  if  only  the  middle  term  be  distributed,  and  this  takes 
place  when  the  universal  premiss  is  E,  or  when,  if  it  be 
A,  the  middle  term  is  the  subject. 

5.  We  may  not  distribute  in  the  conclusion  a  term 
which  has  not  been  previously  distributed  in  a  premiss, 
for  this  would  violate  the  cardinal  axiom,  that  A  conse 
quence  cannot  transcend  its  premises. 

6.  From  two  negative  premises  no  inference  can  be 
made ;  for,  since  in  this  case  both  extremes  disagree  with 
the  middle  term,  we  cannot  know,  by  means  of  this  term, 
whether  they  agree  or  disagree  with  each  other. 

7.  If  one  of  the  premises  be  negative,  the  conclusion 
must  be  negative  also.     Here  one  of  the  extremes  is 
affirmed  to  agree,  and  the  other  to  disagree,  with  the 
middle  term,  and  consequently  they  must  disagree  with 
each  other. 

8.  If  one  of  the  premises  be  particular,  the  conclusion 
must  be  particular  also;  for,  although  the  whole  of  one 
extreme  is  compared  in  the  universal  premiss  with  the 
middle  term,  yet,  as  in  the  particular  premiss,  only  a  part 
of  the  other  extreme  is  compared  with  the  middle  term, 
only  a  part  of  the  first  can  be  compared  with  the  second 
in  the  conclusion. 

9.  Where  there  are  two  universal  positive  premises, 
we  cannot  draw  a  universal  conclusion,  if  the  two  extremes 
are  both  predicates  in  the  premises,  for  then  they  are  both 
undistributed :  e.  g. 

All  Z  is  X, 
All  Z  is  Y, 
therefore 

Some  Y  is  X. 

The  ambiguity  of  the  middle  term  is  a  fallacy  arising 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  337 

from  the  matter,  or  the  peculiar  use  of  words,  and  there 
fore  is  not  to  be  considered  here,  where  we  are  discussing 
the  pure  deductive  formula. 

It  is  evident  that  only  four  different  conclusions  can 
be  drawn,  viz. :  A,  E,  I,  and  0  ;  now  the  premises  which 
are  to  determine  these  conclusions  must  be  constituted  in 
accordance  with  the  above  principles.  Let  us  consider 
them  in  order. 

I.  A  universal  affirmative  conclusion.  This  can  be 
drawn  where  all  of  one  extreme  can  be  inferred  to  be  con 
tained  in  the  other.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  contain 
ing  extreme  should  itself  be  distributed ;  it  may  contain 
the  other  extreme,  and  a  great  deal  more ;  all  which  is 
necessary  to  the  universal  conclusion  is,  that  all  of  one 
extreme  should  be  affirmed  to  be  contained  in  the  other. 
Now,  as  the  middle  term  must  be  distributed,  it  must  be 
the  subject  of  one  of  the  premises ;  and  as  one  of  the 
extremes  must  be  distributed,  it  must  be  the  subject  of 
the  other  premiss ;  and  again,  as  it  is  the  only  extreme 
distributed,  it  must  be  the  subject  of  the  universal  con 
clusion.  And,  once  more,  as  the  middle  term  is  the 
medium  of  comparison,  it,  on  the  one  hand,  must  embrace 
the  whole  of  one  extreme,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  must 
itself  be  all  embraced  by  the  other  extreme.  The  follow 
ing  arrangement  of  the  terms  is  the  only  one  which  com 
prises  all  the  conditions  of  a  universal  conclusion : 
A,  Z  is  X, 
A,  Y  is  Z, 
A,  Y  is  X.* 

Hence  the  major  term  is  here  the  one  which  contains 
the  middle,  and  the  minor  is  the  one  which  is  contained 
in  the  middle. 

*  Barbara. 
15 


338  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

We  might  arrange  the  premises  thus : 

A,  Y  is  Z, 

A,  Z  is  X, 

A,  Y  is  X, 
but  the  major  premiss  is  generally  placed  first. 

II.  Universal  negative  conclusion.  Here  the  two  ex 
tremes  are  universally  denied  of  each  other.  Hence  there 
is  only  one  possible  arrangement  of  the  terms,  viz.  :  so 
that  one  extreme  shall  be  universally  excluded  from  the 
middle  term,  and  the  other  extreme  universally  contained 
in  it,  as  follows  : 

(1.)  (2.) 

E,  Z  is  X,*  E,  X  is  Z,f 

A,  Y  is  Z,  or  A,  Y  is  Z, 

E,  Y  is  X,  E,  Y  is  X. 

The  only  difference  between  the  two  syllogisms  above, 
is  the  conversion  of  the  major  premiss,  in  the  last. 
Or  we  may  express  the  same  thing  thus  : 

(3.)  (4.) 

A,  X  is  Z,t  A,  X  is  Z,§ 

E,  Y  is  Z,  or             E,  Z  is  Y, 

E,  Y  is  X,  E,  Y  is  X. 

The  only  difference  between  the  last  two  is  the  conver 
sion  of  the  minor  premiss,  in  the  second.  And  the  only 
difference  between  the  first  and  the  last  two  is,  that  the 
extreme  which,  in  the  first  two,  is  excluded  from  the 
middle  term,  in  the  last  two  is  contained  in  it  ;  and  the 
extreme  which,  in  the  first  two,  is  contained  in  the  middle 
term,  in  the  last  two  is  excluded  from  it. 

*  Celarent.  f  Cesare.  J  Camestres..  J  Camenes. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  339 

But  it  is  evident  that  all  these  different  forms  satisfy 
the  conditions  required,  and  are  virtually  the  same. 

As  to  the  title  of  the  extremes,  the  term  which 
becomes  the  subject  of  the  conclusion  is  generally  called 
the  minor  term,  and  that  which  becomes  the  predicate 
of  the  conclusion,  the  major  term.  In  a  universal  nega 
tive  conclusion,  however,  this  is  of  no  account,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  simply  convertible.  It  is  quite  immaterial 
whether  we  express  the  conclusion  by  E,  Y  is  X,  or  E, 
Xis  Y. 

Indeed,  the  2,  3,  and  4  forms  may  all  be  easily  re 
duced  to  the  first :  the  2,  by  simply  converting  the  major ; 
the  3,  by  simply  converting  the  minor,  and  making  it  to 
change  places  with  the  major,  and  then  simply  converting 
the  conclusion ;  and  the  4,  by  transposing  the  premises, 
and  simply  converting  the  conclusion. 

III.  Particular  affirmative  conclusion.  This  conclu 
sion  is  drawn  where  one  of  the  premises  is  a  particular 
affirmative,  or  where  both  premises  are  universal  affirma 
tives. 

1.  Where  one  of  the  premises  is  a  particular  affirma 
tive,  all  of  the  middle  must  be  contained  in  one  extreme, 
and  some  of  the  other  extreme  in  the  middle,  or,  which 
amounts  to  the  same  thing,  since  a  particular  affirmative 
is  simply  convertible,  some  of  the  middle  in  the  other  ex- 
treme.  The  form  which  directly  presents  this  is  the  fol 
lowing  : 

(1.) 

A,  Z  is  X, 
I,  YisZ, 
I,  YisX.* 

*  Darii. 


340  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

The  deduction  here  is  manifestly  valid.     There  are 
three  other  forms,  viz. : 


(2.) 

(3.) 

(4.) 

I,   ZisX,* 

A,  Z  is  X,f 

I,   XisZ,J 

A,  Z  is  Y, 

I,   ZisY, 

A,  Z  is  Y, 

I,  YisX. 

I,  YisX. 

I,   YisX. 

All  these  evidently  fulfil  the  required  conditions. 
Here,  again,  the  2,  3,  and  4  forms  may  be  reduced  to  the 
first :  the  2,  by  simply  converting  the  major,  transposing 
the  premises,  and  then  converting  the  conclusion ;  the  3, 
by  converting  the  minor ;  and  the  4,  by  transposing  the 
premises,  and  converting  the  conclusion. 

Scholium.  It  will  be  remarked  that  the  change  of  the 
forms,  by  conversion  of  propositions,  and  the  transposi 
tion  of  the  premises,  does  not  alter  the  current  of  the 
deduction.  We  have  seen  §  that  a  proposition,  when  law 
fully  converted,  asserts  no  more  than  it  did  before :  the 
transposition  of  the  premises  obviously  does  not  change 
their  character,  nor  their  relation  to  each  other;  and 
since,  when  this  transposition  is  made,  what  was  before 
called  the  major  becomes  the  minor  term,  and  vice  versa, 
the  conclusion  is  converted,  to  correspond  to  it. 

2.  Where  both  premises  are  universal  affirmatives. 
Here,  either  both  extremes  are  predicates,  and  of  course 
undistributed,  or  one  only  is  a  predicate,  and  undis 
tributed. 

There  are  then  two  forms  : 


Disamis.  f  Datisi.  J  Dimaris. 

§  Supra,  See.  IV. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 


341 


(5.)  (6.) 

A,  Z  is  X,*  A,  X  is  Z,f 

A,  Z  is  Y,  A,  Z  is  Y, 

I,  Y  is  X.  I,   Y  is  X. 

These  also  can  easily  be  reduced  to  the  first :  the  5, 
by  converting  the  minor  premiss  into  I ;  and  the  6,  by 
transposing  the  premises,  and  simply  converting  the  con 
clusion.  After  the  transposition,  we  consider  A,  X  is  Z, 
as  I,  X  is  Z,  for  only  the  particular  is  required  for  the 
conclusion.  Indeed,  these  forms  are  quite  unnecessary, 
since  a  particular  affirmative  conclusion  requires  only  one 
universal  premiss  ;  and  two  universals,  arranged  as  above, 
cannot  form  the  premises  of  any  thing  more. 

IV.  Particular  negative  conclusion.  We  have  seen 
that  from  two  particular  premises  no  inference  can  be 
drawn,  not  even  where  a  particular  negative,  of  which  the 
middle  term  is  the  predicate,  and  consequently  distributed, 
is  one  of  the  premises.  Nor,  again,  can  any  inference  be 
drawn  from  two  negatives.  One  at  least  of  the  premises, 
therefore,  must  be  a  universal,  and  only  one  of  them  a 
negative.  If  there  be  two  universal  premises,  the  extreme 
contained  in  the  universal  positive  must  be  a  predicate, 
so  that  it  be  not  distributed,  for  if  both  extremes  were 
distributed,  then  the  conditions  of  a  universal  negative 
would  be  fulfilled.  From  this  it  follows  that  we  can  draw 
a  particular  negative  conclusion  only  in  the  three  follow 
ing  ways : 

1.  The  whole  of  one  extreme  must  be  excluded  from 
the  middle  term,  and  some  of  the  other  extreme  must  be 
contained  in  it.  There  are  six  forms  in  this  division : 

*  Darapti.  t  Bramantip. 


342  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

(1.)       (2.)        (3.)       (4.) 

E,  Z  is  X,*  E,  X  is  Z,f  E,  Z  is  X,J  E,  Z  is  X,§ 

I,  Y  is  Z,  I,  Y  is  Z,  A,  Z  is  Y,  I,  Z  is  Y, 

0,YisX.  0,  YisX.  0,YisX.  6,YisX. 

(5.)  (6.) 

E,  X  is  Z,||  E,  X  is  Z,^[ 

A,  Z  is  Y,  I,  Z  is  Y, 

0,  Y  is  X.  0,  Y  is  X. 

2.  The  whole  of  one  extreme  must  be  contained  in 
the  middle  term,  and  only  some  of  the  other  extreme  ex 
cluded  from  it.  In  this  the  preceding  is  reversed.  Here 
is  only  one  form,  viz.  : 


A,  X  is  Z,** 
0,  Y  is  Z, 
0,  Y  is  X. 

3.  Some  of  the  middle  term  must  be  excluded  from 
one  extreme,  and  the  whole  of  it  contained  in  the  other 
extreme.  Here  also  is  only  one  form,  viz.  : 

(8.) 

0,  Z  is  X,ft 
A,  Z  is  Y, 
0,  YisX. 

Every  one  must  perceive,  upon  a  little  reflection,  that 
these  three  divisions  embrace  all  possible  negative  conclu 
sions. 

Here,  again,  all  the  forms  can  be  shown  to  be  identical 
in  their  principle,  by  reducing  all  the  others  to  the  first 

*  Ferio.  f  Festino.  J  Felapton.  §  Feriso.  ||  Fesapo. 

f  Fresison.  **  Baroko.  ft  Bokardo. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  343 

form.  2  is  reduced  by  simply  converting  the  major ;  3,  by 
converting  the  minor  into  I ;  4,  by  simply  converting  the 
minor ;  5,  by  simply  converting  the  major,  and  converting 
the  minor  into  I ;  and  6,  by  simply  converting  both  the 
major  and  minor.  In  these  the  mode  of  reduction  is 
obvious  and  easy.  7  and  8  are  reduced  in  a  manner  more 
circuitous :  In  7,  the  major  term  must  be  changed  by  con 
traposition,  and  the  minor  changed  into  I,  by  connecting 
the  negative  particle  with  the  predicate,*  thus  : 


A,  X  is  Z,    by  contraposition  f  E,  not  Z  is  X, 

0,  Y  is  Z,  by  connecting  the  particle  I,  Y  is  not  Z, 
0,  Y  is  Z?  "  "         0,  Y  is  X. 

In  8,  the  minor  is  changed  into  E,  by  double  negation, 
and  is  not  converted  as  before ;  the  major  is  converted 
into  I,  as  before  ;  the  premises  are  then  transposed ;  and 
lastly,  the  conclusion,  by  a  double  negation  and  conversion, 
is  made  to  correspond  legitimately  as  well  as  in  form  with 
the  premises,  thus  : 

0;  Z  is  X  converted  into  I,  not  X  is  Z, 

A,  Z  is  Y  by  double  negation  becomes  E,  Z  is  not  Y. 

„,  (  E,  Z  is  not  Y. 

Transposing  these  premises  we  have  < 

(  I,   not  X  is  Z. 

Then  0,  Y  is  X,  by  double  negation  } 

and  conversion  gives  the  proper  >  Q;  notX  is  not  Y. 
conclusion  ) 

*  Vide  Section  IV. 

f  Contraposition  supposes  a  previous  double  negation ;  it  is  a  simple  con 
version,  after  a  change  has  been  made  by  this  negation,  e.  g.  E,  X  is  not  Z  is 
the  double  negation,  and  then  by  conversion,  E,  not  Z  is  X. 


344  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

As  this  is  somewhat  complicated,  I  will  give  an  illus 
tration  : 

0,  "  Some  oppressed  men  are  not  discontented ; 

A,     All  oppressed  men  are  wronged ; 
Therefore 

0,  Some  wronged  men  are  not  discontented." 

This,  when  reduced  as  above,  becomes 
E,  "  No  oppressed  men  are  not  wronged  ; 

1,  Some  not  discontented  are  oppressed  men ; 
0,     Some  not  discontented  are  not  not  wronged." 

This  may  also  be  reduced  to  the  first  form  of  the  par 
ticular  positive,  viz.,  to  A,  I,  I,  by  converting  the  minor 
term  and  the  conclusion  into  I,  by  connecting  the  negative 
particle  as  before,  and  then  transposing  the  premises,  thus  : 

0,  Z  is  X  convei  ed  and  transposed  to  minor  I,  notX,  is  Z 
A,  Z  is  Y  transposed  to  major  A,  Z  is  Y 

0,  Y  is  X  converted  I3  not  X  is  Y 
A,  All  oppressed  men  are  wronged ; 

1,  Some  not  discontented  are  oppressed  men  j 
I,    Some  not  discontented  are  wronged  !  * 


From  the  foregoing  analysis,  it  appears,  that  there  are 
but  four  original  distinct  syllogisms,  comprising  the  four 
possible  conclusions,  viz.,  A,  A,  A ;  E,  A,  E ;  A,  I.  I  ; 
and  E,  I,  0,  as  arranged  under  the  first  form  of  each  kind  ; 
— all  the  other  forms  being  capable  of  a  legitimate  reduc 
tion  to  these  primary  forms. 

*  Whately's  Logic,  Book  II.,  Ch.  iii.,  §  5. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  345 

At  the  beginning  of  this  section  we  considered  the  two 
primary  axioms  of  pure  science  which  determine  the  gene 
ral  formula  of  Deduction.  But  in  analysing  this  formula 
under  the  ideas  of  quantity  and  quality,  we  find  another 
axiom  developed.  In  every  form  of  the  syllogism  one  of 
the  extremes  is  more  comprehensive  than  either  the  other 
extreme,  or  the  middle  term  ;  and  the  middle  term  com 
prehends  this  other  extreme,  whether  it  be  the  whole  or  a 
part  of  the  class  to  which  it  belongs,  thus  : 

All  Z  is  X, 

All,  or,  some  Y  is  Z, 

therefore  we  may  infer 

All,  or,  some  Y  is  X. 

Hence,  it  appears,  that  what  is  affirmed  of  Z,  viz., 
that  it  is  comprehended  by  X,  must  be  affirmed  of  Y  also 
to  the  extent  that  it  is  comprehended  by  Z.  So  far  with 
respect  to  Quantity. 

With  respect  to  Quality,  the  middle  term  is  always 
universally  affirmed,  either  to  be  comprehended  by,  or  to 
be  excluded  from,  the  first  extreme ;  and  the  other  extreme 
is  in  whole  or  part  affirmed  to  be  comprehended  in  the 
middle  term,  thus : 

All,  or,  no  Z  is  X, 
All,  or,  some  Y  is  Z, 

therefore  we  may  infer 

All,  or,  some  Y  is,  or  is  not,  X. 

Here,  again,  what  is  affirmed  of  Z,  viz.,  that  it  univer 
sally  does,  or  does  not,  agree  with,  or  belong  to  X,  must 
be  affirmed  of  Y  also,  to  the  extent  that  it  is  compre 
hended  by  Z. 

15* 


346  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

Now  all  this  is  evident ;  and  the  axiom  which  forms 
the  basis  of  it,  is  the  Dictum  de  omni  et  nullo  of  Aristotle, 
viz.,  Whatever  is  affirmed  or  denied  of  any  term  distri- 
butedj  (i.  e.  taken  universally,)  is  affirmed  or  denied  of 
every  particular  comprehended  under  it. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  347 


SECTION  VI. 

OF   MOODS   AND    FIGURES. 

THE  Mood  of  a  Syllogism  is  determined  by  the  quantity 
and  quality  of  the  three  propositions  which  compose  it, 
and  is  represented  by  the  corresponding  symbols  ;  thus, 
A,  A,  A,  expresses  the  mood  of  the  syllogism  which  gives 
a  universal  positive  conclusion  ;  and  so  with  respect  to  the 
others. 

The  Figure  of  a  Syllogism  refers  to  the  situation  of  the 
extremes  in  the  premises  with  respect  to  the  middle  term. 
Now,  obviously,  there  are  but  four  variations  that  can  be 
made,  viz.,  the  middle  term  must  be  the  subject  in  both 
premises  ;  or  the  predicate  in  both  ;  or  the  subject  of  the 
major,  and  the  predicate  of  the  minor ;  or  the  predicate 
of  the  major,  and  the  subject  of  the  minor.  The  following 
table  presents  their  several  relations  : 

(1.)  (2.)  (3.)  (4.) 

ZisX,  XisZ,  ZisX,  X  is  Z, 

Y  is  Z,  Y  is  Z,  Z  is  Y,  Z  is  Y, 

YisX.  YisX.  YisX.  YisX. 

Now  as  there  are  four  kinds  of  propositions,  A,  E,  I, 
0,  and  three  are  appropriated  to  each  syllogism,  all  the 
possible  ways  of  combining  them  must  be  sixty-four.  For 
four  different  majors  multiplied  into  four  different  minors, 
and  these  again  into  four  different  conclusions,  is  a  com 
bination  of  four,  three  times,  4  X  4  X  4=64:  Kegarding  it 


348  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

as  a  mere  arithmetical  problem,  since  the  sixty-four  Moods 
can  be  each  stated  in  the  four  different  Figures,  we  shall 
have  in  all  4x64=256  varieties  of  the  syllogism.  The 
arithmetical  determination,  however,  although  noticed  by 
logicians,  is  of  very  little  use.  We  find  out  in  this  way  the 
utmost  limit  of  the  syllogisms,  but  we  are  not  aided,  in  the 
least,  in  discriminating  between  the  true  and  the  false. 

This  discrimination  can  be  made  only  on  the  principles 
laid  down  in  the  preceding  section  ;  and  which  have  there 
been  applied  to  determining  the  legitimate  and  required 
syllogisms,  independently  of  the  apparatus  of  Moods  and 
Figures.  And  yet,  after  having  completed  this  analysis, 
there  may  perhaps  be  some  convenience  in  employing 
Moods  and  Figures  in  distinguishing  the  different  forms. 

The  legitimate  forms,  we  have  seen,  are  in  all  nine 
teen  ;  of  which,  one  only  is  used  for  universal  positive  con 
clusions,  four  for  universal  negative,  six  for  particular 
positive,  and  eight  for  particular  negative  conclusions. 
These  are  found  in  the  different  Figures.  That  figure 
which  embraces  the  four  cardinal  forms,  is  called  the  first. 
All  the  other  forms,  we  have  seen,  can  be  reduced  to  these 
cardinal  forms. 

The  following  lines  have  been  contrived  to  aid  in  com 
mitting  the  Moods  to  memory  ;  and  to  present,  at  one 
view,  the  mode  of  reducing  the  secondary  Moods  to  the 
primary  : 

Fig.  1.  bArbArA,  cElArEnt,  dArll,  fErlOque  pri- 
oris. 

Fig.  2.  cEsArE,  cAmEstrEs,  f  EstlnO,  bArOkO,  se- 
cundae. 

Fig.  3.  tertia,  dArAptl,  dlsAmls,  dAtlsI,  fElApt- 
On,  bOkArdO,  ErlsO,  habet :  quarta  in- 
super  addit. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  349 

Fig.  4.     brAmAntlp,  cAmEnEs,  dlmArls,  fEsApo, 
frEsIsOn. 

In  the  above,  the  initial  letters  b,  c,  d,  f,  denote  the 
mood  of  the  first  figure  to  which  the  secondary  mood  must 
be  reduced :  e.  g.  In  brAmAntlp  the  b  indicates  that  it 
is  to  be  reduced  to  bArbArA  ;  *  and  so  of  the  others. 

The  capital  letters  denote  the  moods  ;  s,  denotes  the 
simple  conversion  of  the  proposition  which  precedes  it ;  p, 
the  conversion  per  accidens  of  the  proposition  which  pre 
cedes  it,  i.  e.,  the  conversion  of  A  into  I,  or  of  I  into  Af ; 
m,  (mutandi)  that  the  premises  must  be  transposed. 

Baroko  and  Bokardo  are  names  given  in  reference  to 
Beductio  ad  impossibile;  a  method  of  reduction  employed 
by  some,  particularly  in  respect  to  these  moods.  The  B 
denotes  that  the  new  mood  is  to  be  formed  in  Barbara ; 
and  the  K,  that  for  the  proposition  immediately  preced 
ing  it,  the  contradictory  of  the  conclusion  must  be  substi 
tuted.  These  moods,  however,  have  in  the  preceding  sec 
tions  been  reduced  in  the  ordinary  way.J 

*  If  reduced  to  Barbara,  it  of  course  is  true  in  Darn. 

f  This  last  occurs  in  Bramantip  only,  and  here  not  because  a  particular  can 
legitimately  he  converted  into  a  universal,  but  because  the  new  arrangement  of 
the  premises  requires  a  universal  conclusion.  The  transposition  of  the  premises 
places  the  mood  in  the  1st  Fig.  and  it  becomes  Barbara  necessarily. 

J  The  kind  of  arguments  to  which  the  different  moods  are  in  their  nature 
best  adapted,  is  an  investigation  of  very  high  interest.  I  have  not  entered 
upon  it  in  this  treatise.  Perhaps  I  shall  undertake  it  hereafter.  In  the  ab 
sence  of  any  thing  original  to  offer,  I  take  the  liberty  of  appending  the  follow 
ing  striking  remarks  from  Dr.  Whately's  excellent  work.  They  are  given  in  a 
note  at  the  foot  of  one  of  the  pages  of  Book  II.,  Ch.  III.,  §  4  : 

"  With  respect  to  the  use  of  the  first  three  Figures  (for  the  fourth  is  never 
employed  but  by  an  accidental  awkwardness  of  expression,)  it  may  be  remarked, 
that  the  First  is  that  into  which  an  argument  will  be  found  to  fall  the  most 
naturally,  except  in  the  following  cases: — First,  When  we  have  to  disprove 
something  that  has  been  maintained,  or  is  likely  to  be  believed,  our  arguments 


350  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

will  usually  be  found  to  take  most  conveniently  the  form  of  the  Second  Figure, 
viz.  we  prove  that  the  thing  we  are  speaking  of  cannot  belong  to  such  a  Class, 
either  because  it  wants  what  belongs  to  the  whole  of  that  Class  (Cesare),  or  be 
cause  it  has  something  of  which  that  Class  is  destitute  (Camestres) ;  e.  g.  '  No 
impostor  would  have  warned  his  followers,  as  Jesus  did,  of  the  persecutions 
they  would  have  to  submit  to ; '  and  again,  '  An  enthusiast  would  have  ex 
patiated,  which  Jesus  and  his  followers  did  not,  on  the  particulars  of  a  future 
state.' 

"  The  same  observations  will  apply,  mutatis  mutandis,  when  a  Particular 
conclusion  is  sought,  as  in  Festino  and  Baroko. 

"  The  arguments  used  in  the  process  called  the  '  Abscissio  Infiniti,'  will  in 
general  be  the  most  easily  referred  to  this  Figure. 

"  The  Third  Figure  is,  of  course,  the  one  employed  when  the  Middle  term 
is  Singular,  since  a  Singular  term  can  only  be  a  Subject.  This  is  also  the  form 
into  which  most  arguments  will  naturally  fall  that  are  used  to  establish  an  ob- 
jection  (Enstasis  of  Aristotle)  to  an  opponent's  Premiss,  when  his  argument  is 
such  as  to  require  that  Premiss  to  be  Universal.  It  might  be  called,  therefore, 
the  Enstatic  Figure.  E.  G.  If  any  one  contends  that  '  this  or  that  doctrine 
ought  not  to  be  admitted,  because  it  cannot  be  explained  or  comprehended,' 
his  suppressed  major  premiss  may  be  refuted  by  the  argument  that  '  the  con 
nection  of  the  Body  and  Soul  cannot  be  explained  or  comprehended,'  $r. 

"A  great  part  of  the  reasoning  of  Butler's  Analogy  may  be  exhibited  in 
this  form." 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  351 


SECTION  VII. 

OF    THE   REDUCTION    OF    SYLLOGISMS. 

KEDUCTION  of  Syllogisms  is  of  two  kinds,  Ostensive  Be- 
duction,  and  Eeductio  ad  impossible.  The  aim  in  both 
kinds,  in  respect  to  Syllogisms,  is  to  prove  the  validity  of 
the  secondary  forms. 

I.  Ostensive  Reduction. — Here  the  proof  is  made  out 
by  showing  the  identity  of  the  secondary  and  primary 
forms  ;  and  this  is  done  by  actually  changing  the  secondary 
into  the  primary,  without  making  them  assert  more,  or, 
differently  from  what  they  did  before. 

This  change  is  effected  by  conversion  of  terms,  and 
transposition  of  premises.  But  it  has  been  fully  shown 
that  these  do  not  effect  either  the  kind  or  the  extent  of 
the  predication.  When  the  secondary  are  reduced  to  the 
primary  form,  the  proof  is  made  out,  because  these  forms 
are  a  direct  expression  of  the  Dictum  de  omni  et  nullo. 

II.  Eeductio  ad  impossibile. — By  this  method  we  prove 
the  validity  of  a  secondary  Syllogism  as  a  form  of  reason 
ing,  by  showing  that  if  we  grant  the  premises,  the  conclu 
sion  cannot  be  false.     For  that  in  all  cases  must  be  a  valid 
form,  by  which,  from  true  premises,  we  cannot  draw  a  false 
conclusion. 

The  method  is  simply  this  :  Since  by  the  opposition 
of  propositions,  every  proposition  must  be  true  if  its  con 
tradictory  be  false,  and  false  if  its  contradictory  be  true, 


352  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

we  take  the  contradictory  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Syl 
logism  or  form  in  question,  and  construct  with  it,  as  a 
premiss  in  connection  with  another  unquestionable  pre 
miss,  a  new  Syllogism  in  the  first  Figure.  Now  if  the 
new  conclusion  thus  deduced  be  false,  then  the  assumed 
premiss  must  be  false,  for  there  is  no  question  respecting 
the  validity  of  the  form  in  the  first  Figure  ;  and  if  the  as 
sumed  premiss  be  false,  then  the  original  conclusion  of 
which  it  is  the  contradictory  must  be  true  :  e.  g.  Let  us 
take  Baroko : 

A,  X  is  Z, 

0,  Y  is  Z, 

0,  Y  is  X. 

If  this  conclusion  be  not  true,  its  contradictory  is  true, 
viz.,  A,  Y  is  X.  Let  us,  then,  construct  a  new  Syllogism 
with  this  contradictory  as  a  premiss,  in  the  first  Figure. 
This  we  can  do  by  merely  substituting  it  for  the  minor 
premiss  in  the  above  Syllogism  ;  we  shall  then  draw  a  con 
clusion  in  Barbara,  thus  : 

A,  X  is  Z, 

A,  Y  is  X  ; 
therefore, 

A,  Y  is  Z. 

Now  it  will  be  perceived  that  this  new  conclusion  is 
the  contradictory  of  the  original  minor  premiss, — and  the 
premises  it  will  be  recollected  were  granted  ;  hence  it 
must  be  false  ;  and  being  false,  the  new  premiss  is  false, 
and  this  being  false,  its  contradictory,  the  original  conclu 
sion,  must  be  true. 

All  the  secondary  forms  may  be  tested  in  the  same 
way,  e.  g.  Feriso. 

E,  Z  is  X, 

1,  Z  is  Y, 
0,YisX. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  353 

Substituting  the  contradictory  of  the  conclusion  A,  Y 
is  X,  for  the  major  premiss,  we  form  the  following  Syllo 
gism  in  Darii : 

A,  Y  is  X, 

I,  Z  is  Y  ; 

therefore, 

I,  Z  is  X. 

But  the  new  conclusion  contradicts  the  original  major 
E,  Z  is  X  ;  consequently  it  is  false  ;  and  being  false,  the 
new  premiss  is  false,  and  this  being  false,  its  contradic 
tory,  the  original  conclusion,  must  be  true. 


354  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 


SECTION  VIII. 

OF    MODAL,    HYPOTHETICAL,    AND    DISJUNCTIVE 
PROPOSITIONS. 

I.  Modals. — These  propositions  do  not  differ  in  form  from 
what  are  called  pure  categorical  propositions.  X  is  Y 
represents  both.  The  modality  is  merely  a  peculiarity  of 
the  matter,  and  consequently  does  not  pertain  to  the  pure 
logical  formula.  Besides,  in  the  matter  itself,  modal  pro 
positions  can  be  so  disposed  as  to  become  pure  categoricals. 
This  is  effected  by  attaching  the  modal  words  to  the  sub 
ject  or  the  predicate.  E.  G.  "  It  is  probable  that  all 
knowledge  is  useful,"  i.  e. 

Sub.  Pred. 

"  All  knowledge         is        probably  useful." 

Again  : 

"It  is  possible  that  he  may  arrive  to-morrow  ; "  i.  e. 

Sub.  Pred. 


"  His  arrival  to-morrow  is  possible." 

A  subject  and  predicate  may  each  be  expressed  by 
several  words,  but  this  cannot  affect  the  form. 

II.  Hypothetical . — These  are  propositions  which  con 
tain  a  hypothesis  in  one  of  their  terms,  and  are  therefore 
like  Modals  capable  of  being  reduced  under  the  categori 
cal  form.  Where  the  force  of  the  reasoning  lies  in  the 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  355 

hypothesis  the  case  is  widely  different  ;  but  it  is  evident 
that  this  is  not  the  fact  in  Examples  like  the  following  : 

Every  Z  is  X  or  p, 

Every  Y  is  Z  ; 
therefore, 

Every  Y  is  X  or  p. 

The  aim  here  is  not  to  conclude  which  of  the  two  Y 
is,  whether  X  or  p  :  but  only  that  Y  is  X  or  p. 

III.  Disjunctives. — These  are  a  kind  of  compound 
propositions,  consisting  of  several  categoricals,  one  of 
which  is  affirmed  to  be  true  ;  e.  g.  A  is  either  B  or  C  or 
D.  Now  if  we  can  deny  all  but  one,  then  that  one  is 
true  ;  or  if  we  can  affirm,  one  to  be  true,  then  the  others 
are  false  ;  thus,  But  A  is  not  B  or  C  ;  therefore  A  is  D  : 
or  A  is  D,  therefore  it  is  neither  B  nor  C. 

A  Disjunctive  proposition,  however,  is  capable  of  being 
reduced  like  a  Modal  to  a  pure  categorical,  thus  : 

Sab.  Pred. 


All  A  not  B  or  C         is         D  ; 
Or, 

Sub.  Pred. 


All  A  not  B  or  D         is          C. 

A  Syllogism  with  such  propositions  contains  the  usual 

forms  ;  e.  g.  

Every  A  not  B  or  C  is  D. 
All  Z  is  A  not  TTorO. 
Therefore,  all  Z  is  D. 

"  It  is  either  Spring,  Summer,  Autumn,  or  Winter  ; 
but  it  is  neither  Spring,  Autumn,  nor  Winter  ;  therefore 
it  is  Summer,"  i.  e. 

Every  season  not  Spring,  Autumn,  or  Winter,  is 
Summer. 


356  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 


The  present  season  is  a  season  not  Spring,  &c.,  there 
fore,  the  present  season  is  Summer. 

When  we  affirm  one  to  be  true,  and  infer  the  falsity 
of  the  others,  the  same  reduction  may  be  made  ;  thus  : 
No  A  being  D  is  B  or  C, 


Z    is      A  being  D, 
Therefore,  Z   is  not  B  or  C. 


No  season  being  Summer,  is  Autumn  or  Winter,  &c. 

The  present  season  is  a  season  being  Summer  ;  there 
fore,  &c. 

Or,  again,  a  Syllogism  of  this  kind  may  be  put  into 
the  form  of  a  conditional,  thus :  * 

If  A  is  not  B  or  C, 
Then  A  is  D,  &c. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  preceding  kinds  of 
propositions  require  no  new  formula,  but  lie  within  the 
principles  already  established. 


DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  357 


SECTION  IX. 

HYPOTHETICAL    REASONING. 


A  CONDITIONAL  proposition  consists  of  an  Antecedent  and 
a  Consequent,  each  of  which  is  a  distinct  proposition, — 
e.  g., 


Antecedent. 


"  If  the  Scriptures  are  not  wholly  false, 

Consequent. 

---A-  ^ 

They  are  entitled  to  respect." 
If       Y  is  Z, 
Then  Y  is  X. 

There  are  two  rules  generally  applied  in  hypothetical 
reasoning. 

1.  If  the  Antecedent  be  granted,  the  Consequent  is 

granted  also  ;  e.  g., 

If       Y  is  Z, 

Then  Y  is  X. 

But    Y  is  Z, 

Therefore,  Y  is  X. 

2.  The    Consequent   being  denied,  the   Antecedent 
must  be  denied  also. 

If       Y  is  Z, 
Then  Y  is  X. 
But    Y  is  not  X, 
Therefore,  Y  is  not  Z. 


358  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

The  first  rule  is  founded  upon  the  obvious  principle, 
that  a  false  Antecedent  or  Premiss  cannot  yield  a  true 
conclusion.  The  second  rule  is  founded  upon  the  no  less 
obvious  principle,  that  an  Antecedent  or  Premiss  must  be 
false,  which  yields  a  false  conclusion. 

But,  from  the  falsity  of  an  antecedent,  we  cannot  infer 
the  falsity  of  the  consequent,  for  the  consequent  may  flow 
out  of  some  other  antecedent  which  is  true  :  e.  g., 

If       Y  is  Z, 
Then  Y  is  X. 

Now,  suppose  Y  is  Z  to  be  false,  still  Y  is  X  may  be 
proved  by  some  other  antecedent,  e.  g.,  Y  is  P. 

Hypothetical  reasoning  really  differs  from  categorical, 
only  in  that,  one  of  the  premises  is  a  hypothesis.  The 
formula  and  all  the  principles  are  the  same.  If  Y  is  Z, 
then  Y  is  X  :  this  is  an  affirmation  that  if  one  proposition 
be  granted,  another  must  be  granted  also.  But,  one  pro 
position  alone  cannot  authorize  an  inference.  We  here 
then  have  only  part  of  an  argument,  viz.  :  the  conclusion 
and  one  of  the  premises.  Which  premiss  have  we,  and 
can  we  supply  the  other  ?  There  is  no  difficulty.  The 
conclusion  always  contains  the  minor  and  major  terms ; 
the  other  premiss  contains  the  middle,  together  with 
either  the  major  or  minor.  Now,  if  there  be  a  term  in 
the  antecedent  or  premiss,  the  same  as  the  subject  of  the 
consequent  or  conclusion,  then  the  given  premiss  is  the 
minor  premiss  ;  but  if  the  same  as  the  predicate  of  the 
consequent,  then  the  given  premiss  is  the  major.  And  in 
either  case,  in  order  to  supply  the  wanting  premiss,  we 
have  only  to  connect  the  middle  term  with  that  term  of 
the  conclusion  which  is  not  found  in  the  given  premiss  or 
antecedent :  e.  g., 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  359 

If       Y  is  Z, 
Then  Y  is  X. 

Here  the  wanting  premiss,  obviously,  according  to  the 
above,  is  the  major,  which  supply,  and  we  have  the  fol 
lowing  syllogism : 

Z  isX, 
If       Y  is  Z, 
Then  Y  is  X. 

Or  we  may  state  it  thus  :  It  is  affirmed,  that  if  Y  is 
Z,  then  Y  is  X  :  but  why  does  it  follow,  that,  if  Y  is  Z, 
Y  is  X  also  ?  The  answer  to  be  given  is,  Because  Z  is  X 
— if  Y  is  contained  in  Z,  then  Y  must  be  contained  in 
X  also,  because  Z  is  contained  in  X. 

"If  the  Scriptures  are  not  wholly  false,  then  the 
Scriptures  are  entitled  to  respect." 

But,  why  does  this  follow  ?  Because,  "  Whatever  is 
not  wholly  false,  is  entitled  to  respect."  Or,  "Every 
book  of  pure  morality  and  heavenly  promises,  &c.,  not 
wholly  false,  is  entitled  to  respect  :  " 

"  If  the  Scriptures  are  such  a  book,  not  wholly  false," 

"  Then  the  Scriptures,  &c." 

Take  another  case  *  in  which  the  minor  premiss  is 
wanting : 

If       Z  is  X, 
Then  Y  is  X. 

The  antecedent  here  must  be  the  major  premiss,  be 
cause  it  compares  the  middle  with  the  predicate  of  the 

*  The  suppression  of  the  minor  premiss,  and  the  construction  of  a  condi 
tional  out  of  the  major  and  the  conclusion,  gives  that  case  in  which  the  ante 
cedent  and  consequent  have  a  different  subject,  and  which,  hy  some,  is  supposed 
to  involve  peculiar  difficulties.  See  Whately's  Logic,  Book  II.,  Chap,  iv.,  §  6, 
note  at  the  foot  of  the  page. 


360  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

consequent  or  conclusion.  We  can  easily  supply  the 
minor  :  The  affirmation  is  that,  If  Z  is  X,  then  Y  must 
be  X  also.  But,  why  must  this  follow  ?  Because  Y  is  Z. 

"  If  whatever  exhibits  marks  of  design  is  the  work  of 
an  Intelligent  Creator  ; 

"  Then  the  universe  must  be  the  work  of  an  Intelligent 
Creator/'  But  why  ? 

Because,  "The  universe  exhibits  marks  of  design." 

In  ordinary  language,  all  reasoning  is  usually  in  an 
EntJiymematic  form  ;  i.  e.,  one  premiss  is  suppressed  ; 
because,  when  one  premiss  and  the  conclusion  are  stated, 
the  mind,  generally,  readily  supplies  the  other.  Thus 
the  syllogism  just  above,  usually  appears,  in  ordinary  lan 
guage,  with  the  major  suppressed  ;  since  when  it  is  af 
firmed  that,  "The  universe  must  be  the  work  of  an  In 
telligent  Creator,  because  it  exhibits  marks  of  design," 
every  one  assents  on  the  ground  that,  "  Whatever  exhibits 
marks  of  design,  must  be  the  work  of  an  Intelligent 
Creator." 

What  therefore  is  called  by  logicians,  a  Conditional 
Proposition,  is  nothing  more  than  an  enthymeme,  with 
the  given  premiss  hypothesised.  And  to  grant  the  ante 
cedent,  is  merely  to  remove  the  hypothesis.  The  hypothe 
sis  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  pure  logical  form,  for,  that 
we  ever  hypothesise  is  owing  to  considerations  lying  wholly 
in  the  matter  or  subjects  of  our  reasoning.  And  to  reduce 
a  conditional,  we  have  only  to  supply  the  suppressed 
premiss. 

The  validity  of  the  Kules  before  given,  now,  also, 
appears  clearly  to  arise  out  of  the  nature  of  the  syllogism. 
To  grant  the  antecedent,  is  to  grant  the  consequent, 
because,  since  the  suppressed  premiss  is  of  course  granted, 
not  being  hypothesised,  to  grant  the  antecedent  is  to 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  361 

remove  the  hypothesis  from  the  other  premiss,  and  conse 
quently  to  remove  all  doubtfulness  from  the  argument. 
And  to  deny  the  consequent,  must  be  the  destruction  of 
the  argument,  since  it  is  equivalent  to  granting  the  con 
tradictory  of  the  conclusion,  and  consequently  denying 
the  premises. 

16 


362  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 


SECTION  X. 

OF     THE     DILEMMA. 

A  DILEMMA  is  formed  by  bringing  together  several  Con 
ditional  Propositions,  so  that  different  antecedents  shall 
have  the  same  consequent;  or,  different  antecedents  shall 
have  different  consequents;  or,  the  same  antecedent  shall 
have  different  consequents. 

I.  Different  Antecedents  with  the  same  Consequent. 

If  A  is  B,     And  if  A  is  0,      And  if  A  is  D, 
Then  A  is  X,         then  A  is  X,         then  A  is  X,  &c. 
Now,  if  the  matter  be  such  that  we  can  disjunctively 

grant  the  antecedents,  thus  : 

But,  A  is  B,  or  C,  or  D  •  then  it  must  follow  that 

AisX. 

II.  Different  Antecedents  with  different  Consequents. 
If  A  is  X,  If  A  is  Y,  If  A  is  Z, 

Then  A  is  B,          then  A  is  C,         then  A  is  D. 
Now  here  again,  if  the  matter  is  such  that  we  cannot 
disjunctively  grant  the  antecedents,  then  we  must  disjunc 
tively  grant  the  consequents  likewise  :  thus  : 
But  A  is  X,  or  Y,  or  Z. 

Therefore  A  is  B,  or  C,  or  D. 

III.  The    same   Antecedents   with    different   Conse 
quents. 

If  A  is  B,  If  A  is  B,  If  A  is  B, 

Then  A  is  X,        then  A  is  Y,         then  A  is  Z. 


DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  363 

Now,  if  we  perceive  from  trie  matter,  that  the  common 
antecedent  admits  of  all  these  consequents,  then  of  course, 
by  granting  the  common  antecedent,  we  grant  all  the  con 
sequents. 

Where  we  grant  the  antecedent,  and  establish  the 
consequent,  the  dilemma  is  called  constructive. 

But  where  we  deny  the  consequent,  and  destroy  the 
antecedent,  the  dilemma  is  called  destructive. 

We  have  already  remarked  in  the  preceding  section, 
that  the  hypothesis  arises  from  the  peculiar  •  character  of 
the  matter  of  the  proposition  ;  for  the  logical  form  sup 
poses  the  connection  between  the  subject  and  predicate  to 
be  certain.  And  so  here  again  the  possibility  of  disjunc 
tively  affirming  the  antecedents,  or  of  disjunctively  deny 
ing  the  consequents,  lies  in  the  peculiar  character  of  the 
matter.  The  force  and  keenness  of  the  dilemma,  as  a 
weapon  in  debate,  arises  from  the  matter  also,  and  from 
many  relations  and  circumstances  of  which  the  forensic 
disputant  knows  how  to  avail  himself :  e.  g.,  An  individual 
may  be  so  situated  that  his  words,,  or  conduct,  or  both, 
justify  two  or  more  inferences  unfortunate  for  himself, 
from  one  or  the  other  of  which  he  cannot  escape.  He 
must  admit  one  fact  or  the  other,  and  either  is  an  ante 
cedent  involving  a  stinging  consequent.  We  have  here 
described  the  second  kind  of  Dilemma,  and  of  which  the 
several  antecedents  are  the  "horns"  :  e.  g.,  "  If  ^Eschines 
joined  in  the  public  rejoicings,  he  is  inconsistent ;  if  he 
did  not,  he  is  unpatriotic  ;  but  he  either  joined  or  not  ; 
therefore  he  is  either  inconsistent  or  unpatriotic." 

From  the  denial  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  consequents, 
we  necessitate  the  denial  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  ante 
cedents  ;  and  this  proves  no  less  forcible  than  the  other 
mode.  Thus  we  may  state  the  preceding  example  in  the 


364  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

following  manner  :  "  If  ^Eschines  is  consistent,  he  did 
not  join  in  the  public  rejoicings  ;  if  he  is  patriotic,  he  did 
join  in  them  :  but  he  either  joined  or  not  ;  therefore  he 
is  either  not  consistent,  or  not  patriotic." 

The  first  kind  is  forcible  taken  in  the  constructive 
mode  ;  for  here  the  individual  who  is  the  subject  of  the 
dilemma  is  involved  in  several  facts,  so  related,  that  some 
one  must  be  admitted,  and  any  one  leads  to  the  torturing 
inference. 

The  third  kind  is  the  weakest,  and  perhaps  ought  not 
to  be  considered  a  dilemma  at  all.  Having  only  one  an 
tecedent,  it  wants  the  "horns/"  In  the  constructive 
mode,  it  is  merely  a  conditional,  in  which  the  antecedent 
involves  several  consequents  ;  and  this  is  common  to  many 
conditionals,  without  yielding  any  peculiar  advantage  in 
debate.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  point  in  disjunc 
tively  denying  the  consequents,  since  the  denial  of  any  one 
of  them  destroys  the  common  antecedent,  so  that  the 
whole  force  of  the  argument  is  found  in  one  of  the  simple 
conditionals. 

Where  the  dilemma  has  the  subject  of  the  consequents 
different  from  the  subject  of  the  antecedents,  the  antece 
dents  are  major  premises.  This  is  obvious  from  what  was 
shown  in  the  preceding  section. 

Since  the  dilemma  is  merely  a  combination  of  condi 
tionals,  it  may  be  resolved  into  these  again,  and  each  con 
ditional  reduced  to  the  complete  syllogism,  by  supplying 
the  suppressed  premiss. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  365 


SECTION  XI. 

OF    THE    SORITES. 

THIS  is  an  abridged  form  of  an  argument  consisting  of 
several  Syllogisms.  It  is  either  categorical  or  hypothe 
tical. 

I.  Categorical  Sorites. — This  is  so  arranged  that  the 
predicate  of  the  first  proposition  is  the  subject  of  the 
second,  and  the  predicate  of  the  second  the  subject  of  the 
third,  and  so  on.  In  every  new  proposition  a  new  predi 
cate  appears  ;  and  in  the  last  proposition  it  is  inferred 
that  the  first  subject  agrees  with  the  last  predicate  ;  e.  g. 
A  is  B,  B  is  C,  C  is  D,  D  is  E  ;  therefore  A  is  E.  It  is 
evident  that  in  the  same  manner  the  last  predicate  may 
be  affirmed  of  all  the  intermediary  subjects.  The  truth 
of  the  argument  is  evident .  If  all  A  is  contained  in  B, 
and  all  B  in  C,  and  all  C  in  D,  and  all  D  in  E,  then  all 
A.,  B,  and  C  must  be  contained  in  E  likewise. 

By  carefully  inspecting  the  Sorites,  we  shall  perceive 
that  the  first  proposition  of  the  series  is  a  minor  premiss, 
and  all  the  other  propositions  major  premises,  except  the 
last,  which  is  a  conclusion  ;  so  that  we  have  here  parts  of 
several  Syllogisms,  which  are  so  related  that  the  conclu 
sion  of  the  preceding  becomes  the  minor  premiss  of  the 
succeeding  ;  and  the  Sorites  is  constructed  by  suppressing 
all  the  minor  premises  but  the  first,  and  all  the  conclu 
sions  but  the  last ;  thus  : 


366  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

(1.)  (20 

A  is  B,  B  is  0,  C  is  D, 

B  is  0,  A  is  B,  A  is  C, 

C  is  D,  Therefore  A  is  C,     Therefore  A  is  D, 
D  is  E,  (3.) 

Therefore  A  is  E,  D  is  E, 

A  is  D, 

Therefore  A  is  E, 

The  Sorites  is  formed  of  the  Primary  Syllogisms,  i.  e. 
those  of  the  first  Figure,  because  in  this,  inasmuch  as  it  is 
the  natural  form  of  the  Syllogism,  no  change  by  conver 
sion  or  otherwise  has  to  be  made  in  the  propositions  in 
transferring  them  from  one  Syllogism  to  another,  which 
will  be  the  case  in  the  other  figures,  since  the  middle  term 
is  continually  changing  ;  e.  g.  In  Darapti  the  1st  Syllo 
gism  would  be, 
BisC, 

B  is  A,  and  then  the  next  Syllogism  is  C  is  D, 
Some  A  is  C,  Some  A  is  C, 

Some  A  is  D, 

Which  is  Darii ;  and  this  can  be  prevented  only  by  con 
verting  A  is  C. 

It  will  be  perceived,  also,  that  the  first  and  last  pro 
positions  of  a  Sorites  alone  can  be  Particular ;  for  the 
major  premiss  in  the  first  Figure  is  always  universal,  but 
the  minor  term  and  the  conclusion  may  be  particular. 

Where  a  Sorites  has  a  Negative  Conclusion,  only  the 
last  term  of  the  series,  before  the  Conclusion,  can  be  nega 
tive.  Thus,  A  is  B,  B  is  C,  C  is  D,  and  No  D  is  E, 
therefore  No  A  is  E.  Otherwise  we  should  have  two  Ne 
gative  Premises  in  the  Syllogisms. 

II.  Hypothetical  Sorites. — This  consists  of  a  series  of 
Conditionals,  so  related  and  arranged,  that  the  Consequent 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  36*7 

of  the  first  becomes  the  Antecedent  of  the  second  ;  and 
the  Consequent  of  the  second,  the  Antecedent  of  the  third, 
and  so  on  ;  and  then,  by  granting  the  first  Antecedent, 
we  grant  the  last  Consequent,  and  indeed  all  the  Conse 
quents,  thus  :  If  A  is  B,  then  A  is  C,  and  if  A  is  C,  then 
A  is  D,  and  if  A  is  D,  then  A  is  E  ;  but  A  is  B,  there 
fore  A  is  E. 

By  denying  the  Consequents  successively,  we  of  course 
deny  the  Antecedents  ;  and  this  forms  the  destructive 
Sorites.  The  Conditional  can,  as  before  shown,  be  reduced 
to  complete  Syllogisms  ;  and  then  the  Syllogisms  will  be 
found  to  be  related  in  the  same  way  with  those  of  the 
Categorical  Sorites,  viz.,  the  conclusions  of  each  preceding 
Syllogism  being  the  minor  premiss  of  each  succeeding  one. 
The  only  difference,  then,  between  the  two  kinds,  lies  in 
the  hypothetical  character  of  one  of  the  premises  in  the 
last  kind. 

A  Sorites  may  be  constructed  either  by  suppressing 
the  major  or  minor,  just  as  conditionals  in  general. 

Scholium. — It  appears  from  the  preceding  Analysis  of 
Hypothetical  reasoning  under  all  its  different  modes,  that 
it  involves  no  new  formulas  or  principles.  Every  kind  of 
Deduction  therefore  is  comprehended  by  the  Dictum  de 
omni  et  nullo,  and  the  axioms  of  agreement  and  disagree 
ment.  The  fundamental  Ideas  are  Evolution,  Identity 
and  Difference,  Quantity  and  Quality. 


368  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 


SECTION  XII. 

APPLICATION    OF    THE    DEDUCTIVE    FORMULA. 

THE  greater  part  of  human  reasoning  is  of  the  Deductive 
kind.  The  number  of  first  principles  and  general  truths 
is  comparatively  few,  but  their  application  is  infinite. 
Many  of  them,  and  especially  in  Keligion,  Morals  and  Po 
litics,  have  been  spontaneously  developed  in  the  human 
mind  ;  and  many  others,  the  result  of  nice  and.  laborious 
investigation,  have  become  current,  through  the  means 
which  now  exist  for  widely  circulating  knowledge.  In  the 
constant  expansion  of  knowledge  by  scientific  men  ;  and 
the  improvements  of  art  by  the  ingenious  and  skilful ;  and 
in  the  multiform  practical  duties  of  the  general  human 
life,  these  first  great  principles  and  truths  receive  their 
continual  and  diversified  application.  Hence  there  is  no 
department  of  knowledge,  of  art,  or  of  duty,  where  Deduc 
tive  Logic  is  not  required. 

But  are  Conclusions,  in  order  to  be  legitimate,  re 
quired  to  be  drawn  strictly  according  to  the  deductive 
formula?  By  no  means,  if  we  intend  by  this  the  formal 
expression  of  every  step  of  the  reasoning.  This  is  not 
necessary,  for  many  things  are  so  plainly  implied  when  not 
expressed,  that  their  formal  expression  would  only  en 
cumber  the  style.  But  still,  in  every  case  of  legitimate 
inference  no  logical  principle  can  be  violated,  and  the  Ian- 


DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  369 

guage  is  capable  of  being  reduced  to  the  Syllogistic  form. 
Hence,  whenever  it  is  required  to  test  the  validity  of  in 
ferences,  a  resort  to  the  Syllogism  is  decisive. 

It  would  not  be  difficult  to  give  here  examples  of  the 
application  of  the  formula  in  testing  deduction  in  a  variety 
of  subjects.  I  at  first  intended  this.  Upon  reflection, 
however,  I  have  concluded  to  limit  these  examples  to  one 
subject,  and  this  one  eminently  clear  and  beautiful.  I 
mean  Geometry.  My  first  plan  would  have  tended  con 
siderably  to  swell  a  work,  already,  perhaps,  transcending 
the  just  bounds  of  an  elementary  treatise  ;  besides,  all  the 
ends  of  illustration  will,  I  think,  be  found  to  be  answered 
by  this  one. 

Demonstration  is  of  two  kinds,  direct  and  indirect. 
Direct  demonstration  is  the  deduction  of  a  conclusion  from 
admitted  truths  and  principles  :  indirect  shows  the  truth 
of  a  proposition  by  proving  that  its  contradictory  violates 
admitted  truths  and  principles.  Geometry  employs  both. 
It  is  a  science  *  of  absolute  certainty,  for  its  fundamental 
Ideas  are  clearly  developed  ;  its  Axioms  are  perfect ;  f  its 
Definitions  adequate  and  precise  :  its  subject  pure  and 
exact  quantity  ;  and  its  deductions  are  made  with  the  ut 
most  rigour. 

After  laying  down  its  axioms  and  definitions,  Geome 
try  proceeds  to  make  its  deductions.  The  first  deduction 
must  necessarily  be  made  directly  from  the  axioms  and 
definitions.  But  the  next  may  employ  the  deduction  al 
ready  made  as  a  basis,  in  connection  with  the  axioms  and 
definitions,  and  so  onward.  Hence  the  field  of  deduction 
is  continually  enlarging. 

In  constructing  this  science,  much  depends  upon  the 

*  Pages  89,  90.  t  Page  232 

16* 


370  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

order  of  arrangement :  for  since  propositions  already  de 
monstrated  are  employed  in  demonstrating  others,  it  is 
evident  that  one  arrangement  may  be  superior  to  another 
in  affording  facilities  for  the  progressive  demonstration.* 

After  the  science  has  been  constructed,  it  is  highly 
advantageous  and  beautiful,  to  reverse  the  order,  and 
trace  back  remote  propositions  through  the  connected 
chain  of  demonstrations  to  the  axioms  and  definitions. 

In  illustrating  the  application  of  the  Deductive  formula 
in  this  science,  I  shall  first  take  an  instance  of  direct 
demonstration.  The  proposition  I  have  selected  is  the 
following  : 

"  A  line  which  bisects  the  vertical  angle  of  a  triangle, 
divides  the  base  into  two  segments,  which  are  proportioned 
to  the  adjacent  sides/' 

We  have  in  this  proposition,  deductions  both  from 
axioms,  and  from  propositions  previously  deduced,  so  that 
it  will  serve  to  illustrate  both. 

A  C  B  is  the  triangle,  and  the  angle  at  C  is  bisected 
by  the  line  C  D. 

Now  to  aid  the  deduction  by  bringing  in  other  rela 
tions  besides  those  simply  presented  in  the  triangle,  we 
produce  a  line  A  C,  and  draw  B  E  parallel  to  C  D,  so  that 
the  two  lines  thus  added  meet  in  E.  We  now  have  a 
case  of  alternate  angles  included  between  two  parallel 
lines  and  an  intersecting  line,  and  this  is  our  first 
syllogism,  as  follows  : 

*  Corollaries  are  important  links  in  the  chain  of  demonstration.  They  are 
propositions  which  in  all  cases  require  demonstration.  In  the  usual  definition 
of  a  Corollary,  it  is  said  to  be  "  An  obvious  consequence  deduced  from  some 
thing  going  before."  But  because  it  is  "  obvious,"  the  deduction  is  not  given, 
but  left  to  be  supplied  by  the  learner ;  and  yet  in  some  instances  the  deduction 
of  the  Corollary  is  more  difficult  than  that  of  other  propositions  where  it  is 
formally  given. 


DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 


371 


All  alternate  angles  are  equal ; 

But  the  angles  BOD  and  E  B  C  are  alternate  angles ; 

Therefore  these  angles  are  equal. 


But  BCD  and  A  C  D  are  equal  by  construction  ; 
and  this  leads  to  another  syllogism,  viz.  : 
B  C  D  is  equal  to  A  C  D, 
E  B  C  is  equal  to  B  C  D, 
Therefore 

E  B  C  is  equal  to  A  0  D  : 

t.  e.   All  B  C  D,  as  an  equal,  is  contained  in  A  0  D, 
All  E  B  C,  as  an  equal,  is  contained  in  B  0  D, 
Therefore 

All  E  B  C,  as  an  equal,  is  contained  in  A  G  D. 
In  the  second  deduction,  the  conclusion  of  the  first 
deduction  is  made  the  minor  premiss  :  it  will  be  remarked, 
that  this  is  therefore  a  case  of  the  Sorites ;  but  the  Sorites 
comprehends  all  cases  where  one  deduction  flows  out  of 
another. 

Or  we  may  deduce  it  directly  from  the  axiom,  "  Things 
equal  to  the  same  thing,  are  equal  to  each  other  :  "  thus, 


372  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

All  things  equal  to  the  same  thing,  are  equal  to  each 
other ; 

EEC  and  A  C  D  are  things  equal  to  the  same  thing, 
viz.  BCD; 

Therefore  they  are  equal  to  each  other. 

This  is  a  syllogism  of  which  the  axiom  forms  the  major 
premiss.  It  is  evident  that  in  all  cases  of  deduction 
from  an  axiom,  the  axiom  must  form  the  major  premiss. 

Inspecting  the  diagram  still  farther,  we  perceive  that 
the  angles  A  C  D  and  0  E  B  are  an  outward  and  inward 
angle,  opposite  to  each  other  on  the  same  side  of  a  line 
A  E,  cutting  the  two  parallel  lines  C  D  and  E  B  ;  hence 
their  equality  is  inferred  as  in  the  first  deduction  ;  the 
major  premiss  being  here  again  a  proposition  before  proved, 
viz.,  "  All  outward  and  inward  opposite  angles  on  the 
same  side  of  a  line  intersecting  two  parallel  lines,  are 
equal." 

But  we  have  just  before  inferred  the  equality  of  A  C  D 
and  E  B  C,  therefore  we  infer  again  from  the  axiom 
already  quoted,  and,  in  the  same  way,  the  equality  of 
C  E  B  and  E  B  C  ;  thus, 

All  things  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  each 
other  ; 

C  E  B  and  E  B  C  are  things  equal  to  the  same,  viz. 
A  C  D; 

Therefore,  they  are  equal  to  each  other. 

We  have  now  two  angles  of  a  triangle  E  B  C,  opposite 
two  of  its  sides,  equal ;  we  therefore  infer  the  equality  of 
these  sides  from  a  proposition  already  proved,  which  here 
again  becomes  the  major  premiss  of  the  syllogism,  thus  : 

"  Every  triangle  equal  in  respect  to  two  of  its  angles, 
is  equal  also  in  respect  to  the  two  sides  opposite  these 
angles  ;  " 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  373 

The  triangle  E  B  C  is  a  triangle  equal  in  two  of  its 
angles,  viz.  C  E  B  and  E  B  C  ; 

Therefore,  it  is  equal  in  the  two  sides  opposite  these 
angles,  viz.  the  sides  E  C  and  B  C. 

Inspecting  next  the  whole  triangle  A  B  E,  we  perceive 
that  it  is  a  triangle  having  its  two  sides,  A  B  and  A  E, 
divided  hy  a  line  C  D  parallel  to  its  base  E  B  ;  we  can 
therefore  infer  the  proportionality  of  the  segments  of 
the  sides  from 'a  proposition  already  demonstrated,  thus  : 

"  Every  triangle  having  a  line  drawn  parallel  to  its 
base  dividing  its  other  two  sides,  is  a  triangle  whose  sides 
are  divided  proportionally  ;  " 

The  triangle  A  B  E  is  such  a  triangle  ; 

Therefore  its  sides  are  divided  proportionally,  viz. 
AD:DB::AC:CE. 

But,  if  A  C  is  proportional  to  C  E,  it  must  be  pro 
portional  to  C  B,  equal  to  C  E  ;  for 

E  C  is  a  proportional  of  A  C  ;  and 
C  B  is  E  C  ;  therefore 
C  B  is  a  proportional  of  A  C. 
Hence  A  D  :  D  B  :  :  A  C  :  C  B. 

The  above  analysis  shows  conclusively  that  the  formula 
of  Deduction  permeates  geometrical  demonstration. 

Although,  for  the  purposes  of  demonstration,  it  is  not 
necessary,  generally,  to  draw  out  the  whole  deduction  in 
detail,  still  a  better  insight  would  be  gained  of  Geometry, 
and  striking  illustrations  afforded  of  this  part  of  Logic 
if  it  were  occasionally  done.  Indeed,  by  raising  questions 
respecting  the  axioms  and  definitions  in  order  to  show 
their  necessary  and  intuitive  character,  as  well  as  by 
analysing  the  demonstrations,  the  study  of  Geometry  may 
be  connected  with  the  highest  parts  of  Logic,  and  be  made 


374  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

to  embrace  the  whole,  with  the  exception  of  Induction ; 
and  this  again  may  be  happily  connected  with  the  whole 
range  of  natural  science.  The  study  of  science  would 
thus  be  placed  on  the  most  elevated  grounds,  and  Science 
herself  be  clothed  with  light  as  with  a  garment. 

In  the  course  of  the  preceding  analysis  we  have  re 
ferred  to  several  propositions  previously  proved.  Now  we 
might  go  back  to  these  and  analyse  them  in  like  manner, 
until  we  should  repose  amid  the  axioms  and  definitions 
and  their  governing  Ideas.  But  this  process  has  been  so 
amply,  and  I  hope  so  clearly  indicated,  that  I  do  not  deem 
it  necessary.  One  of  the  propositions  referred  to,  how 
ever,  affords  an  illustration  of  the  indirect  mode  of 
demonstration,  otherwise  called  the  Eeductio  ad  absurdum, 
or  the  Eeductio  ad  impossibile.  I  will  therefore  proceed 
to  give  an  analysis  of  the  demonstration  of  this  one  pro 
position  more.  The  proposition  is  stated  as  follows  : — 

"  Every  triangle  equal  in  respect  to  two  of  its  angles, 
is  equal  also  in  respect  to  the  two  sides  opposite  these 
angles." 

If  this  be  not  true,  its  contradictory  is  true,  viz. : — 

"  Some  triangles  equal  in  respect  to  two  of  their  angles, 
are  not  equal  in  respect  to  the  two  sides  opposite  these 
angles/' 

Let  A  B  C  be  the  triangle  having  its  two  angles  A 
and  B  equal. 

Now  if  the  contradictory  be  true,  and  the  two  opposite 
sides  B  C  and  A  C,  are  not  equal,  then  of  course  one  must 
be  greater  than  the  other.  Let  us  therefore  suppose  A  C 
to  be  the  greater,  and  take  A  D,  on  A  C,  equal  to  B  C. 
Next  join  B  D.  Now  we  have  a  triangle  A  D  B  within 
the  triangle  ABC;  and,  comparing  them,  we  have,  by 
the  contradictory,  in  the  first  triangle,  side  A  D  equal  to 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  375 

side  B  C,  in  the  second  ;  also  the  side  A  B  is  common  to 
both  ;  also,  by  the  hypothesis  contained  both  in  the  pro 
position  and  the  contradictory,  the  angle  A  in  the  first, 
is  equal  to  angle  B,  in  the  second.  But  it  has  previously 
been  shown  in  the  chain  of  geometrical  deductions,  that 
"  Any  two  triangles  having  two  sides  and  the  included 
angle  in  the  one,  equal  to  two  sides  and  the  included 
angle  in  the  other,  are  equal  each  to  each/'  This  we 
assume  as  a  major  premiss ;  and  then  add  as  a  minor, 
"  The  two  triangles  A  13  B  and  A  B  C,  by  the  contradic 
tory,  are,  two  triangles  having  two  sides  and  the  included 
angle  in  the  one,  equal  to  two  sides  and  the  included 
angle  of  the  other."  Hence  the  conclusion,  "  The  two 
triangles  A  D  B  and  ABC  are  equal." 


Here  we  assumed  the  contradictory  as  a  minor  premiss 
in  connection  with  an  unquestionable  major.  But  what  is 
the  conclusion  ?  That  one  triangle,  A  I)  B,  contained  in 
another  triangle,  A  B  C,  is  equal  to  its  container ;  i.  c. 
That  a  part  is  equal  to  a  whole.  The  conclusion  then, 
inasmuch  as  it  violates  the  axiom,  "  A  whole  is  greater 
than  any  of  its  parts,"  is  false.  But  the  falsity  of  the 
conclusion  must  be  traced  to  the  falsity  of  one  or  both  of 
the  premises,  since  the  form  is  correct ;  but  the  major 
was  granted  ;  therefore  the  falsity  is  in  the  minor  ;  and 


376  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

the  minor  being  false,  its  contradictory  must  be  true  ;  but 
the  contradictory  is  the  original  proposition. 

Jllus  rations  of  the  Syllogism  can  be  drawn  from  Ge 
ometry  and  from  the  Mathematics  generally,  to  an  indefi 
nite  extent.  The  above,  however,  will  answer  the  ends  of 
a  general  and  elementary  work. 


DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  3*77 


SECTION   XIII. 

OF  FALLACIES. 

A  FALLACY  is  a  false  argument  artfully  constructed,  with 
the  intent  to  deceive  ;  or,  unwarily  stumbled  upon,  from 
an  ignorance  of  the  Logical  form,  or  of  the  subject  under 
consideration. 

The  full  examination  of  this  subject  would  lead  us  into 
a  wide  field,  and  one  in.  which  all  the  principles  of  Logic 
would  have  to  be  brought  under  review.  The  limits  we 
have  judged  fit  to  assign  ourselves  will  prevent  an  exami 
nation  in  detail  ;  but  we  hope,  nevertheless,  to  present 
the  important  points  with  sufficient  amplitude. 

In  giving  a  division  of  Fallacies  we  must  follow  the  di 
visions  of  Logic  itself.  We  shall  not,  however,  pursue  the 
same  order  :  but  as  we  have  just  now  been  engaged  with 
the  Deductive  Formula,  we  shall  first  consider  the  Falla 
cies  pertaining  to  this  part,  so  as  not  to  break  the  contin 
uity  of  the  investigation,  and  reserve  what  remarks  we  may 
have  to  make  on  Fallacies  pertaining  to  the  other  parts  of 
Logic  for  the  close  of  this  Section. 

FALLACIES    OF    DEDUCTION. 

These  are  divided  into  Fallacies  in  the  formula  ;  and 
Fallacies  in  the  matter. 

The  latter  are  not  strictly  logical ;  but  inasmuch  as 


378  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

they  lie  in  the  matter  of  propositions  employed  in  deduc 
tion,  and  where  also  a  rigid  adherence  to  the  formula  is 
used  to  conceal  the  Fallacy  in  the  matter,  this  appears  to 
be  the  most  appropriate  division  to  which  they  can  be 
assigned. 

I.  FALLACIES  IN  THE  FORMULA. — These  have  virtually 
been  set  forth  already  in  the  Analysis  of  the  Formula  in 
Section  V.  Nothing  more  is  necessary  here  than  a  sum 
mary  view  of  them  : 

1.  Undistributed  Middle;  e.  g. 

I,   Z  is  X, 

A,  Y  is  Z, 

A,  Y  is  X. 

Here,  although  all  Y  is  contained  in  Z,  yet  as  only 
some  Z  is  contained  in  Y,  and  only  some  Z  in  X,  that 
part  of  Z  which  is  contained  in  X  may  contain  no  part  of 
Y,  and  thus  there  can  be  no  ground  for  an  inference. 

2.  Illicit  Process. — This  designates  the  fallacy  of  dis 
tributing  a  term  in  the  conclusion  which  has  not  been  pre 
viously  distributed  in  the  corresponding  premiss,  and  thus 
drawing  a  conclusion  beyond  the  data;  e.  g. 

A,  Z  is  X, 
A,  Z  is  Y, 
A,  Y  is  X. 

3.  Two  Negative  Premises. — Here,  since  both  terms 
are  excluded  from  the  middle,  no  comparison  of  them  can 
be  made  through  it  ;  e.  g. 

E,  Z  is  X, 
E,  Y  is  Z. 

4.  Positive  Conclusion,  where  there  is  a  Negative  Pre 
miss  ;  or  a  Negative  Conclusion,  where  both  premises  are 
positive. 

5.  Particular  Premises. — In  all  cases  where  both  pre- 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  379 

mises  are  particular,  we  shall  have  an  undistributed  middle, 
or  an  illicit  process  of  the  major  or  the  minor  term,  or  both 
combined. 

6.  More  than  three  terms  plainly  expressed. — This  is 
an  attempt  to  combine  two  Syllogisms  into  one. 

7.  Inferring  the  falsity  of  the  conclusion  from  that  of 
the  premiss;  or  the  truth  of  the  premiss  from  that  of  the 
conclusion. 

The  first  of  these  fallacies  appears  where,  when  an  in 
adequate  or  false  argument  has  been  used  to  establish  a 
conclusion,  and  the  argument  having  been  successfully  re 
futed,  it  is  inferred  that  the  conclusion  is  false  ;   e.  g.  If  it 
be  argued  in  favor  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  that  all 
men  entertain  a  belief  of  it ;  admitting  that  the  argument 
might  be  refuted  by  adducing  the  instance  of  some  nation 
who  manifest  no  conception  of  immortality,  still  this  is  no 
ground  for  concluding  against  the  doctrine.     The  argu 
ment  must  go  for  nothing,  but  the  doctrine  of  immortality 
may  still  have  a  real  and  impregnable  foundation.     This 
fallacy,  indeed,  identifies  itself  with  the  illicit  process  ;  e.  g. 
A,  Z  is  X, 
I,  Y  is  Z, 
I,  Y  is  X. 

Now,  if  the  minor  be  refuted,  as  is  supposed  in  the  ex 
ample  above,  then  the  argument  will  stand 
A,  Z  is  X, 
0,  Y  is  not  Z, 
0,  Y  is  not  X. 
In  which  there  is  an  illicit  process  of  the  major. 

The  second  of  these  fallacies,  viz.,  inferring  the  truth 
of  the  premiss,  from  the  truth  of  the  conclusion,  is  a  case 
of  undistributed  middle  ;  e.  g.  If  from  the  truth  of  the 
doctrine  of  immortality  we  infer  its  universal  belief,  thus, 


380  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

"  Whatever  is  universally  believed  is  true.  The  doctrine 
of  Immortality  is  true.  Therefore  it  must  be  universally 
believed  ; "  ?'.  e. 

A,  Z  is  X, 
I,  Y  is  X, 
I,  Y  is  Z. 

The  above,  therefore,  is  not  really  a  distinct  branch  of 
fallacies  in  the  formula,  although  at  first  view  it  might 
appear  to  be  so. 

II.   FALLACIES  IN  THE  MATTER. 

In  this  class  of  Fallacies,  the  formula  is  supposed  to  be 
strictly  observed. 

1.  Ambiguous  Middle. — This  fallacy  consists  in  using 
a  word,  as  a  middle  term,  which  admits  of  two  significa 
tions.  In  the  major  premiss,  the  major  term  agrees  with 
the  middle,  taken  in  one  of  its  significations  ;  and  in  the 
minor  premiss,  the  minor  term  agrees  with  the  middle, 
taken  in  another  signification  ;  and  then  in  the  conclusion, 
the  minor  and  major  are,  according  to  the  formula,  in 
ferred  to  agree  with  each  other.  The  two  extremes  are, 
indeed,  compared  with  the  same  word,  but  with  two  very 
different  ideas  ;  so  that  in  reality  we  have  two  middle 
terms  ;  e.  g. 

"  A  pitiful  man  is  beneath  respect. 
Howard,  the  philanthropist,  was  a  pitiful  man. 
Therefore  he  was  beneath  respect." 

Many  words,  however,  are  so  settled  in  their  significa 
tion,  that  such  fallacies  cannot  be  successfully  practised 
with  them.  Perhaps  the  word  pitiful  is  one  of  these. 

Logicians  have  distinguished  several  kinds  of  Ambigu 
ous  Middle  : 

Fallacia  Figurce  Dictionis,  in  which  the  middle  term 
is  not  precisely  the  same  word,  in  form,  in  both  premises, 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  381 

but  so  nearly  akin  that  they  may  be  assumed  to  have  the 
same  meaning ;  e.  g. 

"  A  designing  man  is  unworthy  of  confidence. 
This  man  has  formed  a  design. 
Therefore  he  is  unworthy  of  confidence." 

Many  fallacies  may  be  formed  in  this  way ;  and  the 
slighter  the  shades  of  difference  in  the  meaning  of  the  two 
kindred  words,  the  more  likely  is  the  fallacy  to  pass  un 
detected. 

Fallacia  Plurium  Interrogationum. — This  fallacy  con 
sists  in  asking  several  questions  apparently  the  same,  and 
yet  in  reality  of  several  different  meanings,  and  therefore 
admitting  of  several  different  answers.  The  question 
forms  one  of  the  premises  of  the  argument ;  and  then, 
when  an  answer  is  given,  the  sophist  stands  ready  with 
another  premiss  to  make  out  a  conclusion,  which,  because 
unexpectedly  opposite  to  what  the  one  replying  intended, 
serves  to  embarrass,  if  not  to  confound,  him  ;  e.  g.  There 
are  cases  in  which  we  may  strictly  follow  the  statute  law, 
and  yet  be  guilty  of  great  injustice  and  cruelty.  Now  let 
the  question  be  asked,  Is  not  a  man  justified  when  he 
does  that  which  is  lawful  ?  Here  a  reply  would  not  be 
likely  to  be  given  in  the  negative  :  and  when  given  in  the 
affirmative,  another  premiss  might  be  formed  embodying 
some  act  of  oppression — as  a  landlord  seizing  the  goods  of 
a  worthy,  but  sick  and  unfortunate  tenant ;  and  then  the 
conclusion  appended  that  the  landlord  is  justified  in 
doing  so. 

Fallacy  of  Division  and  Composition. — In  this  fallacy 
the  middle  term  in  one  premiss  is  taken  collectively,  in  the 
other,  distributively.  If  in  the  major  premiss  it  be  taken 
collectively,  and  in  the  minor  distributively,  it  is  a  Fallacy 
of  Division  ;  e.  g. 


382  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

"  Five  is  one  number  ; 
Three  and  two  are  five  ;  therefore, 
Three  and  two  are  one  number." 

If  in  the  major  the  middle  term  be  taken  distribu- 
tively,  and  in  the  minor  collectively,  it  is  a  fallacy  of  com 
position  •  e.  g. 

"  Three  and  two  are  two  numbers  ; 
Five  is  three  and  two  ;  therefore, 
Five  is  two  numbers." 

"  There  is  no  fallacy  more  common,  or  more  likely  to 
deceive,  than  the  one  now  before  us  ;  the  form  in  which  it 
is  most  usually  employed,  is,  to  establish  some  truth,  sepa 
rately,  concerning  each  single  member  of  a  certain  class, 
and  thence  infer  the  sense  of  the  whole  collectively;  thus 
some  infidels  have  labored  to  prove  concerning  some  one 
of  our  Lord's  miracles,  that  it  might  have  been  the  result 
of  an  accidental  conjunction  of  natural  circumstances. 
Next,  they  endeavor  to  prove  the  same  concerning  another; 
and  so  on  ;  and  thence  infer  that  all  of  them  might  have 
been  so.  They  might  argue  in  like  manner,  that  because 
it  is  not  very  improbable  one  may  throw  sixes  in  any  one 
out  of  a  hundred  throws,  therefore,  it  is  no  more  improba 
ble  that  one  may  throw  sixes  a  hundred  times  running."  * 

Fallacia  accidentis. — In  this  form  of  the  ambiguous 
middle,  the  middle  term  in  one  premiss  is  used  to  express 
merely  the  essence  of  a  thing ;  and  in  the  other  premiss,  to 
express  the  same  thing,  together  with  its  accidents  ;  e.  g. 

"  What  is  bought  in  the  market  is  eaten  • 
Eaw  meat  is  bought  in  the  market ; 
Therefore  raw  meat  is  eaten." 

In  the  major  premiss  we  are  considering  edible  sub- 

*  Whately's  Logic,  Book  III.,  §  11. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  383 

stances  in  general,  without  referring  to  their  circumstances  ; 
in  the  minor,  we  bring  into  view  one  of  these  substances 
with  its  circumstances  ;  and  then  infer  of  the  latter  what 
was  true  only  of  the  former. 

There  are  many  ways  in  which  words  become  ambigu 
ous  ;  but  the  discussion  of  this  subject  does  not  properly 
belong  to  Logic.  To  reason  well,  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  some  one  language,  at  least,  as  the  vehicle  of  thought, 
is  evidently  indispensable  ;  but  the  language  in  which  our 
ratiocinations  are  expressed,  and  the  principles  and  for 
mulas  which  are  to  govern  and  direct  the  reasoning  process 
itself,  are  two  different  branches  of  study. 

2.  Fallacies  relating  to  the  connection  between  the 
matter  of  the  premises  and  that  of  the  conclusion. 

The  preceding  head  related  to  the  matter  of  the  middle 
term  as  ambiguously  expressed  in  the  two  premises.  Now 
as  the  same  matter  is  expressed  in  the  two  premises,  and 
in  the  conclusion,  inasmuch  as  the  last  compares  together 
the  two  terms,  which  in  the  former  had  been  compared 
with  the  middle  term,  it  is  obvious  that  Fallacies  may 
arise  also  in  respect  to  the  correspondency  between  the 
representations  of  the  premises  and  the  conclusion,  admit 
ting  the  form  to  be  correct  and  the  middle  term  to  be  un 
ambiguous. 

Logicians  have  distinguished  and  given  names  to  sev 
eral  forms  of  this  Fallacy. 

1.  Petitio  Principii,  or,  arguing  in  a  circle. — In  this 
form  of  the  Fallacy  in  question,  the  connection  between 
the  premises  and  conclusion  is  such,  that  the  premises 
themselves  are  dependent  upon  the  conclusion  ;  so  that 
the  conclusion  must  first  be  assumed  to  be  true,  before  we 
can  find  premises  to  prove  it.  This  Fallacy,  in  order  to 
be  successful,  must  of  course  be  artfully  constructed,  for, 


384  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

when  exposed,  it  is  too  gross  to  delude  any  mind  for  a 
moment.  Hence,  much  here  depends  upon  obliquity  and 
obscurity  of  the  language.  To  attempt  to  prove  the  exist 
ence  of  a  Grod  from  the  Sacred  Scriptures  must  be  a  petitio 
principii,  since  they  profess  to  be  a  revelation  from  God, 
and  therefore  assume  His  existence. 

This  Fallacy,  however,  is  not  by  any  means  always  an 
intentional  one.  Acute  reasoners  have  sometimes  very 
honestly  fallen  into  it. 

Thus  the  famous  argument  used  by  many  writers  on 
Moral  Agency,  to  prove  that  the  "  Will  is  always  deter 
mined  by  the  strongest  motive/'  is  a  notable  instance  of 
this  fallacy,  where  the  reasoners  were  eminent  both  for 
logical  skill  and  moral  integrity.* 

"  The  will  is  always  determined  by  the  strongest  mo 
tive."  How  do  you  prove  this  ?  "  The  will  is  always  de 
termined  to  some  volition  or  other,  and  it  is  always 
determined  by  motives,  for  they  always  are  present/'  But 
how  does  this  prove  that  it  is  determined  by  the  strongest 
motive  ?  "  That  must  be  the  strongest  which  determines 
it."  Why  ?  "  Because  it  could  not  otherwise  be  deter 
mined."  How  do  you  know  that  ?  "  Because  it  must  be 
determined  by  the  strongest  motive."  It  is  evident  that 
the  very  point  to  be  proved  is  the  point  assumed. 

2.  false  or  undue  assumption  of  premises.  This 
embraces  those  instances  in  which  the  premises,  although 
not  dependent  upon  the  conclusion,  require  to  be  proved 
before  the  reasoning  can  be  admitted  to  have  any  force. 
In  all  cases  of  Deduction  we  have  to  begin  with  principles 
already  established ;  or  if  assumed  at  the  beginning  of  a 

*  One  of  the  roots,  if  not  the  root,  of  this  error,  is  the  not  distinguishing  be 
tween  an  order  of  sequence,  and  the  principle  of  causality;  between  the  mo 
tives  as  uniform  antecedents  to  volitions,  and  Will  as  itself,  the  cause  of  volition. 


DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  385 

course  of  reasoning — as  is  sometimes  convenient — they 
must,  before  the  course  is  completed,  be  satisfactorily 
proved.  It  is,  therefore,  always  an  important  enquiry, 
whether  the  principles  with  which  we  begin  are  sufficiently 
established  to  be  made  the  premises  of  an  argument.  A 
judicious  and  honest  reasoner  will  be  cautious  in  this  re 
spect  ;  but  it  is  of  the  nature  of  sophistry  boldly  to  assume, 
and  to  supply  by  a  show  of  confidence,  the  want  of  a  true 
or  an  adequate  basis. 

"  Sometimes  men  are  shamed  into  admitting  an  un 
founded  assertion,  by  being  confidently  told  that  it  is  so 
evident  that  it  would  argue  great  weakness  to  doubt  it. 
In  general,  however,  the  more  skilful  sophist  will  avoid  a 
direct  assertion  of  what  he  means  unduly  to  assume, 
because  that  might  direct  the  reader's  attention  to  the 
consideration  of  the  question  whether  it  be  true  or  not ; 
since  that  which  is  indisputable  does  not  so  often  need  to 
be  asserted  :  it  succeeds  better,  therefore,  to  allude  to  the 
proposition  as  something  curious  and  remarkable  ;  just  as 
the  Royal  Society  were  imposed  on  by  being  asked  to  ac 
count  for  the  fact  that  a  vessel  of  water  received  no  ad 
dition  to  its  weight  by  a  live  fish  put  into  it ;  while  they 
were  seeking  for  the  cause,  they  forgot  to  ascertain  the 
fact,  and  thus  admitted,  without  suspicion,  a  mere  fiction/' 

There  are  several  species  of  false  assumption  mentioned 
by  Logical  writers,  but  as  they  all  involve  the  same  prin 
ciple,  we  shall  only  give  a  brief  summary  of  them. 

Non  causa,  pro  causa.     A  false  assumption  of  causes. 

Here  the  facts  are  given,  and  assuming  a  cause  for 
them,  we  reason  from  it  as  a  real  and  established  connec 
tion. 

A   non  vera,  pro  vera.     This,  if  it  differs  from  the 

*  Whateley's  Logic,  ibid.  §  14, 
17 


386  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

preceding,  is  probably  meant  to  designate  a  false  assump 
tion  of  facts,  as  in  the  anecdote  of  the  Koyal  Society, 
quoted  above. 

When  causes  and  facts  both  exist,  the  connection  be 
tween  the  two  may  be  assumed  on  insufficient  grounds  : 
it  may  be  assumed  either  that  the  causes  necessarily  in 
volve  the  facts,  or  that  the  facts  cannot  be  referred  to  any 
other  antecedents.  The  first  relates  to  the  inherent  na 
ture  of  causes  ;  the  last  to  the  necessary  conditions  of  the 
facts. 

A  non  tali,  pro  tali.  This  is  reasoning  from  a  false 
assumption  of  parallelisms  ;  or  from  false  analogies. 

False  assumption  of  references.  This  appears  chiefly 
in  references  made  to  the  Holy  Scriptures.  Every  passage 
is  authoritative.  Hence,  although  a  writer  may  find  few 
or  none  which  in  reality  bear  upon  a  favorite  dogma,  still  a 
mere  array  of  the  references  strikes  the  eye ;  and  if  the  pas 
sages  are  not  examined,  which,  through  the  indolence  of 
human  nature,  is  apt  to  be  the  case,  the  desired  end  of  the 
sophist  is  obtained. 

Assumption  of  probabilities.  When  the  premises  are 
each  probable  with  a  certain  degree  of  probability,  the 
combined  probability  is  assumed  to  be  an  addition  of 
probabilities,  whereas  it  is  only  a  probability  of  a  proba 
bility. 

If  Z  is  only  probably  X,  and  Y  is  only  probably  Z, 
then  Y  is  probably  X,  not  with  an  increasing,  but  with  a 
decreasing  probability  ;  e.  g. 

Z  is  probably  (say  f )          X, 

Y  is  probably  (say  f )          Z ;         therefore 

Y  is  probably  (£  X  1=^)  X. 

In  a  sorites  the  probability  is  still  more  weakened,  and 
weakened  the  more  the  sorites  is  extended.  A  cumulation 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  387 

of  arguments  consists  of  arguments  drawn  from  distinct 
sources  ;  this  differs  widely  from  arguments  depending  one 
upon  the  other. 

3.  Ignoratio  elenchi,  or  irrelevant  conclusion. — This 
fallacy  consists  in  connecting  with  given  premises,  not  the 
legitimate  conclusion,  but  one  which,  although  widely 
different  from  it,  shall,  in  the  language,  so  resemble  it,  or 
be  so  covertly  substituted  for  it,  that  the  deception  goes 
undetected  by  the  reader  or  hearer.  "Various  kinds  of 
propositions  are,  according  to  the  occasion,  substituted 
for  the  one  of  which  proof  is  required.  Sometimes  the 
particular  for  the  universal ;  sometimes  a  proposition  with 
different  terms;  and  various  are  the  contrivances  em 
ployed  to  effect  and  to  conceal  this  substitution,  and  to 
make  the  conclusion  which  the  sophist  has  drawn  answer 
practically  the  same  purpose  as  the  one  he  ought  to  have 
established." 

"  A  good  instance  of  the  employment  and  exposure  of 
this  fallacy  occurs  in  Thucydides,  in  the  speeches  of  Cleon 
and  Diodotus,  concerning  the  Mitylengeans :  the  former 
(over  and  above  his  appeal  to  the  angry  passions  of  his 
audience)  urges  the  justice  of  putting  the  revolters  to 
death ;  which,  as  the  latter  remarked,  was  nothing  to  the 
purpose,  since  the  Athenians  were  not  sitting  in  judg 
ment,  but  in  deliberation,  of  which  the  proper  end  is  expe 
diency." 

Archbishop  Whately,  from  whom  the  above  extracts 
are  taken,  has  so  admirably  exhibited  the  different  forms 
of  this  fallacy,  that  I  cannot  resist  the  temptation  of  be 
coming  still  more  largely  his  debtor.  Indeed,  on  the  whole 
subject  of  Deductive  Fallacies,  I  freely  confess  my  indebt 
edness  to  him. 

Argumentum  ad  hominem,  &c. — "  There  are  certain 


388  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

kinds  of  argument  recounted  and  named  by  Logical 
writers,  which  we  should  by  no  means  universally  call 
Fallacies  ;  but  which  when  unfairly  used,  and  so  far  as  they 
are  fallacious,  may  very  well  be  referred  to  the  present 
head ;  such  as  the  i  argumentum  ad  hominemj  or  per 
sonal  argument,  (  argumentum  ad  verecundiam,'  '  argu- 
mentum  ad  populum,'  &c.,  all  of  them  regarded  as  contra 
distinguished  from  i  argumentum  ad  rem,'  or,  according 
to  others,  (meaning  probably  the  very  same  thing,)  '  ad 
judicium.'  These  have  all  been  described  in  the  lax  and 
popular  language  before  alluded  to,  but  not  scientifically  : 
the  l  argumentum  ad  hominem,'  they  say,  i  is  addressed  to 
the  peculiar  circumstances,  character,  avowed  opinions,  or 
past  conduct  of  the  individual,  and  therefore  has  a  refer 
ence  to  him  only,  and  does  not  bear  directly  and  abso 
lutely  on  the  real  question,  as  the  '  argumentum  ad  rem ' 
does  : '  in  like  manner,  the  '  argumentum  ad  verecundiam ' 
is  described  as  an  appeal  to  our  reverence  for  some  re 
spected  authority,  some  venerable  institution,  &c.,  and  the 
'  argumentum  ad  populumj  as  an  appeal  to  the  prejudices, 
passions,  &c.,  of  the  multitude  ;  and  so  of  the  rest. 
Along  with  these  is  usually  enumerated  (  argumentum  ad 
ignorantiam,'  which  is  here  omitted,  as  being  evidently 
nothing  more  than  the  employment  of  some  kind  of  Fal 
lacy,  in  the  widest  sense  of  that  word,  towards  such  as 
are  likely  to  be  deceived  by  it.  It  appears  then,  (to  speak 
rather  more  technically,)  that  in  the  i  argumentum  ad 
hominem '  the  conclusion  which  actually  is  established,  is 
not  the  absolute  and  general  one  in  question,  but  relative 
and  particular  ;  viz.  not  that  (  such  and  such  is  the  fact/ 
but  that  '  this  man  is  bound  to  admit  it,  in  conformity  to 
his  principles  of  Reasoning,  or  in  consistency  with  his  own 
conduct,  situation/  &c.  Such  a  Conclusion  it  is  often 


DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  389 

both  allowable  and  necessary  to  establish,  in  order  to  si 
lence  those  who  will  not  yield  to  fair  general  argument ; 
or  to  convince  those  whose  weakness  and  prejudices  would 
not  allow  them  to  assign  to  it  its  due  weight  :  it  is  thus 
that  our  Lord  on  many  occasions  silences  the  cavils  of  the 
Jews  ;  as  in  the  vindication  of  healing  on  the  Sabbath, 
which  is  paralleled  by  the  authorised  practice  of  drawing 
out  a  beast  that  has  fallen  into  a  pit.  All  this,  as  we 
have  said,  is  perfectly  fair,  provided  it  be  done  plainly, 
and  avowedly ;  but  if  you  attempt  to  substitute  this  par 
tial  and  relative  Conclusion  for  a  more  general  one — if  you 
triumph  as  having  established  your  proposition  absolutely 
and  universally,  from  having  established  it,  in  reality, 
only  as  far  as  it  relates  to  your  opponent,  then  you  are 
guilty  of  a  Fallacy  of  the  kind  which  we  are  now  treating 
of :  your  Conclusion  is  not  in  reality  that  which  was,  by 
your  own  account,  proposed  to  be  proved  :  the  fallacious 
ness  depends  upon  the  deceit  or  attempt  to  deceive.  The 
same  observations  will  apply  to  i  argumentum  ad  verecun- 
diam,'  and  the  rest." 

Fallacious  refutation.  This  is  the  refutation  of  a  pro 
position  assumed  to  belong  to  an  opponent  ;  and  thus 
really  an  evasion  of  the  point  in  dispute. 

Nearly  akin  to  this  is  the  expedient  of  shifting  one's 
ground,  by  covertly  adopting  and  discussing  some  other 
question  than  the  one  taken  up  at  the  beginning. 

"  A  practice  of  this  nature  is  common  in  oral  contro 
versy  especially  ;  viz.  that  of  combatting  both  of  your  op 
ponent's  premises  alternately,  and  shifting  the  attack  from 
the  one  to  the  other,  without  waiting  to  have  either  of 
them  decided  upon  before  you  quit  it." 

We  refer  to  the  same  head,  "  the  very  common  case 
of  proving  something  to  be  possible  when  it  ought  to  have 


390  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

been  proved  highly  probable  ;  or  probable,  when  it  ought 
to  have  been  proved  necessary  ;  or,  which  comes  to  the 
very  same,  proving  it  to  be  not  necessary,  when  it  should 
have  been  proved  not  probable  ;  or  improbable,  when  it 
should  have  been  proved  impossible. 

Fallacy  of  Objections.  This  consists  in  "  showing  that 
there  are  objections  against  some  plan,  theory,  or  system, 
and  thence  inferring  that  it  should  be  rejected  ;  when  that 
which  ought  to  have  been  proved  is,  that  there  are  more 
or  stronger  objections  against  the  receiving  than  the  re 
jecting  of  it.  This  is  the  principal  engine  employed  by 
the  adversaries  of  our  Faith  :  they  find  numerous  '  objec 
tions  '  against  various  parts  of  Scripture,  to  some  of  which 
no  satisfactory  answer  can  be  given  ;  and  the  incautious 
hearer  is  apt,  while  his  attention  is  fixed  on  these,  to  for 
get  that  there  are  infinitely  more  and  stronger  objections 
against  the  supposition  that  the  Christian  religion  is  of 
human  origin  ;  and  that  when  we  cannot  answer  all  ob 
jections,  we  are  bound  in  reason,  and  in  candor,  to  adopt 
the  hypothesis  which  labors  under  the  least.  That  the 
case  is  as  I  have  stated,  I  am  authorised  to  assume,  from 
this  circumstance  :  that  no  complete  and  consistent  account 
has  ever  been  given  of  the  manner  in  ivliich  the  Christian 
religion,  supposing  it  a  human  contrivance,  could  have 
arisen  and  prevailed  as  it  did." 

Fallacy  of  proving  part  of  a  Question.  The  skilful 
sophist  having  proved  or  disproved  a  part  of  the  question, 
by  enlarging  upon  this,  often  succeeds  in  removing  out  of 
view  another  part,  perhaps  the  most  important  of  all. 

"This  is  the  great  art  of  the  answerer  of  a  book  ;  sup 
pose  the  main  positions  in  any  work  to  be  irrefragable,  it 
will  be  strange  if  some  illustration  of  them,  or  some  sub 
ordinate  part  in  short,  will  not  admit  of  a  plausible  objec- 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  391 

tion  ;  the  opponent  then  joins  issue  on  one  of  these  inci 
dental  questions,  and  comes  forward  with  '  a  Keply '  to 
such  and  such  a  work. 

"  Hence  the  danger  of  ever  advancing  more  than  can 
be  well  maintained,  since  the  refutation  of  that  will  often 
quash  the  whole  :  a  guilty  person  may  often  escape  by 
having  too  much  laid  to  his  charge  ;  so  he  may  also  by 
having  too  much  evidence  against  him,  i.  e.  some  that  is 
not  in  itself  satisfactory  :  thus,  a  prisoner  may  sometimes 
obtain  acquittal  by  showing  that  one  of  the  witnesses 
against  him  is  an  infamous  informer  and  spy  ;  though  per 
haps  if  that  part  of  the  evidence  had  been  omitted,  the 
rest  would  have  been  sufficient  for  conviction." 

Suppressing  the  Conclusion.  There  are  two  ways  of 
suppressing  the  true  conclusion  :  First,  by  omitting  to 
state  the  proposition  you  are  to  prove,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  argument  ;  and  then,  after  a  long  spun  and  elabo 
rate  argument,  drawing  a  conclusion  remote  from  the  true 
one,  with  a  confident  and  plausible  air.  Secondly,  by 
omitting  to  give  the  conclusion  altogether,  but  framing  an 
argument  in  such  a  way  as  to  lead  the  hearer  to  draw  the 
wrong  conclusion,  which  the  sophist  aims  at.  We  have 
a  striking  instance  of  this  species  of  reasoning  in  Antony's 
speech  over  the  dead  body  of  Caesar. 

"  Jests.  Jests  are  Fallacies  ;  i.  e.  Fallacies  so  palpa 
ble  as  not  to  be  likely  to  deceive  any  one,  but  yet  bearing 
just  that  resemblance  of  argument  which  is  calculated  to 
amuse  by  the  contrast ;  in  the  same  manner  that  a  parody 
does,  by  the  contrast  of  its  levity  with  the  serious  produc 
tion  which  it  imitates.  There  is  indeed  something  laugh 
able  even  in  Fallacies  which  are  intended  for  serious  con 
viction,  when  they  are  thoroughly  exposed.  There  are 
several  different  kinds  of  joke  and  raillery,  which  will  be 


392  DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC. 

found  to  correspond  with  the  different  kinds  of  Fallacy  : 
the  pun  (to  take  the  simplest  and  most  obvious  case)  is 
evidently,  in  most  instances,  a  mock  argument  founded  on 
a  palpable  equivocation  of  the  middle  Term  :  and  the  rest 
in  like  manner  will  be  found  to  correspond  to  the  respec 
tive  Fallacies,  and  to  be  imitations  of  serious  argument/' 

Jests,  however,  are  often  very  serious  arguments,  when 
their  effects  are  considered  ;  for  that  which  is  turned  into 
ridicule,  becomes,  in  some  degree,  an  object  of  contempt, 
or,  at  least,  ceases  to  command  %respect  and  careful  atten 
tion.  They  are  also  popular  arguments,  for  they  require 
no  thought,  and  afford  a  piquant  amusement. 

Fallacy  of  Epithets.  This  appears  in  the  disputes  of 
political  parties  and  religious  sects.  The  fallacy  is  of  a 
twofold  character  :  First,  the  odious  name  may  be  fastened 
upon  an  individual,  or  upon  the  party  or  sect  to  which  he 
belongs,  with  the  utmost  injustice  :  there  may  be  merely 
a  seeming  agreement  arising  from  similar  names  and  cir 
cumstances,  without  any  real  identity  of  principles  ;  or 
there  may  be  an  agreement  only  in  points  unimportant,  or 
even  commendable  ;  but,  notwithstanding,  when  the  hut 
and  cry  is  once  raised,  the  multitude  are  prone  to  rush  to 
the  chase,  and  join  in  the  ferocious  sport.  Secondly,  the 
name  itself  may  have  become  odious  unjustly  :  it  may  be 
a  good  name,  darkened  and  marred  by  the  prejudices  and 
persecutions  of  a  benighted  and  bigoted  age  ;  but  its  cha 
racter  has  become  fixed  in  the  popular  apprehension,  and 
no  one  now  stops  to  enquire  into  its  origin  or  its  princi 
ples  :  it  is  the  symbol  of  enormous  error,  if  not  of  crime, 
and  he  who  is  adjudged  worthy  to  wear  it,  may  fail  to 
gain  a  second  hearing.  In  this  fallacy,  the  conclusion  is 
not  generally  concealed  until  the  close  of  an  argument, 
and  covertly  applied  ;  it  is  brought  out  at  the  beginning 


DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  393 

in  the  epithet  itself,  and  frequently  supersedes  the  neces 
sity  of  even  the  show  of  an  argument. 

We  close  here  our  view  of  the  Deductive  Fallacies. 
It  will  be  seen  that  those  arising  from  the  matter  of  the 
propositions  are  numerous.  It  requires  both  mental  dis 
cipline  and  tact  to  guard  against  and  to  detect  them. 
But  one  thing  is  evident,  that  a  pure,  benevolent,  and 
truth-loving  spirit  is  the  most  effectual  protection  against 
this  species  of  false  reasoning. 

The  fallacies  which  I  next  propose  to  consider,  are 
those  of  Induction  and  Intuition :  fallacies  belonging  to 
the  two  former  parts  of  Logic,  and  therefore  rather  im 
properly  introduced  here.  Notwithstanding  this  seeming 
impropriety,  I  have  concluded  to  do  so,  for  the  purpose  of 
making  the  whole  subject  of  fallacies  a  unique  portion  of 
the  work.  Besides,  I  propose  to  handle  what  remains 
briefly,  as  it  is  not  of  a  nature  to  require  nor  to  admit  of 
an  exposition  running  much  into  details.  The  common 
human  life  is  peculiarly  the  theatre  of  deduction,  for  it  is 
here  that  principles  are  applied  or  violated  most  exten 
sively  ;  it  is  therefore  the  theatre  which  presents  most 
abundantly  both  the  opportunities  and  the  temptations 
of  sophistry. 

FALLACIES    OF    INDUCTION. 

These  are  of  three  kinds  :  Fallacies  of  Observation, 
Fallacies  in  determining  General  Facts,  and  Fallacies  in 
inducting  Laws. 

I.  FALLACIES  OF  OBSERVATION. — We  note  here  three 
Fallacies  : 

First.  Inadequate  Observation.  All  the  phenomena, 
if  possible,  in  relation  to  a  given  subject  should  be  ob 
served  :  and  the  mind  should  not  rest  content  while  any 


394  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

phenomena  probably  remain  which,  by  any  labor  and  dili 
gence  in  observation  and  experiment,  may  be  brought  to 
light.  But  human  nature  is  prone  to  accept  as  sufficient 
a  set  of  limited  but  familar  observations  lying  within  the 
immediate  neighborhood  of  the  individual.  Men  are,  as  it 
were,  divided  into  tribes  dwelling  in  deep  valleys  ;  and 
each  tribe  looketh  upon  its  valley  as  the  wide  universe, 
and  the  high  mountains  around  as  the  horizon  of  being 
and  the  impassable  boundary  of  thought.  This  begetteth 
narrow-mindedness,  bigotry,  and  imperfect  and  crude 
knowledges.  The  philosopher  passes  over  the  mountain 
tops,  walks  through  valley  after  valley,  converses  with  all 
the  different  tribes,  sees  the  same  things  as  they  appear 
in  different  places  ;  and  thus  prepares  himself  to  learn  the 
general  laws  which  govern  God's  creatures,  and  to  enjoy 
the  harmony  and  beauty  of  all  things.  Again,  human 
nature  is  impatient  of  the  slow  and  persevering  labor  de 
manded  in  prosecuting  observation  and  experiment.  It 
is  far  more  pleasant  to  our  natural  indolence  to  take  such 
observations  as  force  themselves  upon  us,  and  to  leave  the 
rest  to  conjecture,  than  to  endure  the  toil  and  restraint, 
and  wait  for  the  results  of  thorough  investigation. 

Another  form  of  this  Fallacy  appears  where  the  obser 
vation,  although  extensive,  is  imperfect  and  hurried. 
Such  are  the  busy  collectors  of  facts,  the  ambitious  found 
ers  of  lyceums  and  cabinets,  who  bring  us  abundance  of 
things  and  but  little  thought ;  who  indeed  manipulate, 
but  do  not  nicely  examine. 

Facts  show  the  state  of  the  world.  He,  therefore,  who 
does  not  look  at  all  the  facts,  and  examine  their  charac 
teristics  minutely,  is  not  prepared  to  form  sound  judg 
ments.  He  may  express  opinions,  but  he  is  not  entitled 
to  any  authority. 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC,  395 

Secondly.  The  Fallacy  of  making  Observation  and 
Experiments  without  a  purpose,  or  a  prophecy  of  the  end 
in  the  form  of  a  rational  hypothesis. 

We  have  already  alluded  to  the  catalogues  of  facts 
made  by  Bacon. *  These  are  an  example  of  the  Fallacy 
under  consideration.  By  the  knowledge  already  attained 
of  the  constitution  of  the  world,  and  the  spontaneous  in 
spiration  of  Ideas  awakened  in  profound  and  patient  me 
ditation,  the  mind  when  it  comes  within  a  new  field  of  in 
vestigation  is  prepared  and  impelled  to  form  some  hypo 
thesis  of  the  order  of  sequences,  if  not  of  the  ultimate  law. 
We  call  this  a  rational  hypothesis,  because  it  considers 
laws  already  ascertained,  arid  thoughtfully  watches  the 
indications  of  the  initiative  phenomena.  Such  a  hypothe 
sis  at  the  early  stage  of  investigation  is  necessary,  in  or 
der  to  arrange  the  facts  already  gained,  and  to  know  where 
to  make  further  observations,  and  how  to  adjust  experi 
ments. 

Without  such  a  hypothesis,  every  thing  is  done  at 
random.  It  is  indeed  sheer  empiricism — a  trying  of  ex 
periments  like  a  blind  casting  of  dice,  with  a  wondering 
and  puerile  curiosity  to  know  what  will  turn  up  next. 
Philosophical  investigation  foresees  its  end  with  more  or 
less  clearness.  Like  Bunyau's  pilgrim,  it  at  least  sees  a 
little  shining  light  a  great  way  off,  and  by  keeping  that 
little  light  in  its  eye,  it  at  length  reaches  the  straight  and 
narrow  way  of  Truth.  When  Newton  saw  the  apple  fall, 
he  formed  his  hypothesis ;  he  thenceforward  had  a  definite 
and  great  end  before  him. 

Thirdly.  The  Fallacy,  of  making  facts  bend  to  favorite 
theories. — When  Theories  are  once  formed,  men  are  ever 

*  Page  284, 


396  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

ready  to  become  intoxicated  with  them.  An  ingenious 
Theory  is  a  proud  effort  of  the  Intellect,  and,  therefore, 
not  easy  to  be  relinquished  by  its  author ;  and  the  light 
and  order  which  it  gives  to  facts  which  before  appeared 
complicated  and  inexplicable,  soon  brings  it  into  general 
favour  with  enquiring  minds.  Hence  there  springs  up  a 
passion  to  apply  it,  and  to  make  every  thing  accord  with 
it.  Men  begin  to  forget  that  it  is  a  mere  hypothesis, 
which  may  or  may  not  be  true  ;  and  that,  if  not  confirmed 
by  general  observation,  it  must  yield  to  some  more  perfect 
conception.  In  this  way  they  are  often  betrayed  into 
great  absurdities.  We  have  an  illustration  of  this,  in 
the  tenacity  with  which  some  chemists  for  a  while  adhered 
to  the  Phlogistic  Theory. 

Now  Truth  and  Philosophy  alike  demand  that  a  Theory 
shall  be  adopted,  always  with  the  tacit  understanding, 
that  it  is  to  be  held  in  abeyance  to  farther  discoveries. 
And  here  the  great  Philosopher  shows  his  greatness,  in 
that  he  becomes  wedded  to  nothing  but  truth  ;  and  hold 
ing  theories  only  as  a  means  of  truth,  he  is  ready  to 
modify  them  according  to  the  indications  of  new  facts,  or 
even  to  renounce  them  when  they  cannot  be  verified,  or  a 
better  light  is  obtained.  Thus  Newton,  for  a  time,  laid 
aside  the  law  of  gravitation,  while  the  calculations  did 
not  appear  to  sustain  it.  But  in  the  end  he  had  his  rich 
reward. 

II.  FALLACIES  IN  DETERMINING  GENERAL  FACTS. 

First.  The  fallacy  of  affirming  a  uniform  Sequence, 
from  a  mere  observation  of  coincidences. — This  Fallacy 
is  very  common.  The  superstition  of  dreams  and  omens, 
the  empiricisms  of  medicine,  and  a  thousand  empty  popu 
lar  maxims,  all  belong  here. 

Because  two  phenomena  are  found  to  be  conjoined  in 


DEDUCTIVE   LOGIC.  397 

time  and  place,  therefore,  by  this  Fallacy,  one  is  assumed 
as  the  uniform  antecedent  of  the  other,  and  we  are  to 
expect  the  recurrence  of  the  one  wherever  we  find  the 
other.  Now,  before  we  have  a  right  to  conclude  that  the 
two  are  in  uniform  sequence,  we  must  prove  by  experiment 
that  the  given  Consequent  never  takes  place  except  where 
the  Antecedent  in  question  is  present  ;  i.  e.  We  must 
prove  by  Negative  instances  as  well  as  Positive.  Upon 
further  examination,  we  may  find  the  same  Consequent 
to  coincide  in  time  and  place  with  a  thousand  other  phe 
nomena  ;  but  that  alone  can  be  its  proper  Antecedent, 
without  which  it  does  not  take  place.  This  indeed  is  the 
Fallacy  condemned  in  the  memorable  language  of  Bacon : 
— "  Inductio  quae  procedit  per  enumerationem  simplicem, 
res  puerilis  est,  et  precario  concludit,  et  periculo  exponitur 
ab  instantia  contradictoria,  et  plerumque  secundum 
pauciora  quam  par  "est,  et  ex  his  tantum  modo  quae  praasto 
sunt  pronunciat.  At  Inductio  quae  ad  inventionem  et 
demonstrationem  Scientarum  et  Artium  erit  utilis,  Na- 
turam  separare  debet,  per  rejectiones  et  exclusiones 
debitas  ;  ac  deinde  post  negativas  tot  quot  sufficiunt, 
super  affirmativas  concludere."  * 

.Secondly.  The  Fallacy  of  denying  whatever  has  not 
been  found  hitherto  in  the  common  observation  of  men,  or 
does  not  exist  in  generally  received  maxims. 

This  Fallacy  is  of  the  same  nature  with  the  preceding, 

*  "  That  induction  which  proceeds  by  a  mere  enumeration  of  instances,  is 
a  puerile  affair,  and  concludes  precariously,  and  is  exposed  to  danger  from 
contradictory  instances,  and  for  the  most  part  it  gives  its  decisions  according 
to  fewer  instances  than  is  proper,  and  from  those  only  which  are  then  present. 
But  an  induction  that  would  be  useful  to  the  discovery  and  demonstration  of 
the  sciences  and  arts,  ought  to  distinguish  nature  through  proper  rejections 
and  exclusions,  and  then,  after  a  sufficient  number  of  negative  instances  have 
been  adduced,  to  draw  the  conclusion  upon  the  positive  ones." 


398  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

and  equally  condemned  by  the  language  of  Bacon.  The 
former  affirms  that  those  are  proper  Antecedents  and 
Consequents  which  have  been  found  together ;  the  latter, 
that  none  can  exist  beyond  those  which  have  hitherto 
been  found  together.  The  one  gives  authority  to  untested 
empiricism  ;  the  other  denies  any  truth  to  exist  beyond 
it.  The  one  consigns  us  to  the  despotism  of  bigotry  and 
ignorance  ;  the  other  cuts  us  off  from  all  hope  in  the 
future.  The  one  affirms  the  majesty  of  ancient  authori 
ties  ;  the  other  denies  all  farther  improvement. 

In  opposition  to  both,  Philosophy  affirms  that  she  will 
receive  nothing  which  she  has  not  tested  by  the  principles 
of  human  Keason ;  and  that  she  will  dare  to  receive  every 
thing  which  she  has  thus  tested. 

The  above  are  the  chief  Fallacies,  given  in  brief,  which 
belong  to  this  division.  They  will  be  found  upon  reflec 
tion  to  comprise  a  violation  of  the  Principles  of  Elimina 
tion  laid  down  under  Inductive  Logic  ;  for,  the  aim  of 
those  principles  is  to  provide  a  test  for  sequences  in  gene 
ral,  so  that  we  may  determine  amid  the  mass  of  pheno 
mena,  which  are  properly  related  as  Antecedents  and 
Consequents. 

III.  FALLACIES  IN  INDUCTING  LAWS. 

We  have  seen  that  the  tests  of  a  Law  are  its 
sufficiency  to  account  for  the  phenomena,  its  characteris 
tics  of  universality  and  necessity,  and  its  correspondence 
to  an  Idea.  Now  we  note  as  a  Fallacy  under  this  head  : 

First.  The  confounding  of  a  general  fact  with  a  law. 
— To  establish  a  general  Fact,  is  to  establish  a  uniform 
order  of  sequence  in  relation  to  certain  phenomena ;  e.  g. 
the  influence  of  the  sun  and  moon  upon  the  tides.  The 
law  under  which  this  particular  sequence  is  comprehended 
is  the  law  of  gravitation  taken  in  connection  with  the 


DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  399 

peculiar  interior  constitution  of  fluids,  which  causes  them 
to  yield  to  an  influence  which  does  not  affect  the  solid 
parts  of  the  earth  in  the  same  manner.  It  is  common  to 
call  the  general  facts  laws  ;  and  thus  the  two  lines  of 
investigation  are  not  clearly  distinguished.  This,  per 
haps,  is  not  so  strictly  a  Fallacy  in  Induction,  as  a  con 
fusion  in  the  end  aimed  at,  and  which  may  lead  to  fal 
lacious  inductions.  A  general  fact  viewed  in  itself  is 
contingent  ;  it  receives  higher  characteristics  only  when 
viewed  as  an  exponent  of  Law,  and  then  of  course  is  dis 
tinguished  from  it.  But  a  perfect  method  of  philosophis 
ing  demands  that  it  keep  its  true  place  in  every  stage  of 
the  induction,  and  thus,  instead  of  shutting  up  investiga 
tion,  it  becomes  a  means  of  leading  it  on  to  its  last  results. 

Secondly.  The  great  Fallacy,  and  one  which  has  been 
alluded  to  more  than  once  in  this  work,  is,  the  separation 
of  Observation  and  Ideas.  This  Fallacy  has  two  modes, 
accordingly  as  it  reposes  upon  Ideas  independently  of  ob 
servation,  or  as  it  employs  observation  independently  of 
Ideas. 

The  true  logical  development  of  Ideas  takes  place  in 
connection  with  the  reality  of  Nature  ;  and  the  laws  of 
Nature  are  discovered  and  expounded  only  in  the  light  of 
Ideas.  The  first  mode  of  the  Fallacy,  therefore,  shows 
itself  in  splendid  but  obscure  conceptions  of  the  order  of 
Nature  ;  while  the  other  presents  us  collections  of  sequences 
without  system. 

FALLACIES   IN    RESPECT    TO    INTUITION. 

I  have  already  remarked,*  that  in  the  sphere  of  In 
tuitive  Truths  falsehood  cannot  well  find  place,  because 

*  Primordial  Logic.     Idea  of  Truth,  pp.  207,  208. 


400  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

the  characteristics  of  these  truths  are  so  clear  and  decided  ; 
and  because  if  there  be  falsehood  here,  there  can  be  no 
absolute  test  of  Truth.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  cannot 
be  denied  that  affirmations  have  been  made,  apparently 
with  an  intuitive  positiveness,  which  afterwards  have 
been  totally  set  aside  ;  e.  g.  The  celebrated  philosophical 
maxim,  that,  "  A  thing  cannot  act  where  it  is  not." 
Even  Newton,  in  order  to  escape  the  force  of  this  maxim 
in  its  bearing  upon  the  law  of  gravitation,  imagines  a 
subtle  ether  diffused  through  the  space  between  the  sun 
and  the  planets,  as  a  mediate  cause  ;  affirming  that,  "  It 
is  inconceivable  that  inanimate  brute  matter  should, 
without  the  mediation  of  something  else,  which  is  not 
material,  operate  upon  and  affect  other  matter  without 
mutual  contact."  He  even  pronounces  it  "  so  great  an 
absurdity/'  that  he  cannot  believe  that  any  man,  "who  in 
philosophical  matters  has  a  competent  faculty  of  thinking, 
can  ever  fall  into  it/'  *  And  yet  in  our  day  the  most 
philosophical  minds  do  not  perceive  it  to  be  at  all  in 
credible  that  the  sun  and  planets  can  act  upon  each  other 
through  the  intervening  space  without  any  medium  what 
ever. 

It  would  appear  from  this  and  similar  instances  that 
might  be  adduced,  that  there  are  Fallacies  in  respect  to 
Intuition.  I  say  Fallacies  in  respect  to  Intuition,  for 
fallacious  intuitions  there  cannot  be.  An  Intuition  carries 
with  it  its  own  truth,  it  is  necessary  and  absolute  ;  to 
deny  it  is  to  belie  Reason  itself,  and  to  destroy  the  possi 
bility  of  certainty.  What  was  said,  therefore,  under  the 
"  Idea  of  Truth/'  as  above  referred  to,  I  conceive  to  be 
impregnable. 

*  See  Playfair's  Dissertation  on  the  Progress  of  Mathematical  and  Physical 
Science. 


DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC.  401 

But  the  question  still  remains,  How  are  we  to  account 
for  Fallacies  in  respect  to  Intuition  ?  If  it  be  granted 
that  an  intuitive  truth  cannot  be  disputed,  how  can  a 
false  maxim  put  on,  to  appearance,  the  characteristics  of 
such  a  truth? 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  to  be  remarked  an  ambiguity 
in  the  word  "inconceivable;"  it  may  be  taken  either 
absolutely  or  relatively :  the  absolutely  inconceivable  is 
the  contradictory  of  all  rational  conception,  and  therefore 
equivalent  to  the  impossible;  the  relatively  inconceivable, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  only  the  opposite  of  the  particular 
conceptions  of  an  individual,  of  a  class,  or  of  an  age. 
Now  nothing  is  more  common  than  men  adhering  to  even 
wild  and  puerile  maxims,  and  denying  whatever  lies 
beyond  the  range  of  their  immediate  experience  with  the 
utmost  positiveness  and  pertinacity ;  this  undoubtedly  is 
owing  to  the  undeveloped  state  of  their  minds,  and  the 
tyranny  of  prejudice. 

This  fallacy  is  one  which  we  have  already  noticed 
under  a  preceding  head.*  Philosophers,  it  must  be  con 
fessed,  have  given  us  similar  examples :  having  embraced 
certain  dogmas,  and  committed  themselves  to  maintain 
them,  they  manifest  the  utmost  certainty  of  conviction, 
and  that  too  with  great  sincerity.  It  follows,  therefore, 
that  in  maintaining  false  maxims,  men  may  assert  with 
great  earnestness,  and  apparent  strength  of  belief,  and  may 
use  the  epithets  "absurd"  and  "inconceivable,"  only 
because  of  their  education,  prejudices,  and  point  of  view. 
Now  suppose  these  same  men  to  be  relieved  from  all  these 
hindrances,  and  to  occupy  the  same  relative  ground  that 
we  do,  with  whom  their  fondly  cherished  maxims  are  ex- 

*  Page  398. 


402  DEDUCTIVE    LOGIC. 

ploded,  would  it  not  be  possible  for  them  to  believe  as  we 
do  ?  And  would  they  not  see  that  they  had  before 
occupied  a  fallacious  position,  but  that,  now,  they  had 
attained  to  the  right  one  ?  While  in  error,  we  are  often 
very  confident,  and  may  be  even  so  much  so,  as  to  think 
that  our  judgments  are  intuitive ;  but  when  we  really 
attain  the  truth,  then  we  see  plainly  enough  that  those 
confident  errors  had  not  the  strength  and  clearness  of 
intuition.  We  are  now  in  a  condition  to  make  a  compari 
son  ;  before,  we  were  not.  Notwithstanding  all  the  mis 
takes  we  may  make,  there  is  such  a  thing  as  perceiving 
absolute  truth,  and  knowing  that  we  are  right. 

In  the  second  place,  we  can  account  for  these  pre- 
tented  intuitions  by  a  want  of  development  in  the  Ideas 
which  govern  the  sphere  in  which  they  appear.  The 
maxim  above  mentioned  was  founded  upon  an  erroneous 
conception  of  Causes ;  showing  that  the  Idea  of  Cause 
was  not  clearly  developed  in  the  minds  of  those  who 
advocated  it.  Now  it  is  the  clearer  development  of  this 
Idea  which  enables  us  to  conceive  of  the  mutual  attrac 
tions  of  the  sun  and  the  planets  without  any  medium  in 
the  intervening  space  ;  nor  can  we  ever  again  conceive 
such  a  medium  to  be  necessary.* 

All  the  Fallacies  which  arise  in  respect  to  intuition 
have  their  origin  unquestionably  in  a  want  of  philosophical 
development ;  for  Philosophy  is  not  merely  a  system  of 
truths  and  a  law  of  method,  but  a  state  of  the  Keason 
in  man.  Just  as  this  development  advances,  does  the 
vision  of  Truth  become  brighter  and  brighter  unto  the 
perfect  day.  But  that  perfect  day  is  still  to  us  an  object 
of  hope,  and  ever  shall  be,  until  we  reach  that  Uncreated 
Light,  in  which  we  shall  see  Light  itself. 

*  Primordial  Logic,  Sect.  VII.,  and  particularly  p.  239. 


BOOK    IV. 

THE    DOCTRINE    OF  EVIDENCE. 


SECTION  I. 

NATURE     OF     PROOF. 

WHEN  we  have  arrived  at  judgments,  we  may  state  them 
in  the  form  of  Propositions  or  Theorems,  and  then  subjoin 
to  them  the  Logical  Process  by  which  they  have  been  de 
termined.  This  is  called  the  order  of  Proof. 

Opposed  to  the  order  of  Proof  is  the  order  of  Investi 
gation.  When  we  are  searching  after  Truth  we  pursue 
the  order  of  Investigation ;  we  employ  our  Intuitions,  or 
the  knowledge  we  may  have  already  gained  ;  we  make  ob 
servations  and  experiments  ;  we  compare  ;  we  generalize  ; 
we  meditate  ;  we  employ  Induction  and  Deduction  ;  and 
when  Truth  appears,  it  appears  as  a  Conclusion.  The 
truths  at  which  we  thus  arrive  are  entirely  new,  or  were 
before  but  dimly  seen  as  conjectures  or  theories. 

When  we  undertake  to  prove  a  proposition,  we  either 
know  it  to  be  true  or  false,  or  we  are  uncertain  of  its 
character. 

I.  If  we  know  it  to  be  true,  then  we  must  be  ac 
quainted  with  the  investigation  upon  which  it  rests  ;  and 


404  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  EVIDENCE. 

to  prove  it,  will  be  only  to  subjoin  that  process  of  investi 
gation,  according  to  Logical  formulae,  or,  at  least,  in  strict 
accordance  with  logical  principles. 

2.  If  we  know  it  to  be  false,  then  we  must  see  that  it 
is  either  deduced  from  false  premises  or  is  a  false  deduc 
tion.     To  prove  it  false,  therefore,  will  require  either  an 
exposition  of  its  premises,  or  a  statement  of  the  fallacious 
syllogism. 

3.  If  loe  are  uncertain  of  its  character,  we  proceed  to 
test  it.     The  method  of  testing  it  will  depend  upon  the 
nature  of  the  proposition. 

1.  If  the  proposition  affirm  an  Antecedent,  we  test  it 
by  searching  whether  it  stands  as  a  necessary  or  probable 
condition  to  the  existence  of  any  known  Consequents.  2. 
If  the  proposition  affirm  a  consequent,  we  test  it  by 
searching  whether  any  known  antecedents  involve  it.  In 
doing  this  we  have  to  apply  the  principles  of  elimination 
laid  down  in  Inductive  Logic. 

We  have  here,  then,  two  kinds  of  proof  developed 
which  are  defined  according  to  the  nature  of  the  connec 
tion  which  they  hold  to  propositions  to  be  proved. 

1.  When  the  proof  holds  to  the  proposition  to  be 
proved,  the  relation  of  Antecedent  to  Consequent,  or  of 
Principle  or  Law  to  phenomena,  as  in  its  nature  envelop 
ing  them, — it  is  called  a  priori  ;  i.  e.  I  prove  that  such 
consequents,  or  such  phenomena  as  the  proposition  affirms 
to  exist,  must  exist,  because  an  antecedent  or  principle 
exists  which  involves  them. 

In  this  case,  when  the  argument  is  reduced  to  the 
form  of  a  syllogism,  the  antecedents  or  principles  from 
which  we  prove  the  phenomena  or  consequents,  form  the 
premises :  and  the  physical  and  logical  sequences  are  said 
to  correspond. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  405 

2.  When  the  proof  holds  to  the  proposition  to  be 
proved,  the  relation  of  phenomena  to  law,  or  to  necessary 
condition  ;  in  other  words,  the  relation  of  consequent  to  a 
necessary  principle  or  antecedent,  it  is  called  d  posteriori  ; 
i.  e.  I  prove  that  the  antecedent  or  principle  which  the 
proposition  affirms  to  exist,  must  exist,  because  phenomena 
exist,  which  demand  the  former  as  the  necessary  condition 
of  their  existence  ;  in  some  cases  as  explaining  the  very 
fact  of  their  existence, — in  others,  the  mode  of  their  ex 
istence. 

When  the  &  posteriori  argument  is  reduced  to  the 
form  of  a  syllogism,  the  phenomena  or  consequents  consti 
tute  the  premises,  and  the  physical  and  logical  sequences 
are  opposed. 

These  two  methods  of  proving,  although  introduced 
above  in  immediate  connection  with  uncertain  proposi 
tions,  or  those  whose  character  remains  to  be  tested,  em 
brace  likewise  the  preceding  cases.  When  I  am  myself 
certain  of  the  character  of  a  proposition,  in  representing 
that  character  to  another,  that  is,  in  proving  it  to  him,  I 
must  necessarily  adopt  one  or  the  other  of  these  methods, 
according  to  the  nature  of.  the  proposition,  as  above  stated. 

This  is  manifest  from  a  comparison  of  these  methods 
with  the  two  great  forms  of  reasoning,  the  Deductive  and 
Inductive. 

To  prove  a  priori  is  to  prove  a  consequent  from  an  an 
tecedent,  a  phenomenon  from  a  law,  by  showing  that  the 
antecedent  and  law  involve  the  consequent  and  the  phe 
nomenon.  This  corresponds  to  Deduction  in  its  princi 
ple,  for  it  is  the  containing  whole  determining  the  par 
ticular  or  particulars  contained. 

Again  :  To  prove  a  posteriori  is  to  prove  an  antece 
dent  from  a  consequent,  a  law  from  phenomena,  by  show- 


406  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

ing  that  the  existence  of  the  consequent  or  of  the  pheno 
mena  can  be  accounted  for  only  by  the  admission  of  the 
antecedent,  or  the  law  which  the  proposition  affirms. 
This  corresponds  to  Induction  in  its  principle  ;  for  it  is 
the  particular  or  particulars  determining  the  whole,  as  that 
which  comprehends  them  and  contains  the  cause  and  law 
of  their  being. 

To  prove,  therefore,  is  to  reverse  the  order  of  Investi 
gation. 

In  the  latter,  we  are  searching  after  unknown  truths  ; 
in  the  former,  we  are  seeking  to  establish  known  truths. 
Both  processes  comprehend  the  same  principles.,  and  es 
sentially  the  same  materials  ;  only,  that  in  the  order  of 
investigation,  many  steps  are  merely  tentative,  and  give 
no  positive  results  ;  while  in  the  order  of  proof,  where  the 
whole  of  the  preceding  investigation  is  before  the  mind, 
nothing  but  what  is  essentially  constitutive  of  the  argu 
ment  is  selected  and  appropriated.  Where  we  test  an 
uncertain  proposition,  there  are  tentative  steps,  and  in 
vestigation  and  proof  are  in  some  degree  commingled. 

The  a  priori  method  of  proving  must  not  be  con 
founded  with  ct  priori  principles.  The  former  assumes 
antecedents,  which  involve  the  consequents  to  be  proved 
by  them,  without  any  reference  to  the  logical  property  of 
the  antecedents.  But  when  principles  are  designated  as 
d  priori,  we  have  direct  reference  to  their  logical  pro 
perty.  By  an  d  priori  principle,  we  mean  a  principle 
which  has  not  its  origin  in  the  sense,  but  in  the  pure  Rea 
son.  Sense  or  experience  is  a  necessary  condition  of  its 
development,  i.  e.  the  reason  would  not  go  into  action  to 
develope  the  principle,  were  not  an  experience  given  as  a 
datum;  but  when  the  principle  is  developed,  we  then 
clearly  see  that  the  experience  itself  would  not  have  been 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  407 

possible  had  not  the  principle  had  a  prior  existence  ;  e.  g. 
body  and  space,  phenomena  and  cause — space  and  cause 
being  a  priori  revealed,  upon  condition  of  body  and  phe 
nomena  ;  but  when  revealed,  we  see  there  could  have 
been  no  experience  of  body  and  phenomena,  had  not  space 
and  cause  had  a  prior  existence.  Ideas,  and  all  first 
truths  and  axioms,  are,  therefore,  d  priori  principles. 


408  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 


SECTION  II. 

THE    DIFFERENT    KINDS    OF    A    PRIORI    AND    A    POSTERIORI 

PROOF. 

ALL  the  other  forms  of  Evidence  or  Proof  may  be  reduced 
to  the  a  priori  and  the  cl  posteriori. 

I.  Testimony. — This    belongs    to   the   a    posteriori. 
The  testimony  given  is  a  fact  which  demands  as  the  con 
dition  of  its  existence  the  truth  of  what  it  affirms,  unless 
other  conditions  can  be  shown   satisfactorily  to  account 
for  it. 

II.  Concurrent  Testimony. — The  concurrence  is  a  fact 
which  can  be  accounted  for,  only  by  admitting  the  truth 
of  the  testimony. 

III.  Argument  from  progressive  approach,     e.  g.  the 
law  of  vis  inertice  may  be  proved  in  this  way.     This  is 
likewise  a  posteriori  proof.     The  facts  of  the  progressive 
approach  are  supposed  to  be  accounted  for,  only  by  admit 
ting  the  existence  of  the  law. 

IV.  Proving  by  example  or  fact  is  a  posteriori,  be 
cause  it  is  establishing  some  point  as  the  condition  or  ne 
cessary  antecedent  of  the  example  or  fact.     Sometimes  the 
a  priori  is  united  with  the  a  posteriori  ;  when,  from  in 
ducted  examples,  we  establish  a  principle,  and  then  again 
apply  this  principle  to  a  particular  instance. 

The  whole  process  is  not  usually  put  down,  but  we  go 
elliptically  from  the  inducted  examples  to  the  particular 


THE    DOCTRINE   OF   EVIDENCE.  409 

conclusion,  suppressing  the  formal  statement  of  the  gen 
eral  principle  which  intervenes  in  the  mental  process. 

Simple  reasoning  from  example  is  nothing  more  than 
inductive  reasoning. 

V.  Reasoning  from   experience. — This   is  reasoning 
either  from  the  past  and  present  to  the  future,  or  from 
the  present  to  the  past.      When  we  reason  from  the  past 
and  present  to  the  future,  we  show  a  priori  what  the  fu 
ture  must  be  from  the  causes  which  have  been,  and  now 
are,  at  work.      Wlien  we  reason  from  the  present  to  the 
past,  we  show  a  posteriori  what  the  past  must  have  been 
from  the  facts  now  existing. 

VI.  Reasoning  from  resemblance  and  analogy. 

1.  Resemblance. — Kesemblance  is  distinguished  from 
identity  by  admitted  differences  ;  identity  excludes  differ 
ences.      Now,   reasoning   from   resemblance  is   reasoning 
either  from  the  differences  or  the  agreements  of  the  two 
parallel  cases  ;  i.  e.  the  actually  existing  agreements  are 
shown  to  involve  other  points  of  agreement,  or  the  ac 
tually  existing   differences   are   shown   to   involve  other 
points  of  difference.     This  is  done  a  priori,  or  a  posteri 
ori,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  case  ;  d  priori,  when 
the  existing  facts  of  resemblance  or  difference  are  antece 
dents  to  those  which  are  to  be  proved  from  them  ;  and  a 
posteriori,  when  the  existing  facts  of  resemblance  or  dif 
ference  are  sequences  of  those  to  be  proved  from  them. 

2.  Analogy. — This   is   not  direct    or    simple    resem 
blance,  but  a  resemblance  of  relations,  or  a  resemblance 
of  circumstances  in  a  common  relation.     In  simple  resem 
blance  there  are  only  two  terms  ;  in  analogy,  there  are 
three  and  four. 

1.  Where  there  are  three  term^,  there  is  a  relation  of 
two  to  a  common  third.     This  is  a  resemblance  of  circum- 

18 


410  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

stances  in  a  common  relation.  In  this  case,  our  object  is 
either — the  analogy  being  granted — to  prove  circumstances 
in  one  relation  by  resembling  circumstances  in  the  other 
relation,  or  to  prove  the  common  relation  or  analogy  it 
self,  by  the  resembling  circumstances.  Where  we  wish  to 
prove  circumstances  in  one  relation  by  resembling  circum 
stances  in  the  others,  the  reasoning  is  d  priori  or  a  poste 
riori,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  relation  between  the 
existing  particulars  and  those  to  be  proved  ; — e.  g.  an 
analogy  is  granted  to  exist  between  mind  and  body,  as 
respects  education  ; — their  development  has  a  common  re 
lation  to  exercise.  Now,  there  are  many  resembling  cir 
cumstances  in  this  common  relation,  and  these  circum 
stances  may  be  made  a  basis  of  reasoning  to  the  existence 
of  other  circumstances  of  resemblance  after  the  d  priori  or 
d  posteriori  method,  as  the  nature  of  the  connection  shall 
determine. 

Where  we  wish  to  prove  the  common  relation,  or  the 
analogy  itself,  from  the  resembling  circumstances,  we  pro 
ceed  according  to  the  a  posteriori  method.  The  resem 
bling  circumstances  are  shown  to  require  the  analogy  as 
the  condition  of  their  existence  ; — e.  g.  Butler's  Analogy  : 
here  the  common  relation  of  Kevelation  and  the  Universe 
to  God  is  shown,  from  the  resembling  circumstances  ;  and 
objections  to  the  first  answered,  by  showing  that  similar 
objections  must  lie  against  the  second. 

2.  Where  there  snefour  terms,  there  is  a  resemblance 
of  relations.  If  this  resemblance  is  granted,  then  we  pro 
ceed  d  priori  to  prove  results  ; — e.  g.  it  being  granted 
that  an  analogy  exists  between  the  relation  of  a  king  to 
his  subjects,  and  of  a  father  to  his  children,  we  may  prove 
d  priori  that  a  king  must  guard  and  guide  his  people,  and 
yield  his  personal  interests  to  their  wants. 


THE   DOCTRINE    OF   EVIDENCE.  411 

If  we  wish  to  prove  an  analogy  of  relations  from  facts, 
we  proceed  a  posteriori.  The  establishment  of  such  an 
analogy  is  like  the  establishment  of  a  general  principle  by 
induction  ;  and  the  analogy  thus  established  is  employed 
like  a  principle  in  reaching  new  conclusions. 

Indeed,  the  analogy  always  contains  a  principle.  In 
the  first  case,  that  of  a  common  relation  of  two  terms  to  a 
third,  this  third,  on  the  a  priori  method,  is  the  principle 
enveloping  the  circumstances  of  the  other  two  ;  and,  on 
the  cl  posteriori  method,  is  the  principle  evolved  from  the 
circumstances  of  the  other  two.  In  the  second  case,  that 
of  the  resembling  relations  of  four  terms,  when  we  proceed 
a  priori,  we  assume  a  principle  which  envelopes  and  ac 
counts  for  these  relations  ;  and  when  we  proceed  a  poste 
riori,  although  we  stop  short,  usually,  when  we  have  es 
tablished  so  many  circumstances  of  resemblance  as,  to 
common  and  general  apprehension,  demand  an  analogy  to 
account  for  them,  still  the  analogy  itself  is  but  the  ex 
ponent  of  a  principle.  The  same  holds  true  with  respect 
to  all  reasoning  from  resemblance  :  the  resemblance  is 
taken  as  the  exponent  of  a  law.  In  order  to  make  this 
plain,  let  it  be  remarked  that  in  reasoning  from  simple  re 
semblance, — i.  e.  of  two  terms,  or  from  analogy  of  three  or 
four  terms — there  is  always  a  comparison  of  certain  cir 
cumstances  in  one  term  or  relation  to  resembling  circum 
stances  in  the  other  term  or  relation.  Now,  in  the  first 
term,  or  relation, — that  is,  the  one  from  which  we  reason, 
— we  find  these  certain  circumstances  to  be  connected  a 
priori  or  d  posteriori  with  other  circumstances  ;  and  then 
passing  over  to  the  second  term  or  relation  to  the  re 
sembling  circumstances  there  found,  we  infer  that  these 
must  likewise  be  d  priori  or  d  posteriori,  as  the  case  may 
^Q,  connected  with  other  circumstances,  like  those  other 


412  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

circumstances  referred  to  in  the  first.  But  why  do  we  in 
fer  this?  The  answer  is  obvious.  Nature  is  uniform  in 
her  operations,  and  therefore  the  resembling  circumstances 
in  the  second  term  or  relation  form  an  exponent  of  the 
same  law  operating  here,  which  is  known  to  have  produced 
those  other  circumstances  in  the  first  term  or  relation  : — 
i.  e.  on  the  &  priori  principle  of  the  uniformity  of  nature, 
as  the  ultimate  basis  of  the  reasoning,  we  assume  the  same 
law  to  envelope  both  terms,  or  both  relations. 

The  same  is  true,  when,  from  resembling  circum 
stances,  we  aim  to  establish  an  analogy,  or  a  strict  re 
semblance.  We  then  say,  inasmuch  as  nature  is  uniform 
in  her  operations,  these  resembling  circumstances  can  be 
accounted  for  only  by  referring  them  to  the  same  law  as 
governing  the  two  terms,  or  relations. 

VII.  Reasoning  from  axioms  and  definitions. — This 
is  usually  called  Demonstrative  Reasoning,  or  simply  De 
monstration.  This  reasoning  is,  plainly  ci  priori  ;  for  all 
the  conclusions  are  wrapped  up  in  the  axioms  and  defini 
tions,  and  are,  therefore,  determined  by  them  in  a  neces 
sary  and  absolute  relation  of  consequents  to  antecedents. 
The  principles  here,  are  necessary  and  d  priori  princi 
ples,  and  all  the  conclusions  exhibit  but  their  manifold 
unfoldings. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  413 


SECTION  III. 

OF  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  ANTECEDENTS 
AND  CONSEQUENTS. 

WE  have  seen  that  all  the  different  modes  of  proof  are 
comprehended  under  those  two, — the  a  priori  and  the  & 
posteriori.  The  a  priori  is  the  proof  of  a  consequent  by 
an  antecedent,  which  involves  it.  The  d  posteriori  is  the 
proof  of  an  antecedent  by  a  consequent,  which  demands  it 
as  the  condition  of  its  own  existence.  But  the  question 
must  here  arise,  What  is  the  nature  of  that  connection 
which  exists  between  the  two  terms  of  antecedent  and 
consequent  ?  It  cannot  be  a  mere  juxtaposition  in  time 
or  space,  because  this  juxtaposition  may  be  arbitrary  or 
accidental,  and  therefore  form  no  basis  of  certainty,  or 
even  of  probability.  It  is  obvious  that  the  connection 
must  be  of  a  nature  to  demand  the  existence  of  the  one 
when  the  existence  of  the  other  is  granted.  Hence,  let  it 
be  observed,  that  in  our  explication  of  the  a  priori  and 
the  &  posteriori,  we  were  careful  to  point  out  this  connec 
tion  as  a  connection  of  antecedent  and  consequent,  or  of  a 
principle  in  necessary  relation  to  comprehended  particu 
lars,  or  of  a  condition  without  which  the  consequent  could 
not  have  existed.  But  all  these  different  forms  of  expres 
sion  do  really  refer  to  relations  of  the  same  nature,  viz., 
either  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  or  of  law  and  phe 
nomena,  or  of  first  truths  and  their  necessary  consequences. 


414  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

When  we  attain  to  merely  uniform  sequences,  as  general 
facts,  the  uniformity  we  assume  to  be  comprehended  by 
some  law  and  necessitated  by  it.  Cause  of  course  is  all- 
pervading,  and  therefore  always  implied ;  but  is  not  the 
great  object  of  investigation,  as  has  been  before  shown.* 
The  consequent,  then,  whether  regarded  as  an  effect,  or  a 
particular  comprehended  under  law,  or  an  inference  arising 
from  an  axiom,  is  really  contained  in  its  antecedent;  so 
that  the  affirmation  of  the  latter  comprehends  the  af 
firmation  of  the  former;  and  the  existence  of  the  former 
proves  the  latter,  when,  by  applying  the  principles  of 
elimination,f  or  by  tracing  upwards  the  necessary  sequence, 
it  is  shown  that  the  former  depends  upon  the  latter. 

A  condition,  without  which  a  consequent  could  not 
have  existed.,  is  not  always  an  immediate  antecedent ;  as 
when  we  say  of  a  tender  plant,  that  it  was  destroyed,  be 
cause  the  servant  carelessly  left  it  out  of  doors  during  a 
frosty  night.  Here  we  do  not  assign  the  carelessness  of 
the  servant  as  the  immediate  antecedent  of  the  destruction 
of  the  plant  ;  but  still,  it  was  the  immediate  antecedent 
of  the  exposure  of  the  plant ;  and,  had  it  not  been  left  out 
of  doors,  it  would  not  have  been  destroyed.  In  this  case, 
there  is  a  series  of  antecedents  and  consequents,  all  of 
which  are  necessary  to  account  for  the  effect  ;  but,  instead 
of  stating  the  whole  series,  we  put  down  a  remote  antece 
dent  as  the  condition  of  the  last  effect,  and  form  thus  an 
abbreviated  form  of  expression  for  the  whole.  But  the 
reasoning  depends  upon  the  relations  we  have  given  above. 

The  cardinal  principles  involved  in  the  foregoing, 
axiomatically  expressed,  are, 

1.  "  Every  phenomenon  must  have  its  cause  and  its 
law." 

*  Supra,  p.  254.  t  Page  288. 


THE   DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  415 

2.  "  Nature  is  uniform  in  her  operations." 

This  uniformity  is  the  uniformity  of  the  action  of 
causes,  as  regulated  by  wise  laws  :  and  the  uniformity  of 
nature,  therefore,  may  be  expressed  as  follows  : 

"  Like  antecedents  involve  like  consequents  ; "  and 

"  Like  consequents  imply  like  antecedents  ; "  * 

Or,  to  give  it  a  more  general  expression, 

"  Cause  is  immutably  regulated  in  time  and  space  ; " 
e.  g.  fire — gravitation — magnetism. 

3.  "  Whatever  is  predicated  of  the  Whole  is  predicated 
of  all  the  parts  contained  under  it." 

Upon  these  three  principles  all  the  different  kinds  of 
proof  above  explained  are  based. 

In  all  the  different  forms  of  the  a  posteriori,  we  prove 
antecedents  from  consequents  or  phenomena.  But,  ob 
viously,  we  cannot  proceed  in  this  proof,  unless  we  assume 
that  "  Every  phenomenon  must  have  its  cause  and  its 
law  ; "  and  "  That  law  governs  uniformly." 

In  the  a  priori,  likewise,  where  we  prove  consequents 
or  phenomena  by  antecedents,  we  cannot  proceed  without 
assuming  that  "Every  cause  is  governed  by  law  uni 
formly/' 

*  Page  301. 


416  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   EVIDENCE. 


SECTION  IV. 

OF    DEGREES    OF    EVIDENCE. 

THE  terms  necessary,  possible,  contingent,  and  impos 
sible,  refer  to  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  a 
given  antecedent  and  consequent.  The  terms  certain, 
probable,  and  presumptive,  refer  to  our  Icnowledgt  of  this 
connection. 

*  A  necessary  connection  between  the  two  is  one  deter 
mined  by  absolute  law  •  e.  g.  the  connection  between  an 
Idea  and  an  Axiom,  as  the  Idea  of  space  and  the  axiom 
of  the  three  dimensions  in  space  ;  the  connection  between 
an  axiom  and  consequences  deduced  from  it ;  the  connec 
tion  between  the  law  of  gravitation  and  the  phenomena  of 
nature  ;  the  connection  between  the  premises  and  conclu 
sion  of  a  syllogism  ;  and  so  on. 

A  possible  connection  is  one  which  no  law  absolutely 
prevents  ;  and  which  might  take  place  by  an  adequate 
power  which  we  know  to  exist,  but  which,  at  the  same 
time,  may  not  appear  probable.  It  is  therefore  a  contin 
gent  connection. 

A  contingent  connection  implies  a  law  in  relation  to  a 
cause  which  may  or  may  not  be  governed  by  it.  It  is  the 
opposite  of  a  necessary  connection.  There  is  no  contin 
gency  in  the  connection  between  natural  causes  and  laws, 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  417 

and  their  phenomena.  Contingency  is  found  only  in  the 
connection  between  a  Free  Will,  and  motives  consisting 
of  Moral  Laws,  Keasons,  and  Inducements.* 

An  impossible  connection,  is  one  prevented  by  law  ; — 
e.  g.  that  a  stone  thrown  into  the  air  should  remain  sus 
pended  there,  or  that  a  mass  of  solid  iron  should  float  in 
water,  or  that  a  part  should  be  greater  than  a  whole,  or 
that  2+2=5. 

Impossibility  is  of  two  kinds,  logical  and  physical. 
The  first  is  a  connection  which  would  contravene  Ideas 
and  Axioms,  and  laws  founded  in  them.  Such  a  connec 
tion  is  an  impossibility  in  itself — e.  g.  that  a  part  is 
greater  than  a  whole,  that  there  are  four  dimensions  in 
space,  or  that  2  +  2  =  5.  A  physical  impossibility  is  the 
impossibility  of  any  phenomena  in  contravention  of  physi 
cal  laws.  While  these  laws  exist,  or  remain  unsuspended, 
their  proper  phenomena  must  take  place.  But  Omnipo 
tence  may  suspend  or  modify  these  laws.  This  of  course 
is  a  miracle  or  wonder. 

The  other  set  of  terms,  we  have  said,  refers  to  our 
knowledge  of  any  supposed  connection  between  an  antece 
dent  and  consequent. 

To  an  Omniscient  Being  there  are  no  degrees  of  know 
ledge.  Such  a  Being  sees,  with  the  utmost  clearness,  the 
necessary  and  the  contingent,  the  actual  and  the  possible. 
To  such  a  Being,  all  knowledge  is  certain.  It  is  only  to 
the  knowledges  which  belong  to  beings  like  ourselves  that 
the  terms  presumptive  and  probable  can  be  applied  ;  it  is 
only  of  such  knowledges  that  degrees  of  certainty  can  be 
affirmed. 

There  are  then  to  us  three  kinds  of  certainty,  according 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  p.  62. 
18* 


418  THE    DOCTKINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

to  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  the  terms  which 
are  the  object  of  proof. 

First.  Absolute  certainty.  This  is  based  upon  the 
necessary  connection  between  the  two  terms.  Our  know 
ledge  of  Ideas  and  Axioms  is  absolutely  certain, — e.  g. 
time  and  space  ;  that  every  body  is  in  space.  So  also  our 
knowledge  of  deductions  from  axioms  is  absolutely  certain, 
as  in  geometry,  for  example.  Our  knowledge  of  the  con 
nection  between  the  premises  and  conclusion  of  a  syllogism 
is  of  the  same  nature  :  this  is  sometimes  called  logical 
certainty. 

Secondly.  Physical  certainty.  This  is  the  certainty 
which  lies  in  the  connection  between  established  physical 
antecedents  and  sequents,  as  exhibited  in  the  phenomena 
of  gravitation,  heat,  chemical  affinities,  mechanical  forces, 
and  so  on. 

Now,  the  reason  does  not  conceive  of  this  connection 
as  necessarily  fixed  with  an  absolute  necessity,  because  it 
ultimately  depends  upon  the  Will  of  God  ;  and  the  same 
Will  which  ordained  it,  can  change,  suspend,  or  even  an 
nihilate  it. 

When,  therefore,  we  affirm  any  thing  to  be  physically 
certain,  we  mean  that  our  knowledge  of  it  is  based  upon 
physical,  and  not  upon  necessary  relations. 

Thirdly.  Moral  certainty.  This  is  the  certainty  which 
lies  between  the  connection  of  Motive  and  Will.  By  Will, 
we  mean  a  self-conscious,  intelligent  and  sensitive  cause, 
or  a  cause  in  a  triunity  with  Keason  and  Sensitivity.  It 
is  in  the  fullest  sense  a  cause  per  se;  that  is,  it  contains 
within  itself  proper  efficiency,  and  determines  its  own  di 
rection.  By  Motives,  we  mean  the  reasons  and  induce- 
/  mentSj  in  view  of  which  the  Will  acts.*  In  general,  all 

*  Doctrine  of  the  Will,  p.  138. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  419 

activity  proceeds  according  to  rules,  or  laws,  or  reasons, 
for  they  have  essentially  the  same  meaning  :  but  in  mere 
material  masses,  the  law  is  not  contemplated  by  the  acting 
force  ;  it  is  contemplated  only  by  the  Intelligence  which 
ordained  and  conditioned  the  force.  In  spirit,  on  the  con 
trary,  the  activity  which  we  call  Will,  is  self-conscious, 
and  is  connected  with  a  perception  and  sense  of  the  rea 
sons  and  inducements,  or  ends,  or  motives  of  actions. 
These  motives  are  of  two  kinds  : 

First.  Those  found  in  the  ideas  of  the  practical  reason, 
which  decides  what  is  fit  and  right.  These  are  reasons  of 
supreme  authority. 

Secondly.  Those  found  in  the  understanding  and  sen 
sitivity  ;  i,  e.y  the  immediately  useful  and  expedient,  and 
the  gratification  of  the   passions.     These  are  right  only  ^ 
when  subordinate  to  the  first. 

Now,  these  reasons  and  inducements  are  a  light  to  the 
Will,  and  serve  to  guide  its  activities.  The  human  con 
science,  which  is  but  the  Eeason,  under  its  practical  func 
tion,  in  relation  to  the  moral,  has  drawn  up  for  the  Will 
explicit  rules,  suited  to  all  circumstances  and  relations, 
which  are  called  ethics,  or  the  rules.  And  so,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  understanding,  by  which  we  mean  the  Keason, 
under  its  practical  function,  in  relation  to  mere  utility,  has 
formed  rules  of  prudence  or  expediency.  The  law  of  the 
sensitivity,  taken  in  itself,  is  unique  ;  it  is  simply  "  To  do  // 
whatever  is  most  agreeable  or  pleasing  to  itself." 

These  various  rules  the  Will  is  not  compelled  or  neces 
sitated  to  obey.  In  every  volition  it  is  conscious  of  a 
power  to  do,  or  not  to  do. 

In  the  moral  harmony  and  purity  of  the  soul,  the  three 
kinds  above  named  do  not  conflict  with  each  other.  The 
right  has  utility  as  an  ultimate  and  certain  result.  The 


420  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

soul  loves  the  right,  in  this  state,  because  it  is  right,  and 
reposes  quietly  in  hope  of  the  consequences.  And  all  the 
passions  find  their  highest  gratification  in  oheying  the  law 
of  the  right.  Hence  moral  certainty,  as  to  the  actions  of 
moral  beings,  can  exist  only  where  the  harmony  of  the 
spiritual  being  is  preserved  in  a  perfect,  or  at  least  para 
mount  degree  :  e.  g.  God,  and  good  angels,  and  good  men. 
In  God,  moral  certainty  is  perfect.  His  dispositions  are 
infinitely  pure,  and  his  Will  freely  determines  to  do  right ; 
it  is  not  compelled  or  necessitated,  for  then  His  infinite 
meritoriousness  would  cease.  Moral  certainty  is  not  abso 
lute,  because  Will  being  a  power  to  do,  or  not  to  do,  there 
is  always  a  possibility,  although  it  may  be  an  infinite  im 
probability,  that  the  Will  may  disobey  the  laws  of  the 
Keason. 

In  the  case  of  good  angels,  and  good  men,  the  moral 
certainty  is  such,  as  to  be  attended  with  no  apprehension 
of  a  dereliction. 

With  respect  to  such  men  as  Joseph,  Daniel,  Paul, 
Howard,  and  Washington,  we  can  calculate,  with  a  very 
high  and  satisfactory  moral  certainty,  of  the  manner  in 
which  they  will  act  in  any  given  circumstances  involving 
the  influence  of  motives.  We  know  they  will  obey  truth, 
justice,  and  mercy, — that  is,  the  first  class  of  motives  ; 
and  the  second,  only  so  far  as  they  are  authorised  by  the 
first. 

If  the  first  class  of  motives  is  forsaken,  then  human 
conduct  must  be  calculated  according  to  the  influence  of 
the  second  class. 

Human  character,  however,  is  mixed  and  variously 
compounded.  We  might  make  a  scale  of  an  indefinite 
number  of  degrees,  from  the  highest  point  of  moral  excel 
lence  to  the  lowest  point  of  moral  degradation,  and  then 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  421 

our  predictions  of  human  conduct  would  vary  with  every 
degree. 

In  any  particular  case,  where  we  are  called  upon  to 
reason  from  the  connection  of  motives  with  the  will,  it  is 
evident  we  must  determine  the  character  of  the  individual 
as  accurately  as  possible,  in  order  to  know  the  probable 
resultant  of  the  opposite  moral  forces  which  we  are  likely 
to  find. 

We  have  remarked  that  moral  certainty  exists  only 
where  the  harmony  of  the  moral  constitution  is  preserved. 
Here  we  know  the  Right  will  be  obeyed.  It  may,  how 
ever,  be  remarked  in  addition  to  this,  that  moral  certainty 
may  be  said  to  exist  in  the  case  of  the  lowest  moral 
degradation,  where  the  Eight  is  forsaken.  Here  the  rule 
is,  "  To  do  whatever  is  most  agreeable/'  and  "  Whatever 
is  useful  in  the  immediate  or  temporal  consequences." 
The  volition,  indeed,  in  such  instances  seems  merged  into 
a  mere  sense  of  present  gratification.  But,  in  the  inter 
mediate  state,  lies  the  wide  field  of  probability.  What 
is  commonly  called  the  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and 
esteemed  of  most  importance  in  the  affairs  of  human 
life,  is  not  the  knowledge  of  human  nature  as  it  ought  to 
be,  but  as  it  is,  in  its  vast  variety  of  good  and  evil.  We 
gain  this  knowledge  from  consciousness,  from  observation, 
and  from  history.  What  human  nature  ought  to  be,  we 
learn  from  Reason  and  Revelation. 

Will  has  already  been  represented  as  forming  a  triunity 
with  the  Reason  and  the  Sensitivity,  and  in  the  constitu 
tion  of  our  being  is  designed  to  derive  its  rules  and  in 
ducements  of  action  from  these.  Acts,  which  are  in  the 
direction  of  neither  reason  nor  sensitivity,  must  be  very 
trifling  acts ;  and  therefore,  although  possible,  we  may 
conclude  they  are  very  rare.  In  calculating,  then,  future 


422  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

acts  of  will,  we  may,  like  the  Mathematicians,  drop  infini 
tesimal  differences,  and  assume  that  all  acts  of  the  will 
are  in  the  direction  of  the  reason,  or  of  the  sensitivity,  or 
of  both  in  their  harmony.  Although  the  will  is  conscious 
of  power  to  do,  out  of  the  direction  of  both  the  reason 
and  the  sensitivity,  still  in  the  triunity  in  which  it  exists, 
it  submits  itself  to  the  general  interests  of  the  being,  and 
consults  the  authority  of  conscience,  or  the  enjoyments 
of  passion.  Now  every  individual  has  formed  for  himself 
habits  and  a  character,  more  or  less  fixed.  He  is  known 
to  have  submitted  himself  from  day  to  day,  and  in  a  great 
variety  of  transactions,  to  the  laws  of  conscience  ;  and 
hence  we  conclude,  that  he  has  formed  a  fixed  purpose  of 
doing  right.  He  has  exhibited,  too,  on  many  occasions, 
noble,  generous,  and  pure  feelings  ;  and  hence  we  con 
clude  that  his  sensitivity,  in  a  predominant  degree, 
harmonises  with  conscience.  Or,  he  is  known  to  have 
violated  the  laws  of  the  conscience  from  day  to  day,  and 
in  a  great  variety  of  transactions  ;  and  hence  we  conclude 
that  he  has  formed  a  fixed  purpose  of  doing  wrong ;  and 
that  his  sensitivity  is  in  conflict  with  the  reason. 

In  both  cases  supposed,  and,  in  like  manner,  in  all 
supposable  cases,  there  is  plainly  a  basis,  on  which,  in  any 
given  circumstances,  we  may  foresee  and  predict  the  voli 
tions,  and  consequently  the  actions  of  men. 

There  is  something  "  that  is  evident,  and  now  existent, 
with  which  the  future  existence  of  the  contingent  event 
is  connected."  On  the  one  hand,  these  predictions  exert 
no  necessitating  influence  over  the  events,  for  they  are 
entirely  disconnected  with  the  causation  of  the  events  ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  events  need  not  be  assumed 
as  necessary,  in  order  to  become  the  objects  of  probable 
calculations.  If  they  were  necessary,  in  any  sense,  the 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  423 

calculations  could  no  longer  be  merely  probable  ;  they 
would,  on  the  contrary,  take  the  precision  and  certainty 
of  the  calculation  of  eclipses  and  other  phenomena  based 
upon  necessary  laws. 

But  these  calculations  can  aim  only  at  moral  certainty, 
because  they  are  made  according  to  the  generally  known 
and  received  determinations  of  will  in  a  triunity  with  the 
reason  and  the  sensitivity ;  but  still,  a  will  which  is  known, 
also,  to  have  the  power  to  depart  at  any  moment  from 
the  line  of  determination  which  it  has  established  for 
itself.  Thus  the  calculations  which  we  make  respecting 
the  conduct  of  one  man  in  given  circumstances,  based 
upon  his  known  integrity,  and  the  calculations  which  we 
make  respecting  another,  based  upon  his  known  dishonesty, 
may  alike  disappoint  us,  through  the  unexpected,  though 
possible  dereliction  of  the  first,  and  the  unexpected, 
though  possible  reformation  of  the  latter. 

When  we  reason  from  moral  effects  to  moral  causes,  or 
from  moral  causes  to  moral  effects  ;  as,  for  example,  in 
testimony,  where  we  reason  from  the  fact  of  the  testimony 
to  the  motive  which  led  to  the  testimony, — we  cannot 
regard  the  operation  of  causes  as  positive  and  uniform 
under  the  same  law  of  necessity  which  appertains  to 
physical  causes  ;  because,  in  moral  causality,  the  free  will 
is  the  efficient  and  last  determiner.  It  is  indeed  true, 
that  we  reason  here  with  a  high  degree  of  probability,— 
with  a  probability  sufficient  to  regulate  wisely  and  har- 
moniously  the  affairs  of  society  ;  but  we  cannot  reason 
respecting  human  conduct  as  we  reason  respecting  the 
phenomena  of  the  physical  world,  since  it  is  possible  for 
the  human  will  to  disappoint  calculations  based  upon  the 
ordinary  influence  of  motives  ;  e.  g.  The  motive  does  not 
hold  the  same  relation  to  will  which  fire  holds  to  a  com- 


424  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

bustible  substance.  The  fire  must  burn  ;  the  will  may 
or  may  not  determine  in  view  of  the  motive. 

Hence,  the  reason  why  in  common  parlance  probable 
evidence  has  received  the  name  of  moral  evidence  ;  moral 
evidence  being  always  probable — all  probable  evidence  is 
called  moral.* 

Next  after  certainty,  we  must  consider  probability. 

By  the  probable,  we  mean  that  which  has  not  attained 
to  certainty,  but  which,  nevertheless,  has  grounds  on  which 
it  claims  to  be  believed.  We  call  it  probable  or  provable, 
because  it  both  has  proof,  and  is  still  under  conditions  of 
proof,  that  is,  admits  of  still  farther  proof. 

That  which  is  certain,  has  all  the  proof  of  which  the 
case  admits.  A  mathematical  proposition  is  certain  on 
the  ground  of  necessity,  and  admits  of  no  higher  proof 
than  that  which  really  demonstrates  its  truth.  The 
Divine  volitions  are  certain  on  the  ground  of  the  Divine 
perfections,  and  admit  of  no  higher  proof  than  what  is 
found  in  these  perfections.  The  volitions  of  a  good 
created  being  are  certain  on  the  ground  of  the  purity  of 
such  a  being,  and  admit  of  no  higher  proof  than  what 
is  found  in  this  purity. 

But  when  we  come  to  a  mixed  being,  that  is,  a  being 
of  Keason,  and  of  a  Sensitivity  corrupted  totally,  or  in 
different  degrees,  then  we  have  place  not  for  certainty, 
but  for  probability.  As  our  knowledge  of  the  future  or 
the  past  volitions  of  such  a  being  can  only  be  gathered 
from  something  now  existent,  this  knowledge  will  depend 
upon  our  knowledge  of  the  present  relative  state  of  his 
reason  and  sensitivity.  But  a  perfect  knowledge  of  this 
state  is  in  no  case  supposable,  so  that,  although  our  actual 

*  Review  of  Edwards  on  the  Will,  pp.  261-269. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  425 

knowledge  of  this  being  may  be  such  as  to  afford  us  proof 
of  what  his  volitions  may  be,  yet,  inasmuch  as  our  know 
ledge  of  him  may  be  increased  indefinitely  by  close  obser 
vation  and  study,  so  likewise  will  the  proof  be  increased. 
According  to  the  definition  of  probability  above  given, 
therefore,  our  knowledge  of  the  future  or  past  volitions  of 
an  imperfect  being  can  only  amount  to  probable  know 
ledge. 

The  direction  of  the  probabilities  will  be  determined 
by  the  preponderance  of  the  good  or  the  bad  in  the  mixed 
being  supposed.  But  the  state  of  the  Keason  itself  must 
be  considered.  If  the  Reason  or  Conscience  be  in  a 
highly  developed  state,  and  the  convictions  of  the  right 
consequently  clear  and  strong,  there  may  be  probabilities 
of  volitions  in  opposition  to  passion,  which  cannot  exist 
where  the  Reason  is  undeveloped,  and  subject  to  the 
errors  and  prejudices  of  custom  and  superstition.  The 
difference  is  that  which  is  commonly  known  under  the 
terms  "  Enlightened  and  unenlightened  conscience." 

With  a  given  state  of  the  Reason  and  the  Sensitivity, 
the  direction  of  the  probabilities  will  depend  also  very 
much  upon  the  correlated,  or  upon  the  opposing  objects 
and  circumstances.* 

We  have  spoken  of  Probability  thus  far  only  in  refer 
ence  to  human  volition  and  actions,  since  here  is  the 
great  field  of  probability.  It  evidently  applies  to  other 
subjects  also  :  it  applies  wherever  the  connection  between 
an  antecedent  and  consequent  is  contingent,  or  appears 
to  us  to  be  so. 

We  have  pointed  out  several  terms  which  refer  to  the 
nature  of  the  connection  between  antecedents  and  conse- 

*  Review  ut  supra,  pp.  291—3. 


426  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

quents,  viz.,  necessary,  consequent,  possible,  and  impos 
sible;  and  several  others,  which  refer  to  our  knowledge  of 
that  connection,  viz.,  certain,  probable,  and  presumptive. 

Now  these  terms  answer  to  each  other.  A  necessary 
connection  of  antecedents  and  consequents,  or  of  any  two 
terms,  is  the  ground  of  absolute  certainty  of  knowledge. 
In  the  connection  of  physical  antecedents  and  consequents 
there  is  a  relative  necessity,  i.  e.,  this  connection  is  neces 
sary  while  the  system  of  nature  remains  unchanged  ;  but 
as  such  a  change  is  possible  by  the  Divine  Will,  the  cer 
tainty  of  knowledge  here  is  called  physical,  and  not 
absolute. 

An  impossible  connection  involves  the  Idea  of  neces 
sity.  Hence,  when  a  connection  is  seen  to  be  impossible, 
our  knowledge  that  it  will  not  take  place  is  absolutely  or 
physically  certain,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  antece 
dents  and  consequents  connected. 

Answering  to  a  contingent  connection  between  antece 
dent  and  consequent,  we  have  a  probable  knowledge. 
We  have  indeed  spoken  of  a  moral  certainty  in  respect 
to  the  volitions  of  pure  beings.  But  the  nature  of  the 
evidence  in  these  cases  is  not  changed.  Moral  certainty 
still  admits  a  possibility  in  the  opposing  scale  ;  but  the 
grounds  of  belief  are  so  stable  and  conclusive  as  to  leave 
no  room  for  doubt.  Generically  considered,  moral  cer 
tainty  is  probable  knowledge. 

Again,  answering  to  a  possible  connection  between 
antecedents  and  consequents,  our  knowledge  is  presump 
tive.  A  possible  connection  is  a  contingent  one,  also ;  it 
may  or  it  may  not  be.  The  difference  between  this  case 
and  the  preceding,  i  e.,  where  a  contingent  connection  of 
antecedents  and  consequents  has  a  probable  knowledge 
answering  to  it,  is  as  follows  :  In  the  preceding  there  is 


THE   DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  427 

always  a  certain  amount  of  proof  for  or  against  the  con 
nection,  with  at  least  a  possibility  in  the  opposing  scale. 
Frequently  the  probabilities  on  either  side  are  so  rife,  that 
a  nice  judgment  is  required  in  determining  the  prepon 
derance. 

But  where  the  connection  is  said  to  be  merely  possible, 
there  is  no  proof  for  or  against,  as  yet,  adduced  ;  and  then, 
according  to  the  point  of  view  at  which  we  stand  in  rela 
tion  to  it,  we  are  said  to  have  a  presumptive  knowledge 
that  the  connection  does  or  does  not  exist.  As  soon  as 
proof  is  adduced,  a  probability  arises  on  one  side  or  the 
other. 

But,  while  there  is  no  probability,  to  which  side  does 
the  presumption  belong  ?  This,  I  have  said,  depends  upon 
the  point  of  view  at  which  we  stand.  And  this  point  of 
view  must  itself  be  determined  on  some  fit  principle  ;  for 
it  is,  by  no  means,  a  matter  of  indifference.  Where  a 
question  arises  between  two  parties,  it  must  necessarily  be 
so  put  as  to  involve  an  affirmative  and  a  negative ;  and 
the  presumption  will  then  be  said  to  lie  in  favour  of  the 
affirmative  or  the  negative.  Now  the  point  of  view  is  de 
termined  : 

1.  By  the  previous  state  of  the  question.     If  it  has  by 
old  opinions  or  established  usage  been  settled  in  the  affir 
mative  or  negative,   then  from  this   point   must   it   be 
viewed.      Independently  of  all  argument,  and  of  all  in 
herent  probability,  there  is  a  presumption  in  favour  of 
the  old  opinion,  and  the  established  usage.     He  who  at 
tacks  the  question  is  said  to  assume  the  burden  of  proof; 
and,  unless  he  can  bring  proof  to  the  contrary,  the  old  de 
cision  must  stand. 

2.  The  point  of  view  is  determined  by  any  natural 
right  which  may  chance  to  be  involved  in  the  question, 


428  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

such  as  the  right  of  life,  liberty,  property,  character,  and 
freedom  of  opinion  ;  e.  g.  A  man  arraigned  as  a  criminal 
is  presumed  to  be  innocent,  until  he  is  proved  guilty.  A 
man  in  possession  of  an  estate  is  presumed  to  be  the  owner, 
until  his  title  is  invalidated  by  sufficient  proof.  Any  an 
cient  institution  is  presumed  to  be  well  founded,  until  its 
principles  can  be  shown  to  be  false  and  mischievous  ;  or  it 
can  be  shown,  by  fraud  or  violence^  to  have  supplanted  a 
more  ancient  institution.  In  the  latter  case  the  burden 
of  proof  falls  upon  the  more  modern,  and  the  presumption 
lies  in  favor  of  the  more  ancient  institution.  It  happens, 
sometimes,  that  those  are  called  innovators,  who  are,  in 
reality,  the  advocates  of  what  is  truly  ancient  and  vener 
able.  If  they  prove  this  to  be  the  fact,  they,  of  course, 
tranfer  the  burden  of  proof  to  where  it  justly  belongs. 

Presumptive  evidence  must  be  distinguished  from  d 
priori  or  antecedent  probability.  This  last  is  strictly  in 
herent  probability,  arising  from  d  priori  or  established 
principle.  Any  fact  or  proposition  possesses  this  kind  of 
probability,  when  it  is  a  probable  consequence  of  such  a 
principle  ;  e.  g.  From  the  known  character  of  an  indi 
vidual,  there  is  an  antecedent  probability  how  he  will  act 
under  certain  circumstances.  There  may  be  a  moral  cer 
tainty  that  he  will  do  right  ;  but  the  circumstances  may 
be  such  as  not  simply  to  involve  a  question  of  rectitude. 
From  the  knowledge  which  we  have  of  the  circumstances, 
in  connection  with  the  character  of  the  individual,  we 
judge  that  an  antecedent  probability  exists  as  to  the  man 
ner  in  which  he  will  act. 

There  is  antecedent  probability  in  favor  of  a  Divine 
revelation,  arising  from  the  character  of  the  Deity  and  the 
moral  condition  of  man. 

In  making  experiments  in  Natural  Science,  there  is 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  429 

often  an  antecedent  probability  of  the  results  arising  from 
known  antecedents. 

In  conclusion,  we  remark,  that  the  evidence  by  which 
we  gain  certain  knowledge  of  the  connection  of  antecedents 
and  consequents,  or  of  any  fact  or  proposition,  is  in  gen 
eral  called  demonstrative  evidence.  The  terms  demonstra 
tive  and  demonstration  are  technically  and  particularly  ap 
plied  to  mathematical  reasoning.  Moral  reasoning  may  be 
demonstrative  in  respect  to  moral  truth  ;  but  not  in  re 
spect  to  moral  action.  The  evidence  by  which  we  gain 
probable  knowledge  is  called  probable  evidence  ;  the  high 
est  degree  of  probability  is  called  moral  certainty.  And 
the  evidence  by  which  we  gain  presumptive  knowledge  is 
called  presumptive  evidence. 

We  shall  next  proceed  to  apply  the  foregoing  princi 
ples  to  the  different  kinds  of  evidence  contained  under 
the  two  general  divisions  of  the  a  priori  and  the  d  pos 
teriori. 


430  THE   DOCTKINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 


SECTION  Y 

TESTIMONY. 

THIS  is  moral  evidence,  because  it  depends  upon  the  hu 
man  will.  The  highest  certainty,  therefore,  to  which 
testimony  can  attain  is  moral  certainty. 

Testimony ,  as  a  species  of  evidence,  must  embrace  very 
extensive  considerations  of  human  nature,  and  of  the  in 
fluence  of  motives.  Testimony,  in  any  given  case,  is  a 
fact  which  must  a  posteriori  be  accounted  for.  It  is  ac 
counted  for  by  referring  it  to  the  motives  which  led  to  it. 
If  it  can  be  shown  that  the  truth  of  the  fact  testified  to, 
is  the  morally  certain  ground  of  the  testimony,  then  the 
testimony  proves  the  truth  of  that  fact  with  a  moral  cer 
tainty.  If  the  truth  is  the  only  probable  ground,  then 
the  testimony  proves  the  probability  of  the  fact  to  a  de 
gree  determined  by  the  character  of  the  witness  and  the 
circumstances  in  which  he  is  placed. 

But  to  proceed  to  a  more  particular  exposition  of  this 
subject — 

I.  What  circumstances  determine  the  truth  of  testimony 
ivith  a  moral  certainty  ? 

1.  The  character  of  the  witness  :  if  he  have  all  the 
qualities  of  a  perfect  moral  being,  then  his  veracity,  un 
der  any  circumstances,  may  be  deemed  morally  certain. 

Only  one  degree,  at  least,  below  moral  certainty  is  the 


THE    DOCTKINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  431 

veracity  of  such  men  as  we  have  already  referred  to,  viz., 
Paul,  Joseph,  Daniel,  Washington,  &c.  We  can  hardly 
conceive  of  a  trial  so  severe  as  to  lead  such  men  to  sacri 
fice  their  integrity. 

2.  Sufficient  opportunities  for  observing  the  fact  testi 
fied  to,  i.  e.  The  fact  must  have  been  the  direct  and  un 
questionable  object  of  sense  or  experience  :    "  That  which 
we  have  heard — which  we  have  seen  with  our  eyes — which 
we  have  looked  upon  (i.  e.  have  steadily  contemplated) 
and  our  hands  have  handled — declare  we  unto  you." 

3.  The  witness  must  be  a  man  of  sane  mind. 

The  first,  however,  may  be  regarded  as  including  the 
two  last.  A  man  of  high  and  perfect  moral  character  will 
not  testify  to  facts  which  he  has  not  carefully  and  fully 
observed  :  nor  will  he  testify,  if  he  is  not  conscious  of 
having  been  in  a  proper  state  of  mind  at  the  time  they 
were  presented. 

II.  What  circumstances  determine  the  truth  of  testi 
mony  on  grounds  of  mere  probability  ? 

1.  The  last  particular  mentioned  under  the  preceding 
head  is  essential  to  all  testimony  ;  and  the  probability  will 
always  be  directly  in  proportion  to  the  first  two. 

2.  The  probability  established  by  testimony  will  vary 
with  the  number  and  character  of  the  motives  under  which 
the  witness  testifies. 

First.  If  the  witness  has  an  interest  in  the  facts  to 
which  he  testifies,  arising  from  pride,  ambition,  or  the 
gratification  of  any  desire,  or  the  fulfilment  of  any  selfish 
purpose  which  he  is  "known  to  entertain,  then  will  his 
testimony  in  proportion  be  invalidated.  Still,  however, 
the  known  character  of  the  witness  must  be  taken  into  the 
account.  The  same  motives  relatively  to  one  man  will  in 
validate  testimony  to  a  greater  degree  than  relatively  to 


432  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

another  ;  i.  e.  the  motive  and  the  character  must  be  taken 
together,  and  the  probability  be  accordingly  deduced. 

Secondly.  If  the  motives  be  such  as  on  principles  of 
self-gratification  would  lead  the  witness  to  testify  contrary 
to  his  actual  testimony,  then  is  the  testimony  strong  in 
proportion  to  the  motives  ;  e.  g.  A  man  testifying  to 
facts  at  the  expense  of  reputation — or  worldly  possessions 
and  honours — or  of  life. 

III.  Testimony  in  relation  to  opinion  and  in  relation 
to  fact. 

By  opinion  we  mean  a  judgment  of  the  mind,  respect 
ing  a  proposition  as  true  or  false.  Opinion  is  to  be  dis 
tinguished  from  absolute  knowledge,  as  implying  that  the 
proposition  which  is  its  object,  is  still  debatable. 

Testimony  cannot  establish  the  truth  of  opinions  or 
judgments.  Their  truth  can  be  established  only  on  some 
necessary  principle  of  the  Intelligence. 

Testimony,  as  evidence,  relates  merely  to  matters  of 
fact.  All,  therefore,  that  a  witness  can  testify  to,  in  re 
lation  to  opinions,  is  the  fact  that  he  or  some  other  person 
entertains  such  and  such  opinions.  But  the  truth  or 
falsity  of  the  opinions  must  be  determined  on  other 
grounds,  and  wholly  independently  of  testimony. 

A  man  may  be  of  the  highest  integrity,  and  of  sane 
mind,  and  may  sacrifice  reputation  and  possessions,  and 
life  itself,  in  maintaining  his  opinions,  without  affording 
any  evidence  of  their  truth.  His  testimony  only  goes  to 
establish  the  fact  that  he  believes  the  proposition  in  ques 
tion,  and  that  he  believes  it  ardently  and  firmly. 

Divine  testimony  is  adequate  to  establish  a  truth  as 
well  as  a  fact,  because  Grod  is  Infinite  Keason,  and  the 
very  substance  of  truth.  We  believe,  therefore,  what 
God  affirms,  although  we  may  be  incapable  of  deter- 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  433 

mining  the  truth,  independently,  on  the  principles  of  our 
reason. 

The  testimony  of  good  and  wise  men  is  entitled  to 
high  consideration.  But  we  do  not  ultimately  and  se 
curely  settle  a  point  which  they  profess  to  believe,  until 
we  have  ascertained  the  grounds  on  which  they  believe. 
The  same  principles  of  evidence  are  common  to  them  and 
to  ourselves;  if,  therefore,  they  have  believed  on  just 
principles,  we  must  be  capable  of  perceiving  them. 

IY.  Truth  and  Fact. — By  fact,  we  mean  phenomena, 
— something  which  we  know  by  observation  merely. 
Facts  are  of  two  kinds  :  1.  Facts  of  the  Senses,  or  exter 
nal  observation.  2.  Facts  of  the  Consciousness,  or  inter 
nal  observation. 

By  truth,  we  mean  that  which  is  arrived  at  by  the 
pure  Keason.  We  always  assume  observation  as  con 
ditional  to  the  exercise  of  Keason.  But  while  observation 
supplies  facts,  Reason  supplies  the  principles  under  which 
the  facts  are  to  be  reduced.  Now,  whatever  the  Eeason 
supplies,  whether  in  intuition  or  in  deduction,  we  call 
truth.  From  this  comparison  of  truth  and  fact,  it  must 
still  more  clearly  appear  that  testimony  cannot  prove 
truths  or  doctrines.  Testimony  is  only  an  attestation  of 
what  has  been  observed.  Truths  or  doctrines  can  be 
proved  by  reasoning  alone. 

V.  Historical  Evidence. — The  leading  feature  of  this 
species  of  evidence,  is  testimony. 

1.  Where  the  historian  relates  what  he  has  himself  seen. 
This  is  pure  testimony,  and  must  be  judged  of  accordingly. 

2.  Where  the  historian  relates  cotemporaneous  events, 
upon  the  testimony  of  others.     Here,  in  addition  to  what 
has  been  laid  down  under  testimony,  we  must  take  into 
account  :    First.      The    prejudices    and    antipathies   of 

19 


434  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

country,  party,  and  sect.  Secondly.  The  philosophical 
ability  of  the  historian  to  investigate,  compare,  and  de 
duce.  Thirdly.  The  time  and  attention  bestowed  on  the 
work. 

3.  Where  the  historian  depends  for  his  information 
upon  the  writings  of  others,  and  upon  national  monu 
ments,  records,  and  antiquities.  Here  the  most  various 
and  lofty  qualifications  are  requisite.  First.  All  the 
qualities  of  a  true  witness.  Secondly.  Varied  and  pro 
found  erudition  :  viz.  a  knowledge  of  languages — of  science 
• — of  arts— of  government  ; — great  skill  in  antiquarian  re 
searches  ;  and  above  all,  original,  all-comprehensive,  and 
penetrative  genius,  as  a  philosopher.  Thirdly.  Adequate 
materials.  A  history  is  entitled  to  belief  in  proportion  as 
these  particulars  appear  in  its  compilation. 

VI.  Concurrent  Testimony. — This  must  be  distin 
guished  from  accumulated  testimony,  which  is  a  mere 
multiplication  of  witnesses.  In  concurrent  testimony,  on 
the  contrary,  although  the  evidence  be  stronger,  accord 
ing  to  the  number  of  the  witnesses,  yet  the  evidence  it 
self  does  not  lie  in  the  qualifications  of  the  witnesses  ;  but 
only  in  their  concurrence. 

Their  concurrence,  on  supposition,  cannot  be  accounted 
for,  without  granting  the  fact  testified  to  ;  i.  e.  If  the  fact 
did  occur,  then  the  concurrence  was  possible  ;  if  the  fact 
did  not  occur,  then  the  concurrence  was  not  probable,  or 
possible,  as  the  case  may  be. 

In  the  first  place.  It  is  plain  that  this  evidence  will 
be  strong,  in  proportion  to  the  improbability  of  previous 
concert.  If  previous  concert  can  be  shown  to  be  im 
possible,  then  the  evidence  occupies  oae  of  its  highest 
grounds. 

But,  in  the  second  place,  although  the  probability,  or 


THE   DOCTRINE   OF   EVIDENCE.  435 

even  possibility,  of  previous  concert  may  be  disproved,  it 
will  still  remain  to  be  shown  that  the  concurrence  can  be 
accounted  for  only  by  the  admission  of  the  fact  in  ques 
tion. 

Now,  if  the  concurrence  can  be  accounted  for  in  any 
other  way,  it  must  be  by  showing,  in  the  case  of  each  wit 
ness,  separately,  that  there  were  motives  which  were  ade 
quate  to  lead  to  the  given  testimony,  without  supposing 
the  reality  of  the  fact  testified  to.  This  would  of  course 
invalidate  the  concurrence.  If  the  existence  of  such  mo 
tives  in  the  case  of  each  witness  should  be  shown  to  have 
existed,  there  would  of  course  be  an  utter  annihilation  of 
the  evidence  :  or,  if  the  above  be  shown  in  the  cases  of 
only  a  part  of  the  witnesses,  it  must  tend  to  destroy  the 
evidence.  In  all  these  cases  the  concurrence  turns  out  a 
singular  fortuity.  Now,  if  in  any  given  concurrence  no 
such  invalidating  or  destructive  circumstances  can  be  de 
tected,  then  it  must  remain  as  valid  evidence. 

VII.  Concurrent  Testimony  in  relation  to  fact  and 
opinion. — The  principles  above  stated  refer  to  concurrent 
testimony,  as  evidence  of  facts  merely. 

Concurrent  testimony,  in  relation  to  opinion,  is  mere 
concurrence  of  opinion.  Where  this  concurrence  exists 
without  previous  concert,  it  affords  evidence  of  sincerity. 
Where  an  opinion  is  thus  concurred  in  by  men  of  high  in 
tegrity  and  wisdom,  it  is  entitled  to  great  consideration  ; 
but  ultimately  it  must  rest  upon  principles,  as  forming 
its  only  decisive  evidence.  This  has  been  above  shown  in 
discussing  opinion  in  its  relation  to  simple  testimony. 


436  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   EVIDENCE. 


SECTION  VI. 

CIRCUMSTANTIAL    EVIDENCE. 

BY  circumstances,  we  mean,  as  the  etymology  denotes, 
whatever  stands  around  a  principal. 

Thus  the  circumstances  of  an  individual  comprise  all 
the  particulars  which  make  up  his  external  condition. 
Thus  the  circumstances  of  an  event  comprise  all  the  par 
ticulars  of  time,  place,  action,  modes,  degrees,  causes,  and 
effects  ;  i.  e.  every  thing  attending  upon  it — accessory  to 
it — or  every  thing  making  up  a  description  of  it. 

Now,  circumstantial  evidence  in  general  takes  place 
where  we  adduce  the  circumstances  which  belong  to  a 
principal,  to  prove  the  existence  of  that  principal.  But 
what  is  the  connection  between  circumstances  and  a  prin 
cipal  which  enables  us  to  reason  from  the  one  to  the 
other  ?  It  must  be  something  more  than  mere  juxtaposi 
tion.  An  arbitrary  and  accidental  connection  cannot  be 
the  foundation  of  reasoning.  The  connection  then  must  be 
that  of  necessary,  or  at  least  probable  consequent  to  a 
stated  antecedent,  or  the  connection  of  phenomenon  with 
cause  and  law  :  i.  e.  The  principal  being  necessary  to  ac 
count  for  the  existence  of  circumstances,  its  existence  is  ci 
posteriori  proved  from  the  circumstances. 

In  calling  this  circumstantial  evidence,  however,  we 
only  give  another  name  to  the  ordinary  d  posteriori  rea 
soning. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  437 

Circumstantial  evidence,  as  a  really  distinct  kind  of 
evidence,  is  constituted  by  a  concurrence  of  circumstances. 

The  circumstantial  evidence  above  described  is  a  mere 
accumulation  of  a  posteriori  proof, — a  bringing  together 
of  many  effects,  or  consequents,  to  prove  a  common  cause, 
or  antecedent.  But  the  concurrence  of  circumstances  or 
facts  is,  in  itself,  a  new  and  peculiar  fact,  independently 
of  the  nature  of  the  facts  taken  separately.  Concurrent 
testimony  and  concurrent  circumstances  are  analogous. 
In  both  kinds,  the  proof  lies  in  the  necessity  of  account 
ing  for  the  concurrence.  It  is  a  phenomenon, — it  must 
have  a  cause. 

That  which  as  condition  or  cause  accounts  for  the  con 
currence  is  proved  by  it,  either  with  certainty,  or  with 
more  or  less  probability,  as  the  case  may  be. 

Circumstantial  evidence  possesses  the  highest  degree 
of  certainty  when  there  is  absolutely  no  other  way  of  ac 
counting  for  the  circumstances,  except  by  the  admission 
of  the  principal  in  question. 

It  possesses  the  highest  degree  of  probability  when  al 
though  it  be  possible  to  conceive  other  ways  of  accounting 
for  the  concurrence  than  the  one  adopted,  still  every  one 
of  these  is  far-fetched,  altogether  hypothetical,  and  having 
no  known  connection  with  any  existent  fact. 

Where  there  are  several  ways  of  accounting  for  the 
concurrence,  and  all  have  claims  to  probability,  we  must 
of  course  weigh  the  opposite  probabilities,  and  determine 
accordingly. 

Any  given  concurrence  of  facts  cannot  be  set  aside,  as 
of  no  weight,  except  by  accounting  for  each  fact  separ 
ately,  in  its  time,  place,  and  relations,  so  as  to  make  the 
concurrence  appear  altogether  fortuitous. 

Reasoning  from  facts,  merely,  and  reasoning  from  a 


438  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

concurrence  of  facts,  since  they  may  both  appear  in  the 
same  case,  and  in  relation  to  the  same  facts,  are  apt  to  be 
confounded.  It  need  hardly  be  remarked  that  it  is  of  the 
utmost  importance  to  discriminate  between  them,  and  to 
present  them  each  on  its  own  independent  basis. 

The  evidence  admitted  in  a  court  of  justice  to  prove 
the  guilt  of  a  prisoner,  must  be  positive,  or  at  least 
morally  certain.  Circumstantial  evidence,  therefore,  re 
garded  either  as  a  collection  of  facts,  or  as  a  concurrence 
of  facts,  can  be  admitted  as  decisive,  only  where  the  guilt 
of  the  prisoner  can  be  taken  as  the  only  way  of  accounting 
for  the  facts,  or  the  concurrence  of  facts  :  i.  e.  It  is  not 
enough  that  it  is  the  most  probable  way  of  accounting  for 
them, — it  must  be  the  only  probable  way. 

Where  the  rights  of  two  parties  are  opposed,  so  that  a 
determination  necessarily  involves  loss' to  one  or  the  other, 
as  in  a  question  respecting  the  title  of  an  estate,  the  de 
termination  must,  of  course,  be  made  according  to  the  re 
sult  of  a  comparison  of  probabilities,  if  no  positive  evidence 
can  be  obtained. 

In  concurrent  testimony,  we  have  a  number  of  wit 
nesses  coming  together,  without  previous  concert,  and  sup 
porting  each  other's  evidence.  In  concurrent  circumstan 
ces,  we  have  a  number  of  circumstances  coming  together 
without  any  previous  contrivance,  and  supporting  each 
other  in  relation  to  a  principal. 

If  the  testimony  be  true,  then  this  concurrence  is  what 
we  might  have  expected.  If  this  principal  exist,  then  the 
concurrence  of  circumstances  is  what  we  might  have  ex 
pected. 

In  addition  to  this,  we  have  assumed  that  unless  the 
concurrence  of  facts  can  be  proved  to  be  fortuitous,  by 
showing  how  each  fact  came  to  happen  in  that  precise 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  439 

time,  place,  and  relation,  without  requiring  any  connection 
between  the  several  facts  ;  and  that  unless  the  concurrent 
testimony  be  accounted  for  in  the  motives  of  each  witness 
separately,  so  as  not  to  require  the  truth  of  their  common 
statement  ;  and,  we  may  add,  unless  it  can  be  shown  to 
be  fortuitous,  as  in  the  case  of  concurrent  circumstances, 
we  are  compelled  to  admit  that  antecedent  or  cause  which 
most  clearly  accounts  for  the  concurrence.  But  there  is 
an  objection  made  to  this  which  requires  attention,  and 
may  compel  us  to  prove  our  assumption. 

It  is  as  follows  : 

"Any  given  phenomena  brought  into  juxtaposition 
must  of  necessity  assume  some  order  of  arrangement.  But 
against  any  particular  order  there  are  chances  indefinitely 
great  in  number  ;  and  as  the  phenomena  must  come  into 
some  order,  it  is  plain  they  may  come  into  one  order  as 
well  as  into  another ;  and  hence  they  may  as  well  conie 
into  that  regular  and  connected  order  which  we  call  con 
currence,  as  into  one  of  utter  confusion  and  want  of  con 
nection/'  Says  the  objector,  therefore,  "What  right  have 
you  to  assume  this  concurrence  as  proof  of  the  principal  to 
which  the  facts  seem  to  relate  ?  I  have  an  equal  right  to 
assume  the  fortuity  of  the  concurrence." 

We  have  here,  then,  two  assumptions  directly  opposed ; 
but  one  or  the  other  must  fall ;  both  cannot  be  true. 
Which  shall  stand  ?  The  objector  may  say,  "  Please 
support  your  assumption."  We  may  rejoin,  Please  to 
support  yours.  Now,  we  may  both  make  the  attempt, 
and  may  both  fail  in  positively  settling  the  question. 
After  all  our  discussions,  there  may  appear  something 
plausible  on  both  sides.  In  this  case,  he  who  can  adduce 
the  greatest  number  of  probabilities  for  his  assumption, 
must  win  the  argument.  In  supporting  our  assumption, 


440  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

we  urge  the  fact,  that  at  least  in  the  great  majority  of 
cases  where  there  is  concurrence,  there  is  some  cause  di 
rectly  and  clearly  producing  it  ;  e.  g.  Of  all  the  books 
ever  made,  we  do  not  find  that  any  were  made  by  a  for 
tuitous  concurrence  of  the  letters  ;  of  all  the  instruments 
and  machines  that  have  ever  been  constructed,  we  do  not 
find  any  that  were  constructed  by  the  fortuitous  occur 
rence  of  the  materials  ;  and  as  to  the  phenomena  of  na 
ture,  we  find,  as  our  knowledge  of  natural  philosophy  and 
chemistry  is  extended,  that  laws  are  brought  to  light 
which  explain  them  in  all  their  multifariousness,  and 
leave  us  little  or  no  place  of  appealing  to  fortuitous  com 
bination  ?  As,  then,  we  produce  the  greater  number  of 
instances  of  this  kind,  we  claim  the  greater  number  of 
probabilities  for  our  assumption.  Indeed,  tne  candid  ob 
jector  must  be  constrained  to  admit  that  he  finds  it  very 
difficult  to  bring  a  single  instance  where  fortuitous  com 
bination  explains  concurrence  and  regularity. 

This  reasoning  goes  to  show  that  a  concurrence  must 
always  have  the  balance  of  probabilities  in  its  favor,  as 
connected  with  some  principal  which  unites  the  facts  in 
the  concurrence  in  opposition  to  the  assumption  of  a  for 
tuitous  concurrence. 

But  here  another  question  may  arise  :  Whether  rea 
soning  from  concurrence  can  ever  possess  the  highest  de 
gree  of  certainty  of  any  kind,  as  we  have  appeared  in  the 
preceding  pages  to  take  for  granted,  where  we  say,  "  this 
evidence  possesses  the  highest  degree  of  certainty  when 
there  is  absolutely  no  other  way  of  accounting  for  the  con 
currence  except  by  the  admission  of  the  principal  in  ques 
tion/'  inasmuch  as  in  every  case  there  is  a  possibility  of 
fortuitous  concurrence  ?  This  is  a  serious  question,  and 
involves  the  possibility,  although  not  the  probability,  of 


THE   DOCTRINE    OF   EVIDENCE.  441 

every  concurrence  whatever, — even  the  creation  of  the 
world  being  fortuitous.  We  may  indeed  comfort  our 
selves  with  the  overwhelming  probability  that  the  world 
is  the  work  of  design ;  but  still  are  we  prepared  to 
grant  the  possibility,  however  remote,  of  a  fortuitous 
creation  ? 

We  are  not  prepared  to  grant  this.  We  think  we  can 
prove  the  impossibility  of  fortuitous  concurrence,  as  well 
as  explain  those  cases  which  appear  to  be  such. 

In  the  first  place,  the  axioms  "  Every  phenomenon 
must  have  a  cause,"  and  "  Every  phenomenon  must  have 
a  law/'  cannot  be  set  aside.  These  are  necessary  princi 
ples  of  the  reason.  But  concurrence  is  a  phenomenon, 
and,  therefore,  must  have  a  cause  and  a  law.  Now  if  by 
fortuity  we  mean  to  negate  cause  and  law,  then  fortuity 
is  impossible  in  concurrence  :  and  thus  the  question  is 
settled  at  once.  In  the  second  place,  those  concurrences 
which  appear  fortuitous  are  not  really  so  ;  e.  g.  a  cast  of 
dice  :  The  dice  have  a  certain  position  before  they  are 
cast  ;  a  certain  degree  of  projectile  force  is  given  them, 
and  the  result  is  a  certain  concurrence  of  sides.  Now  in 
this  case  there  are  causes  definite  and  regular  ;  but  be 
cause  we  are  unable  to  determine  them  with  precision,  we 
call  the  result  fortuitous.  All  cases  of  apparent  fortuity 
may  be  resolved  in  the  same  way.  There  are  causes,  and 
they  work  regularly  according  to  their  nature,  but  we  can 
not  penetrate  their  action.  In  any  case  of  concurrence, 
therefore,  the  question  is  not,  as  we  have  above  allowed, 
out  of  courtesy,  to  the  objector,  between  the  assumption 
of  cause  and  no  cause  ;  but  whether  a  certain  antecedent 
accounts  for  the  concurrence,  or  whether  it  is  to  be  ac 
counted  for  by  some  other. 

Now,  from  our  knowledge  of  antecedents  and  concur- 

19* 


442  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

rences,  there  are  some  concurrences  which  we  do  generally 
attribute  to  certain  antecedents,  because  generally  con 
nected  with  them  ;  e.  g.  The  print  of  a  man's  foot  in  the 
sand.  This  we  should  naturally  attribute  to  the  pressure 
of  an  actual  foot  ;  but  still,  it  is  possible  that  it  might  have 
been  produced  by  the  action  of  the  waves.  If  produced  by 
the  action  of  the  waves,  it  has  its  definite  cause,  and  is  not 
fortuitous  ;  but  it  has  in  this  case  an  unusual  antecedent. 
On  an  inhabited  coast,  we  should  affirm  at  once  that  the 
probabilities  greatly  preponderate  in  favor  of  a  man's  foot 
as  the  cause  ;  but  a  man  in  the  situation  of  Robinson  Crusoe, 
finding  such  a  print  upon  the  sea-shore,  might  be  in  doubt. 
Now  the  only  case  where  concurrence  would  afford  the 
highest  certainty,  is,  as  we  have  above  affirmed,  one  in 
which  there  is  but  one  way  of  accounting  for  the  fact — not 
in  opposition  to  fortuity,  but  in  negation  of  the  possibility 
of  other  causes. 


THE   DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  443 


SECTION  VII. 

ARGUMENT    FROM   PROGRESSIVE    APPROACH. 

THIS  belongs  to  the  cl  posteriori  form  of  proof,  because  we  v 
ascend  from  facts  to  a  law.  If,  however,  the  facts  of  the 
progressive  approach,  introduced  on  the  principle  of  cau 
sality,  are  the  only  elements  of  the  proof,  then  we  have  an 
ordinary  case  of  induction  ;  e.  g.  We  put  a  ball  in  motion 
on  a  rough  surface,  and  its  motion  soon  ceases  ;  we  put  it 
in  motion  on  a  smoother  surface,  and  the  motion  is  pro 
portionally  prolonged  ;  and  we  find  generally,  that  the 
time  of  the  motion  is  inversely  as  the  resistance.  Hence 
we  infer  that  if  all  resistance  were  removed,  there  would 
be  no  change  in  the  motion  ;  i.  e.  From  the  uniformity  of 
a  given  number  of  facts,  we  infer  an  universal  uniformity  - 
of  facts. 

But  are  we  certain,  on  the  mere  induction,  that  we 
may  not  in  actual  experiment  arrive  at  a  point  where  the 
phenomena  shall  be  reversed?  where  the  resistance, 
after  having  been  reduced  to  a  degree  lower  than  has  ever 
yet  been  attained,  shall  suddenly  be  greatly  augmented  ? 
Recollect  we  are  merely  deducing  from  known  facts  ;  and 
the  uniformity  of  nature  on  which  we  base  our  conclusion 
respecting  the  unknown,  is  a  uniformity  which  relates  to 
law  in  general,  and  not  merely  to  the  particular  law  which 
we  assume.  There  may,  therefore,  be  a  change  in  the 
facts  in  the  extended  experiment,  which  shall  require  them 


444  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

all  to  be  reduced  under  another  law  in  view  of  higher 
points  of  uniformity.  The  suns  which  we  before  deemed 
uniform,  as  fixed  centres,  may  be  found  uniform  as  re 
volving  about  some  higher  and  common  centre. 

The  argument  from  progressive  approach,  therefore, 
would  not  in  itself  absolutely  establish  the  vis  inertice  of 
bodies  ;  although  it  might  afford  a  high  degree  of  proba 
bility.  * 

An  argument  has  been  drawn  in  favor  of  Christianity, 
from  the  fact  that  in  proportion  as  nations  are  enlightened, 
their  religious  views  approximate  towards  Christianity. 
The  argument  in  this  case  differs  widely  from  the  preced 
ing,  in  respect  to  its  subject,  and  is  conclusive.  The 
cause  or  principle  here  is  the  human  Keason.  Now,  we 
conceive  of  this  as  uniform  and  continuous  in  its  action ; 
i.  e.  as  having  fixed  laws  of  action,  and  as  inherently 
active.  Let  it  go  into  action,  therefore,  and  it  will  act 
in  the  direction  of  these  laws,  and  continue  to  act,  unless 
counteracting  and  modifying  causes  are  brought  in. 
Hence,  as  the  Keason  is  the  faculty  of  perceiving  truth, 
if  we  remove  all  obstructions,  and  give  it  its  full  play  and 
development,  its  perceptions  must  be  taken  as  truth. 
That  religion,  therefore,  which  the  Reason  adopts,  when 
thus  developed  and  unobstructed,  must  be  the  true 
religion.  And  so  also  we  must  conclude  that  those  per 
ceptions  which  follow  the  progressive  development  of 
Eeason,  must  be  perceptions  approximating  proportionally 
towards  truth.  Now,  if  it  can  be  shown  from  the  history 
of  human  opinions — the  history  of  philosophy,  that  these 
opinions  have  approximated  regularly  towards  Christianity 
with  the  progressive  development  of  the  Eeason,  then  we 

*  Supra,  p.  231. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  445 

have  in  this  progressive  approach  the  highest  internal 
evidence  of  the  truth  of  Christianity.  And  the  evidence 
in  this  case  is  not  a  mere  induction  of  facts,  whose  uni 
formity  enables  us,  on  probable  grounds,  to  proclaim  a 
general  fact ;  but  that  of  a  principle  regularly  developing 
itself,  and  hastening  on  to  its  certain  issue.  In  this  argu 
ment  for  Christianity,  we  first  lay  down  the  necessary 
criterion  of  a  true  religion,  viz.  its  correspondence  with 
the  Reason  truly  and  fully  developed ;  and,  as  resulting 
from  this,  the  progressive  concentration  of  the  human 
mind  upon  certain  opinions,  in  proportion  to  its  develop 
ment.  This  forms  our  major  premiss.  Then,  by  histori 
cal  evidence,  and  the  evidence  derived  from  philosophical 
criticism,  we  establish  the  fact  that  Christianity  is  the 
point  .upon  which  the  human  mind,  in  its  progressive 
development,  thus  concentrates.  This  forms  our  minor 
premiss.  The  conclusion  is  then  inevitable. 


446  THE   DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 


SECTION  VIII. 

PROVING     BY     EXAMPLE. 

THE  point  to  be  proved  is  either  a  principle  or  a  particu 
lar  fact.  If  a  principle,  then  the  facts  which  go  to  estab 
lish  it.,  are  inducted,  and  this  is  nothing  more  than  induc 
tion,  employed  in  the  order  of  proof. 

If  a  particular  fact,  then  the  establishment  of  a 
principle,  although  not  appearing  in  the  statement,  really 
intervenes  in  the  mental  process,  and  forms  the  ground  of 
the  conclusion,  in  reference  to  the  particular  fact.  In 
both  cases,  the  establishment  of  the  general  principle  is 
the  cardinal  part  of  the  proof.  It  may  therefore  be 
termed  more  appropriately, — proving  by  Induction.  This 
differs  from  Inductive  Investigation  only  in  the  order.  In 
Inductive  Investigation,  we  begin  with  the  facts,  and 
advance  to  the  principle.  In  Proof  by  Induction,  we  first 
lay  down  the  principle,  or  a  fact  which  reposes  upon  and 
presumes  the  principle,  and  then  we  induct  the  facts,  or 
examples,  to  prove  it. 

It  is  necessary,  however,  to  recall  in  this  connection 
an  important  distinction,  which  applies  both  to  inductive 
investigation  and  to  inductive  proof.  In  Induction,  we 
do  not  bring  together  facts  promiscuously.  We  make  a 
selection — we  bring  together  only  such  facts  as  have  some 
connection  with  each  other.  They  are  alike  either  in  form, 
time,  and  place,  or  in  their  relations.  But,  why  do  we 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  447 

bring  only  such  facts  together  as  are  alike?  I  will  answer, 
by  asking  another  question.  Why  do  we  bring  facts 
together  at  all?  Obviously,  to  understand  or  to  compre 
hend  them. 

But,  if  we  wish  merely  to  understand  them  by  gene 
ralizing  them  under  a  common  name,  then  we  must,  of 
necessity,  observe  likeness,  and,  of  course,  difference. 
And,  if  we  wish  to  comprehend  them  by  reducing  them 
under  a  law,  then  also  must  we  observe  likeness  and  differ 
ence,  because  our  idea  of  a  law,  or  cause,  comprehends 
uniformity, — and  the  uniformity  of  the  effects  must  be 
regarded  as  an  exponent  of  the  law. 

When,  therefore,  we  are  seeking  for  a  law  by  Induc 
tion,  in  the  order  of  investigation,  or  when  we  are  proving 
by  induction  a  law  already  laid  down,  we  follow  those 
connections  of  the  facts  which  presume  a  law. 

Now,  in  inductive  investigation,  we  do  not  always 
succeed  in  finding  the  law.  We  are  often  compelled,  at 
least  for  a  time,  to  stop  short  with  a  mere  generalization 
under  a  common  name,  and  the  announcement  of  a  theory. 
The  generalization  and  the  theory  aid  our  farther  inves 
tigations,  and  may  enable  us,  eventually,  to  find  the  law ; 
but  in  them  we  have  not  arrived  at  certainty. 

So  also  in  the  order  of  proof.  The  point  to  be  proved 
may  not  be  a  law,  at  the  conception  of  which  we  may  not 
yet  have  arrived,  but  merely  a  general  uniformity,  or  a 
theory.  The  facts  which  we  bring  together  are  of  course 
limited,  since  induction,  from  its  very  nature,  is  never 
complete.  We  are  compelled,  therefore,  to  infer  the  uni 
versal  from  the  limited.  This  is  illogical.  The  inference 
must  therefore  be  contingent.  It  may  or  may  not  be. 
We  apply,  next,  to  the  inference,  the  laws  of  probability. 
What  reason  have  we,  in  any  given  case,  to  infer  an 


448  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

universal  uniformity  from  a  limited  observation, — e.  g. 
from  the  fact  that  the  sun  has  risen,  at  regular  intervals, 
for  five  thousand  years,  what  reason  have  we  to  infer  that 
he  will  always  rise  at  the  same  intervals,  supposing,  of 
course,  that  we  have  as  yet  ascertained  no  law  of  the 
planetary  movements  ?  It  is  because  we  feel  assured 
that  the  uniformity  of  the  facts  is  the  exponent  of  some 
law,  although  the  law  be  concealed  ;  and  upon  the  author 
ity  of  law,  uniform  and  continuous,  do  we  infer  the  uni 
versal  from  the  limited.  The  particular  and  limited  facts 
are  a  condition  on  which  a  law  is  conceived  of,  and  then 
the  inference  is  imbued  with  the  whole  energy,  and 
stretched  to  the  whole  compass  of  law.  But,  if  the  infer 
ence  thus  rests  upon  the  conception  of  some  law,  why  is 
it  not  always  characterized  by  certainty  1 

When  the  conception  is  not  merely  of  some  law,  but 
arrives  at  a  particular  and  certain  law,  then  the  inference 
is  certain, — e.  g.  when  the  law  of  the  planetary  move 
ments  is  ascertained,  then  we  are  physically  certain  that 
the  sun  will  continue  to  rise  at  the  same  intervals.  But, 
until  we  have  ascertained  the  particular  law,  although  we 
know  from  the  uniformity  there  must  be  a  law,  and 
although  we  may  form  a  shrewd  theory,  we  cannot  be 
certain  but  that  the  uniformity  observed  is  only  a  part  of 
some  other  and  higher  uniformity,  where  the  law  really 
resides,  and  that  this  higher  uniformity,  in  its  wider  cycle, 
presents  the  particular  uniformity  which  we  have  observed 
as  only  one  of  a  long  succession  where  the  facts  are  uni 
form  under  one  characteristic  for  a  certain  period,  and 
then  change  and  become  uniform  under  another  character 
istic,  and  so  on,  throughout  the  whole  succession  ;  all  the 
different  uniformities  being  held  together  by  the  law 
which  penetrates  and  concentrates  all. — e.  g.  Let  an  Intelli- 


THE   DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  449 

gence,  whose  existence  numbers  only  a  few  days,  like  the 
butterfly  of  the  opening  summer,  have  the  term  of  his 
being  in  those  beautiful  months  :  from  the  regular  succes 
sion  of  sunshine  and  soft  showers  which  he  observes,  he 
concludes  there  must  be  some  law  ;  and  taking  the  ob 
served  uniformity  as  the  exponent  of  that  law,  he  concludes 
that  the  whole  succession  of  climate  is  made  up  of  sun 
shine  and  soft  showers.  While  as  yet  he  knows  no  par 
ticular  and  certain  law  of  the  planetary  movements,  he 
knows  not  that  the  uniformity  which  he  observes  is  only 
one  of  a  series  of  uniformities,  under  different  character 
istics,  making  up  the  cycle  of  the  seasons :  but  let  him 
ascertain  the  law,  and  then  he  at  once  passes  beyond  the 
narrow  sphere  of  his  inductions,  and  comprehends  the 
whole  succession. 

So  also,  had  we  not  ascertained  the  law  of  the  plane 
tary  movements,  our  own  observation,  as  well  as  the  ob 
servation  of  five  thousand  years,  could  not  enable  us 
certainly  to  conclude  respecting  the  future  movements, 
inasmuch  as  the  whole  five  thousand  years  might  be  only 
one  of  a  succession  of  uniformities,  under  different  cha 
racteristics,  and  attached  to  a  higher  system. 

You  now  clearly  perceive  the  distinction  at  which  we 
aim.  The  distinction  between  reasoning  upon  the  basis 
of  a  law,  or  upon  the  basis  of  a  mere  uniformity. 

In  the  first,  we  infer,  or  we  prove,  with  certainty.  In 
the  second,  our  basis  is  also  some  law,  but  a  law  unknown, 
and  only  theorised,  and  therefore  our  conclusions  are  only 
probable. 

This  is  a  general  statement.  There  are  apparent  ex 
ceptions  ;  where  a  limited  observation  of  uniformity  seems 
to  enable  us  to  conclude  with  certainty  to  the  future  and 
universal  uniformity.  Indeed,  there  are  cases  where, 


450 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 


upon  a  single  observation,  we  thus  conclude  :  e.  g.  the 
fusibility  of  a  substance ;  the  combination  of  substances 
by  elective  affinity. 

Upon  such  cases  we  remark  : 

1.  The  observation,  although  limited  in  the  particular 
case,  is  supported  by  more  extended  observations  in  simi 
lar  or  analogous  cases. 

2.  The  cases  are  of  such  a  character  that  all  the  possi 
ble  circumstances  and  relations  that  can  be  of  any  weight, 
are  embraced  in  the  observation,  though  limited  both  as 
to  time  and  space. 

3.  The  cases  in  which  a  succession  of  uniformities  is 
conceivable,  and  in  which  therefore  certainty  is  attainable 
only  by  the  discovery  of  a  law,  are  cases  where  we  take 
into  consideration  not  the  specific  natures  or  powers,  and 
susceptibilities  of  substances,  but  general  and  extended 
relations  in  time  and  space  ;  whereas,  in  these  other  cases, 
the  specific  natures  or  powers,  and  susceptibilities  of  sub 
stances,  are  what  we  particularly  take  into  consideration. 
Take  the  elective  affinity  of  two  substances,  and  apply  to 
it  these  principles  as  an  illustration.     1.  This  is  supported 
by  observations  in  numerous  analogous  cases.     2.  All  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  of  any  weight,  are  embraced 
in  our  observation.     No  change  of  time  or  place  can  add 
to  or  take  from  the  completeness.     3.  We  are  considering 
only  the  specific  natures  of  these  substances,  in  no  gene 
ral  relation,  but  simply  in  relation  to  each  other. 


THE   DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  451 


SECTION  IX. 

REASONING   FROM    EXPERIENCE. 

I.  From  the  present  to  the  past. — This,  in  the  general 
statement,  is  called  a  posteriori.  We  wish  to  ascertain 
the  past.  We  take  the  facts  of  the  present,  and,  in  ac 
counting  for  them,  call  up  the  past.  This  presumes  that 
the  past  is  the  cause  of  the  present.  Eegarded,  how 
ever,  more  closely,  this  form  of  proof  presents  itself  as 

follows : 

^ 

1.  The   facts   of  the  present    are   accounted   for  by 
referring  them  to  causes — causes  which  are  also  present, 
and  now  acting.     But,  causes  are  inherently  energetic, 
and  are  uniform ;  hence,  since  they  existed  in  the  past, 
they  must  have  produced  effects  like  those  which  we  now 
witness.     We  thus  draw  the  facts  of  the  past  from  the 
facts  of  the  present,  not  by  assigning  the  former  as  the 
causes  of  the  latter,  but  by  referring  both  to  common 
causes,  and  then  analogically  concluding  the  past  from  the 
present. 

Thus  we  may  prove  the  physical  condition  of  the 
ancient  world ;  and,  taking  human  nature  as  a  cause,  we 
may  prove  its  moral  condition. 

2.  The  distinction  between  moral  and  physical  causes, 
and  between  moral  and  physical  certainty,  must  be  borne 
in  mind.     The  former  brings  in  the  consideration  of  free 

will,  in  connection  with  a  vast  variety  of  moral  character. 

sr 


452  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

and  therefore  gives  birth  to  a  vast  variety  of  results, 
while  the  latter  is  fixed  and  precise. 

The  physical  condition  of  the  ancient  world,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  determine  on  well  known  and  uniform  general 
principles.  But,  in  order  to  determine  the  moral  condi 
tion  with  any  precision,  we  need  data  from  history.  There 
is  indeed  a  reciprocal  action  between  history  and  general 
moral  principles,  in  reasoning :  the  latter  often  serving  to 
determine  points  of  history  otherwise  doubtful  ;  the 
former  supplying,  leading,  and  determining  facts  to  the 
latter. 

3.  Laws  have  often  a  gradual,  instead  of  an  immediate 
development.  Thus  a  law,  in  order  to  complete  its  cycle, 
may  require  ages.  This  appears  in  Geology  and  Astro 
nomy,  and  in  Politics  and  Philosophy. 

Now,  if  we  can  ascertain  that  given  and  present  facts 
are  a  part  of  such  a  development,  gradual  and  progressive, 
then  we  have  at  once  a  chain  by  which  we  can  a  posteriori 
ascend  to  the  past  as  well  as  &  priori  descend  to  the 
future. 

II.  From  the  present  to  the  future. — Our  present  ex 
perience  is  connected  with  causes.  If  these  causes  are 
known,  on  the  uniformity  of  law,  we  predict  the^  future. 

The  distinction  between  moral  and  physical  causes, 
and  between  moral  and  physical  certainty  above  referred 
to,  is  of  equal  importance  here.  On  laws  gradually 
developing,  no  additional  remarks  are  necessary.  • 

The  above  proceeds  on  the  supposition  that  we  have 
ascertained  Laws.  In  many  instances,  however,  we  may 
proceed  merely  on  an  uniformity  more  or  less  extensive. 
The  distinction  given  under  Reasoning  from  Example 
will  apply  here  also,  viz.  That  when  we  reason  upon  the 
basis  of  mere  uniformity,  generally,  our  conclusions  are 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  453 

only  probable :  but  when  we  reason  upon  the  basis  of  a 
law  clearly  ascertained,  our  conclusions  are  certain,  morally 
or  physically,  as  the  case  may  be. 

Those  instances  where  we  reason  to  a  past  and  a 
future,  uniformity  upon  a  single  experiment,  or  a  very 
limited  experience, — e.  g.  the  fusibility  of  a  substance — 
have  already  been  considered. 


454  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 


SECTION  X. 

REASONING   FROM    RESEMBLANCE    AND    ANALOGY. 

KESEMBLANCE  is  defined  as  agreement  in  certain  points, 
and  is  thus  distinguished  from  identity,  which  is  universal 
agreement,  and  excludes  difference.  Other  things  being 
equal,  the  more  numerous  the  points  of  agreement,  the 
closer  the  resemblance.  Some  points,  however,  are  more 
important  than  others.  Agreement  in  a  few  important 
points  constitutes  a  closer  likeness  than  agreement  in  a 
multitude  of  unimportant  or  trifling  points. 

Kesemblance  is  of  two  general  kinds :  First,  Eesem- 
blance  in  properties.  Secondly,  Eesemblance  in  relations. 

Now,  in  reasoning  from  resemblance,  we  must  of  course 
reason  either  from-  the  resemblance  of  properties  or  of 
relations.  The  first  is  called  reasoning  from  direct  or 
simple  resemblance.  The  second,  reasoning  from  analogy. 

In  reasoning  from  resemblance,  there  are  two  terms. 
In  reasoning  from  analogy,  there  are  three  or  four  terms, 
and  two  relations. 

I.  Direct  Eesemblance. — The  object  in  this  case  is  to 
determine  particulars  of  resemblance  unknown  to  exist, 
from  known  particulars ;  i.  e.  From  known  corresponding 
properties,  to  reason  to  others  which  are  unknown.  One 
property  in  a  subject  is  seen  to  involve  another,  either 
on  the  ground  of  uniform  sequence  or  of  law.  Hence  we 
infer  the  agreement  of  two  terms  in  properties,  which  are 


THE    DOCTKINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  455 

involved  in  those  which  are  known  to  exist.  The  reason 
ing  is  a  priori,  when  the  unknown  property  holds  to  the 
known,  the  relation  of  consequent  to  antecedent ;  and, 
vice  versa,  the  reasoning  is  d  posteriori. 

The  probability  of  the  reasoning  obviously  must  be 
determined  by  the  nature  of  the  connection  between  the 
known  and  unknown ;  if  it  be  a  connection  of  mere  stated 
uniformity,  the  reasoning  is  generally  only  probable ;  if 
it  be  a  connection  of  law,  the  reasoning  is  certain.  Caesar 
and  Buonaparte  resemble  each  other  in  certain  properties 
— ambition,  &c.  But  ambition  can  be  shown  to  involve 
the  love  of  supreme  power,  and  the  love  of  supreme  power 
involves  attempts  to  gain  the  supremacy,  if  the  time  and 
opportunity  be  auspicious :  hence,  Csesar  and  Buonaparte 
may  have  the  consequential  points  of  resemblance,  inas 
much  as  they  have  the  quality  which  involves  them. 
This  is  a  pinori;  and  the  conclusion  morally  certain. 

In  arguing  that  the  planets  are  inhabited,  from  their 
resemblance  to  this  world,  we  proceed  a  posteriori. 
From  like  provisions  for  social  existence,  we  infer  social 
existence.  We  argue  here  to  the  motive  or  design.  This 
likewise  is  morally  certain. 

II.  Indirect  Resemblance  or  Analogy. 

1.  Where  there  are  two  terms  related  to  a  common 
third,  we  may  call  the  two  relations  a  common  relation, 
inasmuch  as  the  common  third  is  a  cause  of  both,  or  at 
least  a  uniform  antecedent  of  both.  In  this  case,  when 
the  analogy  is  granted,  and  we  reason  from  particulars  of 
one  relation,  or  of  one  member  of  the  common  relation 
to  particulars  of  the  other,  our  reasoning  is  probable  or 
certain  ;  In  the  first  place,  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
connection  between  the  common  third  and  the  two 
related  terms  :  if  it  be  only  a  connection  of  uniform 


456  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

sequents,  the  reasoning  is  generally  only  probable ;  if  of 
Law,  the  reasoning  is  certain. 

The  reasoning  is  probable  or  certain  in  the  second 
place,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  particulars  from 
which  we  reason :  if  they  are  particulars  necessarily  com 
prehended  in  the  third  term,  the  reasoning  is  certain :  if 
they  be  merely  circumstantial,  the  reasoning  will  be 
probable,  according  to  the  degree  of  uniformity.  When 
the  third  term  is  merely  a  uniform  antecedent,  and  the 
particulars  of  the  relation  likewise  only  circumstantial, 
with  more  or  less  of  uniformity,  we  shall  have  the  case  of 
a  probability  of  a  probability. 

When  the  analogy  is  to  be  proved  from  the  resembling 
particulars,  we  have  substantially  a  case  of  simple  a 
posteriori  reasoning.  Each  set  of  particulars  is  shown  to 
demand  the  common  third  as  an  antecedent.  The  prin 
ciples,  therefore,  which  apply  to  d  posteriori  reasoning  in 
general  will  apply  to  this  case. 

2.  Where  there  are  four  terms  and  two  distinct,  but 
resembling  relations. 

What  constitutes  the  analogy  ?  The  resembling  rela 
tions  ?  But  this  resemblance  may  be  accidental.  It 
must  be  at  least  a  uniform  resemblance,  therefore,  that 
constitutes  the  analogy.  The  particulars  in  one  relation 
must  uniformly  resemble  the  particulars  in  the  other 
relation.  But  this  uniformity  is  an  exponent  of  some 
law.  Whatever  conclusion  is  drawn,  therefore,  must  rest 
upon  this  law  as  certainly  ascertained,  or  as  existing  only 
in  theory,  and  accordingly  will  be  a  conclusion  certain  or 
probable. 

Now,  this  law  must  comprehend  both  relations,  because 
it  explains  the  uniformity  of  the  resemblance  between 
the  two  relations.  But  are  not  these  relations  themselves 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  457 

relations  of  antecedent  and  consequent,  as  respects  the 
two  terms  respectively,  comprehended  by  some  higher  and 
common  term  ?  It  is  even  so.  The  two  terms  on  either 
side  of  the  analogy  are  related  as  antecedent  and  conse 
quent  ;  and  then  their  relations  exhibit  resemblances 
which  must  be  referred  to  a  higher  law  comprehending 
and  penetrating  both ;  e.  g.  The  seed  of  a  plant,  and  the 
egg  of  a  fowl.  The  plant  is  in  some  sense  the  cause  of 
the  seed — and  the  fowl  in  some  sense  the  cause  of  the 
egg.  The  two  terms  on  either  side  have  very  slight  direct 
resemblances.  And  the  two  relations  do  not  resemble 
each  other  merely  in  being  relations  of  cause  and  effect, 
for  they  resemble  a  multitude  of  relations  in  the  same 
way.  But  the  point  to  be  nicely  and  strictly  observed  is, 
that  these  two  relations  have  particulars  of  resemblance 
beyond  their  general  agreement  with  each  other,  and  with 
all  other  relations  of  cause  and  effect.  What  is  this 
agreement  ?  It  is  this.  The  egg  and  the  seed,  besides 
being  effects  the  one  of  the  fowl,  the  other  of  the  plant, 
contain  alike  the  principle,  of  generative  life.  Now,  when 
we  reason  from  one  to  the  other,  we  reason  on  the  basis  of 
this  common  principle.  Whatever  particulars  are  neces 
sarily  comprehended  in  the  action  of  this  principle,  and 
developed  as  such  on  one  side  of  the  analogy,  may  be  con 
cluded  as  likewise  existing  on  the  other  side. 

If  the  principle  be  only  in  theory,  then  the  reasoning 
cannot  advance  beyond  probability.  If  the  particulars 
have  only  a  uniform,  and  not  a  necessary  connection,  to 
our  perception,  with  the  principle,  the  reasoning  here 
likewise  is  only  probable.  If  both  the  preceding  concur 
in  a  given  case,  we  have  only  a  probability  of  a  proba 
bility. 

Not   unfrequently  in  this  kind  of  analogy  the  great 


458  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

object  of  the  reasoning  is  to  establish  the  analogy  itself ; 
i  e.,  Four  terms  being  given,  and  two  terms  respectively 
being  related  each  to  each,  constituting  two  relations,  the 
object  of  the  reasoning  is  to  bring  these  relations  under  a 
common  principle.  This  may  be  done  d  priori,  by  show 
ing  that  a  principle  exists  which  necessarily  or  probably 
comprehends  these  relations ;  or,  d  posteriori,  by  show 
ing  that  there  are  particulars  of  resemblance  in  these 
relations  which  probably  or  certainly  require  the  principle 
to  account  for  them. 

This  analogy  thus  established,  as  we  have  before  shown, 
becomes  a  general  principle  to  these  relations  and  forms 
the  basis  of  deductions.  We  have  an  illustration  of  this 
in  an  argument  adduced  by  phrenologists. 

There  is  an  obvious  connection  between  the  governing 
and  specific  propensities  of  animals  and  their  physical 
structure  :  thus  carnivorous  animals  may  be  distinguished 
from  graminivorous — the  lion  from  the  ox. 

There  is  a  connection  likewise  between  the  intellect 
of  man  and  his  physical  structure.  His  senses  and  his 
brain  are  unquestionably  connected  with  the  development 
of  his  intellect. 

Now  the  object  of  the  reasoning  is  to  establish  an 
analogy ;  i.  e.,  That  the  relations  on  either  side  are  com 
prehended  by  the  same  principle  or  law.  This,  if  estab 
lished  at  all,  must  be  established  either  d  priori  or  d  pos 
teriori.  If  d  priori,  then  we  must  find  some  principle  or 
law  actually  existing  which  comprehends  these  relations 
necessarily,  or  at  least  probably.  Is  there  any  such  prin 
ciple  ?  They  are  bound  to  show  it.  1  cannot  perceive 
any.  If  d  posteriori,  then  we  must  find  such  particulars 
of  resemblance  in  the  two  relations  as  demand  necessarily, 
or  at  least  probably,  a  common  principle  to  account  for 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  459 

them.  Are  there  such  particulars  of  resemblance  ?  Let 
us  see.  In  the  first  relation  ;  i.  e.,  between  the  animal 
propensities  and  physical  structure,  we  perceive  that  the 
propensities  have  reference  to  ends  which  can  be  accom 
plished  only  by  a  physical  structure  directly  adapted  to 
them.  The  thirst  for  blood  demands  the  teeth  and  paws 
of  the  lion  and  tiger  ;  palpably  the  nature  cannot  be  com 
plete  without  these  instruments.  But  are  there  any  like 
particulars  in  the  relation  between  the  intellect  of  man 
and  his  senses,  brain  and  skull,  &c.?  The  senses  and 
brain  are  indeed  conditional  to  the  exercise  of  thought ; 
but  are  they  the  instruments  of  thought  ?  Can  it  be 
shown  that  the  senses  and  brain  are  to  the  intellect,  what 
the  teeth  and  paws  are  to  the  propensity  for  prey  ?  Can 
it  be  shown  from  any  particulars  in  this  relation,  that  any 
power  of  the  mind  requires  a  portion  of  the  brain  as  its 
instrument  for  accomplishing  its  end,  just  as  the  beast 
palpably  requires  the  strong  jaws  with  all  their  furniture, 
and  the  muscular  legs  and  paws  ! 

The  relation  between  the  intellect  and  the  brain  and 
senses,  contains  no  such  particulars  as  the  relation  between 
the  animal  propensities  and  the  instruments  which  are 
necessary  to  accomplish  their  ends.  Hence  we  cannot  infer 
that  they  come  under  the  same  law — hence  we  cannot 
reason  from  one  to  the  other. 

A  beautiful  and  familiar  analogy,  and  one  which  aptly 
illustrates  analogy  consisting  of  four  terms,  is  that  between 
the  human  being  at  death  and  insect  metamorphoses. 
Here  are  the  two  relations,  of  the  human  being  to  death, 
and  of  the  caterpillar  to  its  chrysalis.  In  the  latter  case 
we  see  the  whole  process,  a  dissolution  of  the  caterpillar, 
and  the  infolded  germ  of  a  higher  being  reposing  for  a 
time  within  the  chrysalis  and  there  preparing  for  its  new 


460  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

form  of  life,  and,  when  the  hour  arrives,  bursting  from 
its  shell  a  winged  and  gorgeous  psyche,  dwelling  in  the 
sunheams  and  feeding  upon  the  aroma  of  flowers.  In 
like  manner  the  human  being  lies  down  to  die ;  but  in 
this  last  case  we  do  not  see  the  whole  process, — we  cannot 
by  the  microscope  discover  the  wings  of  the  immortal 
form  infolded  in  the  " mortal  coil;"  nor  do  we  see  the 
struggling  psyche  after  it  has  burst  its  shell.  The  analogy, 
therefore,  does  not  present  us  many  resembling  circum 
stances  in  the  two  relations  compared.  But,  nevertheless, 
there  are  some  points  very  striking.  The  death  of  the 
caterpillar  is  not  the  extinction  of  the  organific  Life 
within— that  survives.  And  yet  he  who  first  witnessed 
this  metamorphosis,  when  he  saw  the  worm  die,  and  the 
chrysalis  formed,  must  have  concluded  that  Nature  in  her 
sportive  and  beautiful  fancy  had  only  given  the  frail  and 
insignificant  creature  a  golden  tomb.  But  when  he 
looked  again,  he  saw  a  bright  and  spirit-like  creature 
struggling  into  a  nobler  life.  We  see  thus,  in  Nature,  an 
apparent  death  only  the  precursor  of  another  and  a 
hiyherform  of  life.  Now  take  the  human  being,  with  all 
his  sublime  capacities — capacities  admitting  of  indefinite 
improvement — and  with  his  actual  conceptions  of,  and 
longings  after  immortality,  and  does  it  not  seem  d  priori, 
a  fit  and  reasonable  thing  that  he  should  live  again  when 
he  appears  to  die  ?  And  if  any  should  object  to  the  con 
clusion,  that  all  the  circumstances  of  dissolution  ought 
to  lead  to  a  contrary  induction,  then  we  may  reason  from 
the  analogy  of  the  butterfly,  that  in  Nature  an  apparent 
death  is  but  the  process  through  which  a  new  and  more 
perfect  form  of  life  is  produced. 

The    use   of   the  analogy   here  is  not  to  prove  the 
doctrine  of  immortality,  but  to  answer  an  objection  to  it. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  461 

The  principle  which  comprehends  both  relations  is  that  of 
LIFE,  not  as  the  product  of  organization,  but  as  itself  the 
organific  power.  To  this  we  may  add  the  fitness  and 
harmony  of  the  Divine  design. 

The  above  exposition  of  reasoning  from  Resemblance 
and  Analogy,  suggests  the  following  rules  for  conducting 
this  reasoning  : 

First.  Be  careful  to  distinguish  between  direct  resem 
blance  and  the  resemblance  of  relations,  and  between  the 
analogy  of  three  and  that  of  four  terms. 

Secondly.  Distinguish  between  important  and  unim 
portant  resemblances.  Those  are  unimportant  which  are 
merely  accidental.  Every  degree  of  uniformity  claims  a 
corresponding  degree  of  attention,  because  uniformity  is 
an  exponent  of  law.  Those  resemblances  which  stand  di 
rectly  and  unquestionably  connected  with  law,  are  the 
most  important. 

Thirdly.  Another  rule  commonly  given  is,  not  to 
carry  out  our  comparison  of  the  terms  or  relations  to  too 
many  resemblances. 

The  resemblances  evidently  cannot  be  too  numerous 
if  they  all  be  important.  This  rule  contemplates  sub 
stantially  the  same  point  as  the  preceding.  A  comparison 
is  always  carried  out  too  far  when  it  is  carried  out  to  un 
important  points  of  resemblance. 


462  THE   DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 


SECTION  XI. 

DEMONSTRATIVE    PROOF. 

IN  noticing  the  application  of  the  Deductive  Formula,*  I 
drew  illustrations  from  Geometry.  Geometry  then  is  De 
duction.  But  it  is  Demonstrative  Proof  also.  The  prin 
ciples  are  the  same — the  process  of  reasoning  the  same. 
The  only  distinction  lies  in  the  order  of  proof  and  the  or 
der  of  investigation  already  noticed.f  He  who  first  con 
structed  Geometry  proceeded  of  necessity  according  to  the 
latter  order.  Now,  that  it  is  constructed,  the  learner  pro 
ceeds  according  to  the  former. 

Indeed,  where  we  lay  down  a  proposition,  and  then 
give  the  demonstration,  we  evidently  only  announce  before- 
hand  the  conclusion  at  which  we  are  to  arrive  ;  and  this 
we  are  enabled  to  do,  because  in  a  previous  investigation, 
this  proposition  was  found  to  be  the  conclusion  of  the  very 
chain  of  premises,  or  the  sorites,  which  we -now  call  the 
demonstration. 

Demonstrative  proof  applies  to  all  subjects  where  our 
deductions  can  be  made  from  absolute  principles. 

*  Supra,  p.  370.  t  Supra,  p.  403. 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  463 


SECTION  XII. 

CALCULATION    OF    PROBABILITIES   AND    CHANCES 

THE  calculation  of  probabilities,  is  generally  called  the 
calculation  of  chances,  but  improperly.  Let  us  try  to  dis 
tinguish  them.  I  have  already  defined  the  probable  as 
implying,  both,  that  a  certain  amount  of  proof  has  already 
been  obtained  for  a  given  proposition,  and  that  still  more 
is  required  for  complete  certainty.  The  possible,,  in  dis 
tinction  from  this,  exists  where  no  proof  has  actually  been 
obtained,  but  where  the  proposition  is  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  admit  of  proof  * 

Now,  a  proposition,  while  in  the  state  of  progressive 
proof,  shows  probabilities  on  either  hand.  It  is  here  that 
a  calculation  is  required,  viz.  :  a  calculation  of  the  oppos 
ing  probabilities,  so  as  to  determine  the  ratio  of  probabil 
ity  for  the  proposition  in  question. 

Now,  on  the  other  hand,  the  calculation  of  chances 
would  be  the  calculation  of  possibilities,  or  rather  of  pre 
sumptions  founded  upon  possibility.  We  have  shown 
above,  f  that  where  a  presumption  is  said  to  lie  in  favor 
of  any  proposition,  there  is  always  some  principle  which, 
in  reality,  determines  it.  Some  natural  right  claims  to  be 
respected  until  positive  reasons  be  given  why  it  should  be 
set  aside  ;  or  the  sanctions  of  time  and  usage  surround 


Supra,  Section  IV. 


464  THE    DOCTEINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

the  disputed  point,  and  claim  to  hold  it,  until  a  higher 
authority  be  adduced.  Now,  here  is  something  of  the 
nature  of  probability.  The  fact  that  I  am  in  possession 
of  an  estate,  is  proof  that  I  am  the  owner,  until  my  right 
is  invalidated  :  and  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  any  insti 
tution,  is  proof  in  its  favor,  until  it  be  proved  to  have  had 
its  origin  in  fraud  or  violence.  Presumption  may  there 
fore  be  called  the  lowest  degree  of  probability,  as  moral 
certainty  is  sometimes  called  the  highest  degree. 

A  calculation  of  pure  possibilities,  or  chances,  is  im 
practicable,  because  there  are  no  data.  In  pure  possibili 
ties,  all  the  terms  are  equally  improbable,  or  without 
proof,  and  hence  there  is  no  calculation  by  which  one  re 
sult  may  be  shown  to  be  more  likely  than  another.  For 
example,  in  the  cast  of  a  die  there  are  six  possibilities, 
and  yet  any  one  side  is  improbable,  for  no  reason  can  be 
assigned  why  it,  in  particular,  should  come  up  :  there  in 
deed  is  a  reason  lying  in  the  position  of  the  die,— the 
manner  in  which  it  is  thrown — giving  it  just  such  a  direc 
tion,  and  such  a  degree  of  force  ;  but  it  is  unascertainable. 
It  may  indeed  be  said  that  the  probability  in  favor  of  a 
particular  side  is  one-sixth,  because  there  are  six  sides  to 
the  die  ;  but  this  is  not  true,  since  it  is  possible  that  the 
same  side  might  come  up  successively  many  times. 

What  is  called  the  calculation  of  chances,  therefore, 
is  really  the  calculation  of  probabilities,  either  as  proba 
bilities  simply,  or  under  that  form  which  we  have  termed 
presumptions.  There  are  always  data — something  given 
upon  which  we  may  base  our  calculations.  This  is  amply 
illustrated  in  insurance  upon  life  and  property.  The  term 
of  human  life,  under  different  climates,  in  different  em 
ployments,  and,  taking  as  a  point  of  departure,  different 
ages,  has  been  made  the  subject  of  very  extensive  obser- 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  465 

vations,  by  which  data  have  been  accumulated  sufficient 
to  enable  us  to  calculate  the  probable  number  of  years 
still  remaining  to  any  individual,  so  as  to  affix  to  it  a  de 
finite  commercial  value.  The  rates  of  insurance  on  houses 
and  ships  are  determined  upon  data  acquired  in  the  same 
way.  Here  there  is  no  chance  or  mere  possibility,  but 
tangible  proof.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  results  cal 
culated,  may,  in  particular  instances,  fail  of  being  at 
tained  ;  but  this  obviously  arises  from  the  fact,  that  our 
data  are  necessarily  limited,  embracing  only  the  more  gen 
eral  and  striking  circumstances  of  the  risks  of  human  life, 
by  disease  and  accident,  and  of  houses  and  ships,  by  fire 
and  tempests.  We  have  not,  in  respect  to  these,  deter 
mined  any  absolute  law,  nor  even  any  stated  and  fixed  se 
quences,  for  then  we  should  have  certainty  ;  we  have 
only  arrived  at  certain  aggregate  sequences  and  a  com 
plexity  of  influences  and  laws,  where  we  are  liable  to  the 
introduction  of  some  new  influence  or  law  which  may 
change  the  whole  state  of  things.  And  this  is  the  reason 
why  the  process  is  called  a  calculation  of  chances,  since 
men  are  accustomed,  in  common  parlance,  to  call  that 
chance  which  happens  unexpectedly  ;  and  we  are  here 
calculating  particular  results  in  opposition  to  possible  for 
tuities.  Or,  perhaps,  a  juster  representation  is,  that  pre 
suming  an  end,  we  calculate  the  risks — in  other  words, 
the  probabilities,  that  it  will  not  take  place. 

Indeed,  there  are  just  two  orders  in  which  the  proof 
may  proceed  :  First.  We  may  consider  what  antecedents 
may  exist  in  relation  to  a  particular  consequent,  and  which 
of  them  is  most  likely  to  produce  it.  Secondly.  The  con 
sequent  may  be  one  in  whose  favor  the  presumption  lies, 
so  that  the  burden  of  proof  rests  with  him  who  would  dis- 


20* 


466  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE. 

pute  it.     In  this  case,   probabilities   are  to  be  arrayed 
against  the  consequent. 

Under  the  first  order  there  are  obviously  three  possible 
cases  : 

1.  The  several  possible  antecedents  may  not  differ  as 
to  the  probability  of  their  existence,  but  they  may  differ 
as  to  the  probability  with  which  each  one  claims  to  be  the 
actual  antecedent.     In  this  case,  the  ratio  to  be  deter 
mined  respects  the  immediate  connection  of  antecedent 
and  consequent. 

2.  The  antecedents  may  not  differ  as  to  the  probability 
of  their  actual  antecedence,  but,  as  to  the  probability  of 
their  existence.     Here  the  ratio  to  be  determined  respects 
the  antecedents  themselves,  and  not  their  connection  with 
the  consequent. 

3.  The  antecedents  may  differ  in  both  respects.     In 
this  case,  the  ratio  of  the  probabilities  will  be  as  the  pro 
duct  of  the  probabilities  of  the  existence,  and  of  the  ac 
tual  antecedence  of  the  one,  to  the  products  of  the  same 
probabilities  of  the  other  ;  i.  e.  the  ratio  of  a  probability 
of  a  probability  to  a  probability  of  a  probability  :  e.  g.  sup 
pose  the  probabilities  of  existence  be  as  5  :  6,  and  the  pro 
babilities  of  actual  antecedence  as  3  :  4,  then  the  resultant 
probability  will  be  as  5  :  8. 

Under  the  second  order,  the  same  cases  must  occur. 
This  is  the  order  of  proof  in  insurances.  The  presumption 
is  always  in  favor  of  life  and  property  ;  for  the  propaga 
tion  and  sustentation  of  human  beings,  and  the  accumu 
lation  and  preservation  of  property,  is  the  fixed  and  pre 
dominant  order  of  things.  He  who  insures  them,  can  lose 
only  by  their  being  lost.  He  therefore,  under  the  given 
circumstances,  must  calculate  the  probabilities,  that  ante 
cedents  exist  which  may  occasion  this  loss  ;  and  if  this  be 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EVIDENCE.  467 

granted,  or  rendered  probable,  then  he  must  calculate  the 
ratio  of  the  probabilities  of  the  several  antecedents. 

There  are  cases  which  appear  at  first  entirely  fortu 
itous,  but  which  afterwards  are  invested  with  probability, 
through  data  acquired  by  sheer  empiricism  :  e.  cj.  nothing 
appears  more  fortuitous  than  the  casting  of  a  particular 
side  of  a  die  ;  and  yet,  by  casting  the  die  a  great  many 
times,  it  has  been  found  that  a  particular  side  returns  with 
a  considerable  degree  of  exactness,  according  to  a  certain 
ratio. 

We  have  not  attempted,  in  this  place,  any  thing  like 
a  full  explanation  of  the  calculation  of  probabilities  ;  for 
this  would  lead  us  into  the  domain  of  Mathematics.  We 
have  only  aimed  to  state  the  leading  principles  as  they 
stand  connected  with  the  Doctrine  of  Evidence. 


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